Type of Review: Project Completion Review
Project Title:
Uganda Humanitarian Funding – Landslides and Floods Response 2011
Date started: December 2011
Date review undertaken: June 2012
Instructions to help complete this template:
Before commencing the review you should have to hand:
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the Business Case or earlier project documentation.
the Logframe
the detailed guidance (How to Note) - Reviewing and Scoring Projects,
the most recent annual review and other related monitoring reports.
key data from ARIES, including the risk rating
the separate project scoring calculation sheet (pending access to ARIES)
Two scores are produced at project completion - one based on achievement of the outputs and
one based on achievement of the outcome. You should assess and rate both the individual
outputs and the overall outcome using the following rating scale and description:
Output Description
Outputs substantially exceeded expectation
Outputs moderately exceeded expectation
Outputs met expectation
Outputs moderately did not meet expectation
Outputs substantially did not meet expectation
Scale
A++
A+
A
B
C
Outcome Description
Outcome substantially exceeded expectation
Outcome moderately exceeded expectation
Outcome met expectation
Outcome moderately did not meet expectation
Outcome substantially did not meet
expectation
Introduction and Context
What support did the UK provide?
DFID provided £215,000 for humanitarian relief to flood and landslide affected areas of northeast
Uganda through the British Red Cross (BRC) to the Uganda Red Cross Society (URC) for a 3 month
period in mid December 2011.
More specifically, DFID supported the provision of temporary shelter and emergency relief items for
4,000 vulnerable affected households.
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What were the expected results?
The expected result of the DFID support to the URCS floods and landslides emergency response was
reduced impact of disasters in Uganda.
The key outcome of the intervention was that the immediate needs of households affected by landslides
and floods in Uganda in 2011 would be met.
Key results of providing support to the URC included, but were not limited to:
 4,000 vulnerable households able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide protection from
the weather.
 4,000 vulnerable households received emergency relief items and support.
 Learning from the emergency response documented and used to inform future practice.
What was the context in which UK support was provided?
From late August to November 2011 severe rains caused landslides and heavy flooding in eastern
Uganda, including the districts of Bulambuli, Kween, Mbale, Soroti, Katakwi, Butalejja, Sironko, and
Kapchorwa. Heavy rains and hailstorms affected the districts of Gulu, Nebbi and Moyo in northern
Uganda and in Kasese, Bundibugyo and Kosoro districts in western Uganda rains led to flooding in
many areas. Bulambuli district was the most affected area, with rains causing massive landslides that
resulted in the death of 44 people and displaced entire communities.
In many of these districts, the affected communities were unable to cope with the impact of the
disasters and therefore required assistance from the Government of Uganda, URCS, and other
humanitarian agencies. The floods, mudslides and hailstorms destroyed crops and houses and
affected thousands of households. Many villages remained water logged into November, making it
impossible for households to recover and resume their daily lives. Water resources became
contaminated, posing risk for outbreaks of water borne diseases such as cholera and malaria. Some
health centres were cut off, many feeder roads were damaged, bridges were washed away and
schools were closed or severely damaged by the floods.
Most of the affected families had to stay with host families, whose already limited resources then
became strained. Other displaced families sought temporary shelter in town trading centres, schools
and churches. As the number of people affected by continuing rains increased over the following
months into late 2011, figures revealed that over 212,000 people were affected by the floods and
landslides countrywide.
There was urgent need for food and non-food items to support the affected communities. The
livelihoods of the largely agrarian population were especially affected; most of the affected population
was dependent on agricultural activities such as crops, livestock and fisheries. Crops were destroyed
by the landslides and floods which severely affected the availability of and access to adequate food for
a large proportion of the population in the subsequent months.
Problems were compounded by weak capacity in the District Disaster Management Committees in the
affected Districts. Data collection by the Government of Uganda was slow and coordination at district
level was not as timely or effective as warranted given the severity and scope of the disaster.
Given its long standing presence in the affected communities and emergency response auxiliary role to
the GoU, the URCS took the lead in the emergency response and managed the distribution of relief
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assistance with partners and other concerned agencies. It became clear from assessments undertaken
in the affected districts that there were not enough resources to meet the needs of the affected
communities and that efforts needed to be made to address the existing gaps in response.
The response included £1.2million (UGX5bn) provided by the Office of the Prime Minister of Uganda to
procure food, which the URCS distributed on its behalf.
The URCS emergency response plans were supported by:
 USAID
 Danish Red Cross
 World Vision – mosquito nets and water purification tablets
 IFRC via the DREF
 ICRC – Non-Food Items (NFI)
 UNICEF - sanitation kits (containing a wheel barrow, shovel, metallic buckets, rope, squatting plate,
rake, pick axe and panga/machete) for 971 households
 ADRA – NFI kits, food and mosquito nets
 Tullow
 Salvation Army – Promised to drill 7 boreholes and has contributed food for 400 households in
Bunambutye and Bwikhonge sub-counties in cooperation with the URC
The URCS took the lead in the distribution of all food and non-food items in the affected sub-counties
as well as being involved in the implementation of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) related
activities and support to the affected communities.
Through its response interventions and support received in early 2012 from DFID through the British
Red Cross, the URCS was able to assist 24,526 people affected by the floods and landslides.
Section A: Detailed Output Scoring
Output 1: Affected households are able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide
protection from the weather.
Output 1:
Target: 4,000 households have access to shelter and non-food items.
Score: A (Outputs met expectation)
Performance description: With the funding provided by DFID in December 2011, the URCS was
able to provide 4,000 households (HHs) with distributions of temporary shelter materials from JanuaryMarch 2012.
Specifically, 4,000 tarpaulins were distributed to allow households to create temporary shelters and
cover the ground in the households to protect against the damp.
Additionally, 4,000 non food item kits were distributed to affected households. In total, 8,000 cooking
pots, 20,000 plastic plates, 20,000 plastic cups, 8,000 blankets, 8,000 jerry cans, 12,000 bars of
laundry soap and 8,000 mosquito treated nets were distributed to 4,000 affected households reaching
a population of 24,526.
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Final results:
Household items were distributed to 4,000 vulnerable households in Amuria, Bulambuli, Katakwi,
KisoroKween, Nakapiripit and Sironko Districts. During the distributions, information about the benefits
of using bednets was shared with beneficiaries, ways of erecting bednets were demonstrated and the
‘do’s and ‘don’ts’ of their use were discussed.
Additionally, 120 volunteers were deployed and 32 hygiene awareness sessions were conducted
between December and March 2012. Approximately 18,368 people were reached through these
formal sessions; additional beneficiaries were reached at NFI distribution points and in schools.
The awareness sessions were supported by the distribution of 25,000 posters and 35,000 brochures
with messages on cleanliness, sanitation, hand washing with soap before eating and so on. As well as
being distributed at the awareness sessions, posters and brochures were shared at health centres,
churches, and primary schools.
With funding provided by DFID through the British Red Cross, the URCS was successful in
implementing its floods and landslide response programme to provide assistance to affected
households through the provision of temporary shelter and NFI materials.
Impact Weighting (%): 90%
Revised since last Annual Review? N/A
Risk: Low
Revised since last Annual Review? N/A
Output 2: Learning from the response used to inform future practice
Output 2:
Score: A (Outputs met expectation)
Final results:
The business case also contained a proviso that learning from the response should be used by URCS
and BRC to inform future practice.
Documentation of the URCS floods and landslide response was produced and shared with other
humanitarian organisations. Information and communication was provided in a timely and consistent
manner, with progress reports and situational updates released and shared widely with government
authorities, donors, partner agencies and other key stakeholders. A communications strategy was
developed and implemented in order to create awareness of the URCS landslide/floods response
among targeted communities, the general public, Government officials and donor agencies
Additionally, district level disaster management meetings were held for the coordination of local
response efforts, where URCS was able to share distribution plans and reports with local authorities
and other partner agencies.
An After Action Review workshop was held in May 2012 following the conclusion of the landslides/
floods response with active participation from URCS staff, branch governing body, and District
stakeholders. The workshop was designed to identify strengths and weaknesses of the response,
decide how to improve performance, and recommend follow-up actions. In addition, the After Action
Review provided ideas, solutions and recommendations in order that the URCS team could learn from
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this particular operation and apply lessons learned in future or similar application.
An independent evaluation of the response was carried out in May 2012. The evaluation assessed the
response overall and involved a review of literature, interviews with national and local stakeholders,
and focus group discussions with beneficiaries. Key findings from the evaluation and lessons learned
from this response will inform and support URCS policy, strategy and operational change. The
evaluation will be used by URCS to strengthen its disaster management operations and inform future
responses and contribute to improvements in policy and practice in the Society.
The evaluation will also be used by the International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC) regional East
Africa Office and the British Red Cross Society, with learning used to inform other RC/RC activities
where appropriate. A copy of the evaluation and the final report will be shared with partners who
supported the response.
Impact Weighting (%): 10%
Revised since last Annual Review? N/A
Risk: Low
Revised since last Annual Review? N/A
Section B: Results and Value for Money.
1. Achievement and Results
1.1 Has the logframe been changed since the last review? No
1.2 Final Output score and description: A
Given the assessment of results, evidence of impact above and relative costs, the floods and landslide
response achieved its proposed outputs. With the funding provided by DFID, the URCS was able to
provide for the short term needs of 4,000 households affected by landslides and floods in Uganda with
distributions of temporary shelter materials from January-March 2012.
Additionally, lessons learnt from this response are being shared with relevant stakeholders, and will be
taken into consideration and will guide URCS in future disaster management operations.
Specifically, the URCS was able to provide 4,000 affected households with tarpaulins to provide
temporary shelter. Additionally, 4,000 non food item kits were distributed to affected households,
including 8000 cooking pots, 20,000 plastic plates, 20,000 plastic cups, 8,000 blankets, 8,000 jerry
cans, 12,000 bars of laundry soap and 8,000 treated mosquito.
Distribution of items was undertaken based on needs assessments undertaken by URCS staff and
volunteers, with an emphasis on targeting the most vulnerable of the community members, namely
those whose houses had been destroyed or collapsed, as opposed to providing a general community
distribution. However, the URCS assessment process allowed for the disaggregation of data by age
and sex. As such, the URCS was able to make adaptations for distribution of relief kits to
accommodate family composition taking into consideration special needs of women and children.
1.3 Direct feedback from beneficiaries
The end of project evaluation confirmed that those who received HH kits felt the items were necessary
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and relevant, and grateful that they did not have to share the contents with others, i.e. there was no
redistribution of relief items. Beneficiaries interviewed said that all items in the HH kits were of good
quality, relevant and appropriate to their needs, even when received months after the initial disaster.
Recipients of the kits reported that without such items they would have had nothing, as the majority of
households lost all their possessions in the landslide and those affected by floods had their
possessions damaged or corroded. Beneficiaries interviewed during the end of project evaluation
confirmed they would not have been able to buy the items themselves, after losing their livelihoods and
source of income in the disasters.
Given the scope and the impact of this disaster, beneficiaries interviewed noted that additional
assistance for early recovery activities, including distribution of seeds to replant damaged farms, would
have been warranted and appreciated had resources allowed.
1.4 Overall Outcome score and description: A
With financial assistance provided by DFID and additional funds supplemented by BRCS due to an
exchange rate loss, the URCS was able to achieve its proposed outcome of providing access to shelter
and non food items for the landslide and flood affected vulnerable households in eastern Uganda. A
total of 24,526 persons were reached through the DFID funded response.
Overall, the URCS was successful in implementing its disaster response programme, and was able to
meet the short term needs of the floods and landslide disaster affected communities through the
provision of temporary shelter supplies and NFIs. However, the broader proposed impact of this
intervention, “Reduced impact of disasters in Uganda”, could not fully be realised as early recovery
activities which would have been relevant and appropriate to allow affected households to rebuild their
livelihoods, promote community resilience for future disasters and achieve longer term sustained
recovery were not funded. This was also affected by the absence of a longer term relocation strategy
that remains pending from the Government of Uganda.
Impact and Sustainability
The floods and landslides in 2011 resulted in severe damage, deaths of 44 persons and displacement
of communities in 12 districts of eastern Uganda. With houses destroyed and/or severely damaged,
households displaced, water sources contaminated, crops destroyed and many villages remaining
waterlogged for months, funds from DFID allowed the URCS to respond with the provision of
temporary shelter and emergency relief items for the most affected and vulnerable households.
However, given the scope and the impact of this disaster, additional assistance to others also affected
in the communities would have been warranted and relevant had resources allowed. Specifically,
longer term needs, including early recovery and restoration of livelihoods, though initially put forward as
an area for intervention in the DFID proposal, were not funded therefore this was a significant gap
needing to be addressed. Considering the post harvest losses of food staple items (maize, cassava
roots), the general destruction and damage to crops in this primarily agricultural dependent area, and
the loss of livestock as a result of the floods and landslides, additional support to help affected
households rebuild their livelihoods and achieve food security would have assisted the communities in
terms of longer term recovery and sustainability of interventions.
Finally, in the last 6 months we have seen repeated incidents of landslides and flooding in the same
region in Eastern Uganda, and indications are that these disasters will continue to recur on an annual
basis. An intervention on a much greater scale that delivers a sustainable solution both on the practical
and on the political level will be needed in order to achieve the goal level indicator of reduced impact of
disasters in Uganda.
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2. Costs and timescale
2.1 Was the project completed within budget / expected costs: YES
However, it should be noted that due to the delays in approval of the DFID proposal and release of
funds, this resulted in significant cost implications, as exchange rates changed between the time of
submission in September 2011 and the subsequent approval in December 2011. An amount of over
GBP29,000 was lost due to a currency conversion rate fluctuation from the time that the proposal was
developed and submitted until the time that the funds were released. This loss was covered by BRC to
ensure that the number of HHs reached would not be affected by the currency fluctuation.
2.2 Key cost drivers
The BRC and the URCS used competitive bidding in their procurement processes to drive down costs
of materials procured and distributed. The BRC and URCS undertook implementation of its emergency
response programme using strong logistical capacity and maximizing the URCS’ volunteer network
(over 200,000 registered volunteers), and the number of people who were already on the ground and
ready to be mobilised when disaster struck. Therefore, the £215,000 in funds allocated by DFID for this
response were able to be applied to the procurement and distribution of proposed temporary shelter
and non food item supplies.
2.3 Was the project completed within the expected timescale: No The application for support, which initially included both response and early recovery elements, was
submitted to DFID in September 2011. Although there was an early indication that it would be
supported, it was only approved in December 2011, and then only for the response phase not including
early recovery elements for longer term impact. The delay in approval reduced the overall timeliness of
the response, as affected households reached through DFID supported relief items did not benefit from
distributions until early 2012. However, despite this delay in distribution of relief items, the response
was still needed and relevant. This delay in funding approval also reduced the overall efficiency of the
response, as the procurement and distribution of relief items had to be undertaken in stages.
3. Evidence and Evaluation
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
The DFID funded support to fund £215,000 for the provision of relief items represented just over 10%
of the total financial cost of the URCS disaster response (28% of donor funding towards the URCS
response). This decision was taken on the basis of a consideration of appropriate burden share. This
amount allowed for the provision of temporary shelter needs and NFIs for 4,000 households over a
period of 3 months, but did not include a recovery and resilience-building element.
The benefits of the intervention were “lives saved, suffering reduced and dignity protected” as per
DFID’s humanitarian policy and commitments in the HERR response. Final results of the response
included:
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4,000 vulnerable households were able to construct basic temporary shelter to provide protection
from the weather.
4,000 vulnerable households received emergency relief items and support.
Learning from the emergency response was documented and used to inform future practice.
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No new evidence emerged during the three months of implementation, or changed the project design
or rationale, and the assumptions used in the project design were realised through project
implementation with no modifications necessary.
4. Risk
4.1 Risk Rating (overall project risk): Low
Did the Risk Rating change over the life of the project? No
4.2 Risk funds not used for purposes intended – N/A
The £215,000 in funds provided by DFID to the BRC/URCS were used for their intended purposes, as
is evidenced by financial management, procurement, and distribution reports.
4.3
Climate and Environment Impact
The impact of this response on climate change and environment was minimal, with no risk/manageable
potential risk/opportunity. The programme was considered not to have a significant negative impact on
the climate or the environment.
The project was unable to increase the short term resilience of the communities to future shocks, as
funding for the provision of short term livelihood support and planned recovery options was not
approved. This particular geographic area of eastern Uganda experiences chronic vulnerability to
disasters, thus any livelihoods support component would require elements of disaster risk reduction
and strengthening of community coping mechanisms to ensure interventions are sustainable.
There is opportunity for the URCS to connect post disaster recovery efforts from this disaster to the
DFID funded Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) and community resilience project currently being
implemented, as some of the affected communities would be able to benefit from those already
approved activities. Although the new Community Resilience Project will be undertaken in a fairly
limited area and will not cover all communities affected by the floods/landslides, the URCS has an
opportunity to maximise its existing presence in these disaster affected communities to efficiently
address some, though not all, of the early recovery and resilience initiatives.
Also affecting the impact of this response was the inability of URCS to develop longer-term plans to
assist landslide affected families, as a government decision related to the potential resettlement of
communities away from the disaster prone Bulambuli area is still pending.
5. Value for Money
5.1 Performance on VfM measures
The benefits of the intervention as set out in the business case were: “lives saved, suffering reduced
and dignity protected” as per DFID’s humanitarian policy and commitments in the HERR response.
On the basis of the fact that the anticipated results were delivered, this intervention can be judged ot
have provided value for money as set out in the business case.
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The BRC was able to provide strong logistical capacity and financial accountability systems to support
the URCS in its response. The URCS’ value for money was demonstrated by the scale of its volunteer
network (over 200,000 registered volunteers), and the number of people who were already on the
ground and ready to be mobilised when the disaster struck.
All procurement of relief items was undertaken by the URCS with the logistics support of the BRC. All
major tenders were verified and technical support provided by the BRC before procurement for relief
items progressed. Additionally, the BRC and the URCS used competitive bidding in their procurement
processes to drive down costs.
However, it should be pointed out that the delay in DFID providing the funding to the BRC had a
negative impact on the timeliness and efficiency of the intervention.
5.2 Commercial Improvement and Value for Money
As indicated above, the competitive bidding procurement process undertaken by URCS to procure the
relief items was an effective means of achieving Value for Money in this response. In addition the
mobilisation of the URCS volunteers to distribute relief items maximised available resources and
contributed to overall efficiency of the response.
5.3 Role of project partners
The URCS was the sole implementer of this project, with technical support from the BRC. Both
organisations were very professional and performed their roles effectively – the URCS through their
effective mobilisation of their volunteer network to carry out their intervention, and the strong
relationship they built with local government, working through districts on the NFI distributions, and the
BRC providing high quality technical assistance when needed.
5.4 Did the project represent Value for Money : YES
The overall assessment of the DFID funded project for floods and landslide affected communities in
Uganda confirms that the project provided value for money, given its limited response scope and focus.
The £215,000 provided by DFID allowed the URCS to respond to the short term needs of floods and
landslide affected households, assisting a total population of 24,526 with temporary shelter supplies
and non food relief items. This response was not able to respond to longer term early recovery efforts
for greater sustained impact, given the uncertainties surrounding recovery work needing to be informed
by the still pending GoU plan to relocate the displaced households.
Therefore, intervention through the URCS with technical and management support from the BRC
provided good value for money in the rapid humanitarian response in the affected areas of eastern
Uganda.
There may be a case in future for providing the additional funds required for the recovery efforts as
more evidence becomes available, in particular, progress made on the GoU’s plans to aid the
displaced households.
6. Conditionality
6.1 Update on specific conditions
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N/A
7. Conclusions
With DFID funded support, the URCS was able to successfully achieve its proposed objectives for
meeting the short term needs of flood and landslide affected communities in Uganda through the
provision of temporary shelter materials and non food relief items. The provision of 4,000 tarpaulins to
affected households allowed the beneficiaries to construct basic temporary shelter to provide protection
from the weather, while the provision of 4,000 NFI kits provided necessary household items to families
who had been devastated by the disaster. A total of 24,526 persons were reached through the DFID
funded response.
Additionally, the lessons learned and best practices identified during this response have been shared
and will continue to feed into the development of improved URCS Disaster Management policies and
procedures going forward in order to inform future programmes and practice.
A number of issues for consideration were identified during the implementation of this response,
including the need to strengthen capacity and coordination efforts, particularly at the district level with
the District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs). There is substantial opportunity to work jointly
with district authorities and community groups to strengthen disaster risk reduction, community
resilience and early warning systems, in order to develop stronger mitigation strategies and ensure
comprehensive contingency plans are in place in future.
It is unfortunate that the originally proposed early recovery element of this response was not approved,
as this would have allowed for more longer term and sustained impact of this response. There remains
a need to engage more with the GoU and donors to advocate for greater support for DRR,
preparedness and recovery financing – not just response funds. It is advisable for DFID to consider
other possible mechanisms for funding small scale emergency responses, such as the establishment
of a contingency fund, or a multi-donor draw down facility.
Advocacy could also be undertaken on the need for stronger preparedness capacity within the OPM
and DDMCs. With environmental degradation and climate change issues at the top of the development
agenda in Uganda, a significant amount of work remains to be done on strengthening the GoU’s
capacity to address issues of DRR and CCA. Such issues also tie into the pending dilemma of
relocation for the communities affected and displaced by this most recent disaster. While the OPM
proposed to relocate 10,000 persons per year (for a total of 700,000) no concrete plans or guidance
has been agreed yet on the details of this plan and in the meantime community members await further
direction in order to start rebuilding their lives and recuperate from this catastrophe.
Lastly, it should be noted that the delay in approval of funds from DFID resulted in exchange rate
losses which had to be covered by the British Red Cross and impacted on the timeliness of the
response. It would be advisable for DFID to review its internal review and approval procedures in order
to determine how this risk can be reduced in future.
8. Review Process
An independent review and evaluation of the response was conducted by an external consultant in
May 2012. The evaluation assessed the overall URCS response and involved a secondary data
review and desk research of response documentation. Interviews with the URCS managers at the
national headquarters (HQ) and staff of the Federation delegation and British Red Cross in Nairobi.
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Field site visits were conducted from 16-25 May to the affected areas in Sironko District where focus
group discussions were held with local district authorities, URCS Branch Governing Body, Sironko
branch volunteers and with beneficiaries. In-depth interviews were conducted with households affected
by the landslides and floods in Bulambuli and Atari, all of them beneficiaries of the URCS response.
Key informant interviews were conducted with the staff of the URCS, Minister for Disaster
Preparedness in the Office of the Prime Minister, and partner agencies (ICRC, UNICEF).
An After Action Review workshop was conducted with participation from URCS staff from national,
regional and branch level, Branch Governing Board members, and district authorities. Debriefing
sessions were then held with URCS staff at regional and national level before completion of the
evaluation to present initial, main findings and recommendations, including some discussion on the
way forward
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