MGIMO University November 2007
Lecture 1
The “Gold Standard”: Rational Actor Model
Resources
Kahler, Miles. "Rationality in International Relations,"
International Organization, 52.4: 919-941.
About the Author
The “Main Idea”: Assumptions of rational behavior permeate
all IR theory (American perspective!): realist, neorealist,
psychological (emphasis on limited rationality),
organizational (collective bargaining dynamics) and
approaches emphasizing culture-norms-identity.
The most compelling and widespread model of decision-making is the
rational actor model. This model permeates all of social science,
especially economic theory. You need to understand the rational actor
model to critique it.
What does it mean to be rational?
 Logical
 Dispassionate
 Satisfy one’s needs by maximizing benefits and minimizing costs
 Implies perfect information about the consequences of certain
choices
Steps for Rational Decision-Making:
1. Identify goals and prioritize them
2. Search for alternatives
3. Predict the consequences of each alternative
4. Evaluate each alternative in terms of your goals
5. Select the alternative that maximizes your values
What do people really do when making decisions?
 Ask someone you trust (mostly likely will produce an outcome
based on other person’s goal)
 Responding to advertising
© 2007 G. Matthew Bonham
MGIMO University November 2007

Ask your spouse/partner; compromise (usually as part of the
goal-forming process)
Rational only describes the decision-making process, not the values or
outcome.
Lecture Notes: Rational Calculations for Hostage Crisis
(MSPowerPoint 126KB)
Normal Utility Maximizing Function: E(U) = sum of P V
 E(U)1 is the expected utility of alternative 1
 N is the number of possible outcomes
 Vi is the value of the ith outcome affected by the alternative
 Pi is the probability that the alternative will result in the outcome
Sum the values of the expected value of all the outcomes times the
probability of each outcome.
Reagan’s Hostage Crisis
1. Sell Arms to Iran
2. Rescue Mission
3. Third Party
4. Do Nothing
Outcomes from Alternative 1: V x P = U
 Hostages are Released: + 80 x .6 = +48
 Improve Relations with Iran: + 50 x .9 = +45
 Help Freedom Fighters (Contras): + 20 x .3 = +6
 Harm Terrorism Policy (if discovered): -100 x .2 = -20
 TOTAL UTILITY of Alternative 1 = 79 (48+45+6-20)
Going through the exercise in practice reveals the difficulty, both in
quantifying goals and priorities and in estimating probability. The
Reagan Administration grossly overestimated their ability to keep this
a secret, and when it went public, it did a great deal of harm to the
Administration and to US terrorism policy.
Why is it difficult?
 Different people have different priorities, goals, calculations of
probabilities
 Decisions are made in a bureaucratic environment where many
actors tend to prefer the status quo
 Consequences in foreign policy are difficult to predict
© 2007 G. Matthew Bonham
MGIMO University November 2007

Time is short and events can overtake reality (what if key actors
are assassinated?)
Alternatives:
 Play Politics
 Satisficing - settling for an alternative that may not maximize
your utility, but it satisfies key constituents. I know this isn’t
going to work, but I have to do something and this is the least
objectionable alternative for most people. Ex) blockade Cuba
 The President makes a decision – “the buck stops here”
Assemble a panel of like-minded advisors, who provide political
cover if something goes wrong: “all my advisors told me this
would work.”
Practitioner’s Hour
Case Study – President Bush’s Decision to Invade Iraq
“Because September 11th made the security of the American people
the priority…a sacred duty for the president. It is the most necessary
duty for the president, because if the president doesn’t take on that
duty, who else is going to?”
Saddam was a “madman.” “He had weapons of mass destruction in
the past. He has created incredible instability in the neighborhood”
(Bush quoted in Woodward, Plan of Attack, 2004, p. 27)
Was the Decision Rational?


The military didn’t want to go in. Secretary of State Powell kept
saying, “This is lunacy” (Woodward, 2004, p. 22). They preferred
other approaches.
There was little weighing of the alternatives and consequences
“Two months into the job, Rumsfeld drafted a three-page memo called
‘Guidelines When Considering Committing U.S. Forces’….It was a
series of questions to be addressed: ‘Is a proposed action truly
necessary?’ ‘Is the proposed action achievable?’ ‘Is it worth it?’’
(Woodward, Plan of Attack, 2004)
Rational Decision-Making Model for the Iraq War
© 2007 G. Matthew Bonham
MGIMO University November 2007

Three options: military force, vigilant containment;
(Mearsheimer and Walt, “An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy,
No. 134, [Jan. - Feb., 2003], 50-59); and do nothing
What are the likely outcomes of each? “Is it worth it?”

Alternative 1 – Military Force
Outcomes








Removal of Saddam
Destruction of WMD
Democracy in the region
Military casualties (US and allies)
Civilian casualties
High monetary cost
Lengthy occupation (quagmire)
Complicated relations with other countries
Alternative 2 – Vigilant Containment (phased strategy of
pressuring Saddam, including diplomatic and economic sanctions, as
well as efforts to strengthen the opposition within Iraq)
Outcomes






Saddam remains in power
Risk of continued development of WMD
Risk of terrorism
International cooperation
Sanctions are undermined by smuggling and non-compliance
Other:
Alternative 3 – Do Nothing
Outcomes
Utilities of each alternative
Choice
© 2007 G. Matthew Bonham
MGIMO University November 2007
© 2007 G. Matthew Bonham