Churchland’s Eliminative Materialism and Autism
Chienchih Chi (Graduate Student)
Department of Philosophy
State University of New York at Buffalo
cchi@buffalo.edu
12 Holly Lane, Apt.3
Tonawanda, NY 14150
Abstract
Not all mental phenomena can be described from the third-person viewpoint. Some qualities
of the mind seem irreducible to the physical world. Churchland argues that those irreducible
qualities are in fact nonexistent. We are misled to believe in their existence by following folk
psychology. Since folk psychology is deeply entrenched in our language, after learning
language, we develop a folk psychological viewpoint to explain mental activities. If we reject
folk psychology, the problem of irreducibility will disappear. Churchland claims that folk
psychology is a false theory and those intentional terms in folk psychology refer to nothing.
They are nothing but misleading concepts. Therefore, we should reject it.
Following Churchland’s view, since folk psychology is deeply entrenched in our
language, when we learn language, we learn folk psychology, and when we learn folk
psychology, we understand the meanings of folk psychological terms. However, this is not the
case. Some children with autism learn language well but still fail to understand folk
psychological terms. This fact shows that folk psychological terms (or intentional terms) are
not completely misleading concepts.
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People believe that mental phenomena are generated from brain processes or physical
processes, but we fail to give mental phenomena an explanation in terms of physical concepts.
This is so called the problem of irreducibility. Searle says,
Suppose we tried to reduce the subjective, conscious, first-person sensation of pain to
the objective, third-person patterns of neuron firings. Suppose we tried to say the
pain is really "nothing but" the patterns of neuron firings. Well, if we tried such an
ontological reduction, the essential features of the pain would be left out (Searle
1992, p.117).
Let’s suppose that we try to reduce the experience of pain to a third-person event X and then
we will say that the pain is nothing but X. In this situation, no matter what the X is, something
is left out, because X is a third-person event and it is impossible for us to get any sense of
first-person experience from the third-person event. It seems that we cannot use the
third-person viewpoint to explain the first-person experience completely. Here, Searle points
out that some qualities of the mind are (ontologically) irreducible to the physical world.
Churchland’s Approach for the Problem of Irreducibility
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There are several approaches to resolving this problem of irreducibility. One of the
approaches is to deny the existence of the phenomenal quality of the mind (or consciousness).
Churchland claims that those intentional terms (such as “belief”, “desire”) refer to nothing
real in the world. Thus, the problem of irreducibility is not really a problem (Churchland 1981,
1984).
Chalmers disagrees with Churchland's view and says that in developing an account of
consciousness, the first and most important thing is to take consciousness seriously; the
easiest way to develop a theory of consciousness is to deny its existence (Chalmers 1996).
The reason for Chalmers to hold this view is that there is nothing we know about more
directly than consciousness (Chalmers 1995). Chalmers appeals to intuition to argue that we
cannot deny the existence of consciousness. This opinion is in fact not very useful to refute
Churchland’s argument, because Churchland can explain why we have this kind of intuition
by explaining that human beings have been deeply misled by the common-sense language
framework for thousands of years (Churchland 1984) and intuition is not absolutely reliable.
For example, our intuition of space and time does not fit the theory of relativity and
sometimes people may have very clear dreams or illusions that are not real. This is also one of
the declarations Churchland makes. He says that, given that folk psychology is an empirical
theory, it is at least an abstract possibility that its principles are radically false and that its
ontology is an illusion (Churchland 1981). Churchland may somewhat agree with Chalmers's
opinion that there is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but he can still
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argue that this direct knowledge could be made by an illusion which is caused by a false
theory (folk psychology). Searle refuses this kind of explanation by saying,
We cannot perform eliminative reduction on consciousness because the pattern of
eliminative reductions is to show that the phenomenon reduced is just an illusion.
But where consciousness is concerned, the existence of the "illusion" is the reality
itself (Searle 1998, p.56).
Why is the existence of the illusion the reality itself? Searle explains that the intuition of our
own consciousness is not refutable. The refutable intuitions require a distinction between how
things seem to me and how they really are, a distinction between appearance and reality. But
where the existence of conscious states is concerned, you cannot make the distinction between
appearance and reality because the existence of the appearance is the reality in question
(Searle 1997).
If Churchland thinks that the phenomenon of consciousness is an illusion, then
Churchland cannot reject the existence of the conscious phenomenon because (as Searle says)
the existence of the illusion is the reality itself. But Churchland could mean something
different from the literal meaning of illusion. He can use the term “illusion” just as a sort of
metaphor, not literally a "real" illusion. From Churchland's view, even the term “illusion” (it
may be also a folk psychological term) may refer to nothing. People may use “illusion” to
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mean a real vision that does not exist in the real world, but Churchland can use it in a
metaphorical way. The meaning of illusion may be “ideas or thoughts of folk psychological
terms referring to nothing.” In this meaning Churchland may not encounter the problem
Searle presents. Churchland does not really deny the existence of mental phenomena (or
“inner activities” in his preferred use), but what he really denies is folk psychology. He thinks
we use a false theory (folk psychology) to explain mental phenomena and that theory has been
misleading us deeply. We need to reject this theory and find another one (he recommends
neuroscience) to replace it (Churchland 1984). After we successfully replace folk psychology
by neuroscience, we will have a more powerful explanation to our inner activities, and then
we will not use folk psychological terms any more. There will be nothing like belief, desire,
pain, etc…, rather, all experience will be described in neuroscientific language (e.g. the #1547
neuron group fires a Y-10 pattern). Churchland’s argument can be simplified as follows:
(1) Folk psychology is a theory.
(2) Folk psychology is a false theory.
(3) Folk psychology systematically misleads our conception about our inner activities.
Since the whole theoretical system is a mistake, we need a completely different
theory to replace it.
(4) Neuroscience can explain human behavior well.
Therefore, folk psychology should be eliminated and replaced by neuroscience.
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There are different ways to refute this argument. We might argue that folk psychology is in
fact not a theory. If it is really a theory, we can argue that it is not a false theory. However,
no matter how we try to argue, we are in a dangerous situation, because we use the folk
psychological cognitive framework and its terms for discussion. Churchland claims that
this cognitive structure is deeply entrenched in our language (Churchland 1984). Thus,
when we use language, we fall into this cognitive structure. This potential argument can be
expressed as follows:
(A) Since folk psychology is rooted in our language, when we use language to argue
that the references of the folk psychological terms (such as belief and desire) exist,
we commit a fallacy because we have presupposed their existence.
In order to deny this argument (A), we cannot use our language to prove that belief or desire
exists; if we do, we commit a fallacy. We can only try to find other evidence, without
language to prove their existence. This argument also implies that belief or desire is nothing
but a term -- a misleading term or concept. Thus, if there is a person who does not learn any
human language, then he will have no belief or desire (or cannot understand what belief or
desire is). Let’s make a thought experiment. There is one man, who does not learn human
language, living on an island alone. If he has no beliefs and desires, can he survive?
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Absolutely the answer is no. If he has no desire, he does not want to eat and if he has no belief,
he does not believe he would die without eating. Thus, he will absolutely die in a short period
of time. But if he can really survive, can we say that he has beliefs and desires? Normally we
will say yes. But, there is a problem in our attributing beliefs and desires to him in order to
explain his behavior (his surviving). It does not imply that he really has beliefs or desires. He
cannot tell us he really has them, because he cannot use language to do so. The beliefs or
desires in this thought experiment are from our explanations, not really from his inner
activities. If we have mistakenly used folk psychology to explain people’s behavior, we may
also mistakenly attribute beliefs or desires to him to explain his behavior. Thus, we cannot
prove the existence of belief or desire this way. But, if we teach him language later and then
ask him to recall his life before he learned language, he may tell us, “Yes! I did have beliefs
and desires before I learned language.” Even if he really says so, it is still useless, because if
folk psychology is a misleading cognitive structure to explain human behavior, then, in this
case, we teach him a false cognitive structure and ask him to use this cognitive structure to
explain his behavior. In this situation, what he says is based on this false cognitive structure,
which can prove nothing.
If we really want to find good evidence to deny this argument (A), the only possible
evidence is that we must find someone who cannot really understand the terms of belief and
desire like us, but still can use our language (including the terms of belief and desire) properly
to some degree. It seems that this is the only way to disprove the argument (A). Following
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from the argument (A), since folk psychology is rooted in our language, after we learn
language, we learn folk psychology and its cognitive structure to explain human behavior.
When someone learned language, this cognitive structure should have been fixed in his
thought and he can use terms of belief and desire to explain people’s behavior. But, if a man
who has learned language but still has no abilities to use the term belief or desire to explain
people’s behavior, or even if he does not understand what belief or desire is, then this
argument (A) fails. If belief or desire is not real mental phenomenon, but rather a misleading
concept, then everyone capable of using language should know what belief or desire is;
otherwise belief or desire is not completely generated from the misleading of language. If we
can really find this kind of person as evidence, then we can disprove the argument (A). Does
this kind of evidence exist? Fortunately (or unfortunately for those who suffered), it exists. It
is the children with autism.
The Counterexample of Churchland’s Argument
In order to point out the properties of children with autism, Baron-Cohen discusses Wellman’s
hypothetical being as follows:
Imagine a hypothetical being who knows nothing of internal mental states…. Such a
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being might be able to remember, know, and learn, but it would possess no
understanding of these activities. The social world, the world of self and others,
would be an impoverished place for such a creature…. Persons would be seen and
heard but there would be no notion of a backlog of ideas and beliefs organizing their
actions and personalities. Indeed, for this hypothetical being, no one could be
construed as possessing private persona; public present behavior would have no
deeper meaning. The concept of a lie would be inconceivable, as would… notions
such as illusions, beliefs, hunches, mistakes, guesses, or deceptions. It is almost
impossible to imagine what such a perspective would be like, how such a creature
would view the world (Wellman 1985, pp.169-170).
Based on some experimental evidence, Baron-Cohen argues that he has adequate reasons to
believe that these kinds of children do exist; they are not only hypothetical beings. They are
children with autism (Baron-Cohen 1995).
First of all, Baron-Cohen argues that when a person uses some terms, this does not mean
that the person can understand what the terms really mean. A person may have no
understanding of one term and still use it properly to some degree. Landau and Gleitman
(1985) report that a girl blind from birth produced the following phrases at the ages noted:
See? It’s in my lap. (36 months)
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Look what I have! (36 months)
Look how I do it! (36 months)
See camera! (37 months)
Look, I got Legos. (39 months)
This is a clear evidence to show that people may use some terms properly to some degree, but
without an understanding what the terms really mean. So, if someone can use the term belief
or desire properly to some degree, it does not mean that he/she really understands what the
term belief or desire means. Baron-Cohen uses Dennett’s suggestion that the best way to test a
child’s understanding of belief is to investigate whether the child can understand that someone
might hold a false belief (Dennett 1978). Following Dennett’s criterion, Wimmer and Perner
(1983) designed a “false-belief test,” and their results show that in autism the mental state of
belief is poorly understood. Another experiment shows that in autism there is a genuine
inability to understand other people’s different beliefs (Baron-Cohen 1995, p.71). By another
experiment, they find that children with autism have difficulty in recognizing the belief-based
emotion of surprise (Baron-Cohen, Spitz, and Cross 1993). These experiments suggest that
children with autism cannot really understand what belief or desire is.
To explain these experiments in another way, some might argue that it is probably
because children with autism have some sort of inability in language and this makes
researchers falsely conclude that the children cannot really understand what the term “belief”
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or “desire” means. But, other experiments can exclude this possibility. Some so-called
high-ability children with autism perform well in language. Leslie discusses an experiment by
Baron-Cohen et al (1986) and concludes that autistic children have a better understanding in
mechanical terms than normal children and similar understanding to normal children in
behavioral terms. However, in intentional terms they have much worse understanding than
normal children and even worse than Down’s syndrome children (Leslie 1991). These
so-called high-ability autistic children have learned language well, but they still have
difficulties in understanding intentional terms. Why do these children fail to understand
intentional terms? To answer this question, Churchland might say that children with autism do
not really learn the terms of folk psychology, and then they cannot understand intentional
terms. Why are intentional terms so special? Why is it that when they have learned and
understood other terms, they still fail to learn intentional terms? If folk psychological terms or
intentional terms are just misleading concepts, then they should have nothing special. If
people can learn one concept, then they should also have the ability to learn intentional terms
or folk psychological terms. But, the experiment shows that this is not the case. Thus, folk
psychological terms are not just misleading concepts.
Another fact can also support this suggestion. Baron-Cohen (1995) points out one
individual with autism, Temple Grandin. She has a Ph.D. from Colorado State University and
has written autobiographical books and articles as well as scientific articles on her research.
This kind of achievement would be almost impossible without the basic concepts of beliefs
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and desires (Baron-Cohen 1995, p.139). She lectures, writes books, and lives independently;
however, in her own words, she still cannot even play peekaboo with a baby, because she gets
the timing all wrong. As well, she is still quite abnormal in her understanding of ordinary or
social language (Baron-Cohen 1995, p.142). Baron-Cohen says that technical language is, in a
sense, more factual than “social language,” which is riddled with figurative phrases that
require one to compute the speaker’s unspoken meaning or intention and which, clearly, is an
area of persistent difficulty for Temple (Baron-Cohen 1995, p. 142).
Based on the discussions above, since it is likely that children with autism have a
functional deficiency in their brains, and this deficiency generates their abnormal behavior
mentioned above, we can conclude that people need special brain mechanisms to understand
intentional terms. The brain mechanisms can be an ontological foundation for understanding
intentional terms. Based on this ontological foundation, we may adequately believe that
intentional terms refer to brain states or brain processes. However, we can at least conclude
that it is not true that intentional terms are nothing but misleading concepts; otherwise we
cannot explain the behavior of people with autism.
If the evidence above is enough to support the claim that some people have the ability to
use language but have difficulties in understanding intentional (or folk psychological) terms,
then we can at least say that we learn the concept of belief or desire not only from the
language but also from somewhere else (probably brain mechanisms). In this situation,
Churchland is not right to claim that the concepts in folk psychology are obtained from a
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language misleading; otherwise every person who is able to speak a language should have the
ability to understand intentional terms or folk psychological terms. However, this is not true.
People need other mechanisms besides language to understand folk psychological terms. Thus,
Churchland’s approach for solving the problem of irreducibility has failed.
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