What Really Happened in the Gulf of Tonkin?
Taken and edited from: http://americanhistory.about.com/od/lyndonbjohnson/a/ff_lbj.htm
Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President
Lyndon became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet
Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. Seeking to follow the established
policy of containment, President Johnson and his Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara, began increasing military aid to South Vietnam. In an effort to increase
pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were
covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam.
These PTFs were manned with South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of
coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of an operation known as
Operation 34A. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a
highly classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. After several early
failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and
Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. In
addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto (intelligence operations with
the purpose of gathering information on your enemy) patrols off North Vietnam.
A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in
international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. These types of
patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China,
and North Korea. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the
latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the
former. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on
North Vietnamese military capabilities.
The First Attack:
On July 31st, 1964, the destroyer USS Maddox commenced a Desoto patrol off the coast
of North Vietnam. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed
through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. Unable to catch the fast South
Vietnamese PTFs, the North Vietnamese government in Hanoi elected to strike instead
at USS Maddox. On the afternoon of August 2nd, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo
boats, operated by North Vietnamese military officials, were dispatched to attack the
destroyer.
Cruising twenty-eight miles offshore in international waters, the Maddox was
approached by the North Vietnamese. Alerted to the threat, Captain Herrick requested
air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusader
planes were sent towards Maddox's position. In addition, the USS Turner Joy, another
destroyer, began moving to support the Maddox. Not reported at the time, Captain
Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese
came within 10,000 yards of the ship. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s
launched a torpedo attack.
Returning fire, the Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5millimeter machine gun bullet. After fifteen minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived
and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in
the water. With the threat removed, the Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly
forces. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, President Johnson decided that
the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders
in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions.
The Second Attack:
Reinforced by the USS Turner Joy, Captain Herrick returned to the area on August 4 th.
That night and morning, while cruising in harsh weather, the ships received radar, radio,
and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack was incoming. Taking
evasive action, they fired upon numerous radar targets. After the incident, Captain
Herrick was unsure as to if his ships had been attacked at all, but reported that "freak
weather effects on radar and overeager sonar operators may have accounted for many”
conflicting reports regarding a second attack on the Maddox.
After suggesting a "complete evaluation" of the affair before taking further action, he
radioed requesting a "thorough reconnaissance in daylight by aircraft." American
aircraft flying over the scene during the "attack" failed to spot any North Vietnamese
boats.
Aftermath:
While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard
the USS Maddox and the USS Turner Joy were convinced that the second attack had
occurred. This, along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency,
led President Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. Launching
on August 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and
USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately thirty North
Vietnamese vessels.
Subsequent research and declassified documents has essentially shown that the second
attack on the USS Maddox did not happen. This belief that a second attack did not take
place was later reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister, Vo
Nguyen Giap, who admitted to the August 2nd attack, but denied ordering another two
days later on August 4th.
Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, President Johnson went on television and
addressed the nation regarding the incident. He then requested the passage of a
resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting
freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." Arguing that he did not seek a
"wider war" President Johnson stated the importance of approving his action was to
show that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests."
Approved on August 10th, 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave President Johnson
the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war from
Congress. Over the next few years, President Johnson used the resolution to rapidly
escalate American involvement in the Vietnam War.