TRUTHMAKERS: FROM EXISTENCE TO TRUTH
(55-132.48)
Instructor Details:
Prof. Dr. Benjamin Schnieder
Phil 1058, +49(40)428 38 – 2687
benjamin.schnieder@uni-hamburg.de
Course Details:
Dienstag 10:00-12:00
Beginn:2. April 2013
Phil 1052 VMP 6
Dr. Nathan Wildman
Phil 1059, +49 (40) 42838 - 7774
nathan.wildman@uni-hamburg.de
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------COURSE INFORMATION
Description:
Pilate’s rhetorical question – ‘What is truth?’ – is easily stated, though
answering it is tremendously difficult. Much of the contemporary literature
on truth takes as its starting point ideas which were prominent in the early
20th century. These theories all attempt to directly answer the nature
question – i.e., to specify what the nature of truth is. In answering this
question, each theory makes the notion of truth part of a more
thoroughgoing metaphysics or epistemology, such that explaining the nature
of truth becomes an application of some metaphysical system, and truth
itself inherits significant metaphysical presuppositions along the way.
One particular theory, deriving from the work of Russell & Wittgenstein but
popularized only relatively recently, is that, while some propositions are true,
that they are true is not a fundamental feature of reality. That is, truth is not
metaphysically primitive; it is metaphysically grounded, such that, if a
proposition is true, it is true in virtue of something, or, more accurately, the
existence of some thing. For example, ‘Socrates is wise’ is true because or in
virtue of the existence of some thing or things (e.g., the fact that <Socrates is
wise>). This notion of truth-making directly links truth to ontology, thereby
intimately connecting philosophy of language with metaphysics.
In this course, we will examine several major conceptions of the nature of
truth, focusing especially upon truth-maker theory. Upon completion of this
course, students should be well versed not only in the truth-maker debate
(and thereby able to begin independent research in this area) but also
concerning the nature of truth more generally. Further, students will have
the requisite background to fruitfully participate in the upcoming Second
Hamburg Summer School, led by Prof. Kit Fine, on ‘Truthmaker Semantics’.
Objectives:
The aim of this course is to give students a chance to examine in depth
issues that lie at the heart of contemporary discussion regarding the nature
of truth and truth-making. This will be achieved through close readings of
recent articles, student-led in-seminar discussion, and the completion of
weekly short-answer assignments.
Outcomes:
Students taking this paper will
1. Acquire knowledge of concepts fundamental to Metaphysics, Philosophy
of Language, & Philosophical Logic
2. Engage closely & critically with classic & contemporary philosophical
literature
3. Develop their ability to think & write philosophically
4. Prepare for participation in the upcoming Second Hamburg Summer
School
Requirements:
 6 Weekly Assignments. Each week, questions concerning the weekly
reading will be uploaded to the course website. There will be a total of
12; students much complete 6. Students are expected to submit their
answers to the instructors by 6pm of the day prior to class.
 Participation. This includes class attendance and participating in
discussion, as well as email contact with me (in case you're shy about
speaking in class).
 Reading. The student is expected to read all specified material prior to
attending class.
 Term Paper. Term paper topics, submission date, and paper length,
will be discussed between each student and the instructors personally
prior to the end of Week 7.
Texts
The primary texts for this course will be made available on the course
website,
http://hamburgersommerkurs.wordpress.com/
Further, where available, these texts will be reserved in the library.
Note: the ‘Preparatory Course’ page is password protected; should you
lose/forget the password, please contact the instructors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE
(Please note: this schedule is subject to change!)
SETTING THE STAGE
WEEK 1 (2 April): Organizational Formalities & Introduction to Truth & Truthmaking
THE NATURE OF TRUTH – CORRESPONDENCE & DEFLATIONISM
WEEK 2 (9 April): Early Correspondence Theory
 Russell, B. ‘Truth and Falsehood’, available in his The Problems of Philosophy.
WEEK 3 (16 April): Developing Minimalism about Truth
 Horwich, P. ‘The Minimalist conception of truth', in S. Blackburn & P. Simmons
(eds.) Truth (1999, OUP).
TRUTHMAKING: CONNECTING TRUTH TO EXISTENCE
WEEK 4 (23 April): Truthmaker theory – the issues
 Rami, A. ‘Introduction’, in A. Rami and E.J. Lowe (eds), Truth and Truth-Making (2009,
Acumen Press).
WEEK 5 (30 April): Why truthmakers?
 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. ‘Why Truthmakers’, in Rami & Lowe
 Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. ‘Postscript to Why Truthmakers’, in Rami & Lowe
WEEK 6 (7 May): Truthmaking without Truthmakers?
 Melia, J. ‘Truthmaking without truthmakers’, in H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The
Contemporary Debate (2005, Clarendon).
WEEK 7 (14 May): Deflating Truthmaker theory?
 Horwich, P. ‘Being and Truth’, in Rami & Lowe
WEEK 8 (21 May): NO CLASS
KIT FINE’S TRUTHMAKER SEMANTICS
WEEK 9 (28 May): A Guide to Ground(ing)
 Selections from Fine, K. ‘A Guide to Ground’, in F. Correia and B. Schnieder (eds.),
Metaphysical Grounding (2012, CUP).
WEEK 10 (4 June): Fine against (standard) truthmaker theory
 Selections from Fine, K. ‘A Guide to Ground’
WEEK 11 (11 June): The Logic of Ground
 Selections from Fine, K. ‘A Guide to Ground’
WEEK 12 (18 June): An introduction to Truthmaker Semantics
 Fine, K. ‘Truthmaker Semantics’, unpublished ms.
WEEK 13 (25 June): Developing Truthmaker Semantics
 Fine, K. ‘A note on partial content’, unpublished ms.
WEEK 14 (2 July): Applying the Framework – Counterfactuals without Possible worlds?
 Fine, K. ‘Counterfactuals without possible worlds’, The Journal of Philosophy, 109
(2012).
WEEK 15 (9 July): More on Fine’s conception of counterfactuals
 Fine, K. ‘Counterfactuals without possible worlds, ibid.