Les Oubliés de l’histoire’ Les Harkis: A history distorted by official narratives
Hannah Yadi, University of Durham
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Contents
Introduction
2
i.
The neglect of Harki history: the ‘triple silence’
3
ii.
Using private memories in history
5
iii.
The Harkis: a definition
6
I. Narratives: writing about the Harkis and the problem of silence
9
i.
Official Algerian memory
10
ii.
Official French ‘amnesia’
13
II. Motivations: the debate about the Harkis in the French army
17
i.
Pressure of the French Army
18
ii.
The violence of the National Liberation Movement
21
iii.
The assimilated elite
24
III. Responses: the Harki diaspora in France
28
i.
The treatment of the Harkis in France
29
ii.
The response of the Harkis
30
iii.
Algerian attitudes towards the Harkis
32
iv.
Les fils de harkis: identity crisis
33
v.
Algerian attitudes towards Les fils de harkis
36
Conclusion
39
Bibliography
42
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Introduction
The Harkis are the Algerians who fought as auxiliaries alongside the French during the
Algerian War of Independence, 1954 to 1962. In the eyes of Le Front de Libération
Nationale (FLN) - which led the War of Independence, came to power in 1962, and whose
politics and personalities still have great influence in modern Algeria - the Harkis were, and
remain, traitors. At the close of the conflict, the Harkis were hunted down by the FLN and
killed. There is no consensus about how many were killed, but estimates range between
10,000 and 100,000.1 Those who survived fled to France for protection. Once in France,
however, they were deliberately isolated from French society, and were treated with
hostility and contempt as they brought with them the embarrassing reminders of a less than
perfect process of decolonization. As a consequence, the Harkis have been denied their own
history by both the Algerian and French authorities and are suffering from a complex
identity crisis, which has been until recently shrouded in silence. This dissertation does not
seek to reconstruct a lost Harki history, or to rescue this category of people from the
‘dustbin of history’.2 Rather, it seeks to understand how and why the Harkis past has been
concealed, manipulated and distorted by the official memory of the FLN and the official
‘amnesia’ of successive French governments, and what effect this has had on them.
The mere existence and post-war treatment of the Harkis served to disrupt the myths of
colonialism and decolonization. They exposed the contradictions of both French
Imperialism and Algerian Nationalism; as such the Harkis have been exiled from Algeria,
ignored by France, and forgotten in official history. The Harkis provide evidence that
Algerian Nationalism did not represent a united struggle against the French. To the same
extent, the manner in which the French abandoned the Harkis, allowing them to be
massacred in Algeria, revealed the French ideal of Algérie-française, the idea that Algeria
was part of France and that Algerians were French, to be a colonial illusion. This
dissertation explores the private memories of both the Harki community and of
contemporary Algerians in order to shed light on those aspects of Harki history which have
J. Lacouture, De Gaulle. The Ruler: 1945-1970 (London, 1991), p. 318; B. Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli: la
mémoire de la guerre de l’Algérie (Paris, 1998), pp. 180-184.
2
F. Cooper, ‘Postcolonial peoples: a commentary’ in A. L. Smith (ed.), Europe’s Invisible Migrants
(Amsterdam, 2003), p. 183.
1
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been distorted by official narratives and to discover the true motivations, treatment and
identity of the Harkis.
The neglect of Harki history: the ‘triple silence’
Following the War of Independence, the Harkis were rejected on both sides of the
Mediterranean. In his 1976 thesis, Pierre Baillet described the Harkis as les oubliés de
l’histoire (history’s forgotten ones).3 It is certainly true that in the years immediately
following independence, the French and the Algerian governments successfully maintained
an atmosphere of silence surrounding the treatment of these Muslim auxiliaries.
Unsurprisingly, this silence still persists in contemporary Algeria, as several of the original
FLN members remain in government today; indeed, the current President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika was himself a former member of the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN).
Added to the silence on both sides of the Mediterranean, the Harkis themselves have
shown a personal reluctance to recount their past, for reasons of shame and fear of reprisal.
This has been depicted as a ‘triple silence,’ which has denied the Harkis their own
representation of their past.
Nevertheless, the suggestion that they are les oubliés de l’histoire is misleading. The
French government was more than aware of their existence; indeed it was responsible for
their ill-treatment. This is precisely why they sought to conceal it. The Algerian
government was equally aware of their continued existence in France but ignored it,
considering it a French problem. One former officer in the ALN, interviewed by the author,
remarked that ‘the Harkis are no longer Algerian…this is a French problem now’.4
The fragmented nature of the Harki narrative ensures that the sources, too, are equally
fragmented. The ‘triple silence’ has meant that academic research was largely non-existent
until the 1990s. Even then, the only historians who began to document the experiences of
the Harkis had personal motivations to do so. As such, most of the secondary literature on
the Harkis to date has been written by their own children, who are seeking to establish their
own place in history by challenging the official narratives.
3
4
P. Baillet cited in J- J. Jordi & M. Hamoumou, Les Harkis, une mémoire enfouie (Paris, 1999), p. 115.
Private interview with Sahli Tahar, retired ALN Official, 26 November, 2007.
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There are two main issues that this dissertation challenges. Firstly, the issue of official
memory which has neglected and distorted fundamental aspects of the Harkis experience.
Henry Rousso has observed that ‘the collective memory of an event is shaped by all
representations of that event’.5 However, the dominance of official memories of the Harkis
has, for a long time, prevented the Harkis from writing their representation of that history.
Whilst the children of the Harkis have begun to recount the experiences of their fathers, the
stereotypical images of the Harkis created by official narratives are still accepted by most
historians. The most obvious one, and central to the understanding of this dissertation, is
the mistaken notion that the Harkis were a homogenous group with unified motivation for
joining the French army. This dissertation combines the emerging testimonies of les fils de
harkis, and those of a series of Algerians interviewed by the author, not in an attempt to
rewrite a Harki history, but to investigate how their narration differs to that of French and
Algerian officialdom. It uses private and personal narratives to deconstruct the problem of
official or public narratives, and of opposing national histories.
Chapter One explains why the French and Algerian authorities sought to create their
own history of the War which omitted the Harkis, and how the denial of the Harkis own
history has laid the foundations for their recent agitation in France. It answers questions
about why the Harkis were massacred in Algeria, why the French allowed it, and why the
Harkis were not welcomed in France as heroes.
Chapter Two challenges the durability of stereotypical images created by these official
narratives: firstly, the presumption that the Harkis were a homogenous group with unified
motivations and secondly, the binary understanding of the Harkis as being either traitors
from the Algerian perspective, or loyal French patriots from the French perspective. This
chapter challenges these presumptions by exposing the multiple motivations of the Harkis
and by analysing contemporary Algerian attitudes as opposed to relying strictly on official
accounts. By analysing the attitudes of ex-officials as well as ordinary Algerian citizens this
chapter also assesses whether official discourse of the Harkis still dominates in modern
Algeria.
Chapter Three focuses on the problems created by the official denial of a Harki history,
namely the isolation of the Harkis in France, their failure to integrate into French society
and their resultant identity crisis. More pertinently, it considers the unexplored
5
H. Rousso, The Vichy syndrome: history and memory in France since 1944 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 291.
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contemporary Algerian attitudes towards the situation of the Harkis now living in France
and questions whether after forty years of exile they are welcome in their native land.
Using private memories in history
This paper would not be possible without the use of private interviews. The ‘triple silence’
ensures that primary source material is largely unavailable. The representations of the
Harkis offered by the official discourse of the French and Algerian authorities have clear
agendas. The testimonies of the Harkis and their offspring are equally limited in that most
only document the experiences of an individual. Interviews have therefore been conducted
by the author with Algerians living in Algeria, France and Britain, in an attempt to bring a
new dimension to Harki history. The aim of these interviews is to fill the ‘memory gap’
between official accounts from above, and the fragmented personal testimonies and
autobiographies of the Harki community from below. This is a form ‘micro history’ used
by the historian Martin Evans, which draws upon a collection of personal memories in its
attempt to traverse the interface between personal identities and national politics.6 This
study will use a collection of private memories to directly challenge official and national
narratives and the assumption that collective memory or history must include the memory
of the state, in this case both the Algerian and French, as the definitive ones.
Very few Algerians have publicly or privately expressed their real views about the
Harkis: it is still a forbidden subject. Consequently, this study has set out to gather as much
original research from the surviving Algerian participants of the War as is possible within
the remit of this dissertation.
Seven Algerians, including five high-ranking former FLN and ALN officers and two
second-generation Algerians, agreed to discuss their memories of this difficult period, the
impact it had on their lives, and the history of the people involved. Many were surprised at
being asked to be interviewed about the Harkis, almost as though they too had put the past
behind them, and most were nervous about having to recall such a sensitive subject.
However, once the interviews began, they became enthusiastic and curious about this
6
M. Evans, The Memory of resistance: French opposition to the Algerian War 1954-1962 (Oxford, 1997), p.
xi.
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attempt to put greater meaning and context to such a complex and emotionally charged part
of their lives.
All the interviewees received a list of set questions in advance. Participants were given
adequate time to consider their answers, and questions were formulated to avoid leading the
interviewee. Although five of them had been senior officers in the freedom movements,
which traditionally meant toeing the party line (FLN) and never talking to the press or any
foreign parties, they were exceptionally forthcoming. The lapse of time since the War may
help to explain why those directly involved were willing to talk at length about such a
controversial issue. Clearly, many of the interviewees saw this research as an opportunity to
explain their private history, but also as an attempt to put into context the problems faced
by the second and third generation Harkis living in France today.
What these personal memories showed most of all, however, were the extraordinary
contradictions endured by so many families. The experience of one young secondgeneration French-Algerian, now living in London, Kamal (who did not want his surname
disclosed), demonstrates this vividly: his grandfather was killed by a Harki and yet his
cousin was forced to join the Harkis at a young age. All of the interviewees said they knew
someone who had become a Harki, and one ex-ALN officer admitted to giving orders for
their massacre.
These interviews are by no means unmediated reconstructions of the past. But rather
they are retrospective accounts and must be treated as such. It is important to maintain an
awareness that these accounts might have been effected, filtered or manipulated by events
which have occurred following the War. Nonetheless, the responses are passionate,
suggestive, and unique, whilst it is possible to identify reoccurring themes in their
responses.
The Harkis: a definition
Harki is a derivative of the Arabic word harka, meaning movement. The word was
originally adopted to describe mobile militia units, which were set up in Algeria by the
French political authority. This was a strategy which had been pursued in Algeria since the
-7-
eighteenth century.7 In 1954, the first modern harka was created in the Aurès by the French
ethnologist Jean Servier. In February 1956, their use was institutionalized by the Resident
Minister and Governor, General Robert Lacoste.8 The Harkis were originally intended to
serve as defence units, but they soon evolved into mobile fighting groups who participated
in organized military offensives alongside the French. The historian Géraldine Enjelvin
places particular emphasis on the notion that the Harkis fought with, rather than for, the
French army during the War of Independence.9 Whilst this is true, it is not to say that the
Harkis were all willing volunteers for the French army. Indeed this dissertation questions
the notion of choice in becoming a Harki and demonstrates that the reasons behind their
enrolment were varied, complex and often unavoidable.
It is crucial to note the disparity in material status between two types of Harki. Firstly,
there were les Français-musulmans. These were drawn from the French-educated Algerian
elite and included teachers, doctors and lawyers as well as land-owners; they saw
themselves as part of French civilisation, and were patriotic to France. Although many of
these people were actually subject to racism by the French, they identified more with
French values and culture than with the Arab world. The second group of Harkis, which
comprised the majority of this group, were les supplétives: these were drawn from a poor,
rural, illiterate and dispossessed sector of the population. Most were ignorant of the
national liberation movement and saw the French army as an escape from poverty.
The sheer number of Harkis meant that the label was often used to describe any number
of pro-French, ethnic Algerian groupings.10 These include the Groupes d’auto défense
(GAD), who were charged with the protection of isolated villages; the Groupes mobiles de
sécurité (GMS), who worked with the rural police force, and the Moghaznis who were
assigned to protect the Section administrative spécialisée (SAS), (the French ‘missionaries’
seeking to convince Algerians to maintain a French Algeria).11 In 1957, approximately
10,000 Harkis had been mobilised. They became an indispensable asset for the French, and
M. Evans, ‘The Harkis: the experience and memory of France’s muslim auxiliaries’ in M. S. Alexander, M.
Evans, and J. F. V. Keiger (eds.), The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images,
Testimonies (London, 2002), p. 118.
8
C. Liauzu, ‘Préface’ in F. Besnaci-Lancou, Nos mères, paroles blessées: une autre histoire de harkis
(Broche, 2006), p. 14.
9
G. Enjelvin, ‘The Harki identity: a product of marginalization and resistance to symbolic violence?’
National Identities, 8, 2 (2006), p. 113.
10
C-A. Ageron, ‘Le “Drame des Harkis” mémoire ou histoire?’ Vingtième Siècle ; revue d'histoire, 68
(2000), p. 3.
11
Ibid.
7
-8-
by January 1961 their number had risen to 61,600, before falling back to 55,000 by April
1962.12 It has been suggested that by 1961, there were more Algerians enrolled in the
French army than there were in the FLN.13 The total number of Harkis and other Algerian
draftees and supplementary troops totalled up to 210,000 in 1961, supposedly
outnumbering the 37,000 FLN troops by a ratio of approximately six to one.14
Whilst the term Harki should refer strictly to the Muslim auxiliaries who served in the
French army from 1955 to 1961, it has become a generic one for all Muslims who took a
‘pro-French’ stance in the Algerian War. The historian and son of a Harki, Mohand
Hamoumou insists that ‘before 1955, the Harkis did not exist; and after 1961, they ceased
to exist’.15 However, because the Harkis have been shunned from Algeria and are not of
French decent, they have been labelled by both camps, as Harkis. Moreover, many of the
Harkis themselves have clung to the term as a means of showing they deserve to live in
France and be French; this idea is expanded upon in Chapter Three. In Algeria the word is
still synonymous with ‘traitor’ or ‘collaborator’.
The very term ‘Harki’ is problematic, insofar as it implies that they were a homogenous
group with common motivations. The use of the term has allowed French and Algerian
officialdom to simplify their role, dismissing them and the significance of their history.
12
Ibid., p. 14.
W. B. Cohen, ‘The Algerian War and French memory’, Contemporary European History, 9, 3 (2000), p.
497.
14
Ibid.
15
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 28.
13
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I
Narratives: writing about the Harkis and the
problem of silence
Official memory, fabricated and promoted by the authorities is privileged over history.16
William Cohen
Interrogating the silence of the Harkis must begin with the breaking down of traditional and
opposing official narratives: there is an official Algerian narrative, and an official French
narrative. While 1830 marks the beginning of the colonial experience for both countries, it
has become a useful starting point for opposing interpretations of Algerian history.17
Following the War of Independence the French and Algerian governments battled to
construct their own image of Algérie-française, and to provide their own explanation of
how decolonization had come to pass. They have each had a selective memory of the past
and as such, certain events have suffered neglect and distortion from both sides, resulting in
a complex web of opposing narratives.
The role of the Harkis in the French army has, however, served to disrupt the myths of
both French colonialism and Algerian nationalism. As a result, they have become fraught
victims of these conflicting official narratives: French official discourse has tried to justify
the use of the Harkis by claiming that they were all ‘loyal fighters’ for France while
Algerian official discourse has sought, for as long as possible, to ignore the role of the
Harkis, in their attempts to deny the existence of internal Algerian conflict. The memory of
the Harkis has certainly been dictated by institutional memory or amnesia. This, added to
their own personal silence, ensured that they were denied their own history.
16
17
Cohen, ‘The Algerian War’, p. 496.
M. Evans, Algeria: the Anger of the dispossessed (Yale, 2007), p. 3.
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Official Algerian memory
Following the War of Independence, Algerian history, controlled by the FLN, was geared
towards portraying Algeria as a glorious and independent nation, whose population had
united, fought and won a nationalist liberation struggle against its French oppressors. As a
result, Cohen proposes that all Algerian history has had a single purpose: to serve as the
prelude of the FLN’s uprising in 1954.18 The Harkis were not a part of this uprising. As
such, they do not feature in the writing of the nation’s history.
The FLN fought the War under the slogan un seul héro, le peuple, and the events of
1954-1962 were described by the FLN as la révolution par le peuple et pour le peuple.19
Whilst the French colonial narrative suggests that 1830 was the starting point of Algerian
history, the FLN has interpreted it as the starting point of the national liberation struggle
itself.20 Indeed, since its creation, the FLN has maintained that the native population was
united in their hatred for and opposition to the colonial occupation, spurring a long struggle
for liberation which ended in independence 132 years later.21 Hamoumou suggests that ‘for
Algeria the Français Musulmans Rapatriés (FMR) do not exist as they disrupt the myth of
a united Algerian population’.22 He believes that the official history of the state was written
to be transmitted to the next generation and to inculcate a sense of national pride and
belonging to the ‘one cause’.23
This official view has survived from 1962 to the present day. It exists at all levels of
Algerian society and is the only view taught in the Algerian schools. Children are taught
that the Harkis were ‘groups of people who prefer to sell themselves to their enemy and to
fight against their own brothers…in exchange for money, goods, titles’. 24 The FLN sought
to project an image of the War as being a united struggle against the French. Indeed,
through their 1962 victory, the FLN claimed to have recovered to the people an
‘uncomplicated Arab-Islamic identity’.25 By merging the FLN and the people together in
this way, the FLN narrative reduced an incredibly complex period of Franco-Algerian
Cohen, ‘The Algerian War’, p. 496.
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 118.
20
Evans, Anger, pp. 4-5.
21
Ibid., p. 5.
22
M. Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis (Paris, 1993), p. 319.
23
Ibid., p. 218.
24
B. Stora & T. Leclère, La guerre des mémoires: la France face à son passé colonial (Paris, 2007), p. 59.
25
Evans, Anger, p. 5.
18
19
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history to a simple narrative of heroes and villains.26 The FLN overlooked the existence of
political rivals, and dismissed all those who collaborated with the French as being traitors
to their religion, nationality and heritage.27 At the time, their treachery was confirmed by
the fact that many of them remained in the French army despite the FLN’s propagandist
attempt to convert them:
We know under what conditions you were either forced or led to enlist…You
weren’t born to be the bulldogs of French colonialism…You can’t deny your
origins: your place awaits you among your brothers…HARKIS! JOIN, BEFORE
IT’S TOO LATE, THE RANKS OF THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION!28
All of the author’s interviewees, however, argue that there were no serious attempts to
convert the Harkis and shared the view expressed by Kamal that, ‘the way the Algerians
think is very straightforward. You take one side or the other. If you decide to take one side,
you can’t go back to the other side. The code of honour is very important. If you betray
them, then you are out of their circle’.29
It has been suggested, however, that the existence of the Harkis in fact helped the FLN
to enhance their heroic image: ‘Heroes can only exist in opposition to the figure of a
traitor’.30 However, it seems that rather than drawing attention to the treachery of the
Harkis immediately following the War, the FLN sought to conceal it altogether. After all, to
discuss the Harkis openly would be to admit to the existence of civil conflict during the
War and would reveal it to be more complex than a black and white narrative of heroes and
villains.
Hamoumou suggests that following the War the FLN’s official press, represented by the
newspaper El Moujahid and the magazine Revolution Africaine, naturally and subjectively
exaggerated all aspects of the ‘glorious revolution’.31 However, from 1 November 1984 the
FLN publicly proclaimed that it had to bring light to some important aspects of the
26
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid.
28
‘FLN letter to the Harkis’, 14 July 1960, <www.marxists.org/history/algeria/1960/harkis.htm> (consulted
20 October, 2007).
29
Private interview with Kamal, City Banker, born in Algeria, raised in France, living in England, 4
December, 2007.
30
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 118.
31
Hamoumou, Et ils sont, p. 217.
27
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Revolution, to encourage Algerians to write more objective and legitimate history.32 This
filled the Harki community with the hope that their testimonies could be published in
Algeria. This did not happen. The Algerians interviewed for this research agreed that
following independence the Harkis were rarely mentioned in Algeria, and only ever in a
negative context: ‘They have always been represented negatively and for good reason’. 33
In modern Algeria this negative official memory and portrayal of the Harkis largely
remains. In 1986, El Moujahid, the official FLN newspaper, wrote that the Harkis remain
the ‘renegades’ and the ‘denouncers of their origin’.34 One of the ex-ALN officials, Hellal
Amine, recalled that the media mentioned them briefly following the Muslim uprising of
1988 when the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), tried and succeeded in recruiting sons of
Harkis as terrorists, promising these ‘misguided people’ a rehabilitation within a radical
Muslim state.35
Speaking over thirty years after independence, Colonel Mohammedi Saïd, a former
officer of the ALN and FLN, defended the killing of traitors or the ‘war within a war’. 36 He
believed ‘it was a sacred obligation of all Algerians to inflict war on traitors…The prime
enemy was the traitor, the French soldier came afterwards. It was first and foremost the
traitor that one had to fight’.37
This view still dominates modern Algeria. On 14 June 2000, Bouteflika went on an
official visit to France: on this trip he called for a new beginning in Franco-Algerian
relations and told the National Assembly that recrimination must be replaced by
cooperation. His stance on the Harkis, however, remained unforgiving.38 Bouteflika
declared that the ‘conditions were not yet ready for the Harkis to visit Algeria’ and that this
was like ‘asking a Frenchman to shake the hand of a collaborator’.39 This was an attempt to
renew and reassert Algerian nationalism. 40
It was the continuance of such official hatred, even forty years after independence,
which provoked Harkis offspring such as Besnaci-Lancou to challenge the official
32
Ibid., p. 217.
Sahil Tahar.
34
El Moujahid, 20 January, 1986 cited in Hamoumou, Et ils sont, p. 218.
35
Private interview with Hellal Amie, retired ALN Colonel, 20 November, 2007.
36
Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, p. 142.
37
Ibid., pp. 142-143.
38
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 117.
39
A. Bouteflika cited in F. Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki: le bouleversant témoignage d’une enfant de la
guerre d’Algérie (Paris, 2003), p. 13.
40
Ibid.
33
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interpretation of the Harkis’ past. In her 2003 testimony, Fille de harki, she describes the
trou de memoire which she seeks to fill: ‘Almost forty years of having tried to forget [her
harki heritage] Bouteflika’s speech, like a slap in the face, woke me up, and reawakened
my past and all of its horrors. It painfully brought me out of my memory lapse’.41
Since independence, consecutive Algerian leaders have seen the War as a world of rigid
absolutes where Algerians could only be for or against the FLN, loyalists or traitors: ‘As
the War intensified there was a real pressure to be in one camp or another and you had to
choose. The prevailing attitude of the revolutionaries at the time was: you are either for or
against us’.42 The comments of Bouteflika in 2000 suggest that the official view of the
Harkis has not changed since independence. When Bekka Abdelnour, an ex-member of the
FLN, was asked his opinion of Bouteflika’s speech he simply answered: ‘Reasons of State
overrule any other considerations’.43 The French government has had an equally selective
memory of the Harkis.
Official French ‘amnesia’
In France, the arrival of the Harkis was an embarrassing reminder of a War they would
rather have forgotten; so they tried to do just that. The War of Independence is not a chapter
in history of which the French are proud. As such, they have preferred amnesia to facing
their dismal record there.44 It was often referred to as the ‘war with no name’.45 In his
studies, Stora argues that France, just like a person, can suffer from a psychological
disorder.46 He has found France suffering from a ‘national neurosis’ because, when a nation
is faced with an inconceivable event, it represses and wipes it out of its memory
altogether.47 Until as recently as 1999, French officialdom continued to deny that the
41
Ibid., pp. 11-13.
Sahil Tahar.
43
Private interview with Bekka Abdelnour, retired FLN High Official, 18 November, 2007.
44
Cohen, ‘The Algerian War’, p. 489.
45
M. S., Alexander & J. F. V., Keiger, ‘France and the Algerian War: strategy, operations and diplomacy’ in
M. S., Alexander & J. F. V., Keiger (eds.), France and the Algerian War 1954-62: Strategy, Operations and
Diplomacy (London, 2002), p. 1.
46
Ibid., p. 491.
47
Ibid.
42
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conflict had been a war at all, but rather a ‘mission to maintain order’. 48 To admit that it
was a war would be to undermine the colonial myth that all Algerians were French, and
would suggest that France had fought a war against itself.49 Equally, to admit to the
massacre of the Harkis following the War would be to admit that France had abandoned the
Muslims that it had rallied to the French flag.
Following the War of Independence, the Harkis were disbanded and then abandoned by
the French. Faced with the threat of massacre in Algeria, many sought refuge in France. De
Gaulle, however, was opposed to Algerian integration, and announced: ‘My village would
no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Églises, but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées!’50 At
the end of the War, he sought to prevent a Harkis diaspora in France and demanded that the
French Government ‘…cease all initiatives linked to the repatriation of Harkis’ and that
‘Muslims must leave under the control of the Algerian High Commissioner…their names
must be on a list established to this end’.51 On the one hand, De Gaulle had told the Harkis
that they were French from Dunkirk to Tamaurasset.52 Louis Joxe, the Minister of Algerian
affairs, reprimanded subordinates who helped with the evacuation of the Harkis despite de
Gaulle’s orders.53
Moreover, the Evian Agreement (the peace treaty between the French and the Algerians
signed in 1962) had stipulated that Algerian civilians would be protected in postindependence Algeria. However, this was ignored by the ALN who went on to slaughter
tens of thousands which the French did nothing to prevent.
In Algeria, these massacres were said to mark the purification of the nation and the end
of colonialism.54 In France, the failure to protect the Muslims auxiliaries it had summoned
to its flag exposed the ideal of Algérie-française to be a farce.55 Consequently, they were
immediately hidden from the public in concentration camps in the remote countryside of
Southern France.
48
Ibid., p. 499.
Ibid.
50
A. Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle (Paris, 1994), p.52.
51
Charles De Gaulle cited in Enjelvin, ‘The Harki identity’, p. 114.
52
M.L. cited in Jordi & Hamoumou, Les harkis, p. 21.
53
W. B. Cohen, ‘Legacy of Empire: the Algerian connection’, Journal of Contemporary History, 15, 1 (1980),
p. 107.
54
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, pp. 126-128.
55
Cohen, ‘Legacy of Empire’, p. 108.
49
- 15 -
None of the Algerians interviewed expressed any surprise at the French abandonment of
the Harkis following the War: ‘the Harkis were used merely as instruments that would
eventually be sacrificed once the French objectives were reached’.56 Abdelnour recalls that
‘De Gaulle himself stated that the Harkis were toys’.57 The notion that the Harkis could not
be trusted by the French was raised by three of the interviewees, with one remarking: ‘I
believe that the French have acted abysmally but I am not surprised. Who would trust
anyone who has betrayed his own people?’58 The same attitude was expressed by Kamal
who added another dimension to the debate:
The French believe that you have to have French blood to be French: Le droit du
sang, you need one of your parents to have French blood to be truly French. Just
because Algerians fought on their side, this did not make them French. The French
army always wanted the Harkis to stay in Algeria. They wanted to get rid of them.
They did not appreciate their help.59
The interviewees agree that the Harkis were ‘used’ and manipulated by the French. They
find this unsurprising and ultimately blame it on the Harkis themselves.
Algeria, like France, is haunted by the memory of the massacres of the Harkis: Algeria,
for having carried them out and France for having allowed them.60 The silence of these two
governments has meant that the Harkis have ultimately been denied a history of their own
and as long as there is no state responsibility for the conduct of the War, private views
cannot dominate and the groups who are ‘carriers of memory’ will not succeed in finding
justice.61 On 25 September 2001 the first national Harki Remembrance Day was established
and on 5 December 2002, President Jacques Chirac inaugurated the Algerian War memorial
in Paris. Enjelvin has argued that the Harkis then ceased to epitomise ‘the archetype of
official non-memory’.62 Nevertheless, official stereotypes, particularly surrounding the
initial engagement of the Harkis, linger today.
56
Private interview with Madaoui Tahar, retired ALN & ANP Colonel, 20 November, 2007.
Bekka Abdelnour.
58
Sahli Tahar.
59
Kamal.
60
Hamoumou, Et ils sont, p. 233.
61
B. Taithe, ‘Introduction: an Algerian history of France?’ French History, 20, 3 (2006), p. 492.
62
Enjelvin, ‘The Harki Identity’, p. 113.
57
- 16 -
The persistence of official memories and the silence of their parents have encouraged the
children of the Harkis to begin to challenge official assumptions. Their children protest that
even they are unclear as to why their parents joined the French army: ‘…very few people
know why they became Harkis…they don’t talk about their experiences and those who
speak for them are against them, so they say anything they please’. 63 These children insist
that their parents’ motives for engagement were not the same and demand a renewed
consideration of their role which challenges the official history created by the French
authorities and by the FLN for the FLN.64 Chapter Two, through an examination of
accounts written by the children of the Harkis and contemporary Algerians, demonstrates
that the motivations of the Harkis were far more complex than the official narratives
discussed in this Chapter suggest.
63
64
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 28.
Ibid., p. 13.
- 17 -
II
Motivations: the debate about the Harkis in the
French army
My mother has never spoken about Algeria or the War, and even today none of my family knows
why or how my father and his two older brothers became Harkis.65
Harki daughter
The most important aspect of the Harkis, and the one which remains at the crux of how
they are defined, is their ‘decision’ to join the French army. However, this fateful move has
been clouded by the binary interpretation of this group as being either ‘traitors’ from an
Algerian perspective or loyal ‘patriots’ from the French perspective. The official Algerian
view was simple: take one side or the other. The Harkis chose the wrong side. As such,
there has been no official consideration of the reasons behind Harkis engagement, and the
very term ‘Harki’ masks their diversity.66 The official simplification of the Harkis role
dominates their history and the personal silence of their community has prevented any
alternative explanations. Due to this ‘triple silence’ the Harkis have been seen as a
homogeneous group with a single objective: a closer examination of individual
participation renders this argument false.
The motives of the Harkis were in fact numerous and, in some cases, it is inappropriate
to attribute ‘motives’ to the Harkis at all. Most of the Harkis were victims of unfortunate
circumstances and were pushed towards the French army due to the arbitrary violence of
the FLN, and the psychological manipulation of the French army, which took advantage of
the ‘weak material and educational level of a poor and dispossessed section of the
population’.67 There is a distinction, however, between these supplétives and the Françaisemusulman elite who became the leaders of the Harkis. These men had received a French
education and explained their allegiance to France in terms of patriotism.
65
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, pp. 120-121.
S. Gladieu & D. Kerchouche, Destins de harkis: aux racines d’un exil (Paris, 2003), p. 7.
67
Madaoui Tahar.
66
- 18 -
This Chapter insists on the importance of recognizing the diversity of the Harkis
engagement in the French army. Moreover, it goes beyond current literature by considering
contemporary Algerian attitudes towards their enlistment.
The official Algerian attitude, most strongly expressed by Saïd, crucially dismissed the
notion that the Harkis were victims of the French army, arguing instead that they chose to
join the French army: ‘That’s too bad for them; it was their choice to join. They wanted to
join…Who forced them to join the French army? Who? Why join the French army? So the
French army made you join them…well I would rather die than commit the lowest of
crimes. Today, the Harkis deserve to die’.68 All five war veterans interviewed agreed that
the Harkis were abominable traitors: ‘They massacred their own people and chose the
French camp. Let them now stay in it and be forgotten’.69 Ouassini Yadi added that ‘they
should follow their masters back to France’.70 The interviewees it seems were too wounded
by the conflict to accept the Harkis as anything but traitors.
However, all of the interviewees agreed that the motivations of the Harkis were varied
and complex and that most had ‘no real motivation at all’.71 All of the interviewees agreed
with Amine’s remark that ‘one should judge each Harki according to their individual role.
There are different classes of Harkis and everyone tends to put them into the same bag’.72
So whilst the interviewees agree that the Harkis were traitors, their views differ from the
official assumption that the Harkis were all traitors of the same ilk. Moreover, the official
line voiced by Saïd is undermined by the agreement amongst all interviewees that the
pressure of the French army was a decisive factor in their ‘decision’ to join the French
army.
Pressure of the French Army
The majority of the Harkis were not willing volunteers motivated by pro-colonial
sentiment. Instead it was the French who went out of their way to conscript as many
Stora, La gangrène et l’oubli, pp. 200-201.
Hellal Amine.
70
Private interview with Mohamed El Ouassini Yadi, retired GPRA, ALN & FLN member, 20 August & 28
November, 2007.
71
Kamal.
72
Ibid.
68
69
- 19 -
Algerian volunteers as they could from what was a vulnerable, largely illiterate and rural
population. Indeed, Yadi describes their engagement as the result of ‘ignorance and misery
topped by unspeakable detrimental psychological actions by the French’. 73 General
Maurice Challe underlined the indispensability of the Harkis for both political and military
reasons: ‘the use of les Français de souche nord-africaine is first and foremost a moral
imperative. We can not pacify Algeria without Algerians’.74 On 1 November 1955 when a
leading Caïd (Judge) was killed in Arris, the ethnologist, Jean Servier, blamed the
assassination on a local tribal leader and argued that a Harki unit was necessary for the
protection of the region.75 In reality the French desired Algerian men in their army due to
their superior knowledge of the terrain and the native Arabic and Berber languages.
One of the interviewees for this study, Madaoui Tahar, a retired Colonel of the ALN
and Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP), says: ‘The sheer fact that the Harkis were
Algerians meant that they had a significant power to interfere with the Algerian liberation
ideals’.76 Indeed their region ‘held no secrets from them’, and they provided crucial extra
numbers against the comparatively small ALN.77 Moreover, 3,000 of the Harkis were exALN members which enabled them to employ a dialectical relationship with the ALN,
whereby they used their own tactics against them.78 Added to this, the Harkis were paid a
mere 7, 50 francs a day thus reducing the cost of war.79 The Harkis became so useful that in
1959, General Challe demanded that De Gaulle doubled their number from 26,000 to
60,000.80 Pressure from the French was therefore crucial to enlisting Algerians in the
French army.
The autobiography of Said Ferdi, Un enfant dans la guerre (1981) is the best illustration
of French force: ‘From 1957 to 1962, I was successively roped into being a messenger of
the FLN, a prisoner of the French, who tortured and then protected me, then tortured me
again. I was a victim of one camp [the FLN] and protected by another [the French], and
during this time, I never understood how I had come to be in such a situation; nor did I
73
Ouassini Yadi.
M. Challe, cited in Hamoumou, Et ils sont, p. 162.
75
M. Hamoumou & A. Moumen, ‘L’histoire des harkis et Français musulmans: la fin d’un tabou?’ in B. Stora
& M. Harbi, La Guerre d’Algérie 1954-2004 La fin de l’amnésie (Alger, 2004), pp. 321-322.
76
Madaoui Tahar.
77
Hamoumou & Moumen, ‘L’histoire’, p. 323.
78
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 123.
79
Hamoumou & Moumen, ‘L’histoire’, p. 322.
80
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 122.
74
- 20 -
know which cause I was serving’.81 Ferdi was given a stark ultimatum, join the French, or
watch his father be tortured: ‘I had to do this work to save my parents’. 82 The French army
focused their recruitment in areas such as Oresse and Kabyle, where the population was
particularly young. Kamal explains that the majority of the Harkis were ‘just young with no
real motivation…they were forced to become Harkis…these people were just victims of the
War’.83 The French army took advantage of their vulnerability and forced them to reveal
where Mujahidins (Muslim freedom fighter) were hiding: if your family was placed under
pressure of the French army then ‘you had no choice but to become a Harki’.84 He argues
that society helped this process by condemning the Harkis for giving the French
information, thus pushing them away from their community. Kamal’s cousin was forced to
become a Harki: ‘He had no choice in the matter at all’. He was 12 years old when he was
captured, tortured, forced to drink soap and water and had his fingers and genitals
electrocuted: ‘In this situation I would probably advise my son or brother to tell the truth to
save his life and that’s the sad part of it’.85 This was typical of the French army, who
ensnared many FLN and ALN prisoners and messengers ‘locking them into a brutal logic
whereby they had most to fear from independence’.86
Added to this was the fact that many of the Algerians lived in insolated and rural areas
of Algeria and were completely ignorant of the Nationalist movement which was still in its
early stages. As Tom Charbit suggests, when the War began there was, in reality, no
Algerian national consciousness. The notion of the state or nation meant little for the
inhabitants of a largely fragmented agrarian country, which was influenced as much by
French colonialism as by the Nationalist movement.87 Coupled with their poverty, many
turned to the French army for financial security and protection from the emerging violence
of the liberation movement, which few understood. Even one former ALN member, Sahli
Tahar, admits: ‘Some felt that by becoming Harkis they would be able to feed their families
not realizing what this would entail in the long run’.88 The French army capitalized on this
ignorance: unlike the ALN, who were often portrayed as brutal animals and criminals, the
81
S. Ferdi, Un Enfant dans la guerre (Paris, 1981), p. 10.
Ibid., p. 43.
83
Kamal.
84
Ibid.
85
Ibid.
86
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 126.
87
T. Charbit, Les harkis (Paris, 2003), p. 28.
88
Sahli Tahar.
82
- 21 -
French army claimed to be building a new society based on equality. 89 Indeed, the French
presented the Algerian War of liberation as a ‘war of destroyers of civilization’.90 Elites
such as Maurice Faivre were ideologically motivated to join the Harkis units as they
believed in the French army’s ability to bring democracy and equality to Algeria. 91 Others
were not ideologically motivated but rather their relative poverty and ignorance made them
easy targets for the French, who convinced them of a better life under their rule.92
As well as methods of force, the French sought to actively divide the Algerian
population. The ALN relied on the support of whole villages to carry out sabotages and to
provide their roving armies with food and shelter.93 With this knowledge, the French army
relocated two million Algerians away from their native villages in an attempt to isolate the
ALN guerrillas.94 This undoubtedly alienated Algerians from the ALN and made them
dependent on the French army for protection. Moreover, the French exposed those Muslims
who fought for France to the FLN in order to provoke civil tension.95 In fact, civil violence
often drove people to join the Harkis in the first place.
The violence of the National Liberation Movement
An official French report published in 2007 concluded that the majority of the ancien
supplétives engaged in the French army to protect their families and to keep peace in
villages against the exactions of the ALN.96 It is unsurprising to find that only two Algerian
interviewees identified the violence of the FLN as the reason for joining the Harkis. Firstly
Kamal, who did not experience the War, and Amine who justifies his response thus: ‘There
were those who rallied to the French cause…after certain acts committed against them by
the ALN. But these acts had been manipulated by the French, whose strategy was divide
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 125.
Private interview with Chahid Fourali, Algerian psychologist, born in Algeria, living in London, 8
December, 2007.
91
M. Faivre, Les combattants Musulmans de la guerre d’Algérie: des soldats sacrifiés (Paris, 1995), p. 58.
92
Bekka Abdelnour.
93
Hamoumou, Et ils sont, p. 324.
94
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 126.
95
Hamoumou & Moumen, ‘L’histoire’, p. 326.
96
H. Chabi, ‘La situation sociale des enfants de harkis: étude du conseil économique et social’, Journal
officiel de la République Française, no. 41107-0002 (Jan 2007), p. 12.
89
90
- 22 -
and rule’.97 The Harkis testimonies are in agreement with the French report, indeed despite
the FLN claim to represent a mass struggle based on the will of the nation, the cornerstone
of ALN strategy was in fact forceful control of the population.98
The ALN could only function within a climate of silence and force, and betrayal was
punishable by death. All those who disobeyed the FLN were at risk of having their throat
cut, mutilation or assassination.99 Particular hostility was shown to pro-colonialist Muslims,
who were dismissed as beni-oui-oui or ‘yes men’. Ali Chekkal and Djellali Kaddari were
just two of the one hundred pro-French mayors killed by the FLN.100 The ALN also took
action in areas deemed to be part of the Mouvement National Algérien (the opposing
Nationalist body to the FLN); in some cases this meant the massacre of entire villages. Rod
Kedward argues that many joined the French for protection from being caught between the
FLN and the Messalists, and some were victims of early ALN violence. 101 The historian
and former member of the FLN, Mohamed Harbi, also interprets the number of Harkis
recruits as a reaction against the ‘excesses of the ALN’.102 Mouloud Feraoun, the Algerian
writer confirms the existence of an atmosphere of wanton violence, which in a society with
such a ‘strong code of honour’, triggered an inevitable series of revenge and counter
revenge attempts.103 The French writer Michael Roux also emphasizes the impact of ALN
brutality, best exemplified by the Melouza massacre in 1957, when an entire village
suspected of being pro-MNA was decimated. Kamal argues that ‘they killed whole villages
because they were helping the French’.104 Nevertheless, these events also drove Algerians
towards the French army.
Roux emphasizes that that anti-Muslim ALN violence has been ignored in post-colonial
Algeria.105 This is unsurprising. To admit to civil violence in Algeria would be to admit that
the population was not entirely united against the French. It also raises the issue of the
extent to which ALN violence paved the way for the military dictatorship which emerged
97
Hellal Amine.
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 124.
99
Ibid.
100
Hamoumou & Moumen, ‘L’histoire’, p. 320.
101
R. Kedward, La Vie en Bleu, France and the French Since 1900 (London, 2005), p. 333.
102
M. Harbi, Le FLN, mirage et réalité (Paris, 1980), pp. 310-313.
103
M. Feraoun cited in Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 125.
104
Kamal.
105
M. Roux, Les harkis ou les oublie de l’histoire 1954-1991 (Paris, 1991), p. 40.
98
- 23 -
post-independence.106 The increasingly loud voice of the fils de harkis has, however, made
it difficult to ignore the existence of ALN violence during the War.
Hamoumou and Besnaci-Lancou, both children of Harkis, agree that most Algerians
became engaged in the French army, not due to pro-French sentiments or disloyalty to the
Algerian nation, but to protect their families from the arbitrary violence of the FLN.
Besnaci-Lancou describes the nocturnal activities of the FLN, which destroyed the
vineyards and electrical lines of the colonials: ‘If the first Maquisards [mountain rebel]
fought for democracy and citizens rights, in time their objectives became increasingly
blurred’.107 Hamoumou cites a chief FLN rebel, Youssef Zigout: ‘The FLN fought the War
on two fronts: against the French authorities to gain independence in the name of the
Algerian people; and against the Algerian people, to impose itself as its representatives’.108
Besnaci-Lancou describes a climate of distrust in her village, which meant that people
rarely spoke for fear of reprisal.109 She recalls that:
One day we learnt of the creation of a harka in Novi. For us it was just a new word
meaning movement. One day, out of fear, a group of men belonging to the same
family joined the movement because one of their family and close friends had been
killed by the Maquisards for no apparent reason.110
Charbit asserts that ‘in a country where identity is defined in a segmented way, according
to a series of concentric circles (family, clan, tribe) national identity is only one level of
‘belonging’ and by no means the most important’.111 Indeed, within this atmosphere of
ALN violence, family loyalties became more important than any notion of Algerian
patriotism. Besnaci-Lancou states: ‘we would have been proud to have helped our Algerian
brothers if they had not been so violent and authoritative. We were guided by our fear’.112
Added to this, Hamoumou emphasizes the difficulty of joining the ALN.
The repression of French forces pushed so many to join the ALN Maquisards that it
would often refuse them. The ALN was highly exclusive and members required approval
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 125.
Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p. 45.
108
Y. Zighout cited in Hamoumou & Moumen, ‘L’histoire’, p. 325.
109
Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p. 43.
110
Ibid., p. 44.
111
Charbit, Les harkis, p. 29.
112
Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harkis, p. 44.
106
107
- 24 -
from a local leader. As independence approached, Mouloud Feraoun suggests that leaders
began to reject volunteers because they were unwilling to share the spoils of war should it
end in victory.113 In this bitter and polarized war choosing a side was mandatory. There was
no room for neutrality and there was no third voice.114 This view was echoed by all the
interviewees. As a result, people often chose France because it was easier than joining the
Maquis: ‘Me, I just wanted a gun. When there is a war on, you need a gun to defend
yourself…my three cousins joined the FLN in the mountains to get a gun. My brother and I
missed out, so when a French soldier told us that he would give us a gun, we didn’t want to
miss another opportunity’.115 This is not an example of fervent loyalty to France, nor does it
demonstrate an abhorrence of Algeria. The assimilated elite were, however, fervent
supporters of the colonial presence.
The assimilated elite
Many of les Français-musulmans were in charge of Harki recruitment. This assimilated
elite, which included teachers, lawyers, landowners and military officers, had received a
French education, assumed French citizenship and explained their allegiance to France in
terms of patriotism.116 They had an historic attachment to the French which pre-dated 1954,
claimed to have been nourished by the biberon tricolore and favoured assimilation with the
French to immediate independence.117 The decree of July 1856 had enabled Algerians to
obtain French nationality, but they had to renounce Islam to ‘benefit from the rights open to
a French citizen’.118 Their renunciation of Islam invoked contempt from the wider Algerian
population. Indeed, this group received the heaviest criticism from the interviewees. Sahil
Tahar asserts: ‘The colonial supporters, Bachagas (tribal leaders) and Caïds (judges),
helped recruit the Harkis because by defending colonialism they protected their own
privileged position. They exploited the local population with the full knowledge and
Feraoun cited in Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 125.
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 33.
115
Ferdi, Un enfant, p. 28.
116
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 123.
117
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 116.
118
P. Dunwoodie, ‘Postface: history, memory and identity-today’s crisis, yesterday’s issue’, French History,
20, 3 (2006), p. 325.
113
114
- 25 -
support of the colonials’.119 However, whilst some were, as Evans suggests, ‘swindlers and
cheats’, many were simply content with the way life worked under the French, feared the
violence of the FLN and thus sided with the forces of law and order.120
The most famous example of the assimilated elite was the Bachaga Saïd Boualam, a
wealthy landowner who explained that his allegiance to France had been formed on the
battlefield. Having served in the French army since 1925, in July 1956, he was placed in
charge of the harka in his region. By 1962 he had been promoted to the role of vicepresident of the National Assembly. Boualam defended his allegiance to France thus: ‘I
was proud to have led the Harkis against the minority of rebels who sought to bring
violence upon our country…the revolution was never a popular movement, but rather it
was an insurrection which could not triumph without taking the blood of the population’.121
In the post-independence era, he became the self-appointed representative of ‘his’
Harkis. However, whilst he refers to the Harkis as his ‘French brothers’, there is a serious
disjuncture between his motivations for joining the French army and those of the majority
of Harkis.122 Boualam, actively supported the French because for him, the FLN victory
would result in Soviet-style socialism and therefore in the expropriation of traditional
landowners like himself.123 As well as seeking to maintain his land, he sought to uphold the
honour of his family who had ‘died in the four corners of the world in order to defend
France’.124
The interests of elites such as the Bachaga, and other Harkis, must therefore be
considered separately. This distinction was highlighted when in 1964 Boualam gave a
speech in Clermont-Ferrand, which attracted a large crowd of Harkis; but the Harkis were
left disillusioned because ‘no one could identify with this politician who spoke in a
language inaccessible to them’.125 Moreover, they could not identify with someone from an
entirely different background and did not share his fervent patriotism to France. The
Bachaga’s post-independence defence of the Harkis and his explanation of them as being
French loyalists must therefore be considered within the context of his personal agenda.
119
Sahli Tahar.
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, pp. 118-124.
121
S. Boualam, Les Harkis au service de la France (Paris, 1963), pp. 17-18.
122
Ibid., p. 19.
123
Evans, ‘The Harkis’, p. 124.
124
S. Boualam, Mon pays…La France (Paris, 1962), p. 14.
125
Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, pp. 88-89.
120
- 26 -
Whilst it is clear that men such as the Bachaga had a personal interest in joining the
French army, it is important to realize that elite families such as his, had been influenced
and educated by the French for 130 years. They had fought alongside the French in battles,
shared in their victories and adopted French identity. Indeed, during the First World War,
170,000 Algerian natives were conscripted to the French army and in the Second World
War they provided 250,000 troops for the Italian campaign. For les Français-musulmans,
the Harkis were a logical extension of tradition of military service.
However, it is crucial to note that other French-educated elites such as Ahmed Ben
Bella, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mostafa Ben Boulaid and Belkacem Krim, who also fought in
the Italian campaign, all went on to become future leaders of the FLN.126 So joining the
French army was not an inevitability of past service for the French. In this context, it is
easier to understand why the author’s interviewees condemn those elites who did choose to
continue their support for the French once the country had engaged in a national struggle
against them.
It is crucial to remember that elites such as the Bachaga were the exception rather than
the rule. The majority of the Harkis were motivated not by pro-French sentiments, but by a
desire to protect their families during the War and to earn a living in a country ravaged by
unemployment and famine.127 Added to this, they were placed under great pressure from
the French army, who used methods of force and psychological manipulation on children as
young as 12 years old. Moreover, many elites became involved with the Harkis in order to
defend and protect the benefits that they enjoyed under colonialism. Whilst this has been
criticised by the author’s interviewees, who saw them as greedy and opportunistic, it is hard
to deny that they too were under pressure from the French. The very nature of colonialism
ensured that elite families were dependent on the French. Algerians had even renounced
their religion and citizenship in order to gain the rights enjoyed by Frenchmen. For these
elites, independence would mean the loss of everything they had striven to build under
French colonialism.
Unlike the official narrative illustrated by the remarks of Bouteflika in 2000, the
Algerians interviewed by the author do admit to the complexity of the Harkis engagement
in the War. Amine criticizes the fact that the Harkis are often ‘put in the same bag’ and says
126
Ibid., p. 120.
M. Harbi cited in N. Sutherland, ‘Harkis autobiographies or collecto-biographies? Mothers speak through
their daughters’, Romance studies, 24, 3 (2006), p. 193.
127
- 27 -
that they should instead be judged on their individual circumstances. However, whilst they
accept that the Harkis had multiple reasons for joining the French, they still condemn them
for their betrayal: ‘When you have a bad weed, you have to get rid of it’. 128 Their attitudes
are no more forgiving than those found in official accounts. They have been too wounded
by the conflict and their experiences of the Harkis to dismiss them as anything but traitors.
Whilst these interviewees can admit, in private, to the multiple motivations of the
Harkis, the Algerian state is prevented from doing so, as it would weaken their longestablished claim that the Harkis were outright traitors to Algeria. By admitting to multiple
motivations, they would become involved in a debate about the details of their engagement
and would have to answer to questions about the Harkis massacres. Remaining silent was
simply easier.
128
Sahil Tahar.
- 28 -
III
Responses: the Harki diaspora in France
The Harkis are completely lost. They are from nowhere. They are not considered as French by the
French authorities and they are not considered as Algerian by the Algerian authorities.129
Kamal
This chapter investigates the impact of the ‘triple silence’ upon the Harkis themselves. It
analyses their ill treatment in France, the difficulties they have had integrating into French
society, their identity crisis caused by being torn between two cultures and their subsequent
demands on the French authorities. Whilst the Harki presence in France has led in recent
years to public discussions of their plight, their relative absence in Algeria, and the taboo
surrounding the massacres, has meant that they are rarely mentioned in modern Algeria.
This chapter goes beyond the existing literature in its attempt to explain Algerian attitudes
towards the Harkis now living in France. It focuses particularly on the question of their
identity and whether contemporary Algerians consider the Harkis to be Algerian, French,
both, or neither? It considers how the Harki community has responded to their treatment in
France.
Whilst the ‘first-generation’ Harkis have remained largely silent for fear of reprisal, their
children have begun to voice their grievances.130 Today in France there are at least five
hundred websites and other media outlets through which the children of the Harkis are
expressing their views of what happened to their forefathers, but also addressing some of
their own concerns about their own futures and role in French society. 131 But what exactly
does this generation of French-Algerian descendents demand from the French authorities
and are these demands shared by all? Are they proud or ashamed of their Harki heritage?
To what extent do they define themselves as French and how do they justify their claims of
‘Frenchness’? Moreover, how are the second-generation Harkis perceived in Algeria and
are they welcome there?
129
Kamal.
The terms ‘first’ and ‘second-generation’ are used here to distinguish the children of the Harkis from their
parents. This is not to say, however, that their children automatically inherit the identity and responsibility of
their parents, nor does it seek to deny their French nationality.
131
‘Les forums’, <www.harkis.info> (consulted 25 January, 2008).
130
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Together these questions seek to break the ‘triple silence’ of the Harki community, the
French government, and most significantly contemporary Algerians, few of whom have
spoken about the Harkis. These questions are also linked to how each of the differing
groups of society view the original motivations of the Harkis, namely the issue of whether
they were truly loyal to France or whether they are in France as mere accidents of history.
The children of the Harkis certainly justify their demands by insisting on their parents’
loyalty to France. But do their post-independence claims correspond with those of their
parents or have they merely been created in retrospect to justify their demands for
compensation in France? Does how they see themselves today affect the way they are seen
by contemporary Algerians? Are they judged on the same grounds as their parents? Prior to
an analysis of the demands and identity of the Harkis and their children, one must
understand the treatment that they have endured in France.
The treatment of the Harkis in France
At the end of the War, despite the restrictions imposed by De Gaulle, individual military
commanders helped the Harkis escape to France. As a result, 130,000 Harkis and their
dependants came to France in the summer of 1962.132 By 1968, this figure had risen to
approximately 140,000, and there are now almost 400,000 living in France.133 In 1962, only
10,000 had been expected by the Secretary of State for Repatriation Affairs.134 As such, the
French government was completely unprepared to accommodate the Harkis. Many were
placed in ‘temporary’ internment camps left over from World War Two. These camps were
intended as temporary places of transit once the Harkis had integrated into French society.
However, more than forty years later, many of the Harkis still live in these camps.
Once in France the Français-musulmans were faced with the humiliation of having their
French citizenship revoked. It was common for the Harkis to become mis a l’écart,
ethnicized, ghettoized, isolated from the greater population and treated as second-class
citizens. Hamoumou recalls that ‘the internal regulations within the forest hamlets or the
Cohen, ‘Legacy of Empire’, p. 107.
Cohen, ‘The Algerian war’, p. 497.
134
Cohen, ‘Legacy of Empire’, p. 107.
132
133
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urban ghettos, made any integration practically impossible!’135 Amar Raiah, born in the
Capulude camp ‘didn’t have any idea or knowledge of what France was like. I didn’t know
anything outside our camp. We were locked up like beasts’.136 They were dependent on
their camp Captains for every aspect of their lives, and when they ‘misbehaved’ they were
subjected to inhumane regulations. Camp Captains often abducted and injected people with
sedatives in order to ‘pacify’ them. Anyone who rebelled was treated as mentally ill, often
to the point that they actually became so.137 As a result many ex-Harki soldiers, especially
men living alone in all-male concentration camps, took their own lives.
The response of the Harkis
The Harki community did not have a uniform reaction to their treatment in France. De
Wenden concluded in 1993, that the official French version of history had transformed the
Harkis into a ‘distinct, identifiable and dependent subgroup’.138 However, there is a clear
distinction between the responses of those men who ‘ended up’ in the French army and
those who chose to aid the French, les Français-musulmans. The former group has
remained silent due to a deep-rooted fear of reprisal: ‘I’m scared every time I hear a noise; I
think the Algerians are coming to kill us’.139 There is also a sense that the Harkis are in debt
to France. The historian and daughter of a Harki, Dalila Kerchouche, asked her mother:
‘after all this suffering, aren’t you angry at France?’ She responded: ‘No, France saved our
life. What more can we ask for?’ Dalila answered ‘…a bit of humanity perhaps’. 140 Her
father gave response: ‘Li fat met’, the past is dead.141 This was a common response from
fathers to their inquisitive children, and the paternal authority imbedded in North African
families prevented further questions. Silence has also prevailed due to the difficulty in
explaining their decision to enroll in the French army. One Harki, Hocine Hamani, for
135
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 14.
Amères Patries, documentary for France 5, 2006. (Co-written by M. Gasquest & D. Kerchouche, the
daughter of a Harki).
137
Ibid.
138
C. Wihtol de Wenden, ‘The Harkis: a community in the making?’ in A. Hargreaves & M. Hefferman
(eds.), French and Algerian identities from colonial times to the present (New York, 1993), p. 201.
139
Madame Taouli in Amère Patrie.
140
D. Kerchouche, Mon père, ce harki (Paris, 2003), p. 16.
141
Ibid., p. 22.
136
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example, asks his wife: ‘Why did I kill? Why did we end up in these camps?’ These are
questions he says he can not answer, however he is sure that: ‘If someone came to my door
today and said would you fight with us again, I would say no’.142
These people were not devoted French patriots, nor were they specifically hostile to
Algeria, but rather many fought with the French due to varying personal circumstances
explored in the previous chapter. Indeed for many, even though they have been rejected by
Algeria, they have ‘continued to love and adore her…continue to live to an Algerian
rhythm…[and] have kept their Algerian identity.143
At the same time, some protest that ‘I would rather throw myself in the sea than go back
to Algeria. It’s a country of the dead’.144 This is often the sentiment felt by the educated
elite families who had a more loyal attachment to France. Once in France, these types of
Harkis were not afraid to complain that France had betrayed them:
When they told us we had to go in front of a judge to become French I was furious
with France. De Gaulle had said that we were French…Mitterrand said Algeria is
France….When I fought to liberate France, I was French, but when we were exiled to
France, we were no longer considered as French. Instead we had to ask a judge for
our nationality. It was shameful.145
Bachaga Boualam protests that while France refers to them as rapatriés, they have by no
means been ‘welcomed home’. He does not regret his decision to engage in the French
army, but he demands that the French authorities should at least have the courage call them
refugies.146 There is a disjuncture in the responses of the first-generation Harkis in France:
there are those who were truly French loyalists and thus demand their ‘deserved’ rights for
fighting for the French, and then there are those who ‘ended up’ on the French army and
feel unable to make demands from France as ‘France saved their lives’. They remain
indebted to France and whilst they pine for Algeria, they cannot go back for fear of reprisal.
142
Gladieu & Kerchouche, Destins de harkis, p. 95.
Kerchouche, Mon père, p. 29.
144
Madame Kerchaoui cited in Gladieu & Kerchouche, Destins de harkis, p. 99.
145
M. L cited in Jordi & Hamoumou, Les harkis, p. 21.
146
Ibid., p. 22.
143
- 32 -
Algerian attitudes towards the Harkis
In Algeria, the Harkis are no longer considered as Algerian. Five of the seven interviewees
argued that the Harkis did not deserve to have an Algerian identity, ‘because they have
abandoned it for another. They are French now’.147 One interviewee, Sahli Tahar, said he
was: ‘…against the idea of letting them reclaim their Algerian nationality, while three of
the interviewees pointed out that legally they never lost it’.148 It is certainly true that whilst
les Français-musulmans lost their French citizenship on their departure from Algeria, the
Algerian authorities did not officially revoke the Harkis’ Algerian citizenship. According to
the Algerian state, the Harkis are still Algerian; however, whether they are welcomed as
such is another issue. Fourali asserts that while the Harkis have the right to be considered
Algerian, ‘they are under more pressure to demonstrate loyalty to Algeria than many
others’.149 Moreover, despite the debate about whether the Harkis have the right to be
Algerian, all of the ex-officials agreed that they do not deserve to be considered thus.
Some of the ex-officials refused to compare the Harkis to Algerian citizens. Two of the
interviewees said that they did not understand the question stating that the Harkis have
nothing to do with Algeria and that they are now French. Amine summarized the feelings
of all the ex-war veterans interviewed stating that ‘The Harkis are a humiliated people with
no pride or identity left. They cannot begin to compare themselves to Algerians who are
proud people who fought for their freedom’.150 On the contrary, Fourali said that ‘…a lot of
soul searching could lead to acceptance of their past and moving on as ‘fully qualified’
Algerian’.151 This less violent response can be explained by the fact that he is secondgeneration and was never directly affected by the actions of the Harkis. He understands that
this is not the case for the war generation:
It is difficult not to understand why Bouteflika compared the Harkis to ‘collaborators’.
He has had a first hand experience of the war and has most probably felt the effects of
the Harkis’ support for France…We may try to be logical or psychological about it, but
147
Madaoui Tahar.
Sahli Tahar.
149
Chahid Fourali.
150
Hellal Amine.
151
Chahid Fourali.
148
- 33 -
lets not forget about those who suffered at the hand of France, whatever reason for their
involvement.152
Many of the interviewees explain the Harkis’ loss of Algerian identity in terms of their
choice to become French. Amine asserts that: ‘The Harkis are now French nationals with
meagre pensions and the right to vote. They have not participated in French mainstream life
much until now, but as far as I am concerned, they are ex-Algerians who are now
French’.153 Sahli Tahar did not say that the Harkis were French, but rather he described
them as a ‘Franco-French problem’.154 Moreover, Kamal emphasizes that even the French
do not consider the Harkis as French. Ouassini Yadi states again that legally they are both
French and Algerian. Fourali similarly concludes that they can choose whether they want to
be French, Algerian or neither: ‘It is their decision. This is also a question that goes beyond
what the papers say’.155
Whilst the interviewees admit to the Harkis’ right to be Algerian, many expressed anger
at the very idea that they are still Algerian. They all agree that the Harkis are French now,
despite not being accepted there. They argue that this was their decision, despite the fact
that in the previous Chapter, they questioned the notion of choice in becoming a Harkis.
Ultimately they agree that the Harkis belong nowhere.156 Whilst the identity of the Harkis is
a complex matter, it should be more straightforward for their children, many of whom were
born and raised in France. This is unfortunately not the case.
Les fils de harkis: identity crisis
The children of the Harkis have been raised in isolated internment camps. As such, many
have been deprived of a formal education and have little knowledge of French society.
Whilst most now have French identity cards and are now free to leave their camps, few
have chosen to. Akila Kelfoun attempted to integrate into French society in Toulouse, but
soon moved back to her camp describing the move as a double déracinement: her camp was
152
Ibid.
Hellal Amine.
154
Sahli Tahar.
155
Chahid Fourali.
156
Kamal.
153
- 34 -
all she knew.157 Mohamed Laradji, the leader of a Harki organization admits that despite
owning a French identity card: ‘It is very difficult to be a Frenchman when one’s name is
Mohamed’.158 The same problem led the brother of Dalila Kerchouche, to change his first
name from Abdel-Kader to Paul Yann Gaetan stating that: ‘Harkis are not considered as
French. We have left the camps, but we are still trapped in a cage’.159 Another son of a
Harki describes that: ‘I haven’t left the camp because on the outside I will always be the
son of a traitor. Even though I have a French Christian name, for the French, I will always
be an Arab. I am guilty, guilty of being alive’.160 Dalila described the name change of her
brother as a sad outcome of forty years of ‘integration’. She accuses him of a second
treachery ‘after that of our father, that of his son. One betrayed his country, one betrayed
his origin’.161 Dalila concludes that maybe neither had a choice. Indeed her brother claims:
‘It is the system that is like this. If I could have avoided it, I wouldn’t have done it’.162 One
interviewee expresses the sadness of this generation: ‘They are bastards with French names
who still believe in their integration into French society. The brightest may succeed but the
majority is a forgotten generation who are unjustly paying for their parents’ sins’.163
The repression of les fils de harkis led them to riot in 1975 and 1991. Their riots were
characterized by a strong identification with their Harki heritage. Sutherland has argued
that the children of the Harkis have been forced to identify themselves as such because of
labelling by the French public, the large Franco-Algerian immigrant community, the French
administration and the Algeria government.164 She cites Frantz Fanon who claimed that the
Harkis, like all colonial populations, have suffered from an ‘overdetermining from
without’.165 Whilst this is true, Sutherland neglects to mention that the fils de harkis have
also chosen to adopt this identity voluntarily. In the Narbonne riots of 1991, Boussad Azni,
the son of a Harki and spokesperson for La coordination des enfants de harkis protested
that: ‘we no longer want to be referred to as Français-musulmans; I demand that we are
called Harkis because this term has a historic connotation. We should be identified by our
157
Akila Kelfoun in Amère Patrie.
Mohamed Laradji cited in Cohen, ‘Legacy of Empire’, p. 109.
159
Kerchouche, Mon père, p. 28.
160
Omar Taouli in Amère Patrie.
161
Kerchouche, Mon père, p. 28
162
Ibid.
163
Bekka Abdelnour.
164
Sutherland, ‘Harkis autobiographies’, p. 196.
165
Fanon cited in Ibid.
158
- 35 -
loyalty to France, not by a religion’.166 Many are proudly reasserting their Harki identity as
it is the only identity that they cannot be denied and they are using the image of their
fathers as ‘loyal fighters’ in order to prove their ‘Frenchness’. The creation of the 2006 film
‘Harkis’ filled Omar Taouli, the son of a Harki, with pride: ‘When we heard about the film
being made, we felt great pride. We are Harkis, it is about us!’167 At the same time he
emphasizes his Frenchness: ‘I am French, I am proud to be French, I feel French. I was
born in France, I live in France. My country is France’.168
Enjelvin explains the importance of the label ‘Harki’ as their children’s desire to
distinguish themselves from Maghrebin (North African origin) population, who are often
amalgamated with religious fundamentalists by the French public.169 She argues that many
seek compensation for their losses in Algeria and some even demand the guarantee of a
fixed quota of jobs for their descendents.170 However, while many Harkis offspring
embrace the identity of their parents, it is wrong to assume that all the sons and daughters
of the Harkis identify themselves as part of the ‘Harki community’ and share its claims and
fights.
Some Harkis offspring are deeply ashamed of the acts committed by their parents and
disassociate themselves from their Harki heritage completely, wishing to be forgotten
altogether. One of Jordi and Hamoumou’s interviewees wished that the Harkis truly were
les oubliés d’histoire: ‘I have not been forgotten by history. Forgotten implies that the
French forgot me by accident. This was not the case. France actively sought to forget us.
Personally I wish that they had forgotten about me, and forgotten about my father, I wish
that France and Algeria would forget us’.171 Besnaci-Lancou protests that being a Harki is
not hereditary: ‘I don’t want my child to be known as ‘grand-child of a Harki’ with all the
misery that is attached to the name’.172 Not everyone who fled Algeria sought refuge in the
collective identification of colonial repatriate, some merely sought to continue their lives as
normal.173 Charbit argues that many of the Harkis regard themselves as French nationals of
166
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 18.
Amère Patrie.
168
Ibid.
169
Enjelvin, ‘The Harki identity’, p. 117.
170
Ibid.
171
Jordi & Hamoumou, Les Harkis, p. 55.
172
Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, p. 17.
173
Cooper, ‘Postcolonial peoples’, p. 169.
167
- 36 -
North African origin, an origin that can generate alienation and ostracism in France. 174 But
they prefer this to being categorized as the child of a Harki. There is therefore a disjuncture
between the sentiments of the fils de harkis: there are those who bluntly refuse a Harki
identity, and those who demand it. A number of the authors interviewees judged les fils de
harkis along these lines.
Algerian attitudes towards Les fils de harkis
Kamal drew a firm distinction between two types of Harki offspring. He has sympathy for
those Harkis offspring who understand their parents’ situation without defending it, but he
condemns those Harkis who are proud of what their parents did and are voting for the
extreme right party in France. ‘I think these people are doing exactly the same thing as their
parents’.175 He notes that many are very proud of their Harki heritage and alludes to the
remarks of his friend and son of a Harki (whose name cannot be mentioned) who said that
if he had been there with his father, he would have fought with him. To Kamal this attitude
is unforgivable. The general consensus amongst interviewees was, however, that the
children of the Harkis could not and should not be blamed for the actions of their fathers.
This is also the view propounded by Bouteflika.
On 11 September 2005 the President announced that ‘It is wrong to resent the children
of the Harkis’.176 On 25 January 2005, he confirmed his sympathy for these people stating
that ‘the children of the Harkis are not responsible for the acts committed by their fathers’
and ‘to declare their willingness to serve and defend the country if they want to be
considered as fully fledged Algerians’.177 One of the interviewees, Sahil Tahar, points out
the fundamental difference between first and second-generation Harkis: ‘The secondgeneration are innocent victims and they have no original sin attached to them’.178 Amine
agreed, but stated that ‘in France they are treated just like their parents’.179 Madaoui Tahar
Charbit cited in Enjelvin, ‘The Harki identity’, p. 117.
Kamal.
176
A. Mekfouldji, ‘Bouteflika à Blida ‘la question des Harkis a été définitivement tranchée,” El Watan, 11
September 2005.
177
Editorial staff, ‘Le Président Bouteflika aujourd’hui a Alger’, El Moudjahid, 25 septembre 2005.
178
Sahli Tahar.
179
Hellal Amine.
174
175
- 37 -
believed that ‘if they wish to return to Algeria they should be welcomed’. 180 Some
dismissed their relevance in Algeria: ‘I have no views on the second-generation, they are
born and bred in France and consider themselves French. I do not feel that they should be
considered Algerian citizens as they know little about living in Algeria’. 181 While there is
an official and general agreement that the blame of the Harkis should not be transferred to
their children, they have been condemned in Algeria for fighting their parents cause.
Amine argued that the Harkis offspring have been ‘intoxicated by their parents and are
now used as a good recruiting ground by Muslim fundamentalists to kill innocent Algerians
in our country’.182 According to Sahil Tahar many of the Harkis offspring who returned to
Algeria during the 1990s joined Muslim fundamentalists Guerrillas in Algeria and
‘perpetrated barbaric acts of violence to avenge their fathers’.183 These accusations
demonstrate a fervent mistrust of the Harkis offspring. Abdelnour added that ‘they have not
shown a desire to come back and therefore do not deserve to return’.184 This is simply
untrue. Besnaci-Lancou tells us that many Harkis offspring have returned to Algeria to visit
relatives and they have been warmly welcomed there.185 It appears then, that while the
Harkis are not blamed for the actions of their fathers, these Algerians have found a fresh
reason to judge them: their new political fight in France.
This fight has continued in recent years. Despite the founding of a National day for
Harkis by President Chirac in 2001, the Harkis are still victims of racial abuse in France.
On 11 February 2006, the Socialist politician Georges Frêche told a group of Harkis that
‘you went with Gaullists…They massacred your own in Algeria…They slit your throats
like pigs…you are part of this group of Harkis whose vocation in life is to be cuckolded
until the end of time…you are subhuman, you are without honour’.186 Frêche was forced to
pay a fine of 15,000 Euros and to give an official apology for his comments. In his apology
he claimed to have been referring to one or two Harkis but not their entire community. 187
Nevertheless it is difficult to overlook the violence of his remarks. Although this is only the
180
Madaoui Tahar.
Sahli Tahar.
182
Hellal Amine.
183
Sahli Tahar.
184
Bekka Abdelnour.
185
Besnaci-Lancou, Fille de harki, pp. 14-15.
186
Agence France-Presse (AFP), ‘Georges Frêche, qui avait traité des harkis de ‘sous-hommes’, a été relaxé
en appel’, Le Monde, 13 Septembre 2007.
187
S. Zappi & F. Martin-Ruiz, ‘Face au tollé, Georges Frêche dit ‘pardon’ aux harkis’, Le Monde, 15 Février
2006.
181
- 38 -
view of one person, the Harkis have been victims of isolation, a lack of rights and racial
discrimination in France for over four decades. They may have received official and legal
acceptance in France, but many feel that this is not enough. They are still treated as secondclass citizens and as a result, their children will continue to fight. Boussad Azni is one of
many Harkis offspring who has not and will not stop fighting for justice.188
188
E. Albit, ‘Préface’ in B. Azni, Harkis, crime d’Etat: généalogie d’un abandon (Paris, 2005), p. 13.
- 39 -
Conclusion
It is impossible to reconstruct a history which has been buried for so long in a ‘triple
silence’, and this dissertation has not sought to do so. It has, however, explored the
processes by which the Harkis have been denied a history by the French and Algerian
authorities and the Harkis own repentant silence.
Following the War of Independence, the FLN legitimized their seizure of power with
their claim that the Revolution had been carried out by the entire population, which was
united in its hatred for French colonialism. The Harkis were the only obvious and surviving
threat to this claim. As such, the FLN sought to kill them, shun them from Algeria, and
represent them as traitors to their nation. The only way to do this was to control their
narrative and their history.
Unlike the Harkis and the Algerians interviewed by the author, the Algerian authorities
still deny the varying circumstances in which Algerian men and youths became Harkis. To
admit to the complexities of their situation would be to embark on a grand debate not only
about their motivations, but questions about their treatment, their identity, and their rights
to Algerian citizenship. They would be forced to write a more objective interpretation of
their past which included the Harkis. This is precisely what the FLN sought to avoid. After
all, rewriting the official Algerian narrative of the War would force them to question their
own role in history.
For France, the Harkis were useful weapons, which were disbanded and discarded at the
end of the War. The French abandonment of the Harkis and their subsequent massacre
destroyed the colonial ideal of Algérie-française, the myth that Algeria was a part of
France. Once in France, the Harkis were an embarrassing reminder of the French defeat and
the forced and uncontrolled nature of decolonization. As such, they were concealed in
France, where their treatment only worsened. The French preferred amnesia to dealing with
the consequences of colonialism and its contradictions.
As a result, the Harkis and their families have been described and treated as the
forgotten men and women of history. This does not, however, mean that they have been
forgotten. Today an increasing number of individuals and groups of people within the
Harki community in France are becoming confident enough to not only challenge official
versions, but the silence of their parents, providing their own explanation of their families’
- 40 -
experiences of the War. However, the first-generation Harkis are aging. As such, their
children and grandchildren are under a natural deadline to document the details of their
past.
Over the last few years, hundreds of Harki websites have emerged with discussion
forums where members of the community can share their experiences. A number of film
documentaries, such as Amère Patrie and harkis have revealed the horror of French
concentration camps and the problems of integrating into French society and biographies
have been written les fils de harkis which tell the story of their fathers. These testimonies
have been used in this study to demonstrate that the motivations of the Harkis were far
more complex than official discourse suggests.
The author’s interviewees agreed that the Harkis were not a homogenous group with
unified objectives; this view is starkly different to the traditional narrative. However, whilst
the interviewees differentiate between the circumstances of individual Harkis, they still
condemn them as a group. This is due in part to their inability to forget the actions carried
out by the Harkis. Indeed, whilst the war-generation is still alive, it seems unlikely that a
more critical analysis of the Harkis can be achieved.
Since the War the Algerian authorities have indoctrinated the public through education
and the national media so that even the second and third-generation Algerians sees the
Harkis as the epitome of betrayal to their nation. However, one interviewee, Amine, said
that with time, attitudes towards the Harkis in Algeria are softening: ‘anyone over 45 is still
marked by the atrocities committed by the French army and the role played by the
Harkis…but with time this rejection dampens especially as most of the Harkis now live in
France’.189 However, this is not the case, as the children of the Harkis have raised a new
post-colonial problem in France. This is the problem of how they define their own identity
and how this has been interpreted by the French and indeed by Algerians.
The Harkis offspring have portrayed their parents as ‘loyal fighters’ to force the French
authorities to recognize their sacrifices for France. But by asserting themselves as Harkis,
they are setting themselves apart from French society, increasing their image of ‘otherness’
and reducing their chance of becoming fully fledged Frenchmen. The second-generation are
no longer fighting a battle for their parents, but for themselves: it is a battle for their own
identity. Although they have been officially recognized in France they do not feel accepted
189
Hellal Amine.
- 41 -
by the French population. They feel French and have French identity cards, but their
physical appearance distinguishes them from the ethnic French population. Moreover, by
insisting on the notion of their parents’ loyalty to France, they have undermined their
previous effort to distinguish between the multiple motivations of their parents.
By identifying themselves as Harkis, they have also provoked criticism from Algerians
who accuse them of continuing the ‘treachery’ of their fathers. Whilst most say that the
children of the Harkis are welcome in Algeria, it appears that some would prefer them to
remain as quiet as their parents. The new challenge facing the second and third-generation
Harkis is that they must choose which identity they desire. If they want to integrate fully
into French society and to be accepted in Algeria, they may need to sacrifice their Harki
identity altogether.
There are many parallels in the relationship between the Harkis and French society today
and that between Algerians and the French ruling class before the War of Independence.
One of the defining features of French colonialism was the way the French invited
Algerians to become part of Algérie-française, and many still suffer from the dichotomies
and complexities brought about by the fusion of French and Arab cultures. Today those
torn loyalties are still imbedded in the Harki psyche. At the same time, the French feel great
guilt over the treatment of the Harkis, and the government is far more open today to a
franker discussion of their plight. In Algeria however, the process of enlightenment has
been far slower due in part to the tight reign which the authorities have held over
discussions of all aspects of Algerian political life.
Today, attempts by successive Algerian and French governments to impose their own
interpretation of the Harkis are finally being challenged. The reasons for the ‘triple silence’
are fading: the FLN no longer monopolize Algerian politics; France has recognized the role
and existence of the Harkis; and as the children of the Harkis seek their own identity, they
have discovered the voice that their parents never had.
14, 813 words
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Bibliography
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Private Interviews
Wartime generation
Private interview with Bekka Abdelnour, retired FLN High Official, 18 November, 2007
Private interview with Hellal Amine, retired ALN Colonel, 20 November, 2007
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2007
Private interview with Sahli Tahar, retired ALN Official, 26 November, 2007
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Second generation
Private interview with Chahid Fourali, Algerian psychologist born in Algeria, living in
London, 8 December, 2007
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Cinema
Harkis, film for France 2, directed by Tasma, A., 2006. (Co-written by Kerchouche, D.
Malherbe, A.)
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&
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‘Les oubliés de l’histoire’
The Harkis: a history distorted by official
narratives
DISS73902
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