On the Dualistic Assumptions Underlying G. H. von
Wright’s Non-Causal Explanatory Model
Robert Lantin
Department of Philosophy, National Chung Cheng University
Abstract
I first offer a brief characterization of the argument supporting von Wright’s
non-causal explanatory model for the human sciences (section I). The discussion then moves
on to compare von Wright’s argument to Donald Davidson’s causal theory of action (section
II). My contention here is that von Wright is committed to denying token physicalism, thus
embracing some form of event-dualism. This has traditionally been understood to entail “the
congruence problem” for von Wright’s model—the problem, that is, of accounting for the very
occurrence of bodily movements given an agent’s intentions. In the last section of the paper
(section III), I propose a possible solution to the congruence problem based on a version of
epiphenomenalism that is compatible with current research in the neurosciences.
I
1. Introduction—the von Wrightian approach
In what follows, I wish to re-open a number of issues that were actively discussed,
throughout the 1970s, and up to around the mid-1980s, in the areas of Epistemology, the
philosophy of action, and the philosophy of human and social sciences. The issues I’m
particularly interested in involve the concepts of human action, human behavior, intentionality,
explanation, and causation, to name just a few. The discussion I’m aiming at will be centered
on the debate between causal and non-causal models of explanation of human action. This
debate, as I hope to show in a later section, has evolved into a couple of important strands in the
philosophy of mind, starting roughly in the early 1980s and running pretty much through the
1990s until now—namely, the problem of externalism, on the one hand, and that of mental
causation, on the other. As the title of my paper makes clear, I’ll be approaching the issues
2
from the perspective opened up by the Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright. As I
understand the crux of his position, von Wright aimed at articulating what I would call an
anti-Cartesian view of intentionality, whereby an agent’s intentions, to paraphrase Putnam,
just ain’t in her head. In Explanation and understanding (hereafter EU), published in 1971, von
Wright wrote:
To say that intentionality is in the behavior is at once suggestive of something
important and easily misleading. The truth in that formulation is that
intentionality is not anything “behind” or “outside” the behavior. It is not a
mental act or characteristic experience accompanying it. The misleading
thing about the formulation is that it suggests a “location” of the intention, a
confinement of it to a definite item of behavior, as though one could discover
the intentionality from a study of the movements. One could say—but this too
might be misleading—that the behavior’s intentionality is its place in a story
about the agent. (von Wright, 1971: 115)
As far as I can tell—and I hope it will become clear later—, this passage encapsulates at once
the originality, the strength, and the weakness in von Wright’s perspective. In a nutshell: with
intentions no longer located within the agent, it becomes all but impossible to conceive of them
as bona fide causes of behavior. Hence we can appreciate one important feature of von
Wright’s non-causal perspective. Yet at the same time, it becomes especially hard to see how
intentions and behavior are ‘kept in phase’, as it were. But I’m getting ahead of my story here,
so let’s back-pedal a bit and start from the beginning.
In EU, von Wright is preoccupied with the concept of ‘explanation’ and its evolution
throughout the history of science and what he calls the ‘philosophy of scientific method’. He
distinguishes between two traditions with regard to scientific explanation: one focused on
teleological explanations, and which he calls ‘Aristotelian’; the other focused on causal
explanations, and called ‘Galilean’. Teleological explanations, von Wright notes, are typically
found in the province of Hermeneutics, a discipline concerned with (i) the study of the
individual, unique features of its objects of study; (ii) the psychological and semantic aspects
of understanding; and (iii) the ‘moral sciences’ (from the German Geisteswissenschaften).
This tradition is also characterized by a defense of methodological dualism—the view that
there is a fundamental, irreducible difference between the natural and the human sciences.
On the other hand, the Galilean tradition defends methodological monism—the view
that scientific method should be unique for any and all scientific disciplines. The Galilean
3
tradition is based on mathematical physics and causal explanations. The view was epitomized
by Carl Hempel’s subsumption theory of explanation, also known as the ‘covering law model’
of explanation. A sharp debate between the two traditions was fueled by Hempel’s publication
of a paper titled “The function of general laws in history,” in which he introduced his
explanatory model back in 1942. This, von Wright tells us, has led to a string of seminal
publications towards the end of the 1950s, including William Dray’s Laws and explanation in
history (1957); Elizabeth Anscombe’s Intention (1957); and Peter Winch’s The idea of a social
science (1958). A common theme among the three books is the rejection of Hempel’s covering
law model, as applied to the study of history and social phenomena. One central idea put forth
by Dray is what he called rational explanation, which, he argues, is the form of explanation
privileged by historians. One key aspect of Dray’s model is his insistence on the sui generis
nature of explanations of human actions. Parallel to Dray’s study, Anscombe was developing a
perspective centered on the study of the practical inference as a mode of explanation of
intentional action.
Throughout the 1960s, a lot of effort was devoted to the development of a theory of
intentionality and a model for the explanation of intentional human action, owing to the central
place the concept of action had secured in the philosophy of human sciences. Indeed, several
participants in the discussions considered intentional human action as the object of study of
most human sciences. This has fueled renewed interest in the philosophy of action.
2. Theory of action—the basic issues
There are two sets of basic issues in the philosophy of action. The first set consists in
accounting for the intentionality of action. The second set is focused on the explanation of
intentional action.
Accounting for the intentionality of action usually involves articulating a sharp
distinction between behavior that is intentional and behavior which amounts to mere bodily
movement. It is important to notice the presence of physical movements whenever intentional
behavior is performed (except perhaps in cases of forbearing, but I leave those cases aside for
present purposes). I may close my eyes so as to avoid the discomfort of an excess of dust in the
air around me, say; in the same manner, my eyes may close as I fall asleep sitting on a long bus
ride. The first instance is a case of intentional behavior; the second is mere bodily movement.
The distinction is important for the concept of human action: it is only by reference to
4
intentionality that human action may be distinguished from mere behavior. Furthermore,
human action, whether intentional or non-intentional, always involves intentional behavior. I
may intend to turn on the light but flick the wrong switch and turn on a fan instead. My turning
on the fan is unintentional, but nonetheless involves intentional behavior—namely, the
flicking of a switch.
The second set of issues is focused on the explanation of intentional action. The central
problem here is to characterize intentional explanations and show how they differ from
explanations of mere behavior. Usually, this is accomplished by pointing out that intentional
explanations make reference to reasons for acting, whereas explanations of mere behavior do
not. The term ‘reason’ here covers an agent’s beliefs, desires, motives, and other such
‘volitional factors’ in light of which her behavior may be justified. But justifying behavior is
not to be confused with explaining behavior. An agent’s reasons may be said to justify her
intentional behavior and account for its intentionality. A full-fledged explanation of intentional
behavior must show that the behavior occurred because of the agent’s reasons.
This provides for a rather intricate set of difficulties. The physical movements involved
in intentional behavior are typically caused by neural processes. But what about the reasons for
acting ? What role do they play in the production of intentional behavior ? The typical Galilean
answer was straightforward: reasons for acting are ultimate causes of intentional behavior
subsumed under general laws. The distinction between proximate and ultimate causes made
the case quite simple indeed. One’s reasons for acting cause one’s intentional behavior by
causing the right sort of physical movements to be brought about via proximate causes.
Defenders of the subsumption theory of explanation pointed out that general psychophysical
laws, although highly complex, would eventually be discovered. Hempel spoke of explanation
sketches in this context.
3. The Logical Connection Argument (LCA)
Opponents of the covering law model claimed that explanations of intentional behavior
could not be causal because reasons and the actions they explain are not logically independent
from one another. According to the Humean theory of causality, causes must be logically
independent from the effects they bring about. The notion of logical independence between an
event-cause and the event-effect it brings about can be minimally understood as meaning that
the two events do not share all their intrinsic properties. Donald Davidson saw the potential for
5
confusion in the claim. I return to this point in the next section.
The claim that reasons and actions are not logically independent stemmed from
considerations of the practical inference ([PI]) as the preferred schema to account for
intentional action. The following schema is representative:
[PI]
A intends to bring about p.
A considers that she cannot bring about p unless she does a.
Therefore, A sets herself to do a.
Several philosophers have pointed out that a schema such as [PI] at once shows the teleological
nature of intentional action. The fact that the two premises of [PI]—indeed the reasons for
acting—already mention the action to be undertaken is taken to show the logical connection
between them.
II
4. Davidson’s and von Wright’s perspective on LCA
Donald Davidson thinks that the logical connection argument fails insofar as it rests on
a confusion between events and their descriptions. According to Davidson, causation holds
between events, and not between descriptions of events. The fact that [PI] intertwines reasons
and actions does not imply that the events being described are not independent. From a
Davidsonian perspective, the reasons for acting are mental events. A’s intention to bring about
p, for instance, is a dated particular taking place in A. The fact that the event is described as
pointing to p has no causal effect in physical reality. For Davidson, [PI] serves to justify A’s
intentional behavior, but it cannot serve as an explanation of action.
It is important to mention that Davidson also rejects the covering law model of
explanation of intentional action. His views are well-known. His anomalous monism is an
explicit argument against the existence of any psychophysical laws. Yet, Davidson claims that
reasons are causes, and defends a causalist view for the explanation of intentional action.
To understand the position, one must keep in mind a number of claims, but the argument for
the identity of mental and physical events [AI] is worth stating:
6
[AI]
(i)
if M, a mental event, causes P, a physical event, then
(ii)
under some description, M and P instantiate a strict law; but since
(iii)
strict laws are homonomic, and homonomic laws occur in physical sciences,
(iv)
the strict law instantiated by M and P can only be physical; from which it
follows that
(v)
M falls under a physical law, and thus has a physical description; which in turn
implies that
(vi)
M is a physical event, and, thus, that
(vii)
every mental event that is causally related to a physical event is a physical event
(Davidson, 1970: 224)
For present purposes, it will suffice to point out that for Davidson, the mental events that cause
an agent’s intentional behavior are identified with neural events, and are thus located within the
agent whose behavior they explain. This perspective may now be contrasted with the
‘anti-Cartesianism’ I earlier attributed to von Wright’s position.
Von Wright takes a different route to defend the logical connection argument. His
crucial strategy here consists in relying on the verification of the premises and conclusion of
the practical inference. He asks how one can go about verifying an agent’s intentions. It is in
this section of EU that he unveils his anti-Cartesian stance. After reflecting on a case involving
one’s intention to ring a bell, he writes:
Am I saying then that my intention (right now) to ring the bell and my
thinking the pressing of the button necessary for this end is the same as the
fact that I now press the button ? To this should be answered: It is not the
same as the sequence of bodily movements and events in the external world
which terminates in my finger’s pressing against the button and the button’s
sinking into the hole. But it is this sequence meant by me (or understood by
others) as an act of ringing the bell. (von Wright, 1971: 115)
Here two things should be noticed: (i) the intention is to be understood as meaningful behavior;
and (ii) the premises and the conclusion of the practical inference are mutually dependent. This
mutual dependency is essentially von Wright’s defense of the logical connection argument.
The claim regarding intentions can use one last quotation from von Wright:
7
Intentional behavior, one could say, resembles the use of language. It is a
gesture whereby I mean something. Just as the use and the understanding of
language presuppose a language community, the understanding of action
presupposes a community of institutions and practices and technological
equipment into which one has been introduced by learning and training. One
could perhaps call it a life-community. (von Wright, 1971: 114)
The analogy with language is striking. Intentional behavior thus becomes a sequence of
physical movements invested with meaning—pretty much the same way an uttered sentence is
a sequence of physical sounds invested with meaning. Therefore intentional behavior is
meaningless—i.e. misunderstood and unexplainable—outside of a given life-community.
Intentions are not within agents.
So von Wright must reject Davidson’s claim that intentions are mental events located
within agents. Hence, no more can intentions be identified with internal physical events. Yet,
intentional behavior is meant by agents, and perceived and interpreted (understood) by others
within the confines of a life-community. These meaningful sequences I shall refer to as
‘external events’, distinct from the physical events going on in an agent’s brain.
5. The congruence problem
When engaging in intentional behavior, an agent must engage in a sequence of physical
movements. (Again, I leave out cases of forbearing for the sake of simplicity.) These
movements are caused by neural events located in the agent’s brain. By identifying mental
events with (a subset of) neural events, Davidson avoids what is known as the congruence
problem. This, essentially, is the bringing together of the agent’s intentions with her bodily
movements. One could perhaps claim that the demand that there should be congruence
between reasons and actions is itself a ‘Cartesian’ stricture, and as such should not infect a
non-Cartesian view such as von Wright’s. Nonetheless, the difficulty seems to me worth
exploring.
For the von Wrightian perspective, the problem consists in showing how the intention
is kept in phase with the sequence of physical movements. The movements are caused by
internal events, but why should my body move in precisely the way it does if the reasons for
acting the way I do are not causes ? Von Wright briefly touches upon the difficulty at the end of
his discussion of teleological explanation. Here is the passage:
8
... on the whole, I can say with confidence that my arm will remain in its
present position (we shall assume it is not raised) unless I raise it. That I
should have this confidence is, moreover, necessary if I am to say truthfully
of myself that I can raise my arm. But this confidence, and the fact that I can
raise my arm, does not conflict with the possibility that, every time my arm
goes up, there is a sufficient condition, causally responsible for this event,
operating in my nervous system. (von Wright, 1971: 129-30)
Von Wright goes on to claim that one can not at once observe the operation of a cause lifting
one’s arm while lifting it oneself. Either the operation of the cause is observed, or the agent
makes things happen.
But this does not solve the problem. At issue is the question why should there be
precisely that humean sufficient cause accompanying my intentional behavior ? Von Wright
does not answer the question.
III
6. A possible solution to the congruence problem
In this last section, I wish to sketch a possible solution to von Wright’s congruence
problem. One promising route simply consists in re-interpreting von Wright’s position with
regards to intentionality in terms of extrinsic and relational properties. The idea roughly breaks
down as follows: the neural events causally responsible for an agent’s bodily movements do so
in virtue of the intrinsic properties they instantiate at a time; but these same neural events also
have extrinsic, relational properties, namely, the intentional properties providing the agent’s
reasons for acting. One such ‘externalist’ theory of behavior was put forth by Fred Dretske in a
series of books and articles published mainly throughout the 1990s (see, most notably, Dretske
1988). Dretske adopts a very interesting perspective on the nature of intentional and content
properties (‘meanings’), one that sheds light on an anti-Cartesian view of intentional behavior
such as von Wright’s. In a reply to Jaegwon Kim, Dretske made the following remarks, which
apply, I believe, to our present discussion. He wrote:
I think meanings are physical: in giving a psychological explanation of
behavior, an explanation in terms of what S’s internal states mean, one is
merely giving a very special kind of physical explanation, an explanation in
9
terms of the extrinsic (physical) properties of S’s internal states. ... What
makes psychological meaning a special kind of thing, what gives it its mental
character (and, at the same time, makes its explanatory role puzzling), is the
fact that the meaning of a system’s internal states is constituted by properties
that, though physical, are extrinsic to the system whose behavior they help
explain. (Dretske, 1991: 211)
The crucial element of Dretske’s approach consists in the rapprochement, as it were, of the
internal and external aspects of behavior in a way that solves the congruence problem, and yet
maintains the anti-Cartesian character of von Wright’s perspective.
Of course, one central aspect of Dretske’s theory that I leave to the side here was his
defense of the causal efficacy of extrinsic properties. But I now feel that epiphenomenalism
provides an acceptable and workable solution to the metaphysical puzzles of mental causation,
especially those opened up by postulating the extrinsic nature of intentional and content
properties. According to this epiphenomenal perspective, mentality is the causal product of
internal, neurophysiological events and external, ‘world-head’ relations, as it were. Meaning
and intentionality are extrinsic properties of an agent’s internal states and are the product of the
agent’s commerce with her life-community. As such, those extrinsic, relational properties are
causally idle in the production of behavior, but their being correlated to the agent’s internal
states guarantees that things are kept in phase.
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