Ensuring Justice for Global Manufacturing Workers: Tripartite industrial actors or
beyond?
Presenting author: Md. Ismail Hossain
Additional Author: Renata Semenza
Affiliation and address of presenting author: PhD Candidate in Labour Studies, University of Milan,
Italy.
Affiliation and address of additional author: Professor of labour studies, University of Milan, Italy.
ABSTRACT
The most unwanted consequences of global manufacturing that shouldered on working class
people is the sweatshop condition at the workplace. It is argued that tripartite industrial relations,
participation of all actors in collective bargaining system, can ensure the labour justice at work
place. However, tripartite industrial relation system is not working effectively due to the unequal
power of the actors. In the demise of tripartite collective bargaining, others have argued that
corporate code of conduct can be a best alternative for ensuring labour justice. This paper
reveals that fair participation of workers’ in collective bargaining and implementation of code of
conduct will not be effective until the newly emerging industrial actors (e.g.; civil society, NGOs,
Corporations, human rights organizations) have extended their supports to the workers’ unions
to increase their power, and put pressure on the state and corporations to respect for labour
rights.
Keywords: Labour, Collective bargaining, Industrial relations, Justice, Responsibility, Globalization
INTRODUCTION
The enforcement of neo-liberal economic globalization has stimulated the global manufacturing process
through which capital shifts to developing countries for production and goods are brought back to developed
countries for consumption. This global flow of capital and goods, namely global manufacturing, has
extensively increased the scopes of employment for people in developing world but the most glaring feature
is the unjust labour practices constituted by insufficient wages for subsistence, extremely long working hours
with minimum compensation (12 to 14 hours per week), lack of occupational safety and health, little access to
maternity and childcare benefits, arbitrary punishment and workplace harassment, absence of union and low
workers’ participation, presence of forced and compulsory labour, persisting workplace discrimination
(Jaggar, 2001; Stiglitz, 2000; Acker 2004). The vulnerable and exploitative labour practices have provoked a
strong debate how to improve labour standards at the factories and ensure justice for global workers. Many
industrial relations experts have argued that unjust or unfair labour conditions can be improved or eliminated
through tripartite industrial relations system (e.g.; Shen and Benson, 2008). However, the role of tripartite
industrial relations system is under great criticism for its ineffectiveness due to unequal power relations
between the actors. In the demise of tripartite consultation, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been
enthusiastically granted as a new endeavour to many scholars for labour justice. This approach is also under
greater scrutiny. Critics of codes of conduct and voluntary monitoring regimes argue that CSR activities are
designed and realized mainly for getting competitive advantages in the global market, such as enhanced brand
value and reputation, closer link with the customers and greater awareness of their needs, higher employee
morale and hence higher productivity, but not to protect labour rights or improve labour conditions (Mahon
and Wartick, 2003; Esbenshade, 2004; Siltaoja, 2006). They also argued that the effectiveness of CSR is
constrained by corporations’ impetus for profit maximization than commitment to social responsibility,
greater competition in the market place and insufficient state protection of labour rights. Between these
1
diverse and contested claims, this paper argues that labour justice cannot be ensured only through tripartite
industrial relations systems or CSR of the actors, rather a concerted effort of different actors are needed to
uphold labour justice. The paper shows that the role of non industrial actors is complement to tripartite
industrial relations actors. Readymade Garment (RMG) industry of Bangladesh has been taken as an empirical
site for this argument.
DATA SOURCES AND METHODS
This paper is based on the experiences of the author’s fieldwork on the Ready-made Garment Industry in
Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh, during the period of October 2011 to June 2012. The main reason for
selecting Dhaka City as an empirical site is that approximately 80% of the total RMG factories of Bangladesh
are located there. The study was carried out in eight RMG factories which were selected purposively
considering the size (in terms of total employees), location (Export Processing Zone or outside) and
ownership (domestic or foreign) of the factories. Data were collected through four kinds of research methods
– observation, in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and documents reviews. The prime method for
data collection was in-depth interviews. Interviews were conducted with 71 research participants which
included 32 workers, 16 employer/management staff, 6 representatives from six workers’ unions, three
representatives from Government (ministry of Labour, Directorate of the Inspection of Factory and
Establishment, Bangladesh Export Promotion Zone Authority), two representatives from Bangladesh
Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association, two NGO staffs, six representatives from
Buyers/Brand Companies, and two labour experts. To get access of the workers, the author stood in front of
the factories during closing time accompanied by a female research assistant who spoke with women workers.
The researcher collected the home addresses of workers who showed interest in participating in the interview
and visited their residences during weekends for interviews. Female workers selected for interviews were
between the ages of 18 and 45, and had at least two years of experience of working at RMG industry.
Although a vast majority of the primary data was generated through qualitative interviews, some ethnographic
techniques (observation and conversation with local people) added significant value to the research. The
researcher stayed six months in the research area and spent a large amount of time engaging in informal talks
with local people residing in workers’ residential areas and workers’ family members. The goal was to obtain
these respondents’ opinions on female employment in the RMG industry. The researcher also arranged four
‘Focus Group Discussions’ (FGD) involving workers from different factories and local people. Moreover,
during field work in Bangladesh, the author attended a number of workers’ conventions, seminars and
symposiums arranged by different trade unions and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) involving the
garment workers, civil society members, employers, union leaders, and researchers. All events were additional
avenues to learn about the experiences of workers from almost all factories, including the selected factories
for this study. The author also reviewed various secondary sources. After arrival in Dhaka, the researcher
spent the first four weeks to collect different documentary information and sources from concerned
ministries and offices, such as BGMEA, BEPZA, and collected their annual reports, brochures, periodicals,
bulletins, study reports and visited their web pages.
DEFINING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACTORS
Scholars have argued that unjust or unfair labour conditions are resulted from the absence of effective
industrial relations (IR) system. However, the conceptualization of what constitutes industrial actors is diverge
and changing. IR system is not coterminous with the economic system. While a systematic explanation of
production is under the purview of economic system, the full range of rule making that governs the work
place is central to an industrial relations system. The foremost and mostly used paradigm in IR system was
classical paradigm developed by Dunlop (1958/93). According to Dunlop, industrial relations system is a
composition of certain actors, contexts and ideology that binds the industrial relations system together, and a
body of rules created to govern the actors at the work place and work community (Dunlop, 1993, p. 47).
Dunlop identified three actors in industrial relations system; (1) a hierarchy of managers and their
2
representatives in supervision, (2) a hierarchy of workers and any of their representative, and (3) specialized
government agencies concerned with workers, enterprises and their relationships (p. 47). The classical
paradigm has been used in many studies throughout the century but the concept of an actor and the
limitations of an analysis based on three actors were never spelled out by Dunlop. Confronting the limitations
of systematic approach in explaining the changes in industrial relations system, Kochan et al. (1986)
developed the strategic approach which also confines in the three actors developed by Dunlop but the central
thesis of this approach is that industrial relations behaviour and the outcomes produced by the IR system are
determined by the interplay between the environment and strategic choices made by the actors. However, the
emergence of neo-liberal economic system and the declining of trade unions in the last quarter of twentieth
century necessitated a growth of interest in campaigning, advocacy, advisory and service providing institutions
that discharge some of the functions of traditional actors. Considering the recent changes in production
system, Bellemare (2000) provided an expanded definition of industrial relations actors in the following way:
an individual, group, or an institution that has the capability, through its action, to directly
influence the industrial relation process, including the capability to influence the causal powers
deployed by other actors in the IR environment. … To be a genuine actor, one must not only
take action, but also have the capacity to take one’s actions into consideration and to respond
favourably to some of one’s expectations or demands (p. 386).
According to Bellemare, end users (consumers) are significant actor in industrial relation system because they
can force the global buyers to respect labour rights at work place.
The above discussions clearly indicate that there are many newly emerging actors in industrial relations system
along with traditional actors. The traditional industrial actors are consisted by employers’ organizations,
employees’ associations and the state and the newly emerging actors are multinational corporations, human
rights organizations, Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations and consumers’
groups.
TRIPARTITE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: ILO MODEL
From the inception in 1919, International Labour Organization (ILO) is working to ensure labour justice
through promoting tripartite agreement among its member states as a means of giving voice to all parties. The
basic premise of tripartite IR is that all the parties; employers, employees and state, have equal status and have
an important role to play as social partners for sustained progress in the society. Under the tripartite system,
all rules and governance procedures of work place would come out through the active negotiation of all social
partners. Ideally it implies certain equilibrium among the partners where no one exercises dominant force
over the others but each of the parties carries out its function effectively.
The key event in the history of ILO is the adoption of Philadelphia Declaration. This Declaration contained a
number of fundamental principles; labour is not a commodity; freedom of expression and of association are
essential to sustained progress; poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere; and a just
share of the fruits of progress to all which embraces the core philosophy of social justice (ILO, 1994). This
declaration firmly establishes tripartism as a framework within which various components of social policy can
be negotiated and settled through the collaboration of workers, employers and governments. Collective
bargaining is at the heart of tripartite industrial relations framework. Following the Philadelphia Declaration,
ILO has adopted a number of conventions and recommendations that relate to collective bargaining. The two
basic conventions widely ratified by the states—namely the Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize Convention, 1948 (ILO, 1948), and the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining
Convention 1949 (ILO, 1949) provide the basic premise for a valid and effective industrial relations system
(Simpson, 1994). All other Conventions and Recommendations complement these two basic conventions
through clarifying concepts and supporting the principles stated there. According to the Freedom of
Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87) and the Collective Bargaining
Convention (No. 98), all workers and employers deserve the right to form and join associations for the
support and enhancement of their interests. These legal instruments declares that appropriate measures be
3
taken to encourage and promote the full development and utilization of machinery for voluntary negotiations
between employers or employers’ organizations and workers’ organizations. However, the ways of promoting
collective bargaining are not clearly specified in these instruments. The adoption of the Collective Bargaining
Convention, 1981 (No. 154) and the accompanying Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 1981 (No. 163)
were complementary effort to fill this gap. These two instruments together indicate how the right to collective
bargaining can be effectively exercised. In 1998, ILO adopted the Declaration of Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work which recognized freedom of association and collective bargaining as universal fundamental
rights at work. These principles were further recognised in to the ILO declaration on Social Justice for Fair
Globalization that placed higher importance on freedom of association and effective recognition of collective
bargaining for realization of four strategic objectives–promoting employment, enhancing social protection,
promoting social dialogue and tripartism, and realizing fundamental principles and rights at work (ILO, 2008).
Collective bargaining is defined as “voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’ organizations and
workers’ organizations, with a view to the regulation of terms and conditions of employment by means of
collective agreement. Collective bargaining ensures the equal voice of workers and employers in negotiations
and the outcomes are fair and equitable. The aim of collective bargaining is to reach an agreement which is
beneficial for both the parties and the success of collective consultation is dependent on the balance of
bargaining power between the parties. According to definition, collective bargaining occurs between an
employer or employers’ organization and the representatives of employees but a neutral third party, the state,
assists in this process which led to constitute a tripartite system. In a tripartite system, the government
consults representatives of employers and workers and involves them in the formulation of socio-economic
policies and, in particular, the legal framework of labour relations at the national and industry level (Shen and
Benson, 2008, p. 233).
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM IN BANGLADESH
The history of industrial relations system and collective bargaining in Bangladesh is not too long. It is started
at the last quarter of 1960s under the framework of ‘Industrial Relation Ordinance 1969’ adopted by then
Pakistan government. Unfortunately after the independence Bangladesh government suspended this law in
1986 considering it as a threat for industrial growth. The existence of trade unions is a primary requirement
for collective bargaining but trade union was strictly prohibited in Export Processing Zone (EPZ) through
the suspension of this law and it continued until 2004. During this period, trade union and collective
bargaining initiative were absolutely disappeared in the EPZs. In absence of collective bargaining associations,
employers were free to establish rules unilaterally for their own interest ignoring the rights of workers. After
the continuous pressure from USA, main importing country of Bangladeshi Garments, Industrial Relations
Act of 2004 was passed giving the rights of the formation of Workers’ Associations in three stages between
2005 and 2008 for EPZ workers. It is important to note that EPZ factories are monitor and controlled by
Bangladesh Export Procession Zone Authority (BEPZA) a special organ of the government formed in 1993
to attract foreign investment (BEPZA, 2013). The irony is that most of the factories are located outside EPZs
but there was no comprehensive labour law to protect the rights of these workers until 2006. For lack
statutory provision and authoritarian attitude of the management towards unions, the scope of bipartite
negotiation was almost disappeared. As a consequence, discontent workers, mainly in RMG sector1, started to
raise their voices outside the factory premises in the form of vandalism, strike, road blockings and
demonstrations causing a serious threat to the sustainability of Readymade garment industry. At end of 1990s
the workers’ aggressions became out of control. Perceiving the horrendous effect of labour unrest on export
earnings, Bangladesh government was compelled to open the door for social dialogue through tripartite and
multi-stakeholder involvement. Finally a tripartite committee was formed to settle the industrial disputes and
minimization of workers’ discontent. This committee sat in three consecutive meetings for social dialogue. A
landmark outcome of social dialogue was the signing of MOU on June 2006 among the government, the
BGMEA and leaders of the workers. Many points of MOU were incorporated later in the labour law 2006
1
RMG is the largest and fast growing manufacturing industry in Bangladesh which employs about 4 million workers.
4
(Faruque, 2009). The labour law of 2006 has kept the provision of minimum wage board for fixing the wages
of RMG workers and recognized the right of forming association but effective collective bargaining is far
reaching for lack of workers’ association at the factory level2.
DOES TRIPARTITE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEM WORK?
The main aim of tripartite industrial relations is to lay down normative standards for the promotion of labour
justice through a meaningful dialogue among the partners. The smooth operation of tripartism implies that
each of the parties carries out its functions effectively. In a tripartite collective bargaining system,
representatives of workers and employers play key role for the interest of the members of their respective
organizations. For effective negotiation and bringing the voice of the members in the collective agreement,
representatives should have sufficient legitimacy to speak and act on behalf of their constituents and posses
the necessary technical knowledge and skills. Government agencies play a neutral role staying between two
competing interest groups that may involve regulating, encouraging, moderating, conciliating or even
attributing where necessary (Simpson, 1994). The following sections explore the extent to which tripartite
actors are played in ensuring labour justice at RMG factories of Bangladesh.
Workers Union
Workers’ union is regarded as the most important industrial actors. In explaining the responsibility of actors
against structural injustices, Young (2006) mentioned that the condition of the workers can be improved only
if they are able to place organized demands and monitor the improvements (p. 387). An organized and self
dependent union is a necessary requirement to place the demands to the authority. Cook et al (1992) have
identified two major functions for trade unions: collective bargaining and union education. Unions can
negotiate with the management to lay down workers’ rights in the contract and also take part in conflict
resolution through arbitration. Simultaneously, unions can launch various training and awareness raising
programs for its members (p. 107).
This study has found no existence of unions at workplace. In absence of unions at the factory, workers’
cannot place any collective demand to the authority and educational role of the unions is almost disappeared.
Interviews with different stakeholders have explored various reasons for nonexistence of unions. First,
workers find little interest in joining trade unions. For lack of knowledge, workers participation in unions is
very low. Since, RMG factories are dominated by women workers, low density of labour participation in
unions is influenced by gender biased views. Unions are controlled and directed by men. Male dominated
unions place little importance to the rights concerning women workers. On the other, many women workers
feel that organizing activities and leadership are best suited to men. Second, local labour law does not provide
full freedom of forming association at workplace. The provision of taking prior approval from the factory
authority is a strategic way of the employers to restrict the right of forming association 3. Third, employers’
repressive roles restrict workers from joining trade unions. During interviews, all of the workers reported that
they cannot form or join in trade union activities because there is a very possibility of losing jobs if employers
can identify them. Workers and union organizers reported that owners strategically keep away workers from
joining trade unions. A union organizer said:
It is easy for employers to deny the rights of workers if they are unorganized because organized
workers can force the employers to materialize their demands. Thus, employers always search a
way so that workers cannot be organized. As a strategy, they follow hard rule of discharging the
organizers and workers to create panic among the workers that refrains them from joining in
association.
Workers need prior approval from the authority by submitting a requisition letter along with full details of at least 30
percent of the workers to launch an organization at the factory. Workers do not want to take any risk of losing jobs
identifying them through providing their particulars.
3 See supra note 2
2
5
There is no existence of union but a Workers’ Welfare Committee (WWC) in each factory which is
constituted by equal number of representatives from workers and management, usually five from each group.
The role of the WPC is not significant for ensuring labour justice for few reasons. First, there is no
organizational structure of workers. They cannot call any meeting for discussing the issues relating to their
interests and cannot take any decision independently. Second, workers’ representatives in WWC do not
represent all workers because no democratic processes are followed for selecting the representatives.
Representatives are selected by the higher authority of the factory. These representatives cannot bring any
fruitful result for the workers for lack of sufficient representation and independent organizations. Therefore,
it is often argued that WWC is a substitute but not complement to workers union. A union organizer said:
Workers welfare committee is a new strategy of the employers to exploit worker rights. If workers
union and workers union refer similar meaning why the employers take strong stance against
workers union?
During field visit, the researchers have not found any active union at the factory but there are some Union
Federations4 working in the RMG sectors. The role of these federations is also under strong criticism.
Interviewed workers blamed the leaders for subordinating role. One worker reported, “Workers’ leaders are
devoted to their own interests but not for the workers. They favour management instead of representing
workers by taking undue privileges from the employers”. Union leaders also blame each other for misusing
the labour organizations for their own interests. The main limitation reported by the workers is the political
affiliation of the organizations. Similar to other studies (e.g.; Danneker, 2002; Khan, 2004; Clarke and Pringle
2009), this study explores that unions work as a catalyst of a political party instead of representing workers.
Employers’ Association
Employer’s association is the main driver for sound industrial relation at the workplace. Employers’
association can undertake many welfare schemes for the workers including wages and other labour benefits.
However, they are reluctant to uphold the workers’ rights at the factory for price competition in the market.
They can stay in the business only by selling goods at or below the prices of worldwide competitors, and they
can do it by paying the minimum wages and curtailing other labour benefits (see Yan and Weiqing, 2006; So,
2010). As a result wages and labour benefits remain below the minimum which is reflected in a worker’s
statement:
If you suddenly visit our factory you will see how we work there. Though the work floor is
equipped with light and fan, it is always too hot and over-crowded. The emergency exit room is
too narrow, just as a show case. If we ask them for soap or towels, manager angrily reply us, have
you ever seen these items at your home throughout your life.
Workers’ testimonies affirm that employers possess higher power in the industrial relations system. For
uncompromising attitudes of the employers, collective negotiation never takes place and decisions are
unilaterally taken by the employers(see Danneker, 2002). The interviewed employers and management staffs
do not refute the workers’ claim rather they argued that limiting union rights at the factory is necessary for
sustainability of the factory. One employer said:
Allowing workers’ association in RMG sector will be suicidal for this industry. If workers are
allowed to form organization at the factory, union leader will direct come to manager’s office and
will force employers to accept their undue demands. Then, employers will have no alternative
except to lay off the factory.
At the same time, many management staffs admit the importance of collective bargaining but express their
helpless position in the competitive global market. According to their views, owners hold relatively little
power in the global market. It is a great threat for survival to increase the production cost by paying higher
Federation is constituted by a number of unions working in the same sectors. There is no limit but two or more unions
from the same sector can form a union. Faruque (2009) mentioned that there are 15 garments workers federations
working in Bangladesh.
4
6
wages and other labour benefits. Therefore, owners are incapable to increase the margin of labour benefits
and hold. A manager of a factory said;
Labour standards are highly influenced by the will of the international buyers. If the unit price of
the product goes higher, employers can spend higher amount for the welfare of the workers.
In spite of employers’ limitation fostered by price competition in the global market, management staffs
reported that still there are scopes to do things for the benefit of the workers by the employers’ capacity.
However, employers cannot do until a collective decision is made by the employers’ association because it
may create dissatisfaction among workers to other factories and jeopardize the production system.
State and Government Offices
Scholars have argued that state can actively promote the labour rights by guaranteeing a rights floor below
which wages and working conditions should not be allowed to fall (Young, 2006; So, 2010). It is state that has
the power to enact and enforce local labour law by respecting global standards. In addition, there are some
state led institutions to monitor and regulate the labour market aimed at protecting the rights of all parties
involved in industrial relations system. The following sections have discussed to what extent these institutions
are discharging their role appropriately. First, one of the prime responsibilities of the state is to formulate
new labour laws and policies. The interviews with union organizers, labour scholars, NGOs’ representatives
confirm that formulation of new labour policy is influenced by the employers. A union organizer as well as a
leader of a left-wing political party said;
Labour rights cannot be improved without having a labour friendly industrial policy and its
successful enforcement. However, our state is yet to accomplish it. The main barrier comes from the
industrialists who are the members of the legislative body to the state. They influence government
to protect their rights while enacting a new labor law.
Second, many of the respondents including union leaders and labour scholars strongly believe that if
enforcement mechanisms are strengthened, labour rights would be improved significantly. A union organizer
said:
In spite of some limitations, our labour law have included many of the rights such as right to get
appointment letter, minimum and overtime wages, weekly holiday, maternity leave, childcare
benefit but very little are executed. Employers pay little respect to the implementation of these
rights but law enforcing agencies cannot bring them into trial for their strong affiliation with the
government and political parties.
The institutions that are responsible to monitor and inspect the labour rights situations in the factory are also
crippled being influenced by industrialists and corrupt practices of the staffs in respective departments. A
union organizer said;
Owners of the factories have good connection with the ruling political parties who influence the
concerned persons to release “No Objection Certificate” (NOC) though they do not comply
with the rules and regulations for running factory. On the other hand, dishonest inspectors
provide them false compliance certificate taking bribes from the factory owners.
The frequent industrial accidents recount the poor inspection and regulatory machinery of the state. The very
recent two tragic incidents which caused more than 1500 workers to death were the result of poor inspection
system and violation of the provisions of labour law.5 Third, Bangladesh labour law 2006 has kept the
provision of labour court to settle the disputes between employers and employees. Workers hardly get the
The first event was fire at Tajrin Fashions in October, 2012 which took lives of 124 workers. The most tragic event
was factory building collapse at Savar in April 2013. From the debris, rescuers recovered 1134 death bodies and around
500 workers were missed. Scholars and activists claimed that it could be possible to avoid huge losses of lives if factory
owners did not violate the law. In both of the cases owners’ compelled the workers to work though the possible disaster
was apprehended few hours ago.
5
7
benefits of the labour court due to lengthy trial process. Workers usually do not go to labour court. Instead,
they search alternative way even though it is less beneficial to them6.
BEYOND TRIPARTITE ACTORS
Labour rights issues in global manufacturing industries are no longer confined with national boundaries.
Along with workers, management and state, multiple transnational public and private actors such as
multinational corporations (global buyers and brand companies), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs),
human rights organizations, consumers and citizens’ groups are active not only at the national level but also in
public and private arenas within and beyond national borders for securing labour rights (Trubek, Mosher and
Rothstein, 2000; Santoro, 2003).
Multinational Corporations
Multinational corporations have strong role to protect labour rights in their manufacturing sites. Many large
brand companies or international suppliers have identified some key issues of labour rights, workplace safety
and environmental protection as “code of conduct” combining core conventions of ILO and local labour
laws to regulate labour practices of their overseas suppliers (Kaufman et al, 2004). This study investigated to
what extent buyers’ code of conduct is respected at the factory and its consequence for improving labour
standards.
The study reveals that leading multinational corporations such as Wal-Mart, Nike, Reebok, Levi Strauss,
Disney, Li & Fung, Sears, Hallmark, GAP, Hasbro and Tommy, Haines & Martinez, Tesco have offices or
full-time compliance officers to investigate code of conduct. A marketing executive of Tesco, a brand name
companies in Bangladesh, reported that; “we regularly inspect code of conduct at the factory. If the producers
do not follow the codes of conduct, we refuse their products and do not make any further contact with
them”. Similarly, a human resource management officer of a factory reported that the labour rights situation
in RMG industry is gradually improving and it is the inevitable outcome of the pressure of the multinational
buyers. Unions’ leaders have also acknowledged the positive outcome of buyers’ code of conduct in
followings way:
In absence of effective workers union, buyers’ pressure is the best alternative to enforce
labour standards at the factory. Now the working conditions in RMG industries are better
than that have few years ago. The large share of contribution for this change comes from the
implementation of buyers’ ‘code of conduct’ or compliance monitoring.
In spite of positive role of multinational corporations, this study has explored some limitations that hinder to
get expected outcome. First, the frequency of unannounced inspections still remains at the bottom.
Employers become informed about the buyers’ visit well in advance and get prepared for facing them. A
woman worker said:
Management gets information about buyer’s visit in advance and circulates the message
among us to be cleaned, use of apron, mask, gloves, cap, and remind us not to tell any bad
things to them. In that particular day, floors are kept neat and clean, toilets are equipped
with towels and soaps. Unfortunately all are kept away as soon as buyers or inspectors left
the factory.
Second, workers voices never reach to the compliance monitoring officer. Employers’ devise some strategies
so that buyers cannot get into the touch of the general workers. Confirming the employers’ strategic role,
workers shared following view during focus group discussion:
We hear the presence of buyers but never get a chance to meet them. When buyers wish to
talk with workers, they directly come to the office and management call their preferred
Due to lack of knowledge and financial hardship, they go to federations’ office that brought the case to the arbitration
committee. If federations fail to settle the dispute through arbitration committee, they bring it to the labour court.
Federations take fair share of the benefits from the workers for their legal or other support if they win in the case.
Therefore, federations usually deal with the wage related issues.
6
8
workers. If we fortunately get any chance to be here, we can’t tell them the truth being
frightened by job losses. If we tell them our real picture, certainly we will not be here few
days later.
Third, workers and union leaders blame the auditors for their unethical business. Workers reported that taking
undue privileges from the factory owners, auditors do not give proper attention to the workers’ rights. One
employee says:
Employers, brand companies, merchandisers all are against us. No one is concerned about our
rights. All are go in same direction and exploit us. We have no place to express our sorrows.
Forth, some interviewees particularly management staffs noted that corporations’ compliance monitoring is a
paradox in ensuring labour rights. They claim that though compliance monitoring is aimed to improve labour
conditions, it serves the economic benefit of the corporations. Finding any fault in the product may induce
pressure to the producers to sale the product with half price of the contract from which corporations reap
benefit. Fifth, Inspections of code of conduct are very often done by own staffs of the corporations. This own
audit system of corporations creates debate among the critics whether it is trusted and transparent. Critics
identify a number of conflicts of interest that exist among the key actors involved in this process
(Esbenshade, 2004; Pruett, 2005; Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005).
NGOs, Human Rights Organizations and Citizens Groups
In the demise of national system in the face of global economic and political forces, the network of national
and international organizations has brought a new vision of regulating labour rights in “transnational arena”
as a third way between the national and the global (Turner, 1996; Frundt, 1996). It is defined by Keck and
Sikkink (1998) as “transnational advocacy network”. The key of transnational vision is the belief that through
the continued operation of networks linking various actors across borders, a number of overlapping
normative arenas can be mobilized to create an effective regulatory system (Trubek, Mosher and Rothstein,
2000, p. 1194). It is widely evident that pressures from trade unions, Non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), Human Rights organizations (HROs) and consumer groups have led multinational corporations
(MNCs) to develop their own “code of conduct” and a variety of mechanisms aimed at enforcing labour
rights at their supplier plants (Locke et al., 2007; Schrage, 2004; Mamic, 2004).
The study explores that many international and local level NGOs and HROs are taking part for improving
labour rights situation in Bangladesh. A former woman worker who is currently working in an NGO,
Karmajibi Nari (working women) reported that;
RMG workers are mostly constituted by rural poor women who are mostly illiterate and unaware
about their rights. There is no alternative way but organizing the workers to execute labour rights
at the factory. Local level NGOs are trying to create awareness among the workers, employers,
and civil society through individual contact, organizing workers’ convention, seminars, mass
procession. We arrange also workshops for leadership development among the workers.
The activities of local NGOs and unions are dependent on the support of international NGOs and other
human rights organizations. They build networks with international organizations to bring the workers’ rights
issues at the international level. It is reported from the field work that union leaders contact with foreign
buyers company if authorities do not put proper attention or if it is found the gross violation of labour rights
at the factory. One union organizer said;
We try to negotiate with the employers to solve the crisis. Sometimes, employers’ rigidity led us
to contact with buyers because they do not want to sit together rather take iron hand to tackle
workers unrest denying our demands. If all of the efforts go in vain, we finally communicate with
buyers, International NGOs and HROs.
All of the union leaders, labour experts and labour welfare officers in the factory said that consumers’
pressure upon MNCs has led significant contribution for improving the labour rights at the factory.
Consumers’ denials of buying the products from the bad companies or demonstrations against the companies
compel them to respect labour rights. They further stressed that consumers need to be strict for buying the
9
products that are made complying with the code of conduct; otherwise good companies will suffer a
competitive disadvantage because raising labour standards will increase the production cost. Santoro (2003)
reports that “If consumers accord no marketplace value to the SA8000 mark, it will be a significant
impediment to the global labour rights movement” (p. 308). Thus, local global network of different
organizations and stakeholders are inevitable to be effective the consumers’ pressure for fair labour standards.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The aim of this paper was to explore to what extent tripartite industrial relations are effective to ensure labour
justice and what are the ways to bring back in to just labour condition at the global factories in the demise of
tripartise consultation system. The finding of this study clearly indicates that tripartite industrial relations
system is not sufficient to bring a change in labour practices due to unequal power relation among the actors.
In absence of collective bargaining association and authoritarian role of the employers, role of the workers
remains at the bottom. State protection and regulatory systems do not work effectively because employers or
their association holds dominant power and influence the policy making process and its enforcement. In the
demise of tripartite industrial relations system, buyers’ code of conduct had been granted as a best alternative
for ensuring labour justice. Unfortunately, the role of buyers’ code of conduct is minimal because CSR is not
the top priority to corporations for price competitiveness in the global market. Corporations will be obliged
to respect labour rights if consumers and citizens’ groups can put strong pressure on brand companies for
protecting labour rights at the factories, and NGOs and others human rights organizations extend their help
to increase labour power. Thus, corporations, NGOs, consumers’ and citizens’ groups are the complement of
tripartite industrial relations actors.
References
Absar, M. M. N. (2012). Industrial relations in Bangladesh: a comparative scenario between public and private
sectors, Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, 18(1):19-27.
Acker, J., (2004), Gender capitalism and globalization, Critical Sociology, 30, 17-4.
Bellemare, G. (2000). End Users: Actors in the Industrial Relations System? British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 38(3): 383-405.
BGMEA (2013). Bangladesh Garment Manufacturer and Exporter’s Association, Dhaka.
Clarke, S. and Pringle, T. (2009). Can party led trade unions represent their members? Post-Communist
Economics, 21(1):85-101.
Cook, A. H., Lorwin, V. R., and Deniels, A. K. (1992). The most Difficult Revolution: Women and Trade
Unions, Cornell University Press: Ithaca and London.
Danneker, P. (2002). Between conformity and resistance: women garment workers in Bangladesh, Dhaka:
University Press Limited.
Dunlop, J. T. (1958/1993). Industrial Relations System, Revised edition, New York: Henry Holt.
Esbenshade, J. (2004). Monitoring Sweatshops: Workers, consumers and the global apparel industry,
Philadelphia, PA.: Temple University Press.
Faruque, A. A. (2009). Current situation and evolution of industrial relation system in Bangladesh, Geneva:
ILO.
Frundt, H. J. (1996). Trade and cross-border labour strategies in the Americas. Economic and Industrial
Democracy, 17: 387-417.
Jaggar, A. M. (2001). Is globalization good for women? Comparative Literature, Vol. 53, No. 4. (Autumn,
2001), pp. 298-314.
ILO (2008). Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization, Geneva.
ILO (1998). Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Right at Work, Geneva.
ILO (1981). Collective Bargaining Convention (no. 154) and Collective Bargaining Recommendation (No.
163), Geneva.
ILO (1949). Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (No. 98), Geneva.
ILO (1948). Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention (No. 87), Geneva.
ILO (1994). ILO Declaration of Philadelphia, Geneva.
10
Khan, S. I. (2006). Gender issues and readymade garment industry of Bangladesh: the trade union context. In
Sobhan, R. and Khundker, N. (eds), Globalization and gender: changing patterns of women’s
employment in Bangladesh (pp. 167-218), Dhaka: UPL.
Kaufmann, et al (2004). Implementing voluntary codes of conduct in the Thai garment industry, Journal of
Corporate Citizenship, 13: 91-99
Keck, K., and Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond borders: Advocacy networks in international politics.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
Locke, R. Kochan, T. Romis, M. & Qin, F. (2007). Beyond corporate codes of conduct: Work organization
and labour standards at Nike’s suppliers, International Labour Review, 146 (1/2), 21-40.
Mahon, J. and Wartick, S. (2003). Dealing with stakeholders: How reputation, credibility and framing
influence the Game, Corporate Reputation Review, 6(1):19-35.
Mamic, I. (2004). Implementing codes of conduct: how business manage social performance in global supply
chains. Geneva, ILO.
Muhammad, A. (2011). Wealth and deprivation: Readymade garments industry in Bangladesh, Economic &
Political Weekly, XLVI(34): 23-27.
Pruett, D. (2005). Looking for a quick fix: how weak social auditing is keeping workers in sweatshops. Clean
Clothes Campaign, Amsterdam.
Rahman, M. M, Khanam, R and Absar, N. U (1999). Child labour in Bangladesh: A critical appraisal of
Harkin’s Bill and the MOU-type schooling program, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. 33.
Rodriguez –Garavito, C. A. (2005). Global governance and labour rights: codes of conduct and antisweatshop struggles in global apparel factories in Mexico and Guatemala, Politics & Society 33(2):203233.
Shen, J. and Benson, J. (2008). Tripartite consultation in China: A first step towards collective bargaining?
International Labour Review, 147(1/2):231-248.
Santoro, M. A. (2003). Defending Labour: On the Barricades and in the Boardrooms, The Brown Journal of
World Affairs, 9 (2):303-319.
Schrage, E. J. (2004). Promoting international worker rights through private voluntary initiatives: Public
relation or public policy? University of Iowa Centre for Human Rights
Siltaoja, M. E. (2006). Value priorities as combining core factors between CSR and reputation—A qualitative
study, Journal of Business Ethics, 68: 91-111.
Simpson, W. R. (September, 1994). The ILO and tripartism: some reflections, Monthly Labour Review, pp. 4045.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Employment social justice and societal well-being, International Labour Review, 141(1/2):929.
Taher, M. A. (1999). Politicization of trade unions: issues & challenges in Bangladesh perspective, Indian
Journal of Industrial Relations, 34(4):403-420
Trubek, D. M., Mosher, J. and Rothstein, J. S. (2000). Transnationalism in the regulation of labour relations:
international regimes and transnational advocacy networks, Law and Social Inquiry, 1187-1211.
Turner, L. (1996). The Europeanization of labor: Structure before cction. European Journal of Industrial Relations,
2(3): 325-44.
Yan, H. and Weiqing, G. (2006). The transnational network and labour rights in China, China Rights Forum, 3:
57-62.
Young, I. M. (2006). Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model, Social Philosophy and Policy,
23(1): 102-130.
11