PHIL 5973: Mental Causation Seminar
University of Arkansas, Fall 2003
Topic: Dretske’s Explaining Behavior, Chapter 3
*Dretske introduces this chapter by returning to the main question of the book (see the
Preface for a nice statement of this question): How can reasons (like beliefs and desires)
explain behavior, given neurophysiology? Dretske marks two steps on the road to an
answer:
--First, differentiate between behavior and the movements that are the products of
behavior. (The distinction between behavior and its output.) This step has been
worked out in the first two chapters. Dretske contends that neurophysiology
explains the movements (the products of behavior), whereas reasons explain the
behavior itself. So, Dretske sees neurophysiology and reasons explanations as parts
of “different explanatory games” that do NOT compete (and hence avoid exclusion
principles!). (pp. 51-52)
--Second, we need to ask ourselves how reasons explain. To do this, Dretske says
that we must examine the idea of representation, the focus of this chapter. Beliefs are
kinds of representations:
“Beliefs are those representations whose causal role in the production of output is
determined by their meaning or content—by the way they represent what they
represent.” (p. 52)
*Representational System (RS): “any system whose function is to indicate how things stand
with respect to some other object, condition, or magnitude.” (p. 52)
--Natural vs. Conventional representations. With conventional representations there
is no intrinsic relationship between the elements of the representation and the thing
represented. This representative function is imposed by, and dependent on, us—
e.g., in the examples of popcorn, coins, and basketball players. (pp. 52-53)
*Conventional Systems, Type I:
--Type I representations “have no intrinsic powers of representation”—like in the
basketball/coins example given above. Both their function and their ability to
perform that function are imposed from outside, e.g. by a human agent. Type I
examples include: maps, musical notation, and natural language. (p. 53)
--The elements of Type I systems are called symbols. Symbols are assigned indicator
functions. (pp. 53-54)
Eric Funkhouser
11/04/03
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*Conventional Systems, Type II:
--Type II systems use natural signs. Contrast the Type I symbols with natural signs.
Natural signs intrinsically represent and include things like tracks in the mud,
fingerprints, and cloud formations. Type II systems:
“…natural signs are used in a way that exploits their natural meaning, their
unconventional powers of indication, for representational, and partly conventional,
purposes. This makes systems of Type II a curious blend of the conventional and
the natural.” (p. 54)
--Dretske makes the following important point: an indicator does not require a
person to whom the information is indicated. E.g., properly functioning boilerpressure gauges indicate boiler pressure, whether anyone recognizes this or not.
(Conversely, our taking X to indicate P does not make it so.) Dretske sees the
opposing position as a species of anti-realism about truth—that nothing is true
unless someone believes it or knows it. (p. 55)
--Senses of ‘mean’:
Natural sense: ‘mean’ as a synonym for ‘indicate’ (Grice is cited here). If X means
that P in this sense, then P must be the case—there can be no misindication. 24 rings
cannot mean (in this sense) that the tree is 24 years old unless it is in fact 24 years
old.
Non-natural sense: the kind of meaning associated with language. We can mean
something in this sense, without it being the case. (pp. 55-56)
--Additionally, something doesn’t indicate that P unless the right dependency holds.
Example of broken fuel gauge stuck at half full—even when the tank is half full the
gauge doesn’t indicate this. There is generally a law-like connection between natural
signs and what they represent. (p. 56)
--‘Information’ will also sometimes be used to convey what is meant by ‘natural
meaning’ and ‘indication’. (pp. 58-59)
--Type II systems use natural signs, but we determine what these signs represent (i.e.,
have the function of indicating). (And such systems can misrepresent only what they
have the function of representing.) For example, we determine that a fuel gauge
represents fuel level of the tank instead of the additional weight (of the gasoline).
The fuel gauge does indicate things that we don’t take it to represent (and, hence,
what it doesn’t represent). (pp. 59-60) For these reasons, Type II representations are
partly conventional and partly natural (partly natural because these natural signs
“indicate” what they represent all on their own).
--Type II systems differ from Type I systems, in that in Type I systems we assign the
function and completely control the ability of Type I systems to fulfill that function.
In Type II systems, we do only the former.
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11/04/03
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*Natural Systems, Type III:
--Type I and II systems are conventional systems of representation. Natural systems of
representation, Type III, are ones in which even the representative function is not
assigned from outside the system. Such examples include the functions of bodily
organs like the heart, kidneys, and sensory systems. Biologists discover the functions
of such organs and systems. (pp. 62-64)
*Misrepresentation is an aspect of intentionality (itself, a mark of the mental). The abovedescribed representational systems are susceptible of misrepresentation. Misrepresentation
for Type I and II systems is only derivative on a failure in some person who assigns the
representative function to the given elements. Only Type III representational systems are
capable of intrinsic misrepresentation. The ability to misrepresent is essential for the
elements of a system to have meaning. (pp. 64-67)
--Certain indicators can function well in one environment (and for that reason have
been selected naturally through the evolution of the species), but misrepresent in an
artificial environment. For example, a frog’s “bug detection system” would think
that artificially crafted shadows of a certain size are bugs. (p. 68)
--Misrepresentation is always relative to a function—e.g., perhaps the function of the
so-called bug detection system is merely to detect certain types of shadows. Then,
there would be no misrepresentation in that false environment. Misrepresentation is
relative to the assigned function (see Dennett “Evolution, Error and Intentionality”).
(p. 69)
*The content of a representational system—what it has the function of indicating (i.e.,
represents). (p. 70)
--Two aspects of these contents. First, What is it of (reference)? Second, How is this
referent represented (sense)? These two aspects capture two additional features of
intentionality: aboutness and intensionality (respectively). (p. 70)
--There are pictorial representations in which the representations resemble what they
represent, but representations certainly needn’t resemble what they represent.
--There can be a representation of x without it being represented as x. The former
(‘of’ locution) is a de re content. The fact that a de re belief is of x rather than y is not
given in the representation itself, but by non-representational facts (e.g., a causal
theory of reference). (p. 73)
--De dicto beliefs (contents): reference is determined by how it is represented. (pp. 7374)
--All RSs are property specific: they can represent something as F without representing
it as G, even though everything that is F is G. That is, the content is intensional
rather than extensional. (p. 75)
Eric Funkhouser
11/04/03
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