Managing the Triple Dimensions of the Vote
By Akoko Akech
Introduction
What aspects of competitive electoral politics does an institution such as Kenya’s Independent
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) manage in electoral contest, especially closely
contested presidential elections? What other aspects do other institutions manage?
The management of electoral competitions, especially the presidential elections in divided
societies such as Kenya, is a process that requires a concerted effort of several institutions: an
institution for managing the voter registration, voting and vote tallying process, on the one hand,
and other institutions that can provide checks and balances, on the other.
The first institution should be made up of competent but partisan, and not impartial, public
servants, representing the dominant political interests at a given moment, who can register,
count, tally votes and declare results. The tasks here require administrative competence, but also
a careful representation of main political divides in the body that oversees the working of its
bureaucracy.
The second institutions should be made up of competent and impartial judicial officers on the
one hand, and partisan civil society based organizations capable of monitoring the electoral
processes and pursuing various group interests in the electoral process, on the other. Perhaps the
success management of election depends more on the balancing of the competing factional
political interests than the elusive search for impartial public servants or organizations, which
can stand above the dominant political interests of given a society.
Moreover, counting votes cast in an elections means much more than aggregation of voters’
policy preferences or choices, sanctioning good or bad leadership. General Elections, particularly
the presidential elections, are akin to Arjun Appadurai’s tournaments of value. Presidential
elections are moment when mostly dominant male politician exchange baskets of votes or
strategic public offices in process similar to the exchange of Kula among the men of substance in
Massim group of islands of the eastern tip of New Guinea.

Akoko Akech is a PhD candidate at Makerere Institute of Social Research (MISR)
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In these processes, social distinction, honor, reputation, and memory are critical in establishing
stable alliances and determining political outcomes. The exchange is uneven. Not all partners
share the same values nor are their interests necessarily symmetrical or well aligned. Thus, votebaskets or public offices determine the value of men and a few women who participate in these
tournaments. The asymmetries of interests and values define the challenges and opportunities of
an alliance of such men who capture state power. Betrayals are costly. In such contests, the
value of the vote is socially constructed.
The value of the vote
What is the implication of looking at the vote as a socially constructed commodity for the
management of political competitions? There are two key concepts of the elections, which may
be a good starting point in examining the significance of votes in tournaments of value such as
Kenya’s presidential elections: one the Luo of Kenya’s conception of the electoral contests, and
the other Acholi or Langi of Uganda’s conception of electoral contest.
To the Luo of Kenya, casting the secret ballot is something akin to ‘goyo ombulu’ , predicting
which color of a red and black bead or seed will show up, if it is shaken in closed palm and then
placed on the down on an even surface. Goyo ombulu conveys fair idea that an electoral contest
should be a fair chance of either winning or losing a contest. However, to the Acholi or the Langi
of Uganda, the process of casting the secret ballot is something akin to the process of ‘bolo
kwir’, which is, casting either the venom, implanting the gene, or both. It is more consequential
than the Luo of Kenya’s conceive of it.
These two conceptions of the value of vote capture the reason why the management of elections
is a multidimensional affair. The Luo of Kenya’s conception of the electoral process suggests
that an electoral process requires a competent bureaucracy that can superintend an electoral
process and deliver a fair result.
On the contrary, the Acholi or Langi conception suggests that voters do more than participate in
an equal opportunity process of determining leadership. Through dominant male elites, voters
can cast venom, implant genes of harmony or disharmony, or both, in an electoral contest. Badly
managed tournaments of value by the elite beget inter-ethnic animosity. It turns yesteryear
friends into today’s deadly foes at the polls and beyond.
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Consequently, successful management of electoral contests calls the management of voter
registration, voting and tallying of the votes, the process conveyed by ‘goyo ombulu’. However,
an equally critical aspect managing electoral competition calls for the management of the
consequences of voting together as an alliance of elite and ethnic groups. ‘Bolo kwir’ conveys
this second aspect.
How has Kenya managed these aspects of electoral contests? A look at the evolution of the
institution of managing electoral competition, from the Attorney General Chambers to the
Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission reveals several milestones have been
achieved in managing the count and the disputes that may arise out of it. The challenge remains
the management of venomous or deadly implants of electoral contests, especially in the game of
exchanging votes and strategic public offices.
Managing Elections in Post-colonial Kenya
The institution for managing Kenya’s election has undergone several changes- from the days
when metallic containers, debe, with a narrow slot for inserting ballot, (1960s-1980s) through to
the opaque plastic boxes with a narrow slot for casting (mostly 1990s and 2000s), to the
transparent plastic boxes, with a slot for inserting the ballot (2008 to present).
For the first three decades of independence, under the de facto or de jure one-party state rule,
there was no competitive presidential election. However, the parliamentary elections were fairly
competitive, especially under Kenyatta’s regime more than Moi’s. Political contest was mainly
conducted with the ruling party- Kenya Africa National Union. An officer at the Attorney
General’s Office, who relied on the Provincial Administration, especially the District
Commissioners, as presiding officers, conducted the elections.
However, after the fiasco of the 1988 Mlolongo elections, and particularly, after the reintroduction of multiparty politics, after the repeal of the Section 2(a) of the then Constitution of
Kenya, the Moi regime created the Electoral Commission of Kenya. However, Moi, the
incumbent appointed all the commissioners and its staff. The Electoral Commission of Kenya,
under retired Judge Justice Zachaeus Chesoni, was perceived to be partisan.
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Consequently, following Daniel Moi’s contested victory the 1992 presidential election and initial
demands for a new Constitution, a series of significant legal amendments and elite consensus
emerged with an agreement, popularly known as the Inter Party Parliamentary Group (IPPG)
amendments in 1997. The IPPG agreement addressed the questions of freedoms of assembly,
movement and association, and the re-composition of the Electoral Commission of Kenya.
Significantly, this agreement led to the amendment of the Chief’s Act and Public Order Act,
allowing members of the opposition parties greater freedom of assembly and association and
mobilization across the country. However, the most significant part of this agreement, the
agreement on re-composing the electoral commission was not legislated. It remained just a
gentleman’s agreement, albeit one that Moi honored.
Through the IPPG agreement, the leading political parties, with parliamentary representation,
nominated their representatives to the electoral commission, and Moi appointed these nominees
to the Electoral Commission. Perhaps, the commission that presided over the 1997, and 2002
general elections, and 2005 referendum on the constitution, delivered results that enjoyed
legitimacy, not because it was composed of the most impartial public servants, but because of it
was made up of partisan public servants, representing the various partisan interests, checking and
balancing each other’s political interests.
In 2007, in spite of the IPPG agreement, Mwai Kibaki’s disregarded the IPPG gentleman’s
agreement. Noting that the IPPG was a just a ‘gentlemen’s agreement,’ and not a legally binding
clause of the constitution, Mwai Kibaki, made several appointments to the commission that
would render it incapable of being a fair arbiter of closely contested elections. These unilateral
appointments eroded the legitimacy of the Samuel Kivuitu led Electoral Commission as neutral
refer in the 2007 General Elections, particularly the presidential elections
However, following the 2008 Africa Union and Kofi Annan led mediation process, Kenya
embarked on a series of reform process, which included disbanding the electoral commission and
recreating it a new one: the Interim Independent Electoral Commission and then the Independent
Election and Boundaries Commission.
The electoral commission underwent radical changes aimed at ensuring its independence.
Critically, it embraced the concept of competing political interests, wherein the participation of
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the agent of competing political in the electoral process a critical measure of ensuring fair
outcomes of all electoral outcomes.
Although the commission has conducted several by-election well. It also stands accused of
incompetence, corruption and conflicts of interests, especially in the procurement of electronic
equipments for the 2013 General Elections. If the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission, led by Isaack Hassan, manages the count well or fairly, especially the counting and
tallying of presidential votes, it will have done so, not just because of the new rules, but because
it made up of public servants who have competing political leanings or loyalties, and therefore
can only agree to obey the rules of the game, and not to rig the election in favor of a presidential
candidate.
Moreover, unlike 2007, Kenya’s law clearly provides adequate time frame within which any
dispute arising out of the presidential contest. In other words, if there are grounds to believe that
the in-built mechanism of checks and balances of the Independent Electoral Boundaries and
Commission failed to produce a free and fair outcome of a presidential election, then the
Supreme Court of Kenya shall determine the veracity of such claims and resolves any dispute
arising out of the count.
Consequently, there are internal and external institutions, which are critical in the management
of electoral competition and ensuring that the every vote cast counts. However, these institutions
address only one critical aspect of the management of electoral competition: Fair count.
The most critical aspects of managing elections begin the morning after victory. It is managing
the cleavages wrought by bruising electoral contests and narrow margins of victory, undoing the
dirty work of creating friends or foe categories across various ethnic groups- building bridges
across ethno- political regional divides. It is the management of the potential seeds of discord
within the victor’s camp, lest it flower in the next general election.
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