Gulf of Tonkin Documents

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The Gulf of Tonkin Incident
Put together the best account of what actually happened in the Gulf of Tonkin using the following evidence.
ITEM 1: U.S. Navy Film
VOICE-OVER as you see a re-creation of the scene: In international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, destroyers of the U.S. Navy are
assigned routine patrols from time to time. Sunday, August 2, 1964, the destroyer Maddox was on such a patrol. Shortly after noon,
the calm of the day is broken as general quarters sound. In a deliberate and unprovoked action, three North Vietnam PT boats unleash
a torpedo attack against the Maddox. At once, the enemy patrol boats are brought under fire by the destroyer.
ITEM 2: Statement by U.S. Defense Secretary ROBERT MCNAMARA
No, it [the USS Maddox] has no special relationship to any operations in that area [North Vietnam]. We’re carrying routine patrols of
this kind on all over the world all the time.
ITEM 3: Next part of the U.S. Navy Film
Following the Sunday attack, the Maddox is joined by the USS Turner Joy. As directed by the President of the United States, the
Maddox and Turner Joy resume patrol operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. On the night of August 4, North Vietnamese patrol boats
strike again.
ITEM 4: Statement by GENERAL PHUNG THE TAI
On the night of August 4, the United States made public that so-called “Gulf of Tonkin incident.” But the story was a fabrication,
created by the U.S. National Security Council. Even as the National Security Council met, American aircraft were being sent to
destroy several areas of our country. In reality, the second Gulf of Tonkin incident never happened.
ITEM 5: Information gleaned from MADDOX and TURNER JOY deck logs of August 2, 1964
The Maddox noted that three enemy (North Vietnamese) vessels approached the ship. The attacks began at 5:08 p.m. Saigon time. At
5:34 p.m. Saigon time, four U.S. aircraft arrived on the scene. Maneuvering to close [to catch up] with the Maddox, the USS Turner
Joy cruised toward the northwest at speeds of twenty-five knots beginning at 4:25 p.m. Saigon time. By 7:28 p.m. Saigon time, the
Turner Joy sighted the Maddox; she was fifteen miles away. The Turner Joy sighted U.S. aircraft overhead at 7:44 p.m.
ITEM 6: Information gleaned from Maddox and Turner Joy deck logs and action reports of August 4, 1964
The Maddox traveling south out of the Gulf, met first three and then four “high-speed contacts,” at 9:59 p.m. Saigon time. By 12:53
p.m. Saigon time, the Maddox was clear of the attackers according to its deck logs.
According to the Turner Joy’s action report, the attack began at 10:35 p.m. Saigon time. The deck logs report that the enemy contacts
had ceased and the attack was over by 1:22 a.m. Saigon time.
ITEM 7: Photographic evidence
Photographic information does not exist for the 4 August attacks.
ITEM 8: Radar evidence
The only strong radar contact made that night was the time the Maddox fire-control radar locked on the Turner Joy.
ITEM 9: Visual/physical evidence
No members of the crew visually sighted any enemy vessels. The ship reported no physical damage.
ITEM 10: Interrogation reports of captured North Vietnamese naval crewmen contained in the Seventh Fleet Exploitation
Study
Fuel, radar, and navigation limits kept the North Vietnamese navy squadrons operations within 106.3° E longitude.
ITEM 11: Official U.S. Navy history
The 4 August incident occurred near 108.0°E longitude.
ITEM 12: From naval records
Leaving Keelung with a communications van on board, the Maddox was part of the Desoto Patrol program. Sent into the Tonkin Gulf
to survey and gather intelligence from North Vietnam and China, the Maddox followed a predetermined schedule. The van,
maintained by the Naval Security Group, contained electric equipment used to gather and process Electronic Intelligence (ELINT).
Designed to intercept communications and electronic emissions, the Desoto Patrol surveyed the coasts of North Vietnam and China.
By emitting certain signals, the Maddox could make the North Vietnamese believe she was a force of ships or she could mask herself,
deceiving them into thinking no ship was in the area. Along with the van, a contingent of trained personnel took station aboard the
Maddox. Some personnel were from the Naval Security Group (NAVSECGRU) Taipei and some arrived for duty from
NAVSECGRU Philippines. Those from the Philippines were able to understand the Vietnamese language and those from Taipei could
translate Chinese.
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