Establishment of ASEAN as a Process of Reassurance by Indonesia
Nobuhiro IHARA
Introduction
Due to its large population, tremendous amount of resources, territorial size and enormous
domestic market, Indonesia has been regarded as a potential great power in Southeast Asia.
Sukarno’s Confrontation policy towards Malaysia, which continued until the mid-1960s, clearly
showed that this ‘potential major power’ could be a serious threat to regional peace and stability.
Many scholars devoted to study of the formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) such as Michael Leifer, Roger Irvine, Charles Morrison and Astri Suhrke argue that
regional countries that held these concerns about Indonesia even after the downfall of Sukarno’s
administration tried to draw the potential threat into intra-regional relations in a friendly and
constructive manner.1
In reality, however, since Indonesia took the initiative in the process of establishing ASEAN,
its participation in regional cooperation was simply not welcomed. The Indonesian government,
especially its army, believed that Indonesia had a natural right to play a leadership role in
regional affairs due to its potential power,2 and regarded the regional cooperative body as one of
the vehicles for the expansion of Indonesian influence.3 Other regional countries, especially
Malaysia, had vague but realistic concerns that Indonesia would play a dominant role in regional
cooperation and, in the longer term, utilise the forthcoming regional organisation as a diplomatic
1
Michael Leifer, "The Role and Paradox of ASEAN," in The Balance of Power in East Asia, ed. Michael Leifer,
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1986), 120; Roger, Irvine “The Formative Years of ASEAN:
1967-1975.” Alison Broinowski, (ed.), Understanding ASEAN. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1982), 11-12; Charles E.
Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: the Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States, (St. Lucia.
Qld.: University of Queensland Press, 1978), 268-70.
2
Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl. Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia (London: Macmillan, 1982), 35.
3
Memo, Australian Embassy, Djakarta (hereafter AED), 3.5.1967, A4359, 221/5/22 (hereafter 221/5/22) Pt 1,
National Archives of Australia, Canberra (hereafter NAU).
1
tool to gain regional hegemony.4 Although some researchers, namely Michael Leifer, Ann
Marie Murphy and Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, point out that the mistrust associated with
Indonesia stemmed from its asymmetric power structure,5 few of them mention how the
mistrust affected the process of establishing the ASEAN.
For example, Indonesia inserted a sentence into the Declaration of the South East Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SEAARC), which subsequently became the ASEAN
Declaration, proclaiming that all foreign bases were temporary in nature. This sentence met
opposition from all prospective members of ASEAN, as according to the aforementioned
research, these countries had allied with the US or the UK and relied on these external countries
for their defence. However, it was not well known that prospective members were also opposed
to the reference because of concerns about Indonesia as a potential long term threat. Since
Malaysia was concerned that the unstable Indonesian government would possibly revive its
radical and exclusive diplomacy, they needed to retain long-term deterrence towards Indonesia.6
If the foreign bases were to be withdrawn, this would not only increase the military burden for
the regional countries, but also allow Indonesia to play a bigger military role that could have
resulted in Indonesia justifying its enhanced military capability. Although the references to
foreign bases were kept in the ASEAN Declaration, the military presence of external countries
in the region was maintained after ASEAN’s establishment. While this paradox can be explained
in terms of Indonesia’s potential threat, previous scholars have not examined it in detail. Some
scholars emphasised the effect of a good neighbour policy referred to in the ASEAN Declaration
4
Australian Embassy, Manila (hereafter AEM) to DEAC, 21 Mar 1967, A1838, 3010/9/6 (hereafter 3010/9/6), AU.
Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur (hereafter AHCKL) to DEAC, 7 Mar 1967, A1838, 3004/13/21
(hereafter 3004/13/21), AU.
5
Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 1989), 5-6; Murphy, Ann Marie.
From Conflict to Cooperation in Southeast Asia 1961-1967: The Dispute Arising Out of the Creation of Malaysia
and the Establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN,) PhD Dissertation, New York:
Columbia University, 2002, 324-326; Jorgensen-Dahl, Regional Organization and Order in South-East Asia, 35, 173.
6
For example, AHCKL to Department of External Affairs, Canberra (hereafter DEAC) 3004/13/21 Pt.4. NAU.
2
in the ASEAN member countries’ mitigation of mistrust toward Indonesia.7 However, the
ASEAN states did not reach an agreement on a concrete project for cooperation when the
association was established and could not force the members to uphold the good neighbourhood
policy due to the association’s institutionally loose structure. Accordingly, Indonesia’s good
neighbour policy did not guarantee the absence of threat to the members’ security and thus
cannot clarify why and how ASEAN could mitigate the mistrust towards Indonesia experienced
by the other members.
Inter-state trust plays a significant role when states decide whether to join international
cooperation because there is uncertainty as to the motivation and preference of the other states
that join the cooperation: these states might have concealed certain motives to exploit other
states through the cooperation. This study defines trust as the expectation that other states will
behave in a reciprocal manner, rather than attempting to exploit the other states. Mistrust is
defined as the expectation that other states will behave in an exploitative manner, rather than act
reciprocally towards others in a cooperative way.8 If a particular state wants to achieve
international cooperation, but mistrust is present amongst the others, it must send costly signals
to reassure the other states of its intention to cooperate.9 A state can enhance trust among others
by paying a price that would cause any attempt at exploitation to be unprofitable. In other words,
the trustworthiness of a state often depends on how costly the signal itself is. Since signals that
require larger costs vary from state to state, whether a state is trustworthy is evaluated by the
state’s capability, available options and its consequences.10 Trust will more likely be enhanced if
cooperation promotes the participants’ contact and makes communication easy, which results in
For instance, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Indonesia in ASEAN: Foreign Policy and Regionalism (New York: St. Martin’s
Press: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 198.
8
Andrew Kydd. Trust and Mistrust in International Relations (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press,
2004), 9.
9
Andrew Kydd, "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," International Organization
55, no. 4 (2001), 801.
10
This idea is similar to the social psychological approach. See Patha Dasgupta, “Trust as a Commodity,” Diego
Gambetta (ed.) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, (New York: Basil Blacwell, 1988), 50–1.
7
3
decreasing uncertainty about the other state’s intentions.11
The dominant power in a unipolar system generally prefers to act unilaterally. However, if the
dominant power itself forms an institution in which its unilateral act is constrained, it can
reassure smaller powers.12 Due to the necessity to reach a consensus between two or more
member countries, multilateral procedures of decision making are costly for the largest power.
Meanwhile, it will convince smaller powers that “their preferences matter, and that they are not
simply being coerced or directed to follow the dictates of the dominant power.”13 Moreover,
smaller powers will increase the incentive to join the institution if all states under the institution,
including the dominant power, are constrained in terms of their use of power, which would
inflame tensions among other states, blocs and specific people inside and outside the region.14
Another component of state reassurance includes keeping the dominant state’s military power
lower than that of other states. This is reassuring for smaller powers because the deterrence
toward the dominant power would be maintained. Since it reduces smaller powers’ military
vulnerability at the expense of that of the larger powers, the cost of this way of reassurance was
too high for states that harboured exploitative intentions.15
From these perspectives, this paper hypothesizes that Indonesia mitigated other ASEAN
members’ mistrust by building institutions that would constrain Indonesia’s unilateral action on
its own initiative. The following empirical segment is divided into four sections. After
examining how and why the contents of the Declaration were adopted by Indonesia and
Thailand in the first section, the second section will illustrate how Malaysia’s mistrust of
Indonesia was revealed in the form of its opposition to the Declaration. These two sections show
David Good, “Individuals, Interpersonal Relations, and Trust,” Gambetta, op.cit., 37.
G. John Ikenberry, "Conclusion: an institutional approach to American foreign economic policy," International
Organization 42- 1 (1988), 228.
13
Michael. Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment - Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy after the Cold
War," International Security 21, no. 4 (1997). 60–1.
14
Janice Stein, "Reassurance in Interanational Conflict Management," Political Science Quarterly 106, no. 3 (1991),
437–40.
15
Montgomery Evan, "Breaking out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of
Uncertainty," International Security 31, no. 2 (2006), 157–60.
11
12
4
the desired style of regional cooperation among future members of the ASEAN and the tasks of
reassurance Indonesia and Thailand faced to form the association. The following two sections
then demonstrate why and how the mistrust of Indonesia was mitigated. More concretely, the
third section analyses the negotiation process of forming the ASEAN from the beginning of
1967, and the fourth section summarises the discussion in the establishment meeting that the
ASEAN held in August, 1967.
In regard to historical sources, in addition to newspapers from Southeast Asia, journals,
ASEAN’s formal documents and published secondary sources, this study uses recently released
diplomatic documents from Australia, the UK and the US. These countries have had active
interests and direct involvement in ASEAN’s regions as allies, former suzerain countries and
neighbour countries of several of the ASEAN members. These sources include records of
personal interviews with political elites from countries both included in, and external to,
Southeast Asia. There is a lack of historical sources relating to ASEAN, due partly to the fact
that most of the governments in Southeast Asia have not yet publicly released their diplomatic
documents. The records of interviews are useful for examining not only the process of forming
the ASEAN that have not been clarified in previous studies, but also the mistrust toward
Indonesia among leaders in other ASEAN countries since the foreign policy of many ASEAN
states in this period tended to be affected by the views of a few elite personnel.
The Draft of the SEAARC Declaration
By May 1966, Adam Malik, foreign minister of Indonesia, Abdul Razak, deputy prime
minister of Malaysia and Thanat Khoman, foreign minister of Thailand, had agreed on the need
for closer regional cooperation during the reconciliation process that ended Confrontation.16
16
AED to DEAC, 28 Jul 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU.
5
The members of the Association of South-East Asia (ASA), a regional consultative organisation
of Malaya, the Philippines and Thailand, hoped that two non-aligned countries in the region,
namely Indonesia and Singapore, would join the association to mitigate the stigma that ASA was
pro-Western and anti-communist. However, Indonesia did not wish to lose face by joining an
association that Indonesia had criticised for its ‘links with SEATO and the US defence system’.17
Moreover, Indonesia preferred to be a founding member of a new organisation, rather than a
second-class citizen in ASA as a result of joining later.18 Therefore, the leaders mentioned above
initiated a mutual visit to discuss what organisational framework they would adopt for the
proposed regional cooperation from August 1966 through to the end of December.
In this process of the revival of MAPHILINDO (Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia), a
proposed non-political confederation of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia, with a greater
spread, was also discussed. This proposal was temporarily supported by the Philippines and
Indonesia, which shared deep hostility towards the Chinese government. However, the idea of
MAPHILINDO was based on the concept of Malay unity and thus its membership excluded
Singapore and Thailand. Concerns were also expressed regarding the likely tensions among the
millions of Chinese in the region caused by the Malay-centred characteristics of
MAPHILINDO.19 Moreover, MAPHILINDO was not acceptable for Malaysia since it was
proposed by Indonesia and the Philippines as a means to curb the establishment of Malaysia,
including Sabah. In fact, Tunku Abdul Rahman, prime minister of Malaysia, agreed that the
inclusion of Sabah in Malaysia would not prejudice the Philippines’ claim to Sabah when the
formation of MAPHILINDO was decided.20 From the standpoint of negating Sukarno’s foreign
policy, Indonesia also rejected MAPHILINDO, which was an abortive attempt and therefore
17
AED to DEAC, 12 May 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; Memorandum, date unknown, 221/5/22, AU.
DEAC to all posts, 9 Mar 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; Memorandum, date unknown, 3004/13/21, AU.
19
For instance, Y. H. Tan, the leader of the ruling Alliance Party in the Malaysian Senate said this in the Upper House
of the Malaysian Parliament. ADNB, 7 Sep 1966.
20
ADNB, 28 Jul 1968.
18
6
was seen as a failure.
Hence a combination of the ‘economic and cultural aspects of ASA’ and ‘the political
purposes of MAPHILINDO’ was envisaged for the formation of a new regional organisation.
The SEAARC Declaration was drafted based on this idea when two senior Foreign Ministry
officials from Indonesia, Anwar Sani and Abu Bakar Lubis, were dispatched to Thailand at the
end of 1966. The draft apparently incorporated some phrases from the Manila Declaration that
established MAPHILINDO. Since Thailand was not a member of MAPHILINDO, a strong
impression of Indonesia’s commitment to the draft remained.21 The reference to the temporary
nature of foreign bases in the Thai draft was inserted according to a requirement by the
Indonesian Army. The Army believed that the military presence of foreign countries in the
region could be used ‘as a tool for intervention and invasion’ and therefore could undermine ‘the
solution of Asian problems by Asian nations in the Asian Way’.22 In addition, many Indonesian
army officials tended to see the forthcoming regional organisation as, in the long run, a tool to
reduce and eventually take over the security role of the outside powers in the region.23 If it was
realized, Indonesia was likely to make a greater contribution to regional defence as a “leader” in
the region, and eventually this would lead to the army claiming a greater military budget.
In contrast with the Indonesian army’s position, the Foreign Ministry of Indonesia informally
admitted the advantage of the military presence of external powers such as the US and UK in
maintaining a power balance in Southeast Asia.24 In fact, Southeast Asian countries did not have
sufficient military capability to defend themselves in the event of the security threat posed by
China without military assistance from external powers. Moreover, due to the diversity in their
military capabilities, politics, economics and history, Southeast Asian countries were not certain
21
Memo, date unknown, 3004/13/21 NAU.
Phillips to Foreign Office, (hereafter FO), 28.2.1967, FCO 24/16. National Archives of the United Kingdom,
London (hereafter NUK).
23
DEAC to all posts, 17 Jul 1967, 221/5/22, AU.
24
Australian Embassy, Washington (hereafter AEW) to DEAC, 7 Apr 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; DEAC to all posts, 17
Jul 1967, 221/5/22, AU.
22
7
to cooperate with the united direction even in the defence and security fields. Especially for the
civilian leaders of Indonesia including Malik and Sani, increasing the military budget was
“unrealistic and undesirable” since Indonesia had been preoccupied with its domestic
development and economic rehabilitation. 25 However, given the Indonesian army’s
unquestionable power, Malik could not oppose the insertion of the reference.26 By pre-empting
the Indonesian Army, therefore, Malik attempted to keep regional cooperation within the hands
of the Foreign Ministry.27
Accordingly, Malik had no intention of interfering in the military arrangements between
external powers and some regional countries. The commitment in drafting the SEAARC
Declaration by Thailand, which was an ally of the US and a member of SEATO, was also
regarded as counter-evidence of concerns that the new organisation would replace or eliminate
the existing security or military arrangements.28 In fact, Thanat, a well-known anti-communist
and strong believer in regional cooperation, had characterised such a regional body as
supplemental to SEATO and the alliance with the US.29
Response from Malaysia
As argued in the Introduction, whether other states are trustworthy can depend upon the
states’ capability, available options and its consequences. In this sense, the domestic situation in
Indonesia was reassuring for many member countries of ASEAN. Since Indonesia’s radical
anti-colonialism was mitigated by the downfall of Sukarno, they did not regard Indonesia as a
direct threat to their security. In addition, Indonesia and other future members of ASEAN shared
25
FEER, 3 Aug 1967, 243–4; Philips to FO, 28 Feb 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
Secretary of External Affairs, Wellington (hereafter SEAW), 3 Mar 1967, 221/5/22, AU.
27
AEW to DEAC, 8 Mar 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; AED to DEAC, 3 Mar 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
28
Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia; Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American
Foreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 123.
29
To all posts, 20 May 1967, 3010/9/6, AU.
26
8
the perception that the threat to their security was internal and non-military rather than an
external military one. The Suharto government was concerned about the Indonesian
population’s support of the pro-Sukarno groups and subversive activities caused by
dissatisfaction stemming from the depressed economy and the serious poverty. This basic
assumption about the domestic-rooted threat to their security had been shared in existing
regional organisations, such as ASA. Accordingly, the objective of the new organisation to
contain subversion and insurgencies through regional cooperation in economic, social, technical
and cultural fields was acceptable to the ASA countries. The regional countries especially feared
the unstable Indonesian government reviving its radical foreign policy. They therefore had
strong incentives to stabilize the Indonesian government through the rehabilitation of its
economy.
30
Moreover, Indonesia’s good neighbourhood diplomacy through regional
cooperation was aimed mainly at restoring and enhancing Indonesia’s international credibility in
order to garner significant and urgent foreign assistance from other countries within and without
the region.31 Therefore, Indonesia was not likely to exploit other countries in fear of ruining
their international credibility.
Malaysia nevertheless maintained concerns over Indonesia’s ambition to expand its military
influence through regional cooperation. Rahman sent a letter to Thanat on 3 January 1967 in
reply to a proposed draft of the SEAARC Declaration sent to the Malaysian government at the
end of 1966. Rahman admitted the desirability of regional cooperation and bringing Indonesia
back to the ‘mainstream of Southeast Asia’ in the letter. However, he argued that it was incorrect
‘timing’ to embark on a new regional organisation given the domestic instability in Indonesia
that existed at that time.32 Malaysia believed that the SEAARC would allow Indonesia to
structurally gain regional hegemony with ease, since the SEAARC Declaration referred to the
30
For instance, AHCKL to DEAC, 8.6.1967, A4359, 221/5/22 NAU.
Anwar, op.cit., pp.197-205.
32
Summary of a letter from the Malaysian Prime Minister to the Foreign Minister of Thailand dated 3 Jan 1967,
FCO 24/16, UK.
31
9
withdrawal of military presence by external powers. They anticipated that if they allowed
Indonesia’s initiative, Indonesia would take the leading or dominant roles in regional
cooperation at least in the long term.33 The memories of Indonesia’s Confrontation policy that
ended less than four months earlier and the reluctance of Indonesia to give recognition to
Malaysia also raised concerns about the future of Indonesia’s uncertain political trends.
Indonesia’s diplomatic shift to a hostile foreign policy after rising to dominant status in the
region was still a realistic expectation for Malaysia.
Further, Malaysia doubted that the US would fully back the formation of SEAARC. The
Malaysians were concerned that the US was attempting to establish a defence organisation that
could be an alternative to its military presence after its withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and to
draw regional countries into the Vietnam War.34 It would not only impose on regional countries
a greater military burden, but would also increase the necessity of a new security arrangement in
which Indonesia played a larger role.35 The SEAARC Declaration limited the scope of
cooperation in economic, technical and cultural fields. It also stated that the organisation would
not associate itself with any outside power or power bloc and would not be directed against any
country.36 However, since the Declaration had referred to security from subversion, SEAARC
was regarded as expressing antagonism towards the expansionism of communist China, at least
indirectly.37 This concern was heightened by a proposal for a joint defence organisation
advocated by Lieutenant-General M. Panggabean, Indonesian Deputy Army Chief. This
organisation was proposed right before the SEAARC Declaration was drafted at the end of 1966,
and received support from some members of the Indonesian military. Lieutenant-General A. J.
Mokoginta, the military commander of Sumatra, also advocated the need for regional
33
34
35
36
37
AEW to DEAC, 7 Apr 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; AHCKL to DEAC, 21 Apr 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
Mason to Blarir and Reed, 5.1967, FCO 24/16, NUK.
Unknown to all posts, 20.5.1967, A1838, 3010/9/6, NAU.
SEAARC Joint Declaration (First Draft), 3004/13/21, AU.
Irvine, op.cit., 15.
10
arrangements for defence between Southeast Asian states that could be extended to an alliance in
the face of a threat from communist invasion. Malaysia’s suspicion over the US’s backing and
the anti-communist characteristics of the new organisation was also due to the proposed
SEAARC Declaration being drafted and sent to Malaysia by Thailand, an anti-communist ally
of the US. For the same reason, the Philippines’ attempt to take the initiative of forming a new
regional organisation also raised Malaysia’s concern.38
As argued above, Indonesia and the ASA member countries had consensus by the beginning
of 1967 that the cooperation that would inflame tensions, in particular race, country and bloc,
would be undesirable. This “undesirable cooperation” included the exclusion of non-Malay
people, especially Chinese; the resurrection of past intra-regional conflict including the
Philippines’ claim over Sabah; and the expression of anti-communist and pro-Western
inclinations. In particular, the expansion of the Indonesian military’s role as a result of utilizing
the new organisation as a tool for supporting the Cold War was out of the question for Malaysia.
Hence, they hoped that the reference to the temporary nature of foreign bases in the SEAARC
Declaration would have little substance.
Negotiation for the establishment of the new organisation
38
AEW to DEAC, 11 Apr 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; AHCKL to DEAC, 14 Jun 1967, 3004/13/21, AU. Although
Rahman objected in the letter that the existence of the ASA would be threatened by the new organisation that was not
certain to benefit its members, this was not caused by Rahman’s concern about the expansion of Indonesia’s regional
influence. He simply pointed out that Indonesia could break down the projects that ASA had developed due to its
domestic instability and ‘poor record’ of cooperation. Thanat emphasized that the ASA would be neither dismantled in
an ‘untimely’ manner nor immediately merged with SEAARC. Although Thanat had not denied a long-term merger
in this letter, Thanat refrained from claiming a merger after the Rahman’s opposition in his letter on the 21 January. As
such, an agreement was reached to maintain the existing regional organisations after the establishment of SEAARC.
However, as argued later, this agreement preserved the agreement to form MAPHILINDO, which would not
prejudice the Philippines’ claim over Sabah. Hence, this caused Malaysians to develop another concern regarding the
new organisation. Summary of a letter from Rahman to Thanat, 3.1.1967, FCO 24/16, NUK;Text of a letter dated
18.1.1967, from Thanat to Rahman, FCO 24/16, NUK; From Phillips to FO, 28.2.1967, FCO 24/16, NUK; Summary
of a letter from Rahman to Thanat dated 21.1.1967, FCO 24/16, NUK.
11
In order to reassure other regional countries that had concerns regarding the SEAARC draft
proposal, Indonesia and Thailand repeated explanations on the proposal by sending letters to,
and convening bilateral meetings with, other regional countries. For instance, Sani and Lubis
were dispatched to Rangoon and Phnom Penh at the end of March 1967, and Malik visited these
cities in May. They attempted to downplay the pro-Western image of SEAARC by encouraging
these non-aligned countries to join the organisation.39 However, given their strong relationships
with China, the participation of Burma and Cambodia was not likely as long as two
anti-communist countries in the region –Thailand and the Philippines– were to join the
organisation. Therefore, the Indonesian representatives attempted to persuade Burma and
Cambodia not to oppose and criticise the formation of SEAARC in terms of their policy of
non-alignment.40 As a result, Burma and Cambodia adopted an attitude of “benevolent
neutrality,” by which they neither joined nor opposed the formation of SEAARC.41 Such
responses from Burma and Cambodia reassured future members of the ASEAN since it
appealed to countries within and outside the region that the new organisation would neither aim
to be an anti-communist nor pro-Western bloc, and thus unnecessary tension with communist
countries caused by the formation of SEAARC could be prevented.
Malik and Thanat, who discussed the regional organisation in Bangkok on 10 April, publicly
released their plan for the new organisation. Due to this public announcement, the Malaysian
government needed to clarify their attitude regarding SEAARC. In the Malaysian government
that had favourably responded to the regional organisation, Rahman’s attitude towards it was
inconsistent. In order to persuade Rahman to agree with the new organisation, Thanat visited
Kuala Lumpur on the 20th and 21st of May. Prior to his visit, Thanat wrote to Rahman stating
that the establishment of SEAARC would be announced in a meeting in Bangkok to be held
39
Record of Conversation with Marentek, 3.5.1967, A1838, 3004/13/21 NAU.
AED to DEAC, 3 Mar 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; SEAW, 3 Mar 1967, 221/5/22, AU; British Embassy, Djakarta to
Murray, 25 Apr 1967, 3004/13/21, AU; Phillips to FO, 28 Feb 1967, FCO 24/16, UK.
41
AED to DEAC, 12 May 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
40
12
immediately after the ASPAC Ministerial meeting from the 5th to the 7th of July with the
co-sponsorship of Indonesia and Thailand.42
Rahman agreed to form the new organisation in the meeting with Thanat. Given Indonesia’s
potential power, many officials in Malaysia believed that increasing Indonesia’s influence in the
region was inevitable. Therefore, Malaysia needed a regional institution that could contain and
moderate Indonesia’s influence in case it became a threat to regional peace and stability.43
High-level officials in Malaysia such as Razak therefore persuaded Rahman to avoid isolating
Malaysia from the trend of regional cooperation.44 In fact, Sani stated that Indonesia would
establish the association without Malaysia if necessary.
Rahman’s agreement to form the new organisation did not mean the complete easing of its
mistrust of Indonesia, but was also due to his conviction that SEAARC would have no chance
of success.45 It was not simply because the issue of Indonesia making a meaningful contribution
to the proposed organisation was uncertain given Indonesia’s domestic instability.46 Due to his
complaint about the Philippines’ territorial claim over the island of Sabah, Rahman regarded the
Philippines as disturbing the activities of ASA. He believed that this situation would not change
in the new organisation, and therefore that SEAARC would not bring a practical or lasting
benefit to Malaysia. Rahman envisaged that in case SEAARC ended in failure, Malaysia and
Thailand would implement ASA’s various projects on a bilateral basis after “kick(ing) the
Filipinos out” from regional cooperation.47
However, in the meeting, Rahman in particular disagreed with announcing the formation of
SEAARC in Bangkok immediately after the ASPAC meeting. Rahman did not want the new
42
New Zeland High Commission in Kuala Lumpur (hereafter NZHCKO) to EAW, 19.5.1967, A4359, 221/5/22,
NAU.
43
AHCKL to DEAC, 6 Apr 1967, 3010/9/6, AU.
44
Mason to Bentley, 23 Feb 1967, FCO 24/16, UK; Bentley to Mason, 1 Mar 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
45
Sender and receiver unknown, date unknown, 3010/9/6, AU.
46
NZHCKL to EAW, 30 May 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
47
In fact, since Rahman had already lost his enthusiasm for the continuation of ASA, he suggested dismantling ASA
in the meeting with Thanat. NZHCKL to EAW, 30 May 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
13
organisation to be seen as supported by the US, and therefore argued that as long as the
membership of Burma, Cambodia and Laos was unlikely, the founding meeting of the new
organisation should not be held in either the ‘SEATO capital’ or in the context of ASPAC, which
had demonstrated a strong anti-communist image.48 Moreover, with the opposition of some
particular countries gaining superior status in the organisation, Rahman objected to the
suggestion to establish SEAARC through the co-sponsorship of Thailand and Indonesia by
insisting that all founding members of the association simultaneously announce its formation.49
In order to reassure Rahman, Thanat explained SEAARC as a site for the regular exchange of
views by leaders in member countries regarding international affairs in Asia.50 By making the
new organisation simply a consultative body, the organisation would allow smaller powers to
gain voice opportunities. The agreement reached by the particular country’s initiative also would
not be forced on smaller powers in the forthcoming regional cooperation. It could rather
decrease the uncertainty of other member states’ intentions and preferences by promoting the
participants’ contact and making communication easy.
Thanat reassured Rahman by denying Rahman’s belief that the US was backing SEAARC’s
formation in the meeting.51 In fact, Indonesia had excluded themselves from joining any
military alliance by emphasizing its non-aligned independent policy, and thus the proposals by
Panggabean and Mokoginta for anti-China defence cooperation were denied. Not only
Indonesia and Thailand, the US, which understood the sensitivity of Southeast Asian countries
to external interference, also claimed that it had never encouraged Thailand and the Philippines
to form any style of regional organisation.52
Malik visited the Philippines on 27 May 1967 in the end of his tour of Cambodia and Burma,
48
49
50
51
52
NZHCKL to EAW, 30.5.1967, A1838, 3004/13/21 NAU; NZHCKL to SEAW, 19 May 1967, 221/5/22, AU.
AHCKL to DEAC, 14 Jun 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
The Sunday Times, 21.5.1967.
AHCKL to DEAC, 24 May 1967, 3004/13/21, AU.
Age, 23 Feb 1967.
14
and reached an agreement with Narciso Ramos, Secretary of Foreign Affairs in the Philippines,
on the formation of SEAARC. In this meeting, the Philippines requested that the existing
regional organisations, such as ASA and MAPHILINDO, be maintained after the establishment
of SEAARC.53 Malik accepted this request because he had stated that the new organisation
would not replace or remove any existing regional organisations but would instead exist in
parallel and sometimes supplement the other organisation. However, Ramos’s request was
motivated by his hope to preserve the Manila Accord, a founding accord of MAPHILINDO that
had stated that the Philippines’ territorial claim over Sabah would not be prejudiced. In other
words, the Philippines regarded the preservation of MAPHILINDO as being ‘the formal basis
for pursuing the Philippine claim to Sabah’.54 As such, the SEAARC Declaration possibly
caused further friction between Malaysia and the Philippines, and thus caused Malaysia’s
concerns.
Sani, who accompanied Malik, separated from the Indonesian delegation when Malik left the
Philippines, and visited Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. In his visit to Singapore, Sinnathamby
Rajaratnam, Foreign Minister of Singapore, reconfirmed Singapore joining the new organisation.
The membership of this non-aligned country mitigated the criticisms from the Eastern bloc that
the new organisation would be an anti-communist military bloc. Singapore’s membership also
indicated that SEAARC would have no hostility to overseas Chinese, who had been believed to
be loyal to their mother country. Accordingly, Singapore’s membership was reassuring to other
member countries, since it helped to avoid inflaming tensions with communist countries or
particular races within the region.55
In Sani’s visit to Kuala Lumpur on 3 June, Sani reassured Malaysia by stating firstly that the
establishment of the new organisation would not be announced immediately following the July
53
54
55
ADNB, 31 May 1967.
AEM to DEAC, 31 May 1967, 3004/13/21, AU. DEAC to AED, 2 Jun 1967, 221/5/22, AU.
DEAC to all posts, 20.5.1967, A1838, 3010/9/6, NAU.
15
ASPAC meeting in Bangkok. By not holding the meeting in the context of ASPAC with its
anti-communist image, Sani tried to prevent unnecessary tensions with communist countries.
Secondly, Sani accommodated the other members’ wishes to amend the draft declaration of
SEAARC by arguing that Thailand’s draft declaration was only a starting point for negotiations.
It apparently implied that Indonesia was prepared to make concessions on the issue of there
being reference to foreign bases and security to reassure Malaysia and the Philippines, which
they had hoped for to maintain their security arrangement with the US and UK. Thirdly,
although Indonesia and Thailand had intended to sponsor the formation of the new organisation,
Sani admitted that it would be inappropriate to establish the new organisation with only some of
its founding members as sponsors. Instead, they agreed that all founding members would
sponsor its establishment.56 With this decision, no particular country – especially Indonesia –
could take superior status in the proposed regional cooperation. In other words, Indonesia’s
prominent power in the region was not reflected in the relationship among member countries of
the new organisation.
Bangkok was chosen as the site of the founding meeting of the new organisation. The
convening of the meeting in Thailand, which was an ally of the US and was a member of
SEATO appeared contrary to the logic of reassurance. However, it was based not on the
Indonesian requirement, but instead was a result of Thailand’s strong initiatives. Thailand, which
had taken the initiative in forming the new organisation, hoped to have the founding meeting in
Thailand. Hence, Thailand opposed the proposal to hold the meeting in Kuala Lumpur right
after the ASA Ministerial Meeting in July. On 8 July, Thanat met with Malik in the Bangkok
airport and proposed convening the founding meeting in Bangkok at the beginning of August.57
Since Thanat told Malik in the meeting that both Malaysia and the Philippines had already
56
57
AHCKL to DEAC, 9 Jun 1967, 221/5/22, AU.
Information Bulletin (hereafter IB), 8 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 4, AU.
16
agreed to this venue, Malik ‘had no choice’ but to agree with the place and time.58 Although, in
reality, Thanat had not obtained the agreement of Malaysia, Malik told the press that in early
August the governments of five countries would have a meeting in Bangkok to establish a
regional organisation.59 While Malaysia opposed this decision, it could not refuse to attend the
meeting since Thanat approached Malaysia with a fait accompli after the announcement of the
meeting convened in Bangkok.60
The Bangsaen Meeting and the establishment of ASEAN
As the founding meeting of the new organisation approached, the lack of agreement on
references to security and foreign bases in the SEAARC declaration was revealed: at the end of
July 1967, the Philippines announced the decision to make the deletion of the reference to
security and foreign bases from the SEAARC Declaration conditional on their attendance at the
founding meeting.61 In response, Malik stated the postponement of the founding meeting, and
dispatched Sani and Lubis to Bangkok and Manila to persuade the Philippines. They indicated
that the inclusion of references to foreign bases in the declaration was a precondition for Malik’s
attendance at the ministerial meeting.62 Since Ramos replied that he was not prepared to
concede, Thanat indicated that Thailand was willing to form the new organisation without the
Philippines if they took a firm stance on this issue in the Bangkok meeting.63 Eventually, the
Philippines abandoned its requirement after the Foreign Policy Council in the Philippines gave
the Philippines’ delegation the green light to support the establishment of the new organisation.
58
Bentley to Mason, 21 Jul 1967, FCO 24/17, File No. H2/8, Part B, 334022 (hereafter FCO 24/17), UK.
SUT, 9 Jul 1967; AED to DEAC, 14 Jul 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU.
60
Bentley to Mason, 21 Jul 1967, FCO 24/17, Pt.2, NAU; Australian Embassy, Kuala Lumpur to Wellington, 17 Jul
1967, 3004/13/21, Pt.2, NAU.
61
DEAC to all posts, 17 Jul 1967, 221/5/22, AU.
62
AEB to DEAC, 11 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU; AEB to DEAC, 15 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU. AEB to
DEAC, 17 Aug 1967, 3010/9/6, AU.
63
AEB to DEAC, 15 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU
59
17
Malik then stated that he would leave Indonesia to attend the SEAARC founding meeting on the
5th of August.
As a preparation conference for the Bangkok assembly, an informal meeting among the heads
of the delegations from five member countries of the new organisation was held from the 5th to
the 6th of August in Bangsaen, Thailand. In the meeting, Malik emphasised that he could not go
back to Indonesia without the members’ agreement on the references to security, subversion and
foreign bases because of ‘internal consumption.’64 Meanwhile, the Philippines also proposed
their own draft charter of the new organisation, which omitted these references from the Thai
draft. However, since the Philippines’ draft quoted some phrases from the ASPAC Charter, such
as a “community of free nations,” it was not acceptable to Malaysia due to its hope to keep
SEAARC free from pro-Western ideological influence and future merger with the ASPAC.65
Thanat, to one degree, told the Philippines’ delegates that although both Thailand and the
Philippines needed the military presence of external powers for the time being, the situation
might eventually change. Conversely, he requested a compromise to the Indonesian delegates
arguing that they must recognise the danger of creating a power vacuum in the region caused by
the withdrawal of the external powers’ military presence that communist China would possibly
attempt to fill.66 In addition to pointing out the ineffectiveness of foreign bases in preventing
domestic subversion and insurgencies in each country, Malik explained that the reference to the
“temporary nature” of foreign bases was an elastic concept and would neither literally nor by
intent require member countries’ immediate or early removal of the existing foreign bases.67
Similar to the references in the MAPHILINDO documents in 1963 that were accepted by
Malaysia and the Philippines, the word ‘temporary’ was interpreted as an expression of the
64
American Embassy (hereafter AE), Manila to Secretary of State, Washington DC (hereafter SSW), 15 Aug 1967,
Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, Central Foreign Policy Files , Box 1850, National Archives II, College Park, MA
(hereafter NA).
65
Bentley to Mason, 28.7.1967, FCO 24/17 NUK; AHCKL to DEAC, 7.8.1967, A1838, 3004/13/21 Pt. 2, NAU.
66
AEB to DEAC, 11 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU.
67
Memorandum, date unknown, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU; Joseph to Osborn, 10 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 3, AU.
18
members’ long-term intentions, rather than suggesting an early removal of the foreign bases in
the region.68 In fact, the timing for the dismantling of the foreign bases was not discussed in the
meeting; it was up to the individual countries, according to their own national interests and their
domestic and international situation.69 Moreover, Malik stated that given the ASEAN’s basic
principle of non-interference in domestic affairs, Indonesia would not and could not interfere in
terms of the timing. In the meeting, Malik even stated that despite Indonesia’s non-aligned
foreign policy, it might be necessary to rely continuously on the military presence of the Western
powers and even the US nuclear umbrella.70 Further, Malik asserted that the foreign bases in the
declaration did not refer to the military bases of the US and UK, but was a contingency, should
China or the Soviet Union intrude and establish bases in the region.71 Accordingly, although the
reference to the foreign bases was not deleted from the ASEAN Declaration, it virtually
admitted that the military dependence on the external powers was a necessity, at least in the
present circumstances. In fact, Malik did not oppose a proposed defence arrangement between
the five Commonwealth countries.72 The member countries were reassured by this, since they
could maintain deterrence in case Indonesia revived its radical diplomacy towards neighbouring
countries. As a result, Malaysia and Singapore agreed with the reference, stating in the Bangsaen
meeting that the issue of the withdrawal of the UK troops was believed to be a matter of time.73
The Philippines also could not continue to reject the concessions, since they had agreed with the
reference to the temporary nature of the foreign bases in the MAPHILINDO documents in
1963.74
Meanwhile, Indonesia adopted a flexible attitude regarding other wordings within the
Declaration associated with the members’ security. For instance, reference to members’
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
DEAC to all posts, 17 Jul 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU.
ADNB, 11 Aug 1967.
AED to DEAC, 23 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU.
AE, Manila to SSW, RG59, Box 1850. 15.8.1967, NA.
ADNB, 19 Apr 1968.
AHCKL to DEAC, 11 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU.
AED to DEAC, 23 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU.
19
responsibility for regional security was absent from the ASEAN Declaration. The declaration
referred only to the member countries’ responsibility to strengthen ‘regional peace and
stability’.75 The reference to ‘arrangements of collective defence which should not be used to
serve the particular interest of any of the big powers’ was also deleted from the ASEAN
Declaration. 76 These deletions reassured member countries, since they would prevent
Indonesia’s justification to take a larger role in the military field, and avoided unnecessary
tensions with communist countries.
Further, the members agreed that the issue of Sabah would not be discussed within the
framework of ASEAN. In the meeting, the Philippines’ delegates attempted to insert the phrase
that called for respect for existing agreements between member countries. However, the
Malaysians opposed it since this wording apparently referred to the Manila Accord, in which
Rahman admitted that the Philippines’ claim to Sabah would not be prejudiced. Since Ramos
agreed to withdraw this paragraph, it was unlikely that the Philippines would use the new
organisation as a tool to claim its sovereignty over Sabah, and this therefore reassured
Malaysia.77
Conclusion
After changing its name from SEAARC to ASEAN, the formation of the new organisation
was announced on 8 August 1967. This paper has analysed the establishment of ASEAN as a
process of reassurance by Indonesia. In particular, clarification was offered on how Indonesia
mitigated Malaysia’s concerns about Indonesia’s possible attempt to enhance its influence in the
region. Although previous research has explained the main aims of establishing ASEAN as
75
AEB to DEAC, 11 Aug 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 2, AU; Sender and receiver unknown, 13 Jul 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 3,
AU; Sender unknown to all posts, 5 Sep 1967, 3004/13/21, Pt. 3, AU.
76
ASEAN Declaration, 8 Aug 1967.
77
AE, Kuala Lumpur to SSW, RG 59, Box 1850,15.8.1967, NA.
20
drawing Indonesia into intra-regional cooperation, it was not a sufficient basis, especially for
Malaysia to agree to the proposed regional cooperation.
Malaysia’s agreement to form the new organisation was not because its mistrust of Indonesia
was completely eased. Malaysia was simply reassured enough to join the organisation because
firstly, Indonesia, which had needed external assistance to achieve its domestic development,
could not enter a scheme for cooperation that would ruin its international credibility. Secondly,
substantial equality among the members involved in the new organisation was achieved despite
the salient power of Indonesia in the region. The new organisation was simply a consultative
body in which the smaller powers’ opinion was likely reflected in their decision making by
avoiding being coerced by the dominant power. In fact, the announcement of establishing the
new organisation with the co-sponsorship of Indonesia and Thailand was rejected. Thirdly, it
was agreed that all member countries, including Indonesia, were constrained in terms of their
use of power that would inflame tensions between specific countries, blocs and people. In order
to avoid SEAARC’s membership being defined racially, and to prevent criticism from the
communist countries, the accessions of non-aligned countries such as Burma, Cambodia and
Singapore were sought. In fact, Singapore decided to join SEAARC, and Burma and Cambodia
affirmed that they would not oppose the new organisation from the non-aligned perspective. In
the Bangsaen meeting, the phrases used in the ASPAC document and the reference to protection
from subversion were not adopted with the aim of preventing the new organisation from being
regarded as an anti-communist grouping. Moreover, the members agreed not to discuss the
Sabah issue within the framework of the ASEAN. Fourthly, by allowing the military presence of
external powers continuously stationing in the region, the ASEAN countries could not only
prevent the increased security uncertainty in the region, but also implicitly maintain deterrence
toward Indonesia. Although Indonesia understood that the foreign bases in the region could be a
potential threat to Indonesian security, it took steps to demonstrate that its participation in
21
regional cooperation was benignly motivated. Since this agreement required that Indonesia keep
its relative military power in the region at a low level, its cost was too high to consider
attempting exploitation. All these institutional structures of ASEAN mitigated other members’
mistrust towards Indonesia, since they constrained unilateral action by Indonesia within the
institution.
22