Fundamental Right to Reservation: A Rejoinder
by Parmanand Singh*
Cite as : (1995) 3 SCC (Jour) 6
My distinguished colleague Professor M.P. Singh deserves great praise for his incisive
analysis of the constitutional issues involved in acknowledging a fundamental right to
affirmative action . Professor Singh maintains that the constitutional scheme as well as
judicial decisions support the notion that every member of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes can claim preferential treatment as a matter of fundamental right to
equality. The great merit of his rights thesis is that it enables the members of the intended
beneficiaries to resort to courts to compel the Government to provide compensatory
benefits as a matter of right. His paper is particularly interesting in the wake of Mandal
according legitimacy and binding power to job reservations for OBCs. It is interesting in
this context to note that though he advances several super-classification arguments in
favour of the SCs and STs being accorded fundamental rights, he does not seem to have
any valid reason not to apply the same arguments in favour of the OBCs as well.
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The acknowledgement of a fundamental right to affirmative action deserves our
sympathy and support. There is so much of suffering, discrimination and systematic
exclusion of members of disadvantaged groups from valued resources, opportunities and
careers, that a theory of rights may help them to fight existing inequalities. But despite its
usefulness this theory seems illogical, unsound as well as unbalanced. Some may even
consider it undesirable. One is aware that the DMK leadership in Tamil Nadu could
compel the Government to retain 69 per cent reservation notwithstanding Mandal . In
Kerala, political compulsions were forcing all the political parties to resist the Centre's
directive to eliminate the creamy layer from the OBCs. With too much of politicisation of
the reservation issue and political abuse of this device, one has to move with great
circumspection in acknowledging a right to reservation. One cannot overlook that
Articles 15(4) and 16(4) have been placed under several limitations especially in respect
of a firm evidence of clear and legitimate identification of the backward groups. In
Mandal the Court has clearly ruled that reservations in promotions are constitutionally
impermissible. The Court has also advised the Government not to make any reservations
in higher positions and in specialized areas. For instance, no reservations should be
provided in technical posts in research and development institutions, in specialities and
superspecialities in Medicine, Engineering and other such areas. Similarly university
professorship and higher echelon positions in Defence, Space Science and Nuclear
Research have to go by merit alone. Reservations in these kinds of jobs are seen as
inconsistent with the values of efficiency that are needed in such professions and
services.
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The consequences of recognising reservation as a fundamental right are also relevant.
Once something which has so far been recognised as a matter of policy is acknowledged
as a guaranteed fundamental right, each individual claim to secure the 'enforcement' of
such right will be subject only to judicial determination. It may lose popular and political
control. The right to affirmative action will thus open a floodgate for indeterminate,
uncertain and vacuous claims. It seems even the courts are not likely to be responsive to
such claims as a matter of enforceable right. It may be mentioned here that beginning
from Balaji until the nine-Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Mandal ,
Articles 16(4) and 15(4) have been treated as enabling provisions. In C.A. Rajendran v.
Union of India it was urged that Article 16(4) was itself a fundamental right granted to
the SCs and STs. The Supreme Court rejected it and ruled that this clause imposed a duty
on the State to make reservations but "Article 16(4) is an enabling provision and confers
a discretionary power on the State to make reservation" . This proposition was reaffirmed
in all subsequent decisions. In 1988, in P & T SCs and STs Employees' Welfare Assn. v.
Union of India the Supreme Court categorically ruled that it was not open for a member
of SCs/STs to move a court to compel the Government to provide job reservations
because Article 16(4) was merely an enabling provision. It was, however, held that in
providing reservations the Government cannot be allowed to discriminate between
SCs/STs of one department with those working in other departments. Finally, in Mandal
all the nine Judges uniformly agreed that Articles 16(4) and 15(4) are couched in
enabling language and represent an empowerment of the State to pursue the goals of
substantive or genuine equality . None of these Judges even indirectly indicate that these
clauses can themselves be construed as aspects of the fundamental right to equality and
thus be enforceable in a court of law.
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It is submitted that the notion of equality as a matter of policy has to be kept distinct from
the notion of equality as a matter of right. Professor Singh forgets that in the Constitution
the protective clauses are juxtaposed with the main clauses guaranteeing nondiscrimination and equality of opportunity. The Constitution seems to view it as a matter
of policy. A policy stipulates a collective goal which a community seeks to pursue. A
right is an individual claim which seeks to protect an individual's interest. Rights are
primarily protective. They guarantee citizens certain basic freedoms and protect them
against intrusion, discrimination and arbitrary action by the State. The duties correlative
with these personal rights are largely prohibitions. Constitutional rights inhere in citizens
generally and no one is excluded from the benefits they confer. Indeed, these
constitutional rights can justly be suppressed for achieving certain social or collective
goals. In a sense, Articles 16(4) and 15(4) could be treated as 'authorising' norms in
Kelsenian sense, justifying encroachment of the individual's right to equality for
achieving real equality for the members of the disadvantaged groups.
Professor Singh is right when he observes: "Discrimination results only when religion,
race, caste, sex or place of birth or any of them is made the basis of disrespect, contempt
or prejudice for difference in treatment" . This is exactly the principle that Professor
Ronald Dworkin has advanced in defence of affirmative action programmes for blacks in
America . Professor Dworkin holds that rights are individual claims which operate as
'trumps' over collective goals. If a right is truly a right, it must have some weight to
'trump' policy considerations. But compensatory discrimination is thought of as serving a
policy of increasing caste harmony by eliminating visible and institutionalised prejudices
and increasing economic equality by removing some of the obstacles that keep the
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members of backward classes in an economically and socially disadvantaged position.
Dworkin argues that a right is a matter of principle and thus every citizen has a right not
to be discriminated against on racial grounds and has a right to be treated with equal
concern and respect. It is submitted that the underlying argument in Dworkin's theory has
adequately been embodied in the non-discrimination clauses of Articles 15 and 16. The
rights theory of Professor Dworkin may help Professor Singh in justifying preferential
treatment but not for justifying a fundamental right to reservation. The justification
debate that takes place in America is of little relevance in India in view of a clear
constitutional policy of compensatory discrimination as signified by Articles 15(4) and
16(4) .
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The main argument advanced by Professor Singh in defence of his rights thesis is that
since Articles 16(4) and 15(4) are no more treated as exceptions to the rest of the
provisions, they themselves are fundamental rights. Surprisingly, Professor Singh
dismisses the characterisation of these clauses as exceptions in pre-Thomas cases as
mere 'impressions' gathered on a plain reading of these clauses . But how can one eat the
words used in these clauses just to support a particular theory of rights? The words
"Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision" in Article
16(4) and "Nothing in Article 15 or Article 29(2) shall prevent the State from making any
special provision" in Article 15(4) clearly establish that these clauses constitute
authorising provisions for implementing the directives contained in Article 46. Whereas
Article 15(4) empowers the State to pursue all kinds of equalising measures in all its
dealings Article 16(4) is limited only to the device of reservations. Exceptional character
of Article 15(4) was noted in Balaji as against excessive reservations and as against
public interest involved in preserving and maintaining efficiency in professional and
technical education. A percentage limitation was indicated as a broad policy to strike a
reasonable balance between the individual claims of meritocracy and collective claims
based upon redressal of historic wrongs. This position remains unchanged even after
Mandal. It is true, that in Thomas, the Supreme Court ruled that Article 16(4) was not an
exception to Article 16(1) but an emphatic statement that equality of opportunity could be
carried to the extent of making reservations. But Thomas nowhere acknowledges a
fundamental right to affirmative action.
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It is respectfully submitted that the significance of Thomas lies in the enlargement of the
power of the State to provide employment preferences of all kinds to the members of SCs
and STs in view of their special mention in Articles 46 and 335. The State power is not
limited only to reservations as a means of preference but the Government can
legitimately employ all possible methods to achieve actual or substantive equality for
these groups in the services. All other kinds of preferences could be upheld under Article
16(1). Mandal departs from Thomas on this point and adopts the dissenting opinion of
Justice Beg in Thomas and expands the meaning of reservation used in Article 16(4) to
align the doctrine with existing practice about age relaxations, age waivers, test
exemptions, fee concessions and so forth. Clearly Mandal rejects Thomas that Article
16(1) itself mandates substantive equality for the backward classes. Mandal holds that no
preferences for these groups will be constitutionally permissible under Article 16(1).
Article 16(4) exhausts all power of backward class preferences. In a sense, therefore,
Article 16(4) has been recognised as an exception to Article 16(1) in relation to backward
classes. In any case whether Articles 15(4) or 16(4) are treated as exceptions or not would
be relevant only in discussing the limits of the power of the State to take affirmative
action and would in no way help Professor Singh to construct a theory of right to
reservations.
Another argument advanced by the learned scholar is that if Article 21 which is couched
in negative terms can give rise to positive rights, there is no reason why Articles 16(4) or
15(4) should not give rise to positive rights. He particularly cites Unni Krishnan which
recognises right to education as an aspect of right to life under Article 21. This argument
though attractive is unrealistic. I presume that if pressed, Professor Singh would agree
that despite the fact that the directive principles have greatly been exalted in
constitutional dignity by an imaginative judicial interpretation according certain directive
principles the the status of fundamental rights, the "directive principles as fundamental
rights" theory is far from being clear from jurisprudential point of view. It is futile to hold
that Article 21 embraces all graces of human civilisation and embodies right to education,
right to means of livelihood, shelter, human dignity and a horde of other social goods and
then to hold that the realisation of these rights would depend upon the economic capacity
and development of the State. If these moral rights have already been recognised as
directive principles; then what is the difference? Even these new positive rights
enunciated as legal rights do not break the pattern of State patronage and dependence and
the passivity of the intended beneficiaries. The implication is that these positive claims
can only be 'promoted' and are possibly incapable of being 'enforced' by affirmative
litigation. Professor Singh himself seems to assign to Articles 15(4) and 16(4) the status
of these positive claims only because he tries to equate the rights in them in the positive
claims identified in Unni Krishnan.
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It is important to remember that the courts are involved in a series of contradictions when
they are asked to enforce the beneficial rights promised by them. To take just one
example, the ambiguity and uncertainty over the meaning of "right to life" as including
right to work and means of livelihood enunciated in Olga Tellis has led Justice P.B.
Sawant in D.D. Employees' Union to remark: "This country has so far not found it
feasible to incorporate the right to livelihood as a fundamental right in the Constitution.
This is because the country has so far not attained the capacity to guarantee it. Advisedly
therefore, it has been placed in the Chapter on Directive Principles." Again, in Mohini
Jain , the Supreme Court read a fundamental right to education as an aspect of the right
to life and then in the next breath added that meaningful realisation of this right would
depend on the economic capacity and development of the State. In Unni Krishnan the
Supreme Court quickly realised that the prevailing political economy in India could not
sustain a fundamental right to education at all levels and then limited the right to
education up to the level of primary education. The point is that since most of the
reconceptualised beneficial rights do not promise enforcement through judicial process
their status is no better than the Directive Principles of State Policy. Therefore, Professor
Singh's contention that right to affirmative action should be aligned with other beneficial
rights read by the courts in the Constitution is devoid of any merit.
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We agree with Professor Singh that the idea of correlativity between rights and duties is a
controversial one, at least in the area of constitutional rights. Hohfeld thought of rights
(i.e. claims, powers, liberties, immunities) against specific persons and not against the
State. But social or economic rights can exist even if they are inadequately protected or
enforced through courts. Likewise, the value of equality can be protected by
promulgation of constitutional policies and goals. The Indian Constitution imposes an
obligation on the State to pursue the goals of substantive equality on the guidelines
indicated by the directive principles contained in Articles 38 and 46. Performance of this
obligation has been facilitated by Articles 15(4) and 16(4) which explicitly permit the
State to depart from formal equality in distributing opportunities and careers in the
society. These clauses in effect support the argument of Professor Ronald Dworkin when
he asserts: "Government must not only treat people with concern and respect but with
equal concern and respect. It must not distribute goods or opportunities unequally on the
ground that some citizens are entitled to more because they are worthy of more
concern." The policy of reservation creates an obligation on the State to treat everyone
with equal respect and concern and in this sense this policy serves the principle of equal
treatment. But this policy does not create any corresponding individual right in favour of
the members of the beneficiary groups.
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Asserting a right is quite different from suggesting that something would be on the whole
desirable or good. Rights have special normative force. This special normative force is
the result of invoking rules that we already accept and are committed to, rather than
simply appealing to general moral considerations. If people are to claim 'rights' (like right
to reservation) that are not recognised or conferred by any positive or actually accepted
rules, their claims are vacuous. Only if we restrict the idea of rights to rights conferred by
positive rules can the concept of a right have any definite content and value. In our
submission, the claims advanced in the guise of right to reservation should be accepted as
social or collective goals or as matters of policy rather than acknowledged as
fundamental rights. In short, Professor Singh's thesis reading fundamental right to
reservation in Articles 15(4) and 16(4) is highly controversial and problematic even from
the point of view of legal as well as social justice.
* Professor of Law, University of Delhi.
1. M.P. Singh : "Are Articles 16(4) or 15(4) Fundamental Rights?" (1994) 3 SCC
(Jour) 31-41.
2. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217.
3. Article 15 deals with prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race,
caste, sex or place of birth and states as follows:
(1) The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of
religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of
birth or any of them be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or
condition with regard to:
(a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public
entertainment; or
(b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public
resort maintained wholly or partly out of State funds or dedicated to the
use of the general public.
(3)
*
*
*
(4) Nothing in this article or in clause (2) of Article 29 shall prevent the State
from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and
educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the
Scheduled Tribes.
4. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and
reads as follows:
(1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters
relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State.
(2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent,
place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated
against in respect of, any employment or office under the State.
(3)
*
*
*
(4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any
provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any
backward classes of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not
adequately represented in the services under the State.
(5)
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
*
*
*
M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore, AIR 1963 SC 649.
AIR 1968 SC 507.
Id. 513.
(1988) 4 SCC 147.
In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, Pandian, J.
describes Article 16(4) "a matter of policy of the Government", (para 178);
Thommen, J. treats it as "an enabling provision conferring a discretionary power
on the State". (para 287); R.M. Sahai, J. says that "Article 16(1) is a fundamental
right whereas Article 16(4) is an obligation of the State. The former is enforceable
in a court of law whereas the latter is not a 'constitutional compulsion' but an
enabling provision". (para 564); Kuldip Singh, J. also treats this clause as an
enabling one in para 358. Sawant, J. observes: "(T)he provision of Article 16(4) is
couched in an enabling language" (para 435) and Jeevan Reddy, M.H. Kania,
M.N. Venkatachaliah and A.M. Ahmadi, JJ. also describe this clause as
empowering the State to provide job reservations.
10. (1994) 3 SCC (Jour) 31, 36.
11. Ronald Dworkin: "Taking Rights Seriously", 227, 228, 273 (1977).
12. While defending the programmes of privileged admissions on the touchstone of
equal protection guarantee Professor Dworkin himself concedes it as a policy
when he says "the fairness and constitutionality of any admission program ... is
justified if it serves a proper policy that respects the rights of all members of the
community to be treated as equals". See Ronald Dworkin: "Taking Rights
Seriously" at p. 239.
13. State of Kerala v. N.M. Thomas, (1976) 2 SCC 310.
14. (1994) 3 SCC (Jour) 31, 34.
15. Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P., (1993) 1 SCC 645.
16. Supra n. 1 at p. 37 he observes "If a negative and amorphous right to life and
liberty in Article 21 can give birth to new and until recently, unimaginable
fundamental rights in terms of the directive principles there is a much stronger
case for recognising fundamental rights for the SCs and STs under the positive
and quite specific provisions of Articles 15(4) and 16(4)."
17. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545.
18. Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Admn., (1992) 4 SCC
99.
19. Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666.
20. Ronald Dworkin: "Taking Rights Seriously", at pp. 272-273.
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Date of Access: July 11th, 2007