KATO, Junko. Institutions and Rationality in politics: Three Varieties of Neo –
Institutionalist. British Journal of Political Science, v 26, n. 4, p 553-582, oct.,
1996.
Review Article: Institutions and Rationality in Politics - Three
Varieties of Neo-lnstitutionalists
JUNKO KATO*
The driving force behind the production of new studies in political science is a
focus on political institutions - the new institutionalism. This recent shift in the
dominant approach in political science has brought increasing scholarly interest
in institutions [Nota 1] and ushered in an active debate about certain central
concepts, such as the state [Nota 2].
Two major controversies revolve around the new institutionalism. The first is
between supporters and sceptics of the utility of this approach in political
science. While the advocates claim that the focus on political institutions will
shed new light on underexplored or even neglected aspects of politics, the
sceptics doubt the novelty of the insights and are thus reluctant to promote this
approach at the expense of existing approaches in political science [Nota 3].
The second dispute, which has been less salient, but is becoming more
important as scholarly interest in institutions increases, is concerned with how
the new institutionalism can analyse the relationship between individuals and
institutions. In this argument, three distinct groups can be identified.
The first group employs primarily traditional methods of political science
research, especially historical investigation and qualitative analysis with a
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renewed focus on institutional changes and dynamics. The alleged novelty of
this first approach, therefore, lies not in its research methodology, but in its
broadened perspectives of institutions which include factors such as culture,
norms and routines. The second group is composed of rational choice theorists
who attempt to incorporate institutional constraints upon individual behaviour
into their original approach, which is based on an assumption of economic
rationality. Their approach is 'new' in the sense that they add institutional factors
to the analytical framework of micro-economics or public choice theory. The
third group is least well known and often confused with the second group. They
use the concept of bounded rationality, as presented by Simon [Nota 4] and
consider institutions to be organizational contexts in which individual rational
behaviour is cultivated and promoted.
The three groups are often confused with each other. One reason for this is
that each makes its own claim for the importance of institutions independently of
the other groups' claims. Skocpol sets the agenda for 'bringing the state back in'
only for the first group of new institutionalists [Nota 5]. McCubbins makes a
convincing case for incorporating institutional factors into rational choice
perspectives [Nota 6]. In the third category, North analyses the relationship
between institutional change and economic performance and shows its strength
by using an approach based on bounded rationality [Nota 7].
Recently, some scholars have been interested in comparing these different
approaches [Nota 8]. In contrast to existing comparisons of neo-institutionalism,
this article aims to clarify the merits of the various new institutionalist
approaches and narrow their disagreement on the question of the relationship
between political institutions and individual rational behaviour. A central aspect
of the disagreements among the three approaches is closely related to their
different
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perspectives on individual rationality. A deep chasm divides those who consider
the assumption of individual rationality an important component of institutional
analysis and those who see it as a misperceived postulate diverting our
attention from institutions. Scholars relying on the historical method and
qualitative sociopolitical analysis (those in the first group) regard the assumption
of individual rationality as incompatible with an institutional focus, and, thus, are
sceptical of the other approaches. By contrast, rational choice theorists in the
second group stress that retaining the economic rationality assumption is the
best way to maintain a unified and cohesive analytical scheme of institutional
analysis. The third approach, based upon bounded rationality, seeks a middle
ground between the socio-historical approach and the rational choice approach.
Its assumption of human rationality enables one to regard institutions or
organizations [Nota 9] as possible environments in which the rational behaviour
of individual actors is promoted.
My ultimate aim is to provide some bridge between those who support and
those who oppose employing the rationality assumption. The first part of this
strategy is to clarify the different emphases in institutional analysis between the
socio-historical approach and the rational choice approach. Although these
approaches have distinct strengths in identifying different aspects of the
interaction between institutions and individuals, I do not propose a synthesis
between the two competing approaches. Rather, I will argue that the
coexistence of the two approaches serves to broaden our understanding of
politics, especially in comparative studies. I make a special effort not to
overextend criticisms presented by one approach to another. More specifically, I
intend to qualify, on the one hand, the socio-historical criticism of institutional
analysis using the rationality assumption; and, on the other, the rational choice
criticism of the limited generality of the socio-historical approach. I will then
introduce the third approach as a middle way between these two approaches
and suggest that discussions about the meaning of political institutions and
individual rationality can be made more productive by using this aproach.
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO INSTITUTIONS
The first group of new institutionalists includes a broad range of political
scientists, as well as some sociologists and historians. With a small number of
exceptions, those using the socio-historical approach regard the assumption of
individual rationality or rational behaviour in politics as incompatible with an
institutional focus. I will argue that criticism of the rational choice approach by
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the first group often exaggerates the limitation of the rationality assumption. To
this end, I will first compare and contrast the socio-historical and rational choice
new institutionalisms.
Both the socio-historical institutionalists and the rational choice new
institutionalists are concerned with the question of how institutions shape
political behaviour and outcomes [Nota 10]. These approaches emerged from a
reaction to the indifference to political institutions during the behaviourist era of
the 1950s and 1960s. Major proponents of different new institutionalist
approaches criticize the preceding approaches. For example, Skocpol has
presented a clear antithesis to the pluralist, structural-functionalist and Marxist
literatures, which she alleges were dominant during this period, and has
proposed a new institutional interest, focusing particularly on the state [Nota
11]. March and Olsen contrast their institutionalist approach with contextualism,
reductionism, utilitarianism, instrumentalism and functionalism during the same
period [Nota 12] Rational choice theorists, such as Ordeshook, also define a
new institutionalism as 'an effort at recombining behaviourist research with more
traditional concerns of political science', namely institutions [Nota 13].
The second common point between the socio-historical and rational choice
institutionalists is the inclusion in the analysis of both formal rules and
organizations and informal routines and procedures [Nota 14]. Despite this
similarity, however, these two institutionalist positions are distinguishable,
especially in the way they interpret and analyse individual behaviour in
institutions. Steinmo and Thelen make the most clear-cut distinction in this
respect [Nota 15]. According to them, the rational choice approach relies on 'a
"universal tool kit" that can be applied in virtually any political setting', that is, a
logical framework based on the assumption of utility maximization of selfinterested individuals; and it considers an institution as 'a strategic context,
imposing constraints on self-interested behaviour'. By contrast, historical
institutionalists find that
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reliance on such a deductive logic based on individual rationality restricts their
interests in institutions. Thus, 'rather than deducing hypotheses on the basis of
global assumptions and prior to the analysis, historical institutionalists generally
develop their hypotheses more inductively, in the course of interpreting the
empirical material itself.[Nota 16].
Rational choice studies apply the assumption of utility maximization, or some
approximation of it, to the analysis of political actors. But, which political actor' s
preference or interest is of primary importance differs from one rational choice
perspective to another. Different assumptions, concerning, for example, the
domination of bureaucratic interests over a popular mandate or the
effectiveness of political control over bureaucracy, can lead to completely
different conclusions about policy outcomes. Using the former assumption,
Niskanen,[Nota 17] and Brennan and Buchanan [Nota 18] maintain that the
preferences of constituents of the state, especially bureaucrats who are free
from popular mandates, dominate decisions on public policy. However, other
public choice literature emphasizes the link between public preference and
policy decisions and presents rational choice perspectives that focus on
incentives provided by politicians' desire for re-election [Nota 19]. In terms of
macro-level concerns, the rational choice approach permits one to analyse
various consequences of rational behaviour such as collective action problems
represented by Olson's work on interest groups,[Nota 20] the prisoners'
dilemma situation applied both to international and domestic politics, party
competition as formulated by Downs,[Nota 21] and so on.
The novelty of rational choice new institutionalism lies in the analysis of the
effects and influences of institutions, especially the analysis of whose interests
or preferences prevail in public policy or social decisions. The literature explores
the relationship between institutional contexts or 'structures' for decision making
and rational individual behaviour defined a priori. For example, the rational
choice literature in American politics is especially concerned with how politicians
who desire re-election represent the interests of constituencies under the
constraints of the institutionalized decision-making procedures and committee
system of Congress [Nota 22]. It also investigates agenda
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control and compliance with rules within the Congress and explores the reason
why congressmen representing various interests can decide on specific
legislation. Thus Moe surveys this rational choice literature in American politics
as a 'positive theory of institutions'[Nota 23].
Rather than predetermining a unit of analysis such as a rational individual,
studies using the socio-historical approach are the product of research that
takes organizations or institutions as primary subjects. Among socio-historical
institutional studies, I distinguish those that reflect a state-centred view, those
that examine state-society relations, and those that focus on the more basic
elements that constitute institutions, that is, routines, rules, norms, values and
ideas [Nota 24].
Because attempts at 'bringing the state back in' belong to studies of the statecentred view, Skocpol [Nota 25] reviews many works including those by Evans,
Krasner, Nordlinger, Skocpol, Stepan, Skowronek, Tilly and Trimberger [Nota
26]
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Studies using this perspective tackle the problems of state autonomy directly
(that is to what extent state action is independent of social pressure), and of
state capacity (that is, to what extent the state contributes independently to
determining policies or political changes).
By contrast with the state-centred view, works that examine state-society
relations aim to elicit a pattern of interaction between the state (in most cases,
bureaucracy) and society (social classes or interest groups whose interests are
represented by politicians), and associate this pattern with resulting policy
outcomes or changes. Many works about interest groups and those about
economic policies adopt this view. For example, Schmitter and Lehmbruch
employ the concept of corporatism to investigate modes of representation of
social interests in the state policies;[Nota 27] Gourevitch, Haggard, Hall, Hart,
Katzenstein, and Zysman compare and contrast economic performance of
different countries in terms of the state-society relationship focusing on the state
structure [Nota 28].
Thirdly, some socio-historical institutionalists present much smaller units of
analysis, in the form of norms, rules and ideas comprised in institutions [Nota
29] For example, Elster has shifted from his interest in game theory and has
begun to pay more attention to social norms [Nota 30]. Hall tries to incorporate
elements of policy ideas into the socio-historical analysis of the policy-making
process [Nota 31], and
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March and Olsen argue the importance of norms and rules in organizational
settings [Nota 32].
Each of the socio-historical studies of institutions is unique and original, but
many recent studies share several common perspectives about politics and
political behaviour [Nota 33]. They try to identify the institutional influences that
political actors are likely to follow, such as the organizational interests,
ideologies or value orientations peculiar to certain institutions, rather than to
define them as aggregations of individual interests and preferences. They do
not define individual interests and preferences independently of institutions. Nor
do they relate political behaviour directly to individual interests and preferences.
In order to generalize their findings about different institutions, most studies rely
on a comparative analysis of political processes or the comparison of historical
cases. Thus, these studies reject the use of a deductive method to analyse
individual behaviour that can be applied to different organizations and
institutions. Consequently, they are cautious about employing a concept of
rationality that implies a behavioural pattern based on a means-ends calculus or
even goal-oriented behaviour in general.
The discussion thus far has clarified why proponents of the socio-historical
approach often regard the institutional analysis of the rational choice approach
as limited by a narrowly-defined rational action postulate. How extensively can
this criticism be applied to the rational choice approach?
The rationality concept in economics on which the rational choice approach is
based is utility maximization; it defines a behavioural pattern that links means to
ends [Nota 34]. The concept of economic rationality is purely instrumental and
formal in the sense that it denotes a choice of the best means for whatever
goals individuals pursue. While socio-historical studies regard institutions as a
primary subject of analysis, the rational choice approach focuses on individual
rational behaviour and analyses its relationship with institutions. This contrast is
often interpreted as a superior or inferior method of institutional analysis rather
than a difference in the way to examine institutional factors. Socio- historical
institutionalists tend to believe that the incorporation of a strong
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behavioural assumption, such as in the rational choice approach, deflects one's
attention from the institution as a whole; in contrast, rational choice theorists
contend that the application of a common behavioural assumption, such as a
rational choice, is the best way to distinguish institutional effects which may lead
to strikingly different political outcomes across systems or countries.
There are three reasons to believe that the conflict between the two
approaches is exaggerated. First, it is possible to use the factors such as rules,
routines and norms embedded in institutions with the postulate of individual
rational calculation in the explanation on policy outcomes. For example, Ostrom
argues that rules and social norms do not comprehend all forms of behaviour
appropriately accepted in certain social contexts, and they thereby leave a
significant amount of behaviour to independent individual decisions - most
plausibly, rational ones [Nota 35].
Secondly, on the question of institutional emergence, socio-historical and
rational choice institutionalism may not diverge as much as they appear to. The
socio-historical approach considers the emergence of institutions to be the
result of adopting a certain norm or of a historical consequence, while the
rational choice approach is concerned with the rational basis of institutional
emergence. For example, March and Olsen emphasize institutional emergence
and transformation driven by the logic of appropriateness;[ Nota 36] and the
joint essays by Steinmo and Thelen explain how historical contingencies affect
the formation of policies and political organizations [Nota 37]. In contrast, the
rational choice approach pays attention to the calculation of self-interest by
individuals. Ostrom contends that rational individuals choose institutions for selfgovernance using the information about prospective rules as well as costs and
benefits accompanied by these rules [Nota 38]. More specifically, she shows
that such voluntary self-organiza- tion, instead of coercive state action and
market mechanisms, may well solve the collective action problems of pooled
resources.
While the above rational choice explanation of the origin of institutions appears
to contradict the socio-historical approach, the recent approach within rational
choice certainly serves to bridge this gap because it emphasizes the process of
institutional emergence. For example, Knight focuses on the rational individual's
concern with the distributional consequence of institutions, but he explains the
emergence of these institutions as a by-product of distributional conflicts rather
than as a result of individuals' seeking the collective benetits expected from
them [Nota 39]. Knight shows that the rational choice explanation of institutional
emergence does not necessarily presume intentional individual
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behaviour to seek a certain goal [Nota 40]. Such a new approach shows that
rational choice neo-institutionalism may be more compatible with sociohistorical neo-institutionalism.
Lastly and most importantly, it is possible to maintain that a socio-historical
approach can also involve the assumption of rational behaviour. For example,
the rationality assumption can be an indisputable part of a statist approach,
especially one which focuses on autonomous and self-interested officials who
have secure tenure in the state. Nordlinger [Nota 41] correctly highlights a close
parallel between the statist position and the monopoly bureau model of
Niskanen [Nota 42] which contends that rational bureaucrats maximize their
budgets at the expense of the welfare of sponsors (legislatures and, ultimately,
voters). Both this statist view (in socio-historical institutionalism) and the
monopoly bureau model (in the rational choice approach) assume that
bureaucratic interests dominate over the social interests represented by party
politicians. Thus, in both approaches, bureaucratic interests determine most
policy outcomes at the expense of an electoral mandate.
The historical studies that regard the state as an autonomous organization
also define what interest policy makers or rulers are pursuing and ultimately
attribute the direction of state behaviour to their interest. For example, Skocpol
treats the state as a unitary autonomous actor in her comparative historical
study of the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions,[Nota 43] and presents
the idea that 'one (hidden or overt) feature of all autonomous state actions will
be the reinforcement of the prerogatives of collectivities of state officials' [Nota
44]. In other words, she hypothesizes that state action cannot be 'disinterested'
given its incumbents' intents, though she admits the possible inconsistency of
such an action and refrains from asserting the rationality of constituents of the
state [Nota 45].
In this way, when self-interested behaviour is taken for granted under the
guise of a unitary or autonomous state organization, state-centred views may
be interpreted as being compatible with the rational choice approach. If this is
so,
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the real dispute between the socio-historical and rational choice approaches is
over the issue of methodological individualism rather than the rationality
assumption itself.46 If one rejects an epistemological commitment to methodological individualism, one tends to understand the state only in its relationship
with social processes or social organizations. Mitchell, who regards the state as
a set of disciplinary effects, exemplifies this anti-deductionist nature of the
socio-historical approach; he argues that the state should be analysed as a
structural effect that works in a distinct dimension of society [nota 47]. However,
Mitchell's approach, which refuses to regard the state as a separate entity, is
controversial even among socio-historical institutionalists [nota 48].
The above discussion shows that socio-historical institutionalism often
includes the individual rationality assumption as an element of institutional
analysis though it refuses to develop the deductive logic starting from such a
simple assumption. This point will be confirmed in the next section with
reference to the comparative literature.
SOCIO-HISTORICAL AND RATIONAL CHOICE APPROACHES:
CONTRIBUTIONS TO COMPARATIVE STUDIES
While the critics of the rational choice approach tend to reject its utility
altogether, some rational choice theorists are also uncompromising in their view
of other approaches. Proponents of the approach contend that the individual
rationality assumption is useful for making generalizations about intentions
observed in specific cases, especially for finding an equilibrium in political
interactions as a consequence of decisions [nota 49]. This defence of the
rational choice approach often leads to a dismissal of other approaches. For
example, Riker labelled as 'hermeneutics' the approach that emphasizes
concrete circumstances or cultures in which decisions are made, and he argued
that, within such an approach, one interprets intentions of political actors
specific to the circum- stances around them and 'confines social studies entirely
to the interpretation of specific events' [nota 50]. Here, the disagreement
between critics and advocates of rational choice widens into a chasm which it is
impossible to bridge.
My position differs from the two extremes of full-blown critics and advocates of
the rational choice approach. Instead, I will argue that the socio-historical
approach and the rational choice approach have different merits. More
specifically, I will demonstrate that each approach is suitable for a different
purpose. This point is especially clear if one examines the utilities of the two
approaches in comparative studies, where scholars are required to make
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certain generalizations about political phenomena or to find rules across
different countries and political systems.
The Rational Choice Approach in Comparative Studies
Let me start with reviewing the rational choice comparative literature.
Comparative studies using the rational choice approach are still at their early
stages, but the rational choice theorists' position in such comparative inquiries is
clear: individual behaviour can be regarded as rational in so far as one is
concerned to examine major social and political consequences [nota 51]; and
thus, the fundamental principles of political behaviour are the same across
different political systems despite seemingly different configurations of
institutions and political phenomena [nota 52]. I will illustrate this position by
using a famous Downsian formulation which explains two-party and multi-party
dynamics [nota 53]. In this formulation, the political parties in a two-party system
behave quite differently from those in a multi-party system. But, this divergence
is not considered to be the result of different behavioural principles at the party
level. There is a common assumption about party behaviour that parties make
policies to maximize the votes obtained in elections. The divergence between
different party systems is the result of an adaptation, based on a common
behavioural principle, to different circumstances.
Adopting such a behavioural assumption is quite useful when one attempts to
illuminate the effects of institutions on individuals, because individuals are
assumed to respond to the same influences from their environments in the
same way, that is, rationally. This point is clear if we observe the application of
the rational choice approach to a comparative study of traditional and moder
societies, especially the pre-industrial and industrial ones. Through the eyes of
observers in industrialized democracies, African agrarian societies appear quite
distinct given their resistance to market economies and their difficulties in
transition to democratic polities. Bates began his career as an African specialist
devoted to a cultural explanation that emphasized the indigenous
characteristics of Africa, but he now argues for the utility of the rational choice
approach - especially the collective-choice approach - to a developing society
[nota 54]. One of the
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most crucial differences between the cultural and rational choice approaches
lies in whether to regard individual members of a society as having
psychological characteristics distinct from those found in industrialized
societies. Cultural explanations characterize members of a society by their
special social psychological traits, and relate a society's low level of economic
and political development to individual characteristics particular to its culture
and social values [nota 55]. The choice-theoretic approach, according to Bates,
considers the fundamental pattern of individual behaviour as basically the
same, i.e., rational, and explains divergent political and economic
consequences by influences over individuals of political institutions that are
particular to the society [nota 56]. The picture that emerges from the choicetheoretic approach is just the opposite of the one from the cultural explanation.
That is, 'behavior that has been interpreted to be the result of tradition, passed
on by socialization and learning, can instead be interpreted to be the result of
choice' [nota 57]. More specifically, individuals in agrarian societies in Africa, if
they resist modernization, 'choose to do so' instead of suffering from
misinformation or ignorance. Application of the assumption of individual
rationality, though it is not very strict in Bates's framework, leads to a successful
demonstration of the similarities in the pattern of individual behaviour across
different societies and to a refutation of the uniqueness of the case studied
[nota 58].
As Bates argues, however, a choice-theoretic approach such as the rational
choice approach is not necessarily incompatible with the explanation that
focuses on specific cultural values and distinctive institutions. While refusing to
explain every phenomenon in agrarian Africa by characteristics of its native
society, Bates appreciates the importance of 'the particularities of specific
culture' or 'significance of values and institutions'. What is to be examined 'is the
manner in which these factors systematically shape collective outcomes' [nota
59]. In his view, the rational choice approach provides a powerful tool to
connect individual behaviour to political and economic phenomena at the level
of a society or country, and to explain how rational individuals adjust to distinct
institutional settings and specific cultural entities.
Bates's approach is one of rational choice; but he also contends that
maintaining the behavioural assumption of individual rationality and appreciating the distinct influences of specific circumstance over individuals are equally
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important. This point is also demonstrated by Little [nota 60]. He stipulates that
the rational choice approach 'provides a basis for social explanation in a wide
variety of cultural contexts and may support significant cross-cultural
generalizations' [nota 61]. At the same time however, he is conscious of the
limitations of the rational choice framework, with its oversimplified and abstract
characterization of rational agents and structure, and indifference to the roles of
norms and values. He suggests that it is necessary 'to pay more attention to the
institutional framework within which choice takes place' and to the roles of
values and norms in individual decision making [nota 62]. From this position, the
distance between an approach based on the rationality assumption and one not
so based, for example, socio-historical new institutionalism, may not be very
great. Between the two approaches, there is a shift in scholarly interest: from
one eliciting the general pattern of individual behaviour to one characterizing
institutions that constitute environments for individuals.
Interestingly, Williamson observes this kind of shift in scholarly interests
between neoclassical economics based on a rigorous rationality assumption
and institutional economics based on a weak assumption of rationality, that is,
bounded rationality. He emphasizes that 'comparative institutional analysis
commonly involves an examination of discrete structural alternatives for which
marginal analysis is not required' [nota 63]. I would like to clarify this point by
following Simon's discussion of the modification of the rationality assumption
[nota 64]. According to Simon, in 'analyses aimed at explaining institutional
structure, maximizing assumptions play a much less significant role than they
typically do in the analysis of market equilibria' [nota 65]. This is because 'they
are not focused on, or even much concerned with ... how equilibrium is altered
by marginal shifts in conditions'; rather they are 'focused on qualitative and
structural questions, typically on the choice among a small number of discrete
institutional alternatives' [nota 66].
Closely paralleling this reasoning, one can speculate as to why some employ
the socio-historical analysis of institutions without using the rationality
assumption and why others apply the rationality postulate to the empirical
analysis, though not in a very strict way. To investigate this point, consider two
scholars who study different areas from a comparative institutional perspective.
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Bridging the Gap between the Socio-Historical and Rational Choice
Comparative Studies
Peter Hall, in his comparative study of Britain and France [nota 67] presents a
comprehensive concept of 'institutions', which refers to 'the formal rules,
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the
relationship between individuals in various units of the policy and economy'. In
his analysis of the empirical cases of Britain and France, Hall focuses on 'the
relational characters of institutions', especially, the influences of the organizations [nota 68] of capital, labour and state on the economic policy choices of the
two countries, while also paying close attention to external economic factors. He
examines the rational choice approach [nota 69] as an alternative to his own
institutional approach [nota 70]. He includes in the rational choice approach one
branch of organization theory, which employs a conception of bounded
rationality [nota 71]. He pays special attention to this organization theory as a
promising alternative to his approach. However, he rejects the use of this
approach in the close examination of institutions. He argues 'a great deal of
organization theory has been devoted to the discovery of laws applicable to the
operation of organizations' and 'more must be done to associate particular
patterns of rationality with specific organizational attributes' [nota 72]. Here, Hall
decides not to use the rationality assumption because he intends to analyse
different organizations, that is, capital, labour and state, by different kinds of
logic. He maintains that organization theory applies the same logic to the
analysis of these organizations. And such standardized treatment is obviously
not suitable for his purpose, which is to specify the relationships between these
organizations in the two countries in question and to distinguish the countries in
terms of their relationships.
Stephan Haggard's comparative study of newly industrializing countries
(mainly in East Asia, but also in Brazil and Mexico) [nota 73] is a good example
of starting with the rationality assumption applied to individuals and developing
the study into a socio-historical analysis. His approach is characterized as
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state-centred, although he also includes for consideration factors that represent
international shocks and pressures as well as configurations of social groups.
Instead of focusing on the relationship of different institutions as Hall does,
Haggard pays close attention to the interests of political elites as constituents of
the state. He examines how, and to what extent, international crisis or change
as well as social groups' demands are interpreted by elites and then translated
into specific policies. Thus, his state-centred view is one that is very close to the
rational choice approach centred on the monopoly power of bureaucracy which
I have already discussed relying on Nordlinger. (Nota 74) Haggard himself
acknowledges this: 'The emphasis I give to politically motivated choice by state
actors falls broadly within the realm of rational-choice theorizing, and I have
learned from this strand of work'. (Nota 75)
Haggard starts from the assumption that policy-makers rationally seek power,
but at the same time he puts 'great emphasis on the institutional context within
which political choice takes place'. He stresses the fact that 'political elites differ
in their organizational capabilities and the instruments they have at their
disposal for pursuing their goals'. (Nota 76) He is especially interested in
situations in which the distinctiveness of institutional settings across countries
leads equally rational policy-makers to different policy choices. A subtle balance
between the socio-historical emphasis and the attention to the individual policymakers is the reason why Haggard's approach clarifies the distinct policy
responses among the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) which
have been commonly characterized as successful examples of industrialization.
In this respect, Haggard succeeds in bridging the gap between the first and
second groups of new institutionalists.
This compatibility between the rationality postulate and the socio-historical
analysis demonstrated by Haggard casts doubt on an easy distinction between
the socio-historical and rational choice new institutionalism in comparative
studies. The assumption of individual rationality often seems the focal point of
the dispute between the two groups, but as Haggard's work implies, sociohistorical analysis is not necessarily incompatible with the employment of the
rationality assumption. This finding parallels the theoretical argument at the end
of the previous section: the real difference between socio-historical and rational
choice institutionalism arises from their epistemological attitude to the deductive
logic which derives from a strict application of the rationality assumption. Some
socio-historical new institutionalists clarify the behavioural postulate prior to
analysis, but do not extend the application of such an assumption all the way in
the analysis.
A typical example of such an approach is Rogowski's cautious but persuasive
presentation of the influence of trade on domestic political cleavages in cases
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varying from the ancient period to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. (Nota
77) Rogowski presents a set of three simple assumptions about political
behaviour. First, those who gain from trade try to maintain the status quo while
those who are harmed by exposure to the same situation try to change it;
secondly, economic gainers increase their political power; thirdly, the economic
beneficiaries of trade attempt to institutionalize the mechanism in order to
continue the current favourable conditions. (Nota 78) The close parallel
between economic capability and political power and the primacy of selfinterested behaviour (Nota 79) supports an examination of the historical
development of political cleavages. What he demonstrates is the link between
conflicting domestic interests in the trade issue and political cleavages, a link
which has otherwise been obscured by other factors such as political culture,
religion, tradition, social heritage and custom, and political contingencies. He
avoids overplaying the impact of trade on domestic politics and does not assert
that trade determined most of the configurations of domestic social alliances of
the countries which he studied. Despite this modesty, Rogowski's work
convincingly shows that a rational response to trade contributes to a specific
institutionalization of political alliance in countries that had previously been
examined primarily by socio-historical studies such as Gerschenkron (Nota 80)
and Moore. (Nota 81) He critically examines these alternative explanations of
the emergence of domestic political alliances while showing empirically the
persuasiveness of his argument.
In this respect, Rogowski's approach contrasts well with the rational choice
analysis of Przeworski.(Nota 82) Przeworski uses a game theoretical
formulation to explain the institutional consolidation of democracy. He
specifically focuses on conflicting social forces which try to capture the
transition to democracy to advance their political advantages. He regards the
transition as a process in which their conflicts over a basic institutional design
continue. At the same time, he relates democratic transition with reform to a
market-oriented economy. What is to be noted here is that Przeworski uses the
recent transitions to democracy and market economy in Eastern Europe and
Latin America to support his theory rather than using the framework to explain
these cases. Though both Rogowski and Przeworski start their socio-historical
analysis from the rationality assumption, they differ in how they draw their
conclusions and justify their arguments. Rogowski's work is based firmly on the
assumption of
Página 570
rational behaviour, but his argument is closely supported by inductive reasoning
and empirical observation. (Nota 83).
An approach such as Rogowski's opens' the possibility that the rationality
assumption will be abandoned if it does not approximate a real situation. Such
an example is found in Steinmo's (1993) comparative study of the development
of contemporary taxation in Sweden, Britain and the United States [Nota 84].
Steinmo attempts both an analysis of individual rational behaviour and a socio-
historical analysis. In contrast with Rogowski, however, Steinmo finds little point
in using the rationality assumption and shifts the emphasis to institutional
analysis. Steinmo does not deny that citizens, party politicians and bureaucrats
are rational in the sense that they try to pursue their own interests. But, at the
same time, he emphasizes that they are not necessarily well-informed because
of the limitations of their capacity and affordable time (especially in the case of
citizens); and that 'people do not have a single definable and stable hierarchy of
preferences that can or should be used to decide between competing policy
choices' [Nota 85]. The recognition of the ambiguities of the preferences and
the decisions of political actors shifts the focus of analysis to political institutions
which constitute the context in which policy decisions and behaviour take place.
Steinmo does not deny the existence of a common behavioural pattern across
countries and contends that 'both citizens and elites in Sweden, Britain and the
United States would make highly similar decisions if offered similar
choices'[Nota 86]. However, 'the real choices in one country are not likely to be
offered in the same way that they are in another country ... because the
institutions through which they are offered differ' [Nota 87].Thus, political
institutions which were founded on the basis of historic compromise in these
countries from 1918 to 1945 still have sweeping influences over tax policy
outcomes, though they have been changing and are expected to change in the
future [Nota 88].
Rogowski's and Steinmo's attitudes towards the rationality assumption differ:
Rogowski finds that trade has a persistent impact on the domestic politics of
interest-seeking behaviour, while Steinmo detects no major impact from rational
political behaviour over tax policy outcomes [Nota 89]. Like Rogowski,
Page 571
Steinmo pays close attention to individual rational behaviour and carefully
examines its meaning. But, based on the findings in his comparative study of
tax politics in three countries, Steinmo explicitly denies any epistemological and
methodological commitments that aim to establish a universal law of human
behaviour [Nota 90].
What I have argued in this section is quite simple. Researchers choose a
certain approach from several alternatives, based on their interest in their
subjects and the purpose of their investigation. This attitude is also observed in
their choice between two different new institutionalist approaches - the sociohistorical approach and the rational choice approach. The rational choice
approach explains individual behaviour relating to institutions, but it distinguishes the logic of individual behaviour from that of institutional characteristics. This distinction avoids tying individual behaviour to specific institutions and
serves to emphasize the fundamental pattern of individual behaviour across
different institutional settings. However, this is exactly the reason why some
socio-historical institutionalists such as Hall and Steinmo refrain from using the
rationality assumption and employ a more qualitative analysis of institutions. In
other words, researchers who are overtly concerned with connecting political
choices with the distinct institutional settings of each country, consider the
common patterns of behaviour which may link individual decisions to
institutional settings across countries a secondary interest. Thus, in terms of
scholarly emphasis, both the socio-historical approach and the rational choice
approach are equally justified with no need to dismiss the other.
The Issue of Epistemological Commitment to Methodological Individualism
Despite the compatibility described above between these new institutional
approaches, commitments to methodological individualism may still remain an
issue on which socio-historical new institutionalism and rational choice new
institutionalism disagree. While deduction based on methodological individualism is a theoretical foundation of rational choice comparative studies, the sociohistorical new institutionalists may argue that this theoretical core of the rational
choice itself is incompatible with robust empirical analysis. The key
Page 572
issue here is to what extent and in what way the rational choice comparative
studies can leave room for empiricism. To answer this, one needs to find
comparative literature that apparently employs methodological individualism
and to examine to what extent and in what way it can go hand in hand with
empiricism.
A good example of such literature is Margaret Levi's analysis of the state's
power to produce revenue [Nota 91]. She explains revenue production by the
presence of predatory rulers who aim to satisfy their personal objectives by
maximizing revenue. Levi's analysis is clearly based on methodological
individualism and deduction. She focuses on the self-interested behaviour of
rulers and explains how institutions are arranged to maintain a half-voluntary
compliance with state power to maximize revenue. The rulers' bargaining
power, their ability to avoid transaction costs and the durability of their rule are
the factors that constitute the constraint on their choice of a revenue system
through which they try to capture as much revenue as possible. Alternatively,
the rulers attempt to increase their bargaining power with the governed or their
constituencies, lower the transaction costs that they incur when collecting
revenue (that is, costs of bargaining, agency costs, and so on), and keep lower
discount rates of the present value of revenue in the future. This perspective
shows the dynamic interaction between micro-level factors (which define the
rulers' rational behaviour) and macro-level factors (which characterize the
resulting revenue policies) and is consistent with the process analysis that uses
historical material. Thus Levi can apply her theory to such diverse cases as
Republican Rome, medieval and Renaissance France and England, eighteenthcentury Britain, and twentieth- century Australia, and support her argument with
ample empirical evidence.
Another example of a rational choice comparative study is Geddes's work
which seeks to explain why some Latin American countries have engaged in
administrative reforms to create competent bureaucracies and others have not
[Nota 92]. She considers that reform involves the supply of collective goods to
people in developing countries who desire economic development and essential
govern- ment services through well-organized bureaucratic systems. According
to her argument, politicians face a dilemma when they attempt to implement
reforms that are beneficial for the long-term development of countries and are
desired by their constituencies. This is because they need to give up political
resources (that is, clientelism, established personal connection with officials,
and so on) which they currently get from the existing systems. Politicians
become political entrepreneurs who institute reform only when the benefits
outweigh the costs of implementing them. This means that a substantial number
of politicians must be continuously encouraged with incentives to boost their
latent interests to provide a public good. What is to be noted in Geddes's
framework is that the
Page 573
politicians' incentives to provide a public good (that is, competent administrative capacity expected from the reforms) are primarily shaped by political
institutions such as election systems, party systems, organizations of executive
branches and so on. In her framework, the institutional setting of the country is
not just a constraint on politicians' rational behaviour, rather it provides the
incentives for politicians as well as the solution for collective action problem.
This is the reason why she can point out institutional conditions which serve to
introduce and extend administrative reforms based on historical and empirical
observation. For example, when access to patronage resources is evenly
divided among major parties (such as in stable two-party systems), reforms are
more likely to be introduced and 'presidents are more likely to help build
administrative competence in stable, well-institutionalized, less fragmented, and
more disciplined party systems' [Nota 93].
Levi's and Geddes's works suggest that methodological individualism and
deduction do not necessarily preclude the production of high quality empirical
works. In both studies, the assumed behaviour of a rational individual is deeply
embedded in institutional circumstance. This reminds us of the importance of
knowing under what conditions and in what context rational behaviour takes
place. A ramification of this point provides a key to understanding why the third
group of new institutionalists employs a concept of bounded rationality distinct
from economic rationality conventionally conceived in the rational choice
framework. To explore this issue, the next section will first introduce a
distinction between the concepts of economic and bounded rationality. Then, I
will consider the utility the bounded rationality concept has in comparative
politics.
ECONOMIC RATIONALITY AND BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE
SECOND AND THIRD GROUPS OF NEW INSTITUTIONALISTS
The most popular criticism of the rational choice approach is that the rationality
assumption is too strict and unrealistic to apply to real situations. A criticism of
rational choice perspectives involves two related but still distinct points: (1) the
realism of the rationality assumption, that is, the fit between the rationality
assumption and real situations in general; and (2) the possibility that such a
simple account of individual rationality may ignore the complexities of incentives
in specific real situations.
There are two possible ways to defend the rationality assumption in the face of
such criticisms. One is to defend its general applicability, that is, to support the
utility of the assumption in all aspects of political life. This position ignores the
criticism of the 'un-realism' of the rationality assumption in order to emphasize
its utility as the foundation for coherent theory. Another defence is more modest
and claims that the rationality assumption is a good approximation
Page 574
of certain forms of political behaviour, and thus the rational choice approach is a
true theory in a significant number of important cases though it may not explain
all cases. The second position is obviously concerned with the question of
whether the rationality assumption is realistic or not, that is, the assumption's fit
with specific real situations.
The first position - ascribing rationality to actors prior to an empirical
investigation - is well illustrated by the work of Gary S. Becker. He contrasts
sceptics and advocates of the rational choice approach and explains his
position as follows:
I start with the assumption that behaviour is rational, and ask, 'As I apply this to
a particular problem, is there behaviour that I cannot explain with the rationality
model?'... Others [who] are more agnostic about the scope of rationality ... will
approach a problem by asking, 'Does this look like rational behaviour or is it
better interpreted in a different way?' Part of the difference, therefore, is the
degree of commitment or confidence one has of finding rational behaviour when
investigating a particular set of phenomena [Nota 94].
Becker's statement above well illustrates the point that a pattern of rational
behaviour is assumed as a postulate rather than is examined as an empirical
question.
Becker is also clear about the potential and scope of the economic analysis of
human behaviour. He argues that the economic approach provides a
comprehensive framework for all human behaviour, but he does not suppose
that its application will exhaust useful explanations for all human behaviour. He
applies the economic approach because 'all human behaviour can be viewed as
involving participants who maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences
and accumulate an optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety
of markets [Nota 95].
Simon, by contrast, is more circumspect about using the rationality
assumption. He describes it as 'a methodological principle', so that 'if the
conditions of the real world approximate sufficiently well the assumption of an
ideal type, the derivations from these assumptions will be approximatelycorrect'.96 Differing from that of Becker, this attitude is concerned with the fit
between the rationality assumption and real-life situations, as well as with the
Page 575
theoretical coherence of the approach based on the assumption. It is consistent
with Simon's proposal of bounded rationality as a more realistic assumption
than conventional economic rationality. Based on this concept of bounded
rationality, there is a third category of new institutionalism, which is too rarely
distinguished from rational choice approaches based on economic rationality.
Yet the differences between the concepts of economic rationality and bounded
rationality are significant.
Let me compare and contrast the two different concepts of rationality. Utility
maximization according to economic rationality assumes that actors have
consistent orderings of preferences, constituting their utility functions. The utility
functions may be flexibly defined, but once defined, the actors are assumed to
maximize their utility based on it [Nota 97]. Behaviour is chosen from the
alternatives and serves as a means to lead to particular specified outcomes.
The second premise of the economic approach is thus the consistent link
between means and ends. The critical point here is that this model presumes
the existence of a 'real situation.' Here I mean a 'real situation' in the context of
behaviour. The economic approach presupposes that such a context is
specified and constitutes 'one world' in which the behaviour of all individuals is
commonly observed and analysed. And thus 'rational' behaviour is objectively
defined in relation to the context.
The rival concept is bounded or procedural rationality, which tries to explain
the process of choosing objectives, selecting means and employing strategies
to achieve objectives. The concept of bounded rationality [Nota 98] rests upon
more realistic assumptions than that of substantive rationality. The concept
focuses on the subjectivity of goal-oriented behaviour. It distinguishes 'between
the rationality of perceptions themselves (i.e., whether or not the situation as
perceived is the "real" situation) and the rationality of choice, given the
perceptions' [Nota 99]. This concept highlights the subjective nature of human
self-interested behaviour, that is, 'behaviour that is rational given the perceptual
Page 576
and evaluational premises of subjects [Nota 100]. Alternatively, a set of such
premises constitutes the environment for human behaviour, and the definition of
rationality is inseparable from it. To highlight its difference from substantive
rationality, two major points in the bounded rationality approach should be
distinguished. The first is the limited capabilities of human beings with respect
to information - including misperceptions, misevaluations, limited processing of
accumulated information and a limited attention span. Simon writes:
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems
is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required
for objectively rational behavior in the real world - or even for a reasonable
approximation to such objective rationality [Nota 101],
An emphasis on the limitations of human information capability, however, does
not necessarily imply an incomplete and degraded form of rational behaviour.
Rather, the bounded rationality approach suggests a notion of rational
behaviour that is more reasonable and realistic once the limitations of human
capability are taken seriously. With a limited information capability, an individual
only 'intends' to be rational, and 'the intended rationality of an actor requires him
to construct a simplified model of the real situation in order to deal with it [Nota
102]. One ramification of this approach involves the second point, which distinguishes the concept of bounded rationality from the concept of economic
rationality. That is, a simplified model of the real situation is actually nurtured by
the environment in which the behaviour takes place. The following passage
makes clear the importance of the environment of behaviour in the conceptualization of bounded rationality.
It is impossible for the behavior of a single, isolated individual to reach any high
degree of rationality... Individual choice takes place in an environment of
'givens' - premises that are accepted by the subject as bases for his choice: and
behavior is adaptive only within the limits set by these 'givens'[Nota 103]
Subsequently, Simon suggests that organizations often provide an environment
that makes their members recognize premises of behaviour and encourages
'rational' behaviour within the context of the organization. Although organizational environment may lead to a more integrated pattern of behaviour, one can
easily extend the concern with the environment of rational behaviour to a
renewed interest in institutions as a less integrated but more frequently
observed environment of behaviour.
Page 577
In economics and also in some interdisciplinary fields such as organization
theory, the two concepts of rationality are clearly distinguished. The concept of
bounded rationality is considered a major challenge to the foundation of
conventional economic theory, based on the concept of substantive rationality
[Nota 104]. In mainstream political science, however, there is no clear
distinction between these concepts [Nota 105]. Some critics of the rational
choice approach cite Simon's critical comparison of economic rationality with
bounded (or procedural) rationality [Nota 106] and emphasize the limitation of
economic rationality. At the same time, however, they often criticize works that
are based on the concept of bounded rationality because they regard the
works.as attempts to modify conventional rational choice perspectives by
postulating incomplete information or subjective utility maximization [Nota 107].
Like their critics, rational choice theorists in political science rarely pay attention
to the distinctions between the concepts of bounded rationality and economic
rationality that Simon makes [Nota 108]. A distinction between the two
concepts, however, has less impact in political science than in economics. The
reason for this is quite simple. As Simon emphasizes, many rational choice
works in political science, game theoretical models, spatial competition models,
and so on, draw heavily on assumptions other than the simple assumption of
economic rationality [Nota 109]. Such assumptions include the limited rationality
of certain actors - that is, some assumptions of bounded rationality - as well as
the shape and nature of the utility function. Differing from the simple and
rigorous assumption of economic rationality, these assumptions have to be
identified ultimately by empirical research [Nota 110].The
Page 578
review of various rational choice approaches in the second section of this article
confirms this point. All the literature departs from the simple rationality
assumption and incorporates abundant empirical material which constitutes the
auxiliary assumptions of the rational choice comparative literature. There are
also attempts by rational choice theorists to narrow the distance between
inductive and empirical research and rigorous theory of rational action. For
example, Laver and Schofield try to bridge the gap between the game theoretic
approach to analysing party coalitions and the inductive and empirical approach
to examining the real behaviour of party coalitions [Nota 111].
Although the incorporation of yet another rivalry among the advocates of the
different concepts of rationality might not seem useful, emphasizing the
distinctiveness of the concept of bounded rationality has its own merits. First,
more emphasis on the bounded rationality concept will also appeal to many
sceptics by showing both the flexibility and realism of an approach focused on
rational behaviour. When political scientists replace the concept of economic
rationality with one of bounded rationality without changing what they mean,
their presentation of analytical results will be in plain language, avoiding strictly
defined concepts in economics (equilibrium, Pareto-optimal, and so on). This
restriction of the use of economic concepts to formal analysis will not only
reduce the doubts of the sceptics, but also serve to maintain the accurate
meanings of the concepts themselves.
More importantly, the introduction of the concept of bounded rationality opens
the possibility of understanding political phenomena and outcomes which the
rational choice approach falls short of comprehending [Nota 112]. First, the
concept of bounded rationality is useful in explaining seemingly irrational
behaviour that reveals a consistent pattern. For example, people's behaviour
under a fascist regime and the behaviour of members of terrorist and racist
groups are difficult to understand for those outside such regimes or groups, but
are organized by consistent rules or patterns. Behaviour in unusual
organizational and institutional circumstances is often considered far from
rational, but employment of the concept of bounded rationality can help analyse
the pattern of that behaviour without marginalizing it as abnormal. Goals, which
may seem extravagant for outsiders, can be considered inevitable under a
certain perception of the environment. The concept of bounded rationality is
especially useful in investigating the perceptional limitation and bias of human
beings and connecting them with goal-oriented behaviour.
Page 579
The utility of the concept of bounded rationality, however, is not limited to
specific fields of comparative studies. Rather it may be more appropriate than
the economic rationality concept is in explaining real political behaviour when
considering circumstantial conditions that influence individual behaviour. For
example, Taylor identifies the conditions under which a strictly defined rational
choice theory is more likely to provide strong explanations about real political
changes [Nota 113]. According to him, they are; '(1) the options of courses of
action available to the agent are limited'; '(2) at least some of the thin incentives
facing the agent or the costs and benefits attached to the alternative courses of
actions, are to the agent in question well defined'; '(3) ... it matters (or will turn
out to matter) a great deal to the individual which action is chosen'; 'and (4) prior
to the choice situation there have previously been many similar or analogous
occasions [Nota 114]. These conditions actually mean that behaviour is more
consistently explained by the strict rationality assumption when individuals are
in a situation in which the cost and benefit of their choice is simple and clear,
and anyhow they understand the meaning of their choice - that is, in what
context their choice will be made and how much gain or damage a specific
choice will or is likely to bring. Taylor's discussion implies that the applicability of
the rational choice framework to real situations may depend on factors which
are not directly concerned with the core of the rational choice framework circumstantial conditions in which the behaviour is taken and the perceptions of
the actors about these conditions. If such conditions are not satisfied,
individuals are more likely to take different courses of action from the ones
based on the strict rationality assumption, and these actions tend to lead to
outcomes or consequences that are different from those predicted by the
rational
Page 580
choice explanation. And, in that case, it is more useful to employ the bounded
rationality concept which stresses the limitation of the actor's perception
capability and delineates real situations by auxiliary assumptions to explain
behaviour. Although there are only a small number of works that use the
bounded rationality concept while recognizing its merits as defined above, I can
introduce at least two examples in comparative studies.
In his comparative study of the development of bureaucratic organizations in
France, Japan, the United States and Great Britain, Silberman employs the
concept of bounded rationality. He focuses on the 'uncertainty' of situations
which political elites faced with the succession of leadership in these countries
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when bureaucratic
organizations were developed [Nota 115]. He explains the different patterns of
bureaucratic development across these countries by the greater or lesser
uncertainty for political elites who wanted to establish rules of leadership
succession and strategically chose specific forms of bureaucracy in order to
ensure their possession of power. In the United States and Great Britain in the
nineteenth century, individual equality was established in principle, and political
leaders established rules for determining possession and succession of power
based on social networks or competitive party systems. Because of the low
level of uncertainty related to the leadership organizations in these countries,
highly professional and politically controlled bureaucracies evolved which were
accountable to their constituencies. By contrast, France and Japan experienced
revolutionary political changes, and political leaders in these countries faced
crises of possession and succession of power in the nineteenth century. Under
conditions of great uncertainty, the emerging bureaucratic organization in Japan
and France was utilized as a basis of power for political elites, and a classic
type of a highly rationalized bureaucracy was developed to decrease the
uncertainty of political situations.
Silberman's conceptualization of 'uncertainty' does not fit well with the rational
choice framework in which uncertainty is regarded as a factor that is a mere
constraint on rational behaviour. The problem of uncertainty is solved in the
framework of economic rationality by assigning a probability to each course of
action and a specific consequence of that action. In his framework, however,
the level of uncertainty actually changes the course of action for rational
individuals. Silberman convincingly shows, by using historical evidence, that the
uncertainty of a political situation itself is a primary factor in determining political
elites' strategic responses to an emerging bureaucratic organization. A high or
low uncertainty of environment for the power struggle of political elites, together
with other institutional arrangements such as social networks or political parties,
led to a specific form of bureaucratic organization.
Page 581
Only by using the concept of bounded rationality does Silberman construct a
framework for comparing rational behaviour.
Another example of the use of the concept of bounded rationality is Budge's
work on party competition [Nota 116]. Budge's analysis is especially interesting
because it offers a spatial theory of party competition distinct from the rational
choice approach and is likely to provide a new theory of party competition
based on bounded rationality. In his article, the spatial theory of party
competition is first called into question by pointing out that politicians can obtain
little reliable information about how a party's policy decision influences the next
election. To analyse behaviour subject to such uncertainty, Budge employs the
bounded rationality concept. Then, based on Schelling [Nota 117], he suggests
that, with uncertainty, policy equilibria may emerge from cognitive factors such
as ideology rather than from motivational factors such as re-election incentives.
The merit of his work is that it goes beyond pointing up the uncertainty to
incorporate ideology into the analysis. By doing so he extends his model of
electoral competition to a model of government formation and narrows the gap
between the spatial theory of electoral competition and the spatial theory of
government formation.
Budge's work implies that the rational choice theory may not be able to present
an adequate and unified model for rational behaviour at different levels. The
spatial election model justifies its assumption that politicians seek re-election
because votes and office are the most plausible motivations for politicians, while
the spatial theory of party coalition regards policy implemen- tation as one of the
important goals pursued by parties. The chasm between the two spatial models
exists because the goals for electoral competition and for coalition formation,
both of which concern party politicians, may not be commensurable. Party
politicians want to be re-elected, but, at the same time, once they are re-elected
they want to pursue policies that they favour. Thus, Budge raises the possibility
that in real situations, the party politicians are likely to rely on ideology that
permits them to decide on their behaviour at both the level of electoral
competition and party competition in government formation. He confirms his
argument with data on party behaviour in twenty democracies. As with
Silberman's work, Budge demonstrates that an analysis based on bounded
rationality can offer a useful explanation that may not be possible when relying
on the rational choice approach.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I have distinguished three groups of new institutionalists - the
socio-historical new institutionalists, the rational choice new institutionalists,
Page 582
and the new institutionalists who use a more flexible concept of rationality - in
terms of their attitudes to rational behaviour and its relationship to institutions.
Then, I showed that neither the socio-historical new institutionalism nor the
rational choice approach is superior to the other in terms of institutional
analysis. Each approach has different strengths in undertaking comparative
studies: the socio-historical approach is suitable for explaining directly the
distinctiveness and differences between the cases compared; the rational
choice approach employs a different strategy to apply the assumption of rational
behaviour and illuminates institutional differences that produce distinct policy
and political outcomes. I argue that the most critical dispute between the sociohistorical new institutionalism and the rational choice approach involves
epistemological commitments to methodological individualism, not the issue of
whether to employ the rationality assumption. In the final section, I introduced a
distinction between the concepts of economic rationality and bounded rationality
and proposed the utility of the bounded rationality concept in an analysis of real
behaviour.
NOTAS
* página 553
Department of Social Science, University of Tokyo. The author gratefully
acknowledges comments and suggestions from Stephan Haggard, Margaret
Levi, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Sven Steinmo, Albert Weale and two anonymous
Journal referees.
Nota 1 - página 553
T. Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current
Research', in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, eds, Bringing The
State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 3-37); J. G.
March and J. P. Olsen, 'The New Institutionalism: Organized Factors in Political
Life', American Political Science Review, 78 (1984), 734-49; J. G. March and J.
P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics (New
York: The Free Press, 1989).
Nota 2- página 553
T. Mitchell, 'The Limit of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and the Critics',
American Political Science Review, 85 (1991), 77-96; T. Mitchell, 'Response:
Going Beyond the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 101721; J. Bendix, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political
Science Review, 86 (1992), 1007-10; B. Ollman, 'Controversy: Going Beyond
the State', American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1014-17; B. H.
Sparrow, 'Controversy: Going Beyond the State', American Political Science
Review, 82 (1992), 1010-14.
Nota 3 – página 553
G. A. Almond, 'The Return to the State', American Political Science Review, 82
(1988), 853-74; O. K. Pederson, 'Nine Questions to a Neo-lnstitutional Theory in
Political Science', Scandinavian Journal of Political Science, 14 (1991), 125-48.
Nota 4 - página 554
H. A. Simon, 'A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice', Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 69 (1955), reprinted in H. A. Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality:
Behavioral Economics and Business Organization (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 1982); and H. A. Simon, Models of Man: Social and Rational (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1987); H. A. Simon, 'Rational Choice and the Structure of
Environment', Psychological Review, 63 (1956), reprinted in Simon, Models of
Bounded Rationality and Simon, Models of Man.
Nota 5 - página 554
Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In'. She does not use the term 'new
institutionalism'.
Nota 6 - página 554
M. D. McCubbins, 'Introduction', in P. Cowhey and M. D. McCubbins, eds,
Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 1-16.
Nota 7 – página 554
D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
Nota 8 - página 554
For example, S. Steinmo and K. Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in
Comparative Politics', in S. Steinmo, K. Thelen and F. Longstreth, eds,
Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32; March and Olsen,
Rediscovering Institutions; M. Levi, K. S. Cook, J. A. O'Brien and H. Faye,
'Introduction: The Limits of Rationality', in K. S. Cook and M. Levi, eds, The
Limits of Rationality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990, pp. 219-63);
W. R. Keech, R. H. Bates and P. Lange, 'Political Economy within Nations', in
W. Crotty, ed., Political Science: Looking to the Future, Vol. 2 (Evanston, NJ:
Northwestern University Press,1991), pp. 1-16; P. A. Hall and R. C. R. Taylor,
'Political Science and Four New Institutionalisms' (presented to the Annual
Meeting of American Political Science Association in New York, 1994).
Nota 9 - página 555
The terms 'institutions' and 'organizations' are often used synonymously
because both can be applied to some collective bodies, for example, the state,
bureaucracy, firm, market and so on. But, I consider 'organizations' the better
term in the more specific context in which one presupposes certain internal
structures in such entities and regards these bodies as unified actors. Knight
presents a similar definition of organizations (see J. Knight, Institutions and
Social Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992)).
Nota 10 - página 556
Because most scholars who endorse the socio-historical approach pay too little
attention to the difference in the rationality assumption between the second and
the third groups, I also do not distinguish them in this section. Their differences
will be introduced later.
Nota 11- página 556
Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In', pp. 4-6.
Nota 12 - página 556
March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions, pp. 3-8.
Nota 13 - página 556
P. C. Ordeshook, 'The Emerging Discipline of Political Economy', in J. Alt and
K. A. Shepsle, eds, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 9-30.
Nota 14 - página 556
For example, see P. A. Hall, Governing the Economy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), and Ordeshook, 'Emerging Discipline of Political
Economy'.
Nota 15 - página 556
Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'. Their
edited book (Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, eds, Structuring Politics) is a
collection of essays, many of which have developed into books. For example,
C. A. Dunlavy, Political Structure and Institutional Change (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993); V. C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State
Power: The Origins of Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1993): and S. Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993). These works are good
examples of historical institutionalism, but I will review only Steinmo, Taxation
and Democracy, because of the limited space here.
Nota 16 – página 557
Steinmo and Thelen , ' Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics', p. 12.
Nota 17- página 557
W. A. Niskanen Jr, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago:
Aldine, 1971).
Nota 18 - página 557
G. Brennan and J. M. Buchanan, The Power to Tax (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1980).
Nota 19 - página 557
A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper & Row,
1957); J. M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consents (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1962); W. H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism:
A Confrontation Between the Theory of Social Choice and the Theory of
Democracy (New York: Freeman, 1982).
Nota 20- página 557
M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1965).
Nota 21- página 557
Downs, Economic Theory of Democracy.
Nota 22 - página 557/558
R. Calvert, M. J. Moran and B. R. Weingast, 'Congressional Influence over
Policy Making: The Case of FTC', in M. D. McCubbins and T. Sullivan, eds,
Congress: Structure and Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1987), pp. 493-522; R. Calvert, M. D. McCubbins and B. R. Weingast, 'A
Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion', American Journal of Political
Science, 33 (1989), 588-611; M. P. Fiorina, 'Legislative Choice of Regulatory
Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?', Public Choice, 39 (1982),
33-66; M. D. McCubbins, 'The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure',
American Journal of Political Science, 29 (1985), 721-48; M. D. McCubbins and
T. Schwartz, 'Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Policy Patrols versus Fire
Alarms', American Journal of Political Science, 2 (1984), 164-79, reprinted in
McCubbins and Sullivan, eds, Congress: Structure and Policy; K. A. Shepsle,
'Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models',
American Journal of Political Science, 23 (1979), 27-59; K. A. Shepsle,
'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in H. F. Weisberg, eds,
Political Science: The Science of Politics (New York: Agathon Press, 1986), pp.
51-81; K. A. Shepsle and B. Weingast, 'Structure-Induced Equilibrium and
Legislative Choice', Public Choice, 37 (1981), 503-19; B. R. Weingast and W. J.
Marshall, 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like
Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1988),
132-63.
Nota 23 - página 558
T. M. Moe, 'The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public
Bureaucracy', in 0. E. Williamson, ed, Organization Theory: From Chester
Barnard to the Present and Beyond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990),
pp. 116-53.
Nota 24 - página 558
Pederson presents a categorization that includes (1) a state-centred theory, (2)
a strategic relational theory, and (3) an institutional theory (Pederson, 'Nine
Questions to a Neo-Institutional
Nota 25 - página 558
Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In'.
Nota 26- página 558/559
P. R. Evans, Dependent Development: The Alliance of Multi-national, State, and
Local Capital in Brazil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); S. D.
Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and U.S.
Foreign Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); E. A.
Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1981 ); T. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979); A. Stepan, State and Society: Peru in Comparative
Perspective (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978); S. Skowronek,
Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative
Capitalism (F'note continued) (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982);
C. Tilley, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); E. K. Trimberger, Revolution from
Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and
Peru (New Brunswick, Mass.: Transaction Books, 1978).
Nota 27- página 559
P. C. Schmitter and C. Lehmbruch, eds, Trends toward Corporatist
Intermediation (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1979). Another example of
comparative studies on corporatism is S. D. Berger, Organizing Interests in
Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
Nota 28 - página 559
P. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1986); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1990); Hall, Governing the Economy; J. A. Hart, Rival Capitalists (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1992); P. Katzenstein, Corporatism and Change
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); P. Katzenstein, Small States in
World Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985); J. Zysman,
Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of
Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).
Nota 29 - página 559
The extension of this perspective in political science may be very close to
'sociological institutionalism', named by Hall and Taylor in 'Political Science and
Four New Institutionalisms', which defines the institution more loosely and
flexibly. For example, see W. W. Powell and P. J. Dimaggie, eds, The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1991).
Nota 30- página 559
For his interest in the rational choice approach, see J. Elster, Ulysses and
Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984). For his interest in social norms, see J. Elster, The
Cements of Society: A Study of Social Order (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1989); J. Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of
Rationality (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
Nota 31 - página 559
Peter A. Hall, ed., The Political Power of Economic Ideas (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1989).
Nota 32 - página 560
March and Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. Some of the works, of course,
may involve more than one perspective and, thus, it is difficult to classify all the
works into the above-mentioned categories. For example, Katzenstein's work
can be placed somewhere between the first and second groups, and
Friedman's between the second and third. See P. Katzenstein, ed., Between
Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States
(Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1978); D. Friedman, The Misunderstood
Miracle: Industrial Development and Political Change in Japan (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1988).
Nota 33 - página 560
Pederson, 'Nine Questions to a Neo-Institutional Theory', also presents a
characterization of common theoretical points of the first group of
institutionalists. My presentation here is compatible with, but still distinctive
from, each of his points, because here I am primarily concerned with its
relationship with the rationality assumption, which Pederson includes, but does
not make the focus of his discussion.
Nota 34 - página 560
This definition is oversimplified, but, at this point, it is sufficient to show that the
criticism on the rationality concept is misdirected. In the final section, I will clarify
further the concept of economic rationality in contrast with the bounded
rationality concept.
Nota 35 - página 561
E. Ostrom, 'Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward
Complementarity'. Amertican Political Science Reviewv, 85 (1991), 237-50.
Nota 36 - página 561
March and Olsen. Rediscovering ln.stitution.s.
Nota 37- página 561
Steinmo and Thelen, 'Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics'.
Nota 38 - página 561
Ostrom, 'Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis'.
Nota 39 - página 561
Knight, Institutions Clad1 Social Conflict.
Nota 40 - página 562
Before Knight, some empirical and theoretical works showed that social
institutions are human artefacts but that their formations are not entirely
explained by relying on rational behaviour. For an example of empirical work,
see 0. Young, Resource Regimes (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1982).
Nota 41 - página 562
E. A. Nordlinger, 'The Return to the State: Critiques', American Political Science
Review, 82 (1988), 875-85, especially pp. 880-1.
Nota 42 - página 562
Niskanen, Bureaucracy tand Representative Government.
Nota 43 - página 562
Skocpol, States (1and Social Revolutions.
Nota 44 - página 562
Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In'. p. 15.
Nota 45 -página 562
Mitchell has already shown in detail that Skocpol's perspective of state
organization in States and Social Revolutions ultimately relies on the ideology
or interest of political leaders or rulers who are constituents of the slate (see
Mitchell, 'Limit of the State', pp. 86-9). Kitschelt also considers the combination
of historical structuralism and the rational choice approach in Skocpol's work as
evidence of the compatibility of the socio-historical and rational choice
approaches. See H. Kitschelt, 'Political Regime Change: Structure and ProcessDriven Explanations?' American Political Science Review, 86 (1992), 1028-34,
n. 1.
Nota 46 - página 563
I thank Stephan Haggard for his suggestion that I should include this point here.
Nota 47 - página 563
Mitchell, 'Limit of the State'.
Nota 48 -página 563
Bendix, 'Controversy'; Sparrow, 'Controversy'; Oilman, 'Controversy'.
Nota 49 - página 563
Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', p. 175.
Nota 50 - página 563
Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', p. 175.
Nota 51- página 564
This adjectival clause is important to defend the rationality assumption against
the finding in psychology that human behaviours in experimental situations
diverge from what a theory of rational choice predicts. See A. Tversky and D.
Kahneman, 'Rational Choice and the Framing of Decision', in Hogarth and
Reder, eds, Rational Choice. Becker turns this qualification into the strength of
the rationality assumption by showing that economic behaviours at the market
level can be rational even though irrational decisions dominate individual
behaviour in that market. See G. S. Becker, 'Irrational Behavior and Economic
Theory', Journal of Political Economy, 70 (1962), 1-13.
Nota 52 - página 564
For example, see M. McCubbins, 'Introduction', in Cowhey and McCubbins,
eds, Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States.
Nota 53 - página 564
Downs, Economic TheolT of Democracy.
Nota 54 - página 564: R. H. Bates, 'Macropolitical Economy in the Field of
Development', in Alt and Shepsle, eds. Perspectives on Positive Political
Economy, pp. 31-54.
Nota 55 -página 565
R. H. Bates, 'Some Contemporary Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian
Change', in A. Kohli, ed., The State and Development in the Third World
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
Nota 56 - página 565
For example, Bates applies this framework to several aspects of agrarian
societies in Africa from pre-colonial and post-colonial periods (see R. H. Bates,
Essays on the Political Economy of Rural Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
Nota 57 - página 565
Bates, 'Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development', p. 34.
Nota 58- página 565
Another example of the application of the choice-theoretic approach to rural
development emphasizes the more specific utility of the approach, that is,
increasing the understanding of collective decision problems in rural
development (see C. S. Russell and N. K. Nicholson, eds, Public Choice and
Rural Development (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future Inc., 1981)).
Nota 59 - página 565
Bates, 'Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Development', p. 54.
Nota 60 - página 566
D. Little, 'Rational-Choice Models and Asian Studies', Journal of Asian Studies,
50 (1991), 35-52.
Nota 61 - página 566
Little, 'Rational Choice Models and Asian Studies', p. 35.
Nota 62 - página 566
Little, 'Rational Choice Models and Asian Studies', p. 43.
Nota 63- página 566
O. E. Williamson, 'The Modem Corporation: Origins, Evolution, Attributes',
Journal of Economic Literature, 19 (1981), 1537-68, especially p. 1544.
Nota 64 - página 566
H. A. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', American
Economic Review, 68 (1978), 1-16, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded
Rationality. This article is also cited by Williamson, 'Modem Corporation', p.
1544.
Nota 65 - página 566
Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', p. 6.
Nota 66 - página 566
Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought'.
Nota 67 - página 567
Hall, Governing the Economy, p. 19.
Nota 68 - página 567
Hall uses 'organizations' to mean the same as 'institutions' (see Hall, Governing
the Economy, p. 19).
Nota 69 - página 567
He actually uses the term 'public choice theory' in his discussion, and broadly
includes the approaches that apply economic methods to political analysis. But,
we can replace this term with the 'rational choice approach' without changing
what he means.
Nota 70 - página 567
Hall, Governing the Economy, pp. 10-13.
Nota 71 - página 567
He treats organization theory based on the concept of bounded rationality (the
third group) separately from the conventional public (rational) choice theory
based on economic rationality (the second group) but he includes both in the
discussion of public choice theory (see Hall, Goiverning the Economy, pp. 10)13). I will show in the last section that this version of organization theory
belongs to the third category of new institutionalists if the two different concepts
of rationality are clearly distinguished.
Nota 72 - página 567
Hall, Governing the Economty, pp. 12-13.
Nota 73 - página 567
Haggard. Pathln'av s. friom the Pcrilpherv.
Nota 74 – página 568
E. A. Nordlinger, 'The Return to the State: Critiques', Americfan Political
Science Review, 82 (1988), 875-85.
Nota 75 – página 568
Haggard, Pathways'ts jom the Peripher', p. 4.
Nota 76–página 568
l Haggard, Pathway's from the Peripher', p. 5.
Nota 77 – página 569
R. Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political
Alignments (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).
Nota 78– página 569
Rogowski, Commerce and Coalitions, pp. 3-5.
Nota 79 – página 569
He categorizes different interests in trade as those represented by labour,
capital and land, which correspond to a three-factor model of trade.
Nota 80 – página 569
A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of
Essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).
Nota 81 – página 569
B. Moore Jr, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in
the Making of the Modem World (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1967).
Nota 82 – página 569
A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991).
Nota 83 - página 570
The recent work by Putnam is also a good example of the works which combine
historical observation and empirical data with an analysis of collective action
problems by rational individuals. By comparing communities in northern and
southern Italy using detailed empirical data over two decades, Putnam's work
has discovered the importance of the environment of individual behaviour in
determining the consequences of collective action (see R. D. Putnam, Making
Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1993).
Nota 84 - página 570
Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy.
Nota 85 - página 570
Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 198.
Nota 86 - página 570 : Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 199.
Nota 87 - página 570
Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, p. 200.
Nota 88 - página 570
Steinmo,Taxation and Democracy, chaps. 4-6.
Nota 89 - página 570/571
It is possible to speculate that the selection of the policies to be studied is a
result of the differences between the works by Rogowski and Steinmo. In a
trade issue, those with vested interests are more attentive to policy problems
and sensitive to gains and losses, because trade affects their major economic
activities. However, a tax issue influences the members of a society widely but
not very explicitly, and thus they are less likely to seek reliable information and
are not always as eager to pursue their interests. In other words, if the political
actors put a higher priority on tax issues in their political and/or economic
activities, they can be expected to seek their interests more rationally. My work
on the recent Japanese tax reform explores this possibility by focusing on a
bureaucratic organization in which the policy problems and goals are explicitly
defined and shared among members (see J. Kato, The Problem of Bureaucratic
Rationality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
Nota 90 – página 571
Steinmo, Taxation and Democracy, pp. 201-2.
Nota 91 –página 572
M. Levi, Of Rule and Revenue (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
Nota 92- página 572
B. Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
Nota 93 – página 573
Geddes, Politician's Dilemma, p. 187.
Nota 94 - página 574
Swedberg, Economics and Sociology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1990), p. 41. Becker may go to an extreme here because, in another
instance, he himself attempts to defend the approach instead of regarding its
use only as a commitment (G. S. Becker, Economic Approach to Human
Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976)).
Nota 95 - página 574
Becker, Economic Approach to Human Behavior, p. 14 (emphasis added). Of
course, other rational choice theorists may prefer to defend the rationality
assumption for other reasons. For example, G. Tsebelis, Nested Games:
Rational Choice in Comparative Politics (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990), pp. 39-43, defends the rational choice theory as a more coherent
theory than alternative approaches because of its theoretical clarity, equilibrium
analysis, deductive reasoning, and the interchangeability of individuals in an
analysis.
Nota 96 - página 574
Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Vol. 2, p. 370.
Nota 97 - página 575
The minimax rule in a game theoretical situation has the same premise, but
applies a different rule of choosing alternative means from a maximization rule
and chooses an alternative so as to minimize the worst possible loss.
Nota 98 - página 575
Simon uses the terms 'procedural rationality' or 'bounded rationality' to mean
the same concept which he presents. Both terms - 'bounded rationality' and
'procedural rationality' - mean basically the same concept, though Simon
usually uses the former in more formal and the latter in more descriptive
analysis. For a formal presentation of this concept, see Simon, 'Behavioral
Model of Rational Choice', and Simon, 'Rational Choice and Structure of
Environment'. For an interesting contrast between the rationality concept in
game theory and that in learning theory, see H. A. Simon, 'A Comparison of
Game Theory and Learning Theory', Psychometrika, 21 (1956), 267-72,
reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, and Simon, Models of Man.
For further understanding of this concept, see Simon, Models of Bounded
Rationality, pp. 203-495; Simon, Models of Man, pp. 196-206 and pp. 241-79.
For application to political science, see H. A. Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics',
American Political Science Review, 79 (1985), 293-304.
Nota 99 - página 575
Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory', p. 271. 575
Nota 100 - página 577
Simon, 'A Comparison of Game Theory and Learning Theory'. The application
of bounded rationality is also different from an expected utility theory in
economics. The expected utility theory presumes the existence of a 'real
situation' and then defines the utility function with probabilities.
Nota 101 - página 577
Simon, Models of Man, p. 198.
Nota 102 - página 577
Simon, Models of Man, p. 199.
Nota 103 - página 577
H. A. Simon, Administrative Behavior, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press,
1976), p. 79.
Nota 104 - página 577
Simon himself makes this point very clear in his recent writing. See H. A.
Simon, 'The State of American Political Science: Professor Low's View of Our
Discipline', Political Science and Politics, 36 (1993), 49-50, especially p. 50.
Nota 105- página 577
In decision theories and organization theories, the concept of bounded
rationality has long attracted the attention of scholars. Allison's work on the
Cuban Missile Crisis is a prominent example of such studies (Graham Allison,
Essence of Decision (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1971)). However, the
employment of the bounded rationality concept in these fields aims to illuminate
the limitations of the perception and information capabilities of human beings
without paying much attention to the environment of rational behaviour. This is
one of the important reasons why the distinction between the two different
concepts of rationality has been neglected in political science.
Nota 106- página 577
For example, see Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics'.
Nota 107-página 577
Such examples are: North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance; 0. E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis andAntitrust
Implication (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Williamson, Economic
Institutions of Capitalism. This misunderstanding may derive from the fact that
both North and Williamson utilize the concept of bounded rationality to
emphasize the incompleteness of information and information burdens on
rational individual.
Nota 108- página 577
Simon, 'Behavioral Model of Rational Choice'; Simon, 'Rational Choice and
Structure of Environment'; Simon, 'Comparison of Game Theory and Learning
Theory'.
Nota 109 - página 577
H. A. Simon, 'Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought', American
Economic Review, 68 (1978), 1-16, reprinted in Simon, Models of Bounded
Rationality; Simon, 'Human Nature in Politics'.
Nota 110 - página 577/578
Curiously enough, Becker, as I have shown above, agrees with Simon that the
economic approach is supported by auxiliary assumptions. They differ in
whether to give up the economic approach when faced with the necessity of
assumptions other than economic rationality. Becker maintains the assumption
of economic rationality because he believes it serves to bind together various
human behaviour within a unified framework. Simon replaces it with the
assumption of bounded rationality because he is more concerned with
specifying auxiliary assumptions that support his framework for analysing
rational behaviour.
Nota 111 - página 578
Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The Politics of
Coalition in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
Nota 112 – página 578/579
A theoretical example of a behaviour that is truly counter to the assumption of
economic rationality is a 'commitment' that 'involves choosing an action that
yields a lower expected welfare than an alternative available action´(A.K. Sen,
´Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory',
in Mansbridge, ed., Beyond Self-Interest (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990), pp. 32-3). When a person's consistent ordering of choosing behaviour is
not necessarily related to the person's individual welfare, 'the existence of a
"variety of motives" makes a difference' (see A. K. Sen, 'Beneconfusion', in J. G.
T. Meeks, ed., Thoughtful Economic Man: Essays On Rationality, Moral Rules
and Benevolence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 12-16, at p.
15). In other words, the rational choice framework is silent about the human
psychology that shapes the actor's motivation to make choices. A rational
choice theorist's quick response to Sen's point about limitations of the economic
rationality assumption may be: as long as social scientists are concerned with
social outcomes and not with individual psychology, the economic assumption
is useful (see W. Riker, 'Political Science and Rational Choice', in Alt and
Shepsle, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, at p. 173). But, some
economists are increasingly interested in that field. For example, see R. M.
Hogarth and M. W. Reder, eds, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between
Economies and Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
Nota 113 - página 579
Michael Taylor, 'Structure, Culture, and Action in the Explanation of Social
Change', Politics and Society, 17 (1989), 115-57. He defines a strict theory of
rational choice as a thin rational choice theory as follows: '(1) rational action is
action that is instrumental in achieving or advancing given aims in the light of
given belief; (2) the agent is assumed to be egoistic; and (3) the range of
incentives assumed to affect the agent is limited.'
Nota 114 - página 579
Taylor, 'Structure, Culture, and Action', p. 150.
Nota 115- página 580
Silberman defines uncertainty as 'the inability to predict the kind of decisions
that will arise and/or the degree of acceptance of decisions' (Bernard Silberman,
Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United
States, and Great Britain (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993)), p. 21.
Nota 116 - página 581
Ian Budge, 'A New Spatial Theory of Party Competition: Uncertainty, Ideology,
and Policy Equilibria Viewed Comparatively and Temporally', British Journal of
Political Science, 24 (1994), 443-67.
Nota 117 - página 581
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Boston, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1960), chap. 3. 581