Lesson Learning Review (LLR) on
OCHA’s Response to the Iraq Crisis
- Final Report -
Background
Before the conflict erupted in Iraq, UN agencies put together a comprehensive
preparedness plan. On 18 February 2002, the IASC Reference Group on Preparedness
and Contingency Planning (IASC-RG) met in Cairo (the main outcome of the meeting
was the agreement on participation in contingency planning, and on parameters for
collaboration under IASC/RG supported by OCHA). An IASC Preparedness Meeting
took place in Geneva from 7 to 8 October 2002. The main objectives of the meeting were
to move forward as regards interagency preparedness to responding to the Iraq crisis; to
consolidate interagency agreements at the policy and operational levels; to identify main
constraints and other issues requesting special attention and to formulate responses. Then
the IASC met in Versoix on 12 January 2003, to review the level of preparedness for Iraq
and to identify areas of concerns that would require immediate action.
Based in part on the lessons
derived from the Afghan experience1,
a new mechanism was established at
OCHA for dealing with the Iraq
crisis with the appointment of a task
force under the leadership of a
special appointed senior manager, the
Director of OCHA-Geneva: an
internal OCHA Iraq Crisis Task
Team operating from New York,
with close links to Geneva and the
field was activated on Monday 17
March 2003. The Iraq Crisis Task
Team provided support in the
following areas: Operational support,
Policy development, Information
management, Donor relations and
Field support. However, before the
official creation of the Task Team in
March, activities had been carried out
since October 2002 including
monitoring the humanitarian
situation and refining assumptions on
Contingency Planning. In addition,
UN activities related to Iraq were
The different steps leading to the conflict
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8 November 2002: unanimously adopting
resolution 1441 (2002), the Security Council
instructed the weapons inspectors to resume their
work in Iraq within 45 days;
27 January 2003: the Security Council heard
formal briefings by the heads of the weapons
inspections programme in Iraq;
28 January 2003: the Bush administration
expressed support for a new UN resolution on
Iraq, calling it desirable but not mandatory before
launching military action;
27 February 2003: Security Council members
met to discuss a draft resolution co-sponsored by
Spain, the UK and the USA that would have the
UN decide that Iraq “has failed to take the final
opportunity afforded to it in resolution 1441,”
acknowledging that Iraq “has been and remains
in material breach” of its disarmament
obligations and gave the country a last chance to
comply.
20 March 2003: the USA and UK led a “coalition
of the willing” on an invasion of Iraq, after
giving Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave the
country or face consequences.
1
Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services During the Emergency in
Afghanistan (July 2001 to July 2002), November 2002.
1
coordinated by the Steering Committee chaired by the DSG (comprising the main UN
Departments and agencies). A Humanitarian Action Sub-Group was created and chaired
by OCHA as the “primary forum for timely exchange of relevant information and action
on key policy issues related to the UN response”2 (with WFP, UNICEF, UNDP,
UNHCR, UNSECOORD, IOM, FAO, UNRAW and OIP).
The UN and its partners proceeded to develop a Flash Appeal based on the contingency
planning that was to be issued immediately after the eruption of the war. This Flash
Appeal for about USD 2.2 billion for a six-month response to cover food and non-food
aid for the Iraq crisis and was launched on 28 March 2003 [USD 1.1. billion were made
available from the “oil-for-food” programme, and donors pledged USD 870 million
within three months]. As the events unfolded in Iraq it soon became clear that the
scenarios defined by contingency planning did not occur, in particular regarding
population movements3. The revised Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq requesting USD 250
million, or 12 per cent for the remainder of 2003, was presented to donors on 23 June
2003.
With the endorsement of the Secretary-General, the UN Steering Committee on Iraq
appointed a Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq with effect from 1st February 2003. He
operated from the Regional Coordination Office in Larnaca, Cyprus, established by the
UN in advance of the outbreak of the crisis to serve as a focal point for its humanitarian
activities. The Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq (UNOHCI) was an integral
part of the Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP). Reporting directly to the Executive
Director of OIP, the Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq was responsible for the
management and implementation of the Programme in the field4. On 21 November
2003, the Oil-for-Food Programme was effectively terminated and handed-over to the
Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. However, the long presence of the UN in Iraq
and its association with the sanctions5 made its work difficult in the post-war period when
it inherited some of the “Oil-for-Food” issues.
After international staff6 were evacuated on 17 March 2003 - 48 hours before conflict
erupted - many of the 3,400 UN local staff continued to carry out their duties and did
what they could to bring relief to the civilian population. Since the first air strikes over
2
Flash Appeal, For the Humanitarian Requirements of the Iraq Crisis, six-month response, 28 March 2003,
point 3.6. Roles and Responsibilities, p. 8.
3
It should be noted however that the worst case scenario materialized somehow in the food sector with 27
million people requiring assistance – which prompted WFP’s massive operation.
4
On 14 April 1995, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council adopted
resolution 986, establishing the "Oil-for-Food" Programme, providing Iraq with another opportunity to sell
oil to finance the purchase of humanitarian goods, and various mandated United Nations activities
concerning Iraq. The Office of the Iraq Programme administered the Programme as an operation separate
and distinct from all other United Nations activities within the context of the former sanctions regime,
within the purview of United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC),
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Compensation Commission.
5
In August 1990 the Security Council adopted resolution 661, imposing comprehensive sanctions on Iraq
following that country’s invasion of Kuwait.
6
International staff in Iraq from UNMOVIC, IAEA, the OIP and United Nations agencies, programmes
and funds implementing the Oil for Food Programme.
2
Baghdad in the early hours of 20 March, the ICRC, CARE International, MSF and
Premiere Urgence remained present in the capital. The ICRC sub-delegation in Basra in
the south of the country also stayed open, run by national staff until 29 March, when it
was reinforced by a team of 4 expatriates who had been withdrawn to Kuwait shortly
before the start of the conflict.
The first UN international staff returned to southern Iraq on 23 April and to Baghdad on 1
May. The UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq led a team of senior UN officials across
the border from Jordan into Iraq to re-establish a permanent presence of international
personnel in Baghdad for relief operations. As of 9 May, 250 staff had arrived in Iraq.
Purpose and Methodology
As part of OCHA’s lesson learning strategy, the Evaluation and Studies Unit (ESU)
facilitated an internal Lesson Learning Review of the OCHA Response to the Iraq Crisis.
The purpose of this exercise is to identify good practices from OCHA’s response to the
Iraq Crisis, as well as shortcomings, with the aim of improving and fine tuning OCHA’s
response to future complex emergencies. Following a Desk Review of existing
documentation regarding the overall response to the emergency, interviews were
conducted with four different categories of OCHA key players, i.e. a) members of the
New-York-based Task Team; b) the Geneva-based backstopping team, c) OCHA
colleagues who were deployed to the field and have subsequently returned to
headquarters in Geneva and New York (staff who were stationed in the Regional
Coordination Office in Larnaca, Cyprus as well as in other OCHA offices in the region);
d) other key informants who may have a different perspective on the response to the
crisis (who were dealing with “the rest of the world”). Following the interviews, a
working paper was written to highlight the key findings that would be discussed during a
workshop.
A workshop took place on 27 and 28 October to provide a forum for staff involved during
the crisis to discuss and reflect on key achievements and challenges of OCHA’s response,
agree on key lessons to be learned as well as on key future actions to be taken. The report
reflects participants’ contributions as well as the major issues workshop participants felt
must be tackled on a priority basis. The report is organized around three main areas:
strategic issues, structural issues and implication for support. A list of recommendations
for action with targeted actors is included at the end of the report.
This paper also reflects where relevant similar lessons learned by OCHA during the 2001
emergency in Afghanistan, with the aim of identifying key areas for improvement or
“application/institutionalization” based on Afghanistan and Iraq experiences.
3
Key Lessons
I.
STRATEGIC ISSUES:
1.
Humanitarian leadership and ‘managing’ humanitarian space:
Findings:
Setting the agenda on humanitarian policy vis-à-vis the Iraq conflict
proved to be a challenge: during the early stages of the crisis, OCHA (headquarters)
“reacted” to questions of policy from a range of actors (the Deputy Secretary General,
agencies, NGOs). OCHA was able to develop several key policy instruments but some
staff interviewed argued that OCHA should have played an even more “proactive” policy
role. In the highly politicized environment of the Iraq crisis, the need for ‘humanitarian’
action was the impetus for a broad range of decisions. This expanded, even
unconventional, understanding of what constitutes humanitarian action had a number of
serious implications:
► Contingency Planning – The Contingency Planning (CP) process failed to
“prepare” and address the reality on the ground. Because of a lack of contextual
and political analysis, the CP was defined following a country model that was not
adapted to a society that was well-developed and didn’t take into consideration
the political background of the UN in Iraq. There is a need also to develop an
agreed country analysis that better engages donors and uses the Central
Emergency Revolving Fund - CERF.
► Humanitarian presence – Some key informants felt that the withdrawal of
humanitarian staff from Iraq in March 2003 made the return and credibility of
humanitarian actors difficult and translated into lost humanitarian space for
OCHA. Alternatives should have been carefully considered based on a full
analysis of the situation without being preoccupied by the political debate on the
role of the UN in Iraq. Some staff felt that there was a missed opportunity to
show leadership in promoting an “essential humanitarian presence” rather than
agreeing to the application of standard criteria for continued overall UN presence.
► The Flash Appeal – By seeking USD 2.2 billion dollars to implement “priority
humanitarian programmes” over a six-month period, UN senior management and
participating Agencies characterized war-time Iraq as a humanitarian crisis zone
and applied a definition of humanitarian action that was precedent-setting in its
broadness. By significantly overestimating the eventual needs, the credibility of
the UN’s appeals process was damaged. In addition, the relative needs of Iraq
and the corresponding donor responses (e.g. some donors doubling their
humanitarian budgets to cover Iraq) versus the needs and funding of “other
humanitarian emergencies” indicated a distortion of accepted “humanitarian
action”.
4
► Security Council Resolution 14837 – The Security Council confirmed this
characterization of Iraq as a humanitarian crisis by highlighting the humanitarian
functions of the United Nations in post-war Iraq. The resolution also called upon
the United Nations to work “intensively” with the Occupying Power while failing
to highlight the need for all actors in Iraq to respect humanitarian space in
accordance with IHL. Such instruction was at odds with the guidance for
humanitarians on civil-military relations, which, in accordance with IHL, called
for restricted interaction between humanitarians and the Occupying Power.
OCHA had no influence on Resolution 1483.
OCHA wrote a Guidance Paper on Military-Civil relations8 that was disseminated
to the field through the HC (larger humanitarian community, Coalition Forces,
and donors). While some saw this Guidance Paper as one of the key outputs of
OCHA’s policy leadership, adherence was minimal and impact remains uncertain.
The lack of security, the withdrawal of the majority of the staff and its inability to
leave urban areas made it impossible to monitor whether the Guidance were
widely used by the main stakeholders on the ground. Some informants said that
the Guidelines were well broadcast to the NGO community but not to UN staff,
and that when a formal field request was made of Headquarters to redraft the
Guidelines, in accordance with SCR 1483, no such update was forthcoming
(Guidance papers can be generated by HQ but require significant field buy-in).
Some informants noted that, in general, the humanitarian community in Iraq
displayed a disturbing lack of awareness of discourses on and around the issue of
humanitarian space. The Guidelines were an attempt to set policy on such issues.
In addition, the Occupying Power never signed a MOU with the UN9.
► Local Perceptions – The humanitarian element of the UN was unable to establish
clarity on its role and intentions among Iraqi civilians. The UN’s profile and
reputation in Iraq prior to the war had been tarnished by more than a decade of
sanctions and their impact on the population. Thus, the UN was judged on its
previous involvement, though did not proactively seek to change this image and
did not deploy the necessary skills on the ground to develop an effective UN
communication strategy. In addition, some staff pointed out that, despite repeated
calls from OCHA and other UN personnel in the field, the humanitarian
community in Iraq failed to properly explain to the Iraqi people the UN’s role,
responsibilities and functions in the country as separate from those of the
Occupying Power. This failure, combined with UN withdrawal at the onset of the
war was seen as most damaging and in part responsible for tragic events such as
the August 19 bombing. After 35 years of monocracy, the concepts of
independence and impartiality are unfamiliar to the Iraqi population. This has
serious, ongoing implications for the security of internationals working in Iraq
7
S/RES/1483 (2003)
General Guidance for Interaction between United Nations Personnel and Military and Civilian
Representatives of the Occupying Power in Iraq (updated version 8 May 2003)
9
There was a need for a MOU because of lack of clarity and acknowledgement of humanitarian role as
well as to formalize issue of humanitarian access.
8
5
who, by default, and in the absence of proactive awareness raising, are perceived
as being affiliated with an Authority – be it the CPA or any other foreign
government. The Afghanistan evaluation already highlighted the need for OCHA
to speak out for the defense of the humanitarian principles in the context of
“military humanitarianism”10.
► Protection issues - During the period when the UN country team was withdrawn
from Iraq, the OCHA Protection of Civilians (POC) unit produced an integrated
and systematic matrix of the situation on the ground for civilian protection. The
matrix was shared with the UN country team, the humanitarian community and
most importantly with the Deputy SG’s Steering Group which was responsible for
UN policy making on Iraq. POC was then able to transfer the matrix as a
standardizing analytical and reporting tool over to the UN Country Team’s
Protection Adviser to be used as the basis for the inter-agency protection
framework planned for Iraq. Unfortunately this protection framework was never
implemented due to later events and the subsequent withdrawal of the UN.
Because of the legal requirements of the Occupying Power under the Fourth
Geneva Convention, the issues of security, law and order, both for civilians and
for UN and humanitarian personnel, became the obligation of the Occupying
forces. Due to a precarious security situation and a general lack of commitment on
the part of both UN and NGO headquarters and field personnel to call on
Occupying Power to account, the humanitarian community failed to advocate for
the application of key humanitarian laws and principles, including humanitarian
access and the protection of civilians.
► Gender issues - OCHA did not pro-actively ensure the implementation of the
1999 IASC Policy Statement for the Integration of a gender perspective in
humanitarian assistance as well as Resolution 1325 (2000)11. A Gender Working
Group meeting was established in Baghdad and chaired by the Baghdad Area
Coordination Office (BACO) to see how the voice of women could be heard and
how women could participate in post-conflict reconstruction. “Integrating gender
sensitivity and environmentally sustainable approaches into all programmes”12
was a requirement in the revised Flash Appeal. However, although most UN
agencies appointed gender focal points after the UN came back to Iraq, it remains
to be seen whether gender has been effectively mainstreamed into UN assistance
programmes and activities in the context of volatile security. Some informants
also noted that a gender-sensitive approach to NGO and CPA interventions
continues to be lacking and that while there is a noteworthy representation of
women amongst the international NGO community in Iraq, the CPA remains
10
Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services during the Emergency in
Afghanistan, July 2001 to July 2002, pp.15-16.
11
The Afghanistan evaluation made several recommendations on the need to integrate a gender
perspective; however, it is worth noting that none of those recommendations were followed by action.
12
Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq, Revised Inter-Agency Appeal, 1 April – 31 December 2003, UN June
2003, page 23.
6
overwhelmingly male-dominated. There was also more often than not a total
absence of women involved in key UN decision making processes in field.
Lessons:
1. Effective contingency planning hinges on accurate contextual information,
full participation of experts on the region and must be based on a fully
agreed definition of humanitarian action.
2. In complex emergency crises with a high political profile like Iraq, there is a
risk that the political process takes precedence over humanitarian concerns,
which in turn emphasizes the need for OCHA to take a stronger leadership
position and speak out in the defense of the humanitarian principles;
3. In complex emergency crises with a high political profile like Iraq, it is of the
utmost importance to change negative perceptions. It is essential to educate
the public about the role of the humanitarian community in the mission’s
area, thus avoiding confusion between military and civilian actors.
4. The humanitarian community needs to significantly raise the awareness of
Headquarters and field personnel on humanitarian and human rights laws
and principles; this could be done through training and capacity building of
staff to apply, abide by and advocate on such matters.
5. More attention should have been given to better identifying interlocutors
within the Occupying Power. OCHA didn’t work at a high enough level in
NY to address coordination issues in the field (on protection and in other key
areas).
II.
STRUCTURAL ISSUES:
2.
UN/NGO Liaison and Coordination
Findings: Throughout the war, OCHA served an important role in both Amman and
Kuwait keeping the international NGO community informed of developments and
training NGOs on needs assessment and activity mapping through the HIC.
In May 2003, OCHA and the NGO members of the IASC (ICVA, InterAction, and
SCHR) appointed an NGO Liaison Officer to liaise between the NGO and UN
community in Iraq on behalf of the Humanitarian Coordinator. OCHA took 7 weeks to
contract the NGO Liaison Officer after selection by the NGO community. The Office for
the Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq (UNOHCI) then took a further 7 weeks to deploy
her from Larnaca to Baghdad. This compromised the ability of the NGO Liaison Officer
to maintain linkages, build consensus and legitimately represent the NGO community in
7
Iraq (some informants however said that delays in hiring the NGO Liaison Officer were
partly due to the NGOs themselves not being able to agree on a suitable candidate).
The Humanitarian Coordinator actively promoted the founding of the NGO Coordination
Committee in Iraq (NCCI) as an independent NGO coordination and representation
mechanism. Seven months post-establishment NCCI remained unrepresentative of the
broader NGO community in Iraq and lacked the requisite skills to coordinate.
Coordination between the UN family and the NGO community was adequate, with NGOs
looking favorably to the UN for guidance and leadership on coordination. However, in
general UN agencies failed to capitalize on NGO good-will. NGOs were not involved in
the preparation of the revised Flash Appeal and the SRSG’s report to the Security
Council did not mention the role NGOs play in Iraq.
UN-NGO National Coordination Meetings were known by NGOs as the ‘UN Show’,
structured as donor briefings rather than discussions and seen as patronizing given that
NGOs were spending more time in field than the UN. In Baghdad, area coordination
meetings were dominated by UN agencies detailing public information, which was
largely not representative of needs and response. In the North, coordination was limited
to UN Heads of Agencies meetings. In Hillah, as a result of delayed UN deployment the
military took charge of aid coordination, thus creating significant discord within the NGO
community. Coordination mechanisms in the Centre and Lower South were fully
functional and enjoyed considerable NGO participation.
While sector working groups were established by NCCI in Baghdad, other sector
working groups were not established at the regional level and in general, US NGOs did
not participate in UN coordination. Three months post-conflict, many UN sector
coordinators had left the mission. The national coordination team in Baghdad failed to
monitor sector working groups closely and respond to coordination needs accordingly.
No central focal point for coordination with NGOs was established in New York or
Geneva, although this issue was already stressed in the Afghanistan evaluation: “At the
global level, it is surprising to note that OCHA is one of the few UN humanitarian
entities not equipped with a dedicated NGO relations unit”13. Although it seems that one
of the main problems came from the lack of cohesion within the NGO community itself;
some informants reported that NGOs couldn’t agree among themselves about
coordination issues and had contradictory agendas. As a result, it is doubtful whether the
establishment of an OCHA NGO Liaison Unit/a central focal point would solve the
problem. In addition, NGOs themselves may not want to go through a Liaison Unit
because it may limit their access to OCHA.
Many international NGOs in Iraq were not staffed with experienced personnel. Many
NGO workers in Iraq lacked requisite regional and cultural knowledge, were often on
their first overseas mission, and were in most cases not experienced enough to negotiate a
13 Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services during the Emergency in Afghanistan,
July 2001 to July 2002, p. 20.
8
highly politicized humanitarian assistance environment. The humanitarian community at
large continues to fail to articulate a clear understanding of the global, regional and local
politics at play in Iraq.
In the revised Flash Appeal, OCHA proposed to strengthen the development of national
NGOs.14 The NGO Liaison Officer assisted on an ongoing basis with the capacity
building of at least four new groups of Iraqis15 committed to establishing civil society
organizations in Iraq. Attempts were made to encourage linkages between international
and local NGOs for the purposes of capacity building, although the lack of experience of
many NGO workers in Iraq has limited the development of this process.
Lessons:
1. The NGO Liaison Officer post, nominated by the NGO community, should
be rolled-out to all humanitarian scenarios and the recruitment process sped
up in the interests of maintaining the appointee’s proximity to the
community, thereby better ensuring their ability to coordinate and represent
over time.
2. The NGO community should be consulted, through the IASC NGO umbrella
organizations, at all stages of CAP and SG reporting processes in order to
ensure better representation of needs, concerns and a better understanding
of facts on the ground. The view of NGOs as “add-ons” reduces opportunities
to partner with them and makes coordination more difficult in the field.
3.
Task Team Concept (Pro and Cons/An internal cost benefit)
Findings: The multi-function team co-located in New York under senior leadership
provided efficient support to the ERC and to colleagues in the field. The result was a
coherent, cohesive team in one location, as well as a consolidated management and
operational structure with no time delay between NY and Geneva, thus streamlining the
whole operation and helping to bridge the gap between Geneva and NY. However, while
the Task Team was established in a timely fashion, it was not disbanded in a timely
fashion, there was no framework or exit strategy for doing so. The size of the Task Team
was not reduced when the work was winding down.
While the Task Team concept worked, it did have opportunity cost, particularly regarding
its impact on OCHA Geneva, which reverted to a servicing rather than a substantive
14
Humanitarian Appeal for Iraq, Revised Inter-Agency Appeal, 1 April-31 December 2003, UN June 2003, p. 10.
The Iraqi Medical Union, The Iraqi Health Association, The Karbala Society for the Handicapped, The Voice of
Iraqi Children, and various women’s groups through Women for Women.
15
9
support role. Some functions are Geneva-based and mission critical (administration in
particular). While strengthening New York capacity on one side, the very same staff
deployed from Geneva left a gap concerning their regular functions in support of the
crisis. Some key informants stressed that, for example, there was added value in having
OCHA Geneva on line with the field to prepare the inputs for the morning SGI meeting.
Instead some staff strongly felt that they were bystanders and colleagues in NY had to
rush against the clock to get information for the SGI meeting, when Geneva was already
on a parallel time zone. This had quite a demoralizing effect on Geneva, showing that its
staff were not deemed able or trusted to take care of collecting information with the field
for onward distribution to the more politically charged OCHA HQ.
The institutional role of ESB in the response process was not clear, although ESB
capacity was used to deploy people to the field and deal with staffing issues. Some
informants said that the Task Team was too focused on the USG’s needs and not enough
on field liaison and should have included a Liaison Officer with defined ToRs to work in
Larnaca.
On a different level, there was a lack of gender balance in the composition of the Task
Team. Only one woman was appointed as the Head of a cluster (Information
Management) whereas all administrative support staff were women.
Lessons:
1. For large complex emergencies, OCHA New York and Geneva can only be
effective if brought together in one place with a clear chain of command
(with one Team Leader directly responsible to the ERC) and with a clear
final period/exit strategy.
4.
Guidance and support to regional and area offices
Findings: Performance in this area showed a number of weaknesses and resonated with
findings in earlier OCHA evaluations.
a) Field offices: it is important to stress that there were no OCHA offices in Iraq. An
impression was created internally that OCHA had an independent presence in Iraq, which
was not the case. The Area Offices were UNOHCI offices and in Basrah, Erbil and the
Centre, there was minimal OCHA staff involvement.
In neighboring countries, the impact of OCHA deployments was heavily dependent on
support provided by respective UN Resident Coordinators (RCs). RCs did not always
fully understand the special coordination needs of an emergency and could have
benefited from structured headquarters guidance. Most informants agreed that was the
result of dealing with weak and inexperienced RCs with no proper emergency
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background. While operating environments varied considerably from country to country,
OCHA performance could have been strengthened by providing standardized guidance
for OCHA team leaders (e.g. specific minimum requirements for coordination activities
tailored to this crisis) and “political” support to ensure agency cooperation.
Communication or guidance from Baghdad/Larnaca to Area Offices was, overall,
insufficient. While Area Offices may have inadvertently benefited from Baghdad’s
unintentional hands-off approach, Baghdad/Larnaca’s ability to meet its national
coordination responsibilities, gather information at the national level, institute national
policy, and develop national advocacy and communication strategies was significantly
diminished by minimal contact with the field. Indeed, once deployed to Baghdad the
national coordination team was consumed almost exclusively by policy and coordination
activities in and around the Capital, as it was perceived that this area of Iraq presented the
most challenges for the humanitarian community including in terms of need,
UN/NGO/CPA relations and security.
OCHA could have more robustly supported coordination at the Larnaca/Baghdad level.
The UNOHCI coordination structure dealt mostly with operational issues, whereas what
should be considered for future operations of this type is an addition to the structure
addressing (a) strategic coordination issues at the field level and (b) the coordination of
activities between field and HQs. The structure that was in place did not manage to meet
either of these needs.
In addition, some key informants pointed out the following weaknesses: lack of forward
planning and budgeting for contingency; inadequate negotiations with UNDP country
offices for services provided during the crisis; movements of staff without proper
notification to HQs; absence of an Office Manager in Cyprus to handle the cost-sharing
arrangements; difficulties in recovering monies due from Agencies under the cost-sharing
arrangements.
b) Regional Presence: Some concern was expressed about the utility/wisdom of
choosing (or remaining in) Larnaca as a temporary headquarters or staging point for the
region. Others felt that this ‘distance’ from the region allowed the Humanitarian
Coordinator’s Office to take a ‘big picture’ view of the unfolding situation. As illustrated
above, there was also a lack of clarity on reporting lines. Larnaca was in many ways a
self-contained entity, designing staffing plans and recruiting from wherever they could or
needed to (e.g. DPKO or OCHA).
Offices established in Amman and Kuwait during the war and beyond served their
coordination and cross-border operations purposes well. However, in mid-May a decision
was made to shut down all regional offices with the exception of Kuwait. The decision to
close the Amman and Larnaca offices was questioned by some OCHA personnel in field
on the basis of security concerns in Iraq and the potential need to evacuate UN personnel
on short notice. It was noted, at that time, that although UNJLC and UNHAS could
clearly manage the type of cross-border operations any such evacuation might require, a
UN evacuation would almost certainly prompt significant NGO withdrawal, necessitating
11
the Humanitarian Coordinator to continue coordination functions from neighboring
countries, in accordance with SCR 1483.
Lessons:
1. In order to provide consistent, effective and well-coordinated regional
coverage in complex emergency crisis, the primary role, functions and
relationship of OCHA’s field offices must be clearly defined;
2. OCHA is better and more strongly supported by RCs in the field when
coordination structures are clearly established and the RC’s role and
functions clearly defined;
III.
5)
IMPLICATION FOR SUPPORT:
Administrative/staffing support:
Findings:
Baghdad/Larnaca was responsible for Area Offices and for managing
different administrative relationships (e.g. with DPKO and with UNOHCI Area Offices).
The administrative relationship with DPKO showed very limited flexibility in meeting
administrative needs (e.g. inability to hire local staff as professionals through the DPKO
mechanism, although it was essential to have Arabic-speakers to fill professional
positions).
An important issue here is the position of OCHA as an organization that provides staff
and other support to a different entity (e.g. UNHCR, UNOHCI) and how that impacts
OCHA’s ability to function independently. OCHA was providing support to UNOHCI
but a lack of clarity about their respective functions in the field created additional
operational problems (administrative issues arose with UNOHCI undergoing liquidation
from June 2003 onwards; no alternative arrangements were put in place). Insufficient
administrative support in the field has been reported, i.e. support for area teams in Iraq
(no DSA was available for several of the teams) as well as delays in deploying staff from
Larnaca and providing equipment to field offices. OCHA was actually requested to
handle recruitments, deployments, support to area offices of UNOHCI although OCHA
administration had been informed earlier that these services were all going to be managed
by DPKO.
Short-term deployment and high turn-over of staff resulted in a lack of continuity in some
OCHA offices. The turn-over of staff had a negative impact on the way key humanitarian
partners perceived OCHA’s commitment. One OCHA office was staffed by two persons
seconded from another agency and was working without any proper equipment and
support (e.g. issue of lack of funding to recruit staff and lack of an appropriate
12
operational budget). There is a need to consolidate current Emergency Response tools to
ensure that qualified personnel are available at all levels and to ensure that OCHA is able
to deploy staff quickly in times of crises (key informants raised concerns over the way in
which the system had been set up, a lack of ability of managers to undertake to release
staff on short notice for a six week period). The Emergency Roster also needs to be
gender-balanced at all levels of responsibility: between December 2002 and November
2003, male candidates for the roster outnumbered female candidates, with all senior
humanitarian officers being male.
The issue of field support had been already emphasized in the Afghanistan’s evaluation,
i.e. need for “developing a culture of support to the field”16 (more streamlined
administrative procedures as well as better conditions of service). There is a need to
support the staff who are deployed in working in hardship postings (including by offering
stress counseling).
Lessons:
1.
If OCHA wants to respond quickly and efficiently to complex emergency
crisis, it needs to more robustly address the use of the UN’s administrative
procedures (issues of recruitment and funding) as well as pre-defined
administrative support with other actors involved (like DPKO).
2. The functioning of the Emergency Response Roster needs to be reviewed. It
was agreed that this would be initiated by the AERC as part of Geneva’s
lessons learned review of the Iraq crisis.
6.
Information management and services:
Findings: Performance in this area was mixed, with an overall successful performance
of the HIC but less convincing in the areas of reporting and use of the information. The
HIC was able to demonstrate its value in a crisis situation and played a highly visible and
well appreciated information role. On the other hand, basic reporting and information
inputs suffered from a lack of a pre-determined, integrated and clearly structured
reporting system. A public information center was set up in Amman and this part of the
effort worked quite well. A lot of preparation time went into ensuring that it did, with
good coordination between OCHA, DPI, and agencies. However, it should be noted that
the guidance coming out of HQ, spear headed by DPI, with considerable input from
OCHA (from the start) was simply - again as in Afghanistan - too slow.
a)
Reporting: The complexity of the Iraq operation created multiple reporting
obligations for the field. Frequent contact was required with the ERC, the Executive
16
Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services during the Emergency in
Afghanistan, July 2001 to July 2002, p.38.
13
Head of OIP in New York and the Office of the Deputy Secretary-General (each of them
demanded their amount of attention, reports, information and feed-back: this created
tensions and dispersion of information).
At one point at the beginning of the crisis, the Larnaka Reporting Unit was requested to
produce three reports a day and had to report to both the HC and New York, creating
additional work. Duplication of tasks could have been avoided had the entire reporting
system been streamlined and simplified. Some of the key informants also expressed
frustration about the lack of feed-back from Larnaca/Baghdad and New York. This
echoes observations made by last year’s Afghanistan evaluation, regarding the need for
developing a standard Sitrep format and “the need for a two-way information flow
between field offices and headquarters.”17 It would have facilitated reporting greatly, if
these recommendations had been addressed and followed up on (some key informants
mentioned that NY developed a Sitrep format before the crisis; this was changed/revised
by Larnaca. There were also several key problems in the Sitreps, including lack of
cumulative numbers of IDPs/aid/etc and most importantly during the bombing, sheer lack
of information from Iraq). There were internal and external versions of Sitreps, and
internal versions were so internal that even the head of the information cluster of the Task
Team in NY did not receive them.
In addition, gender-disaggregated data was not included in the reporting system. Such
data would have allowed for better identification of gaps in humanitarian assistance, thus
avoiding duplication of tasks, and facilitating inter-agency needs assessment.
In Iraq, several initiatives were taken with the aim of improving the exchange of relevant
information; for example, the national and area teams were collecting, analyzing and
disseminating information, including preparing a daily Sitrep, press reviews and minutes
of some meetings to the main stakeholders. In the UNOHCI Basrah and Central Areas,
Sitreps were focusing on areas of concern in the humanitarian situation as well as on
identifying gaps in assistance and particular needs of vulnerable groups. In Baghdad, the
BACO disseminated security information among international organizations and NGOs.
National Sitreps were essentially public information tools and were criticized by the
NGO community, in particular, for failing to reflect the humanitarian situation on the
ground. NGOs also noted publicly and frequently that UN agencies often used the Sitrep
mechanism to sell their activities to donors, exaggerating outputs and failing to recognize
that UN activities were almost exclusively being implemented by Iraqi partners and
international NGOs.
For the first time OCHA attempted to systematically track and record key events by
appointing one person at HQ to keep track of key events unfolding in Iraq with the aim of
building institutional memory on the crisis. However, other duties prevented the staff
17
Evaluation of the OCHA and UNOCHA Response and Coordination Services during the Emergency in
Afghanistan, July 2001 to July 2002, November 2002, p. 24
.
14
member from dedicating enough time to that particular task and limiting the value of this
task.
b)
The HIC: The Iraq HIC was established in countries surrounding Iraq in
February/ March and in Larnaca in March 2003. On its website, the HIC provides a wide
range of information and data and makes tools available like the Rapid Assessment
Process (RAP) developed by the humanitarian community. It was used by international
organizations and other key actors as a source to get daily updated news, and information
relating to meetings, strategies, coordination and operations in Iraq. For instance, the HIC
was used by the Briefing Center in Amman to get an update on the situation in Iraq and
the region. As a whole, the HIC functioned effectively in spite of some initial difficulties
in deploying HIC personnel due to limited roster of technical people.
By contrast, the HIC’s services were not used by some of OCHA’s offices in neighboring
countries nor did they actively contribute information. In part as consequences of this,
the work of the HIC was not as integrated into the work of humanitarian agencies at the
regional level as it might otherwise have been. Traditional problems also existed, for
example it was also reported that in Baghdad for instance, the NGO contact list
maintained by the HIC was not as useful as it could have been, e.g. no office location,
infrequent updates. Gathering and maintaining such information is always difficult and
more work needs to be done to improve this data collection.
A system like the HIC could be strengthened and used to better disseminating
information and coordination tools. It could encourage common and standardized
assessments in the future among UN agencies (instead of duplicating information and
tasks). The HIC would also be strengthened by the introduction of a gender perspective
into its work, e.g. in needs assessments, data and information collection, in the RAP’s
different documents and data base (the integration of a gender perspective gives a better
picture of the reality on the ground – what men and women do – and fosters a more
effective response to crises by identifying needs more accurately).
In order for HICs to be more effective in the future it is important that the coordinators
are fully cognizant of the services offered by the HIC and that the coordinators - not the
HIC - take the lead on issues such as common assessments, with the HIC providing
technical support.
c)
IRIN: The question of whether it was appropriate for IRIN to report on the Iraq
crisis was the subject of prolonged debate among OCHA senior staff. Those in favour
argued that IRIN could add significant value by using stringers - or locally-based
correspondents - to provide accurate and timely information from inside Iraq after the
start of a possible conflict. Those who expressed reservations about an IRIN Iraq service
felt that IRIN’s editorial independence could pose significant risks in such highlypoliticised and sensitive environment.
15
In March 2003, the ERC authorised IRIN to start reporting on the Iraq crisis using a
contribution of $150,000 from the Japanese government. Recruiting suitable stringers to
report on humanitarian developments from inside Iraq proved more difficult than
originally anticipated. Given the massive international interest in the forthcoming war,
most experienced journalists contacted by IRIN in March 2003 had already been
employed by newspapers and other similar information outlets to IRIN, such as the
Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) and the International Crisis Group (ICG).
IRIN’s inability to offer concrete contracts without benefits such as insurance was also
problematic for many potential stringers.
Eventually, IRIN did identify several suitable stringers who were able to provide original
humanitarian and human interest stories from inside Iraq as was originally intended.
Before the Humanitarian Coordinator’s return to Baghdad at the beginning of May, IRIN
was the only UN service to provide original reporting on humanitarian developments in
the Iraqi capital and much of Southern Iraq. Since then, the number of people accessing
IRIN’s reports on Iraq has steadily increased, reflecting a continued demand for IRIN’s
humanitarian news service.
Lessons:
1.
Streamlined reporting system and standardized, candid Sitreps would enable
a more efficient and systematic information flow between the different field offices
and HQ and would reduce the need for offices to “re-invent the wheel” (i.e. through
clear coordinated reporting lines, guidelines and information recording).
2.
In complex emergency crises where it is difficult to get access to information,
providing accurate and well-analyzed information through the rapid and strategic
establishment of HIC is vital for ensuring informed decision-making and effective
coordination, rapid assessment systems, data collection and processes.
3.
IRIN can play a key role in providing accurate, non-partisan and contextual
humanitarian information to decision-makers through the use of freelance news
correspondents in complex emergencies. Stringers are particularly effective in
countries where international humanitarian staff have been evacuated as they are
not subject to UN security restrictions and are able to give eyewitness accounts of
rapidly unfolding humanitarian developments.
7)
Training/Induction:
Findings:
Some informants emphasized the lack of proper briefing before being sent
on mission as well as ToRs that would help them better define their functions in the field.
In addition, the lack of clarity in their functions was reflected in the lack of proper
backup from HQ with field-based staff not knowing to whom to turn to in order to get
answers to their questions.
16
Although the skills and competencies of OCHA staff deployed to the region was
generally very impressive, there were considerable inconsistencies in comprehension of
basic OCHA functions such as coordination, and most notably on humanitarian policies
and advocacy strategies. This often led to considerable time wasted on discussions of
approach rather than simply applying, and modifying as required, existing OCHA
models, systematic induction courses for new staff could have helped too.
Lessons:
1.
Systematic and comprehensive pre-deployment briefings would have helped
OCHA staff members better prepare for their mission and better define their
assignment.
17
RECOMMENDATIONS
I.
STRATEGIC ISSUES: Defining what we need to better respond to complex
emergencies.
For immediate action
Action to be taken
1. Humanitarian
leadership and
‘managing’ humanitarian
space.
a) Revise the outline of
Contingency Planning
protocols to ensure a more
consistent integration of
gender issues, protection of
civilians and IDPs;
d) Develop a stronger
linkage with
universities/think-tanks to
be able to draw on
particular expertise when
setting the context in
complex humanitarian
emergencies (developing a
strong contextual and
analytical framework at the
very onset of the crisis);
Responsibility:
HEB/RCB and IASC
Reference Group on CP
HEB/RCB with support
from PDSB.
b) Review OCHA’s
position in integrated
missions (what is the risk of
association?);
e) Look at how to define
modalities for interaction at
appropriate senior levels in
complex humanitarian
emergencies with high
political profile like Iraq
(e.g. better coordination
between NY and
Washington).
OCHA Management
HEB/ERC
Responsibility:
c) Adopt a more pro-active
approach to implementing
the IASC Policy Statement
for the Integration of a
gender perspective in
humanitarian assistance (to
be linked to the OCHA
18
Gender Plan of Action that
is currently being drafted).
Responsibility:
II.
OCHA Management and
PDSB.
STRUCTURAL ISSUES: making sure that the right structures are in place.
1. UN/NGO Liaison and
Coordination.
For immediate action
Action to be taken
a) Develop a generic
framework/structure on how
to best establish dialogue
with NGOs; strengthen,
coordinate their work and
integrate them in the
planning process;
b) Systematically assign a
NGO Liaison Officer
nominated by the NGO
umbrella organizations of
the IASC to do the interface
with NGOs in complex
emergencies;
c) Develop a standard NGO
information set for OCHA
staff deployed in the field
(generic criterion for what
is an NGO; information on
civil society in the region;
international civil society
contact information; and
NGO lessons learnt from
other humanitarian
scenarios).
Responsibility:
HEB/RCB
2. Task Team Concept
a) Define generic ToRs for
(Pro and Cons/An internal the Task Team Concept in
anticipation of future crises
cost benefit).
(should include a final
period/exit strategy that
would enable OCHA to
review the TT role and
extend it or disband it in a
timely fashion with the aim
HEB/RCB
c) Systematically promote
gender and geographical
representation for the Task
Team at all levels of
responsibilities.
19
of reallocating resources in
other areas of
responsibilities);
b) Define the OCHA Iraq
Crisis Task Team as a
precedent for future crises
with a proper delegation of
authority but not at
prohibitive cost to Geneva
(team in one location,
Geneva staff brought to
NY, and functions clearly
defined between Task Team
members);
Responsibility:
HEB/RCB in cooperation
with other branches
3. Guidance and support
to regional and area
offices.
a) Clearly define
responsibilities of RC and
HC (OCHA could better
prepare/train RC on their
role/functions in the field –
send a team in a country to
brief the RC and provide
technical assistance)
Responsibility:
OCHA Management/RCB
III.
HEB/RCB in cooperation
with other branches
IMPLICATION FOR SUPPORT: what is needed to get changes?
20
1. Administrative/
Staffing support.
a) As an immediate measure, establish an
internal OCHA Task Force on
Administration to look into support
services both at HQs and at field levels
(administration, finance, procurement,
selection, recruitment and administration of
expatriate staff, training and briefing of
both expatriate and local staff) to ensure
that: AO is involved from the very first
stage of the emergency and AO Admin
Officer travels to all field locations to
negotiate arrangements with the service
provider, to establish needs of each office
and to train local staff to handle the
Administration;
f) Develop a
support system for
the staff in the field
so that they receive
proper backup when
needed as well as
stress counseling
when posted in
hardship conditions
and when they
come back from
mission.
Responsibility:
ESB/EO/AO
HEB/RCB
b) Make available an Administrative
Manual for distribution to staff posted in
the field to assist them in daily
administrative issues;
c) Draft and sign a MOU between DPKO
and OCHA to clarify arrangements in a
complex emergency situation as regards
financial and administrative support as well
as recruitment of personnel;
Responsibility:
Task Force on Administration (see above)
d) Review OCHA’s Emergency Response
Roster with the aim of strengthening it in
particular in assessing appropriate levels of
skills as well as proper gender and
geographical distribution (identify areas
where there may be weaknesses in
representation, such as in administration,
protection, etc.);
21
Responsibility:
ESB/RCB/HEB
e) Add to OCHA’s Emergency Response
tools through the development of its own
external roster mechanism (OCHA does
not currently have an established
mechanism for mainstreaming a roster of
external candidates who may be hired on
Series 200 contracts and deployed in the
field. The approach remains ad hoc, with
no mechanism to ensure that we get the
right people for the right job).
Responsibility:
HEB/RCB
2. Information
management and
services.
a) Standardized Sitreps and clear reporting
format must be developed for consistency
in reporting (a reporting Task Force could
be created to look at the reporting system
and the lack of feedback);
Responsibility:
HEB/RCB
b) The HIC should be integrated in the
work of humanitarian agencies at the
regional level for a better circulation and
exchange of information, as well as for the
development of standardized assessments
mechanisms that include a gender
perspective;
Responsibility:
FISU
c) IRIN should establish a roster of
freelance journalists that are familiar with
IRIN’s ethos and style who are available
for rapid deployment to complex
22
emergencies as and when required. For
high-profile emergencies in countries not
usually covered by IRIN, OCHA’s senior
management should take an early decision
on whether IRIN should be involved.
Responsibility:
IRIN
3.
Training/Induction
a) Before sending its staff on mission,
OCHA should offer detailed predeployment briefing/orientation sessions
that include cultural awareness and gender
issues (to be linked to the Gender Plan of
Action that is currently being drafted);
Responsibility:
Staff Development and Training Unit in
cooperation with other branches as needed.
b) In the field, staff members should
receive context-specific induction course to
get familiar with the issues at stake in the
country of mission.
Responsibility:
RCB
23