University of London
BA Philosophy of Mind
2006-7, Trm1, Wks1-5
Externalism
5. Semantic Externalism and Psychology
6. General form of Externalist Argument
Step 1.
Establish a difference between members of two groups, A and B (e.g., between
modern experts on Earth (A) and modern experts on Twin Earth (B)). This may be
done in a way that is consistent with Internalism, so that the difference corresponds
with internal differences between the two groups. In Putnam’s example, the difference
is in the extension, hence sense, of Earth “water” and Twin Earth “water”.
Step 2.
Establish internal sameness between members of two groups, C and D (e.g., between
ordinary folk in 1750 on Earth (C) and Twin Earth (D)).
Step 3.
Establish sameness, corresponding to the difference picked up at Step 1, between
members of groups at Step 1 and Step 2. That is, establish that A matches C and B
matches D in the relevant respect. In Putnam’s example, the relevant respect is the
extensions of their respective uses of “water”.
From Steps 1–3, it follows that C and D are internally the same, but differ in the
respect picked out at steps 1 and 3 and, so, in any respect on which that respect
supervenes (e.g., sense, if extension supervenes on sense). Hence, that respect fails to
supervene on total internal state. The critical move is always Step 3. We know from
steps 1 and 2 that members of one of the pairs, A/C or B/D, differ in various respects.
Despite this, it has to be made plausible that they are the same in the respect for which
Externalism is to be shown.
7. Burge’s Argument for Social Content Externalism
De dicto vs de re.
Notions (or concepts) as components of (de dicto) contents.
The extension of a notion (or concept) is determined by the notion (extension
supervenes on notion or concept).
Content Externalism (SE)
1. The extension of ‘arthritis’ in English is arthritis, and so excludes ailments of the
thigh. (Meaning of ‘arthritis’ in English and/or according to doctors.)
2. Alf sincerely utters “Bill has had arthritis for many years”.
3. “Alf believes that Bill has had arthritis for many years” seems true in English. (Alf
appears to be a sufficiently normal English speaker, and there do not appear to be
countermanding considerations, so that we can ascribe belief ‘homophonically’.)
4. Alf sincerely utters “I (Alf) have arthritis in my thigh”.
5. “Alf believes that he (Alf) has arthritis in his thigh” seems true in English. (Alf
appears to be a sufficiently normal English speaker, and there do not appear to
ordinary English speaking assessors to be countermanding considerations, so that we
can ascribe belief ‘homophonically’.)
6. The ascriptions in (3) and (5) are best construed as de dicto.
7. The particular ascription in (3), construed as in (6), is not undermined by evidence
in support of the ascription in (5)—e.g., (4)—despite (1). (Particular applications of
ordinary standards like that in (3) are ceteris paribus more trustworthy than general
principles that might be used to undermine (3) on the basis of (1) and (4), and there is
no reason to think all is not equal in this case.)
8. The particular ascription in (5), construed as in (6), is not undermined by (1).
(Particular applications of ordinary standards like that in (5) are ceteris paribus more
trustworthy than general principles that might be used to undermine them, and there is
no reason to think all is not equal in this case.)
9. Alf believes that Bill has had arthritis for many years. (From (3) and (7). This
premise is critical, and corresponds crudely with premise (2) in Putnam’s argument
for Semantic Externalism.))
10. Alf believes that he (Alf) has arthritis in his thigh. (From (5) and (8).)
11. Alf thinks using a notion of arthritis. (From (9) or (10).)
12. Alf’s notion of arthritis has an extension that fails to include ailments of the thigh.
(From (1).)
13. The extension of “arthritis” in TwinEnglish is tharthritis, and so includes ailments
of the thigh. (Meaning of “arthritis” in TwinEnglish and/or according to
Twindoctors.)
14. TwinAlf is an internal state duplicate, or twin, of Alf. (Differences in their
respective communities need not have impacted on them.)
15. TwinAlf sincerely utters “Bill has had arthritis for many years”.
16. “Alf believes that Bill has had arthritis for many years” seems true in
TwinEnglish. (TwinAlf appears to be a sufficiently normal TwinEnglish speaker, and
there do not appear to be countermanding considerations, so that our Twins can
ascribe belief ‘homophonically’.)
17. TwinAlf sincerely utters “I (Alf) have arthritis in my thigh”.
18. “Alf believes that he (Alf) has arthritis in his thigh” seems true in TwinEnglish.
(TwinAlf appears to be a sufficiently normal TwinEnglish speaker, and there do not
appear to ordinary TwinEnglish speaking assessors to be countermanding
considerations, so that they can ascribe belief ‘homophonically’.)
19. The ascriptions in (16) and (17) are best construed as de dicto.
20. TwinAlf believes that Bill has had tharthritis for many years. (No need to worry
about an analogue of (7); even an Individualist can accept this.)
21. TwinAlf believes that he (Alf) has tharthritis in his thigh. (No need to worry
about an analogue of (8); even an Individualist can accept this.)
22. TwinAlf thinks using a notion of tharthritis. (From (20) or (21).)
23. TwinAlf’s notion of tharthritis has an extension that includes ailments of the
thigh. (From (13).)
24. The extension of Alf’s notion of arthritis is different from the extension of
TwinAlf’s notion of tharthritis. (From (12) and (23).
25. Alf’s notion of arthritis is different from TwinAlf’s notion of tharthritis
(extension supervenes on notion, or content; hence, differences in extension entail
differences in notion, or content.)
26. Psychological content, or notions, fail to supervene on internal state. (From (14)
and (25).)
Step 1 of the argument—establishing difference compatible with Internalism—takes
place at premise 1 and premise 13. Step 2—establishing internal sameness—takes
place at premise 14. The rest of the argument—Step 3—aims to support the
transmission of the difference picked out in Step 1 to internal duplicates, and thence
to their notions. This requires showing that, despite the obvious differences between
Alf and experts in his community, each has a notion of the same disease: arthritis.
Things to note about the argument. (i) The point of sameness appealed to at Step 3
concerns extension and not notion. (ii) The argument does not require us to agree to
both of the attributions made to Alf and to TwinAlf, respectively. In particular, the
argument goes through if we are willing to make one of the attributions—the Bill
attribution in premise 9 and the TwinBill attribution in premise 20. (iii) In responding
to the argument, it is not enough to show that the behaviour of Alf and TwinAlf
support some attributions of psychological states other than those in premise 9 and
premise 20. One needs also to give reason for rejecting the attributions in 9 and 20.
(iv) It is not clear that the argument relies on appeal to public languages. May require
only experts. (v) The argument aims to establish Social Content Externalism, rather
than Environmental Content Externalism. It may be that similar arguments can be
presented for notions of natural environmental elements like water. It may also be that
such an argument has more plausibility than the one that Burge presents.
For our purposes, the critical moves in the argument are those from facts about Alf’s
behaviour to (a) psychological ascriptions and (b) the construal of those ascriptions as
de dicto. Those moves constitute Burge’s argument for Step 3.
8. Defending Step 3.
A. Standard practice. Particular cases versus general principles. (Individualist needs to
provide reason for rejecting the attributions made in Step 3.)
B. Failure of ‘reinterpretation’ strategies. (Individualist needs to provide superior
alternatives to the attributions made in Step 3.)
B1. De re ascription.
B2. Narrow content.
C. Principles governing ascription.
C1. Particular applications versus general principles.
C2. Responsibility to communal norms (“deferring to experts”).
Take home questions:
Can a version of Burge’s argument be constructed with respect to thoughts about
water (or some other natural kind)?
If they can, are such arguments more or less plausible than Burge’s?
How should an Internalist respond to Burge’s argument?
Guy Longworth
g.longworth@ucl.ac.uk