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The evolution Of Chinese military doctrine
With the exception of Washington itself, nowhere will the recent changes in US military
doctrine be more closely scrutinised than in Beijing (see UK Defence Forum M60 paper
July 2001). Acutely aware of the military capabilities of its rivals, a dynamic process of
doctrinal evolution has seen the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shift its strategic focus
from large-scale territorial defence, to developing the technologies and tactics necessary
to conduct rapid, high technology warfare in Asia.
Western military operations in the last decade have provided China with invaluable
opportunities to observe the mechanics and pitfalls of fighting a high-tech war, and
Beijing has capitalised upon them. The PLA’s inability to compete with the US in
conventional military terms has necessitated a more innovative approach in improving its
capabilities, but faced with the development of national missile defence systems, Beijing
now faces a further set of challenges. In attempting to usurp the US in Asia and expand
its sphere of influence can it continue to stay one step ahead of its regional hegemonic
rivals?
The 17.7 per cent increase in Beijing’s defence spending announced in March represents
its biggest expansion in real terms for two decades and reflects concern over the Bush
administration’s military support for Taiwan. While other major nations were reducing
their defence budgets in the post-Cold War environment, China was rapidly increasing its
own.
In the 1980’s research into the high-tech warfare was stimulated by the Falklands
conflict, operations in the the Bekaa Valley and air strikes on Libya, although this
received only tepid support from central government. The gradual movement away from
Mao’s revolutionary doctrine through Deng’s era of modernisation into Jiang’s high tech
era has loosened the ideological constraints placed upon military reform. In doing so it
has enabled doctrine to adapt in line with changes in China’s national priorities and the
wider security environment, alongside the evolving concept of war itself.
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The process of change is a precarious one. In relying upon the support of the Chinese
military establishment to secure their grip on power, the leadership must balance the
influence of more hawkish elements of the PLA against the realities of the strategic and
political environment. Furthermore, as the reach of communist ideology is increasingly
diluted in China, the need for central government to legitimate its control could manifest
itself in the emergence of a more rampant form of nationalism. In this respect, domestic
concerns remain critical in influencing military doctrine.
The acute awareness of historical humiliations continues to shape Beijing’s perception of
the strategic landscape. American leadership in the Gulf War served to highlight the
perceived danger that, in the absence of the Soviet Union to act as a counter balance, the
US would seek to establish itself as the sole superpower. Moreover, in circumventing the
UN Security Council through Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, US actions were widely
seen in China as a clear indication of Washington’s shift towards unilateral militarism.
The precedent that NATO’s actions in Kosovo set, with military intervention on
humanitarian grounds within the territory of a sovereign state, radically raised concerns
in Beijing over the future scope of its actions in Tibet and Xinjiang, and in bringing about
the unification of Taiwan. The bombing of the PRC’s embassy in Belgrade further
reinforced the point; an act interpreted in Beijing as implying that China was a tertiary
power and that their reaction to the incident would be of limited consequence.
Both the Gulf War and Operation Allied Force nevertheless provided Beijing with
opportunities to analyse and internalise the characteristics of alternative military
strategies. Operations in the Persian Gulf impressed upon the PLA the importance of
airpower and the need to rationalise its army and make it more technologically
sophisticated and professional. Indeed the defeat of a land army by airpower in Kosovo’s
no contact war, without incurring any allied fatalities, demonstrated a degree of
sophistication that has compelled the Chinese to rethink their tactical concepts.
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As Beijing continues to advance towards acquiring cutting edge military technology and
move from platform to network-centred warfare, it faces the problem of bridging the
transitional gap. In this respect, in selected areas, the PRC has benefited from being able
to ‘bypass’ the intermediate stages already endured by more advanced Western powers.
Moreover, Beijing has benefited from demonstrations of the critical vulnerabilities of
those defences; the reliance of NATO upon GPS and satellite communications
technology during the Gulf War was one such example.
China’s technological inferiority has led to an increasing tendency towards asymmetrical
warfare strategies that can be used to attack the dependency of adversaries upon
electronic and support systems (the development of parasitic satellites for example and
the increasing incidence of cyber warfare). The strategy is aligned with the PLA’s
continued adherence to the doctrine of active defence; taking a pre-emptive strike to
engage a technologically more advanced enemy whilst avoiding a major head-on
confrontation.
Conventionally speaking, although China’s ambitions of achieving a blue water
capability are still far from being realised, creeping progress in naval modernisation has
enabled Beijing to alter its maritime strategy from coastal defence to one of limited
regional force projection. The erection of permanent military installations in the disputed
Spratly Islands, and the increasing number of intrusions by Chinese vessels conducting
naval operations in the Sea of Japan all point to the PRC’s growing military
assertiveness.
Unable to counter an expression of Amerian military might in Asia head on, Beijing’s
policy of courting smaller nations in the South Pacific potentially will enable China to
extend its military reach. In the event of a conflict with the US, the use of anti-ship
missiles deployable on these islands would seriously disrupt trade and supply lines, along
key shipping routes for the US.
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Beijing’s description of Sino-Taiwanese relations as “complicated and grim”, in a recent
defence white paper, and the Bush administration’s pledge to defend Taipei in the event
of offensive action, signal a potential upward shift in tensions. In this respect, it is
possible to identify motivations above the desire for gaining greater technological knowhow in the recent detention of the downed US EP-3E surveillance aircraft. The incident
has provided the PRC with the opportunity to issue a strong message to the US and the
wider international community vis-à-vis its standing as a strategic competitor for
influence within Asia.
Together, China’s increasingly sophisticated weaponry and Russia’s decline is enabling
Beijing to pursue its regional ambitions. Expansionism is unlikely to develop in the more
traditional sense, but rather revolves around what the PRC regards as its territorial right,
namely Taiwan, and the South China Sea. The shift in doctrine to a more assertive role
in the region is motivated as much by the need to counter the equally new strategic
freedom and emerging capabilities of its neighbours as the desire to challenge
Washington’s hegemonic influence. In this respect, Beijing currently finds itself in a
predicament. With the US seeking to strengthen its military alliances in Asia, should the
PRC continue on its present course of seeking to establish regional hegemony? Or will
the competition for influence push China into a strategic alliance with India?
The growing relationship between Beijing and Rangoon could ultimately provide China
with access to the Indian Ocean through the Bay of Bengal and has raised Indian
concerns that China is pursuing a policy of encirclement.
However, with the potential
for a warming of US/Indian relations and Japan’s military aspirations stirring, Beijing
may be forced to rethink its strategic priorities.
The continuing evolution of Chinese military doctrine will be influenced by a number of
fundamental developments, not least of which includes the need for a relatively peaceful
international environment to foster the economic development required for China to
finance its military modernisation. In the event of an economic downturn the possibility
that China will become more, not less aggressive, to transform domestic dissatisfaction
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into nationalist fervour, cannot be discounted. Developments in Russia, Korea, India and
Japan, but above all the US, will shape China’s future military requirements.
Notwithstanding its current deficiencies, a resurgent China would constitute a formidable
foe.
Disclaimer
The views of the author are his/her own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate
view on the opinions expressed therein. The Forum exists to enable politicians,
industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others with an interest in
defence and security issues to exchange information and views on the future needs of
Britain’s defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profit company.
June 2001
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