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The Temporality of Understanding
Linda Muchová
This paper will be primarily focused on § 68. a) of Being and Time. This part of Being
and Time, as the title shows, is concerned with the temporality of understanding. However,
§ 68. is clearly part of division two of Being and Time, it is necessary to mention also certain
parts of division one of Being and Time. This is mainly because of the structure of this book.
It is important to keep in mind that Heidegger’s intention was to go through once analysed
topics in division one (§ 31., § 32.) once more and show their deeper roots in temporality.
Even though this paper will be presented in English, I think that it will be very useful
to use the original German terms that Heidegger himself uses for explaining the fundamental
structures. When using the English terms I have decided to adopt the terms employed by John
Macquarrie and Edward Robinson in their translation of Sein und Zeit.1
Understanding in Division One of Being and Time
First of all, it is important to mention the central role of understanding in Heidegger’s
thought. It is the new perspective when analysing understanding, which has to catch the eye of
the reader. The understanding is no more just a way of cognition but it is an existential
structure of Dasein. It is very well formulated by H. Dreyfus in his book. “To get the right
approach to understanding it is essential at the outset not to think of understanding as a
cognitive phenomenon.”2
We can read in the division one and it is indeed also clear from the division two that
understanding is not something that Dasein does or does not have, since Dasein always
already understands.3 It is more than clear that what Heidegger means by this is not that
Dasein would for example understand one minor issue. It is exactly understanding as
fundamental existential that makes the understanding of one minor issue possible.
1
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967
DREYFUS, H. L. Being-in-the-World, A commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time. Cambridge : The MIT
Press, 2001, p. 184
3
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967, p.183-184/144
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Heidegger’s words are very clear when he mentions this at the beginning of the §68 a). “With
the term ‘understanding’ we have in mind a fundamental existentiale, which is neither a
definite species of cognition distinguished, let us say, from explaining and conceiving, nor
any cognition at all in the sense of grasping something thematically.” 4
Understanding and Time Ecstases
It is important to mention that every existential has got its primary time ecstasis. It is
also important that it is mentioned no matter that the time ecstases are possible to distinguish
they are not possible to divide. All the ecsatses are always involved in each one of the
existentials. The temporality as such is always a structure that has to be considered as a
whole. What would then in Heidegger’s philosophy be the primary time ecstasis of
understanding? It is the future. And why should it be the future? Why not the past with the
tradition that one might possibly consider to be essential for the understanding?
It is important to remember, that already in the first division of Being and Time,
Heidegger mentions understanding and its close relation to possibility and potentiality-forBeing (Seinkönnen).5 “Understanding is the existential Being of Dasein’s own potentialityfor-Being; and it is so in such a way that this Being discloses in itself what its being is capable
of.”6 It is exactly this close relation that could be seen as be the basis for the connection of the
understanding and future ecstasis of temporality. M. Gelven speaks of this in his commentary
to Being and Time.7 “Since the existential meaning of understanding is the projection of
possibilities, the central ecstasis for this existential is the future.”8 It is one of the basic
features of Dasein that there is a need to choose from possibilities that are open for each
Dasein. Possibility that is essential to projection and potentiality-for-Being in Heidegger’s
4
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 385
„Mit dem Terminus Verstehen meinen wir ein fundamentales Existezial; weder eine bestimmte Art von
Erkennen, unterschieden etwa von Erklären und Begreifen, noch überhaupt ein Erkennen im Sinne des
thematischen Erfassens.“ S. 336
5
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 183
6
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 184
„Verstehen ist das existenziale Sein des eigenen Seinkönnens des Daseins selbst, so zwar, daß dieses Sein an ihm
selbst das Woran des mit ihm selbst Seins erschließt.“ S. 144
7
GELVEN, M. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, A Section by Section Interpretation. New York:
Harper Torchbook, 1970.
8
GELVEN, M. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, A Section by Section Interpretation. New York:
Harper Torchbook, 1970, p. 191
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philosophy is not the kind of possibility that would necessarily have to be grasped
thematically.
The Problem of Authenticity and Inauthenticity
Authenticity and inauthenticity are other issues that our part of Being and Time is
dealing with. It is precisely understanding that plays the crucial role for the whole idea of
authenticity and inauthenticity in Heidegger’s thought. It is the projection connected to the
ultimate possibility, which Dasein is capable of seeing, that makes the authentic projection an
option. What will be the results of our analyses when we talk about understanding and
authenticity and inauthenticity. We will get different modes of understanding based on the
difference in the time ecstasy involved and authenticity or inauthenticity.
The Future Ecstasis and Understanding
The authentic mode connected to future is Anticipation (Vorlaufen). It is important to
see that at this point Heidegger mentions something significant. It is not the present that
Dasein can win the authentic future from but it is the inauthentic future. “This indicates that
Dasein, existing authentically, lets itself come towards itself as its ownmost potentiality-forBeing – that the future must first win itself, not from a Present, but from the inauthentic
future.”9 Future is then primary for both authentic and inauthentic Dasein. It is important that
Heidegger explicitly says that in this part of Being and Time. “Dasein is constantly ahead of
itself, but inconstantly anticipatory with regard to its existentiell possibility.” 10
The inauthentic mode of future is Expecting (Gewärtigen). The basic feature of
Expecting is that Dasein no longer understands itself form the potentiality-for-Being which is
in relation to pure possibility taken as possibility but from the possibilities that are taken from
the world of concerned. It is exactly this inauthentic mode of future which is basis for
9
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 386
“Es zeigt an, daß das Dasein, eigentlich existierend, sich als eigenstes Seinkönnen auf sich zukommen läßt, daß
sich die Zukunft erst selbst gewinnen muß, nicht aus einer Gegenwart, sondern aus der uneigentlichen Zukunft.“
S. 337
10
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 386
“Dasein ist faktisch ständig sich-vorweg, aber unständig, der existenzielen Möglichkeit nach, vorlaufend.“
S. 337
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concern, which understands from ‘the they’ (das Man). Very interesting characteristics for
distinguishing the authentic and inauthentic mode of future are given by M. Gelven.
“Speaking somewhat loosely, one might say that authentic understanding (anticipation) lies in
Dasein going toward the future, whereas inauthentic understanding (waiting) lies in the future
coming toward Dasein.”11
The Present Ecstasis and Understanding
The authentic mode of present is Moment of vision (Augenblick).
Firstly, it is
important to make clear that moment-of vision cannot be understood from Now. Moment of
vision is no Now taken as a point, it is ecstasis. From the ecstatical character Moment of
vision Heidegger’s following words are more than clear. “It means the resolute rapture with
which Dasein is carried away to whatever possibilities and circumstances are encountered in
the Situation as possible objects of concern, but a rapture which is held in resoluteness.”12
The inauthentic mode of present is Making-present (Gegenwärtigen). This inauthentic
mode of present is of a major importance when falling (Verfallen), another of the basic
characteristics of Dasein, is supposed to be possible to be brought into light. We can read that
inauthentic mode of present will be explained in greater depth when the temporal
interpretation of falling will be presented. Making-present will become clear only in the light
of the temporal Interpretation of falling into the ‘world’ of one’s concern; such falling has its
existential meaning in making present.”13 “The connection between understanding and an
inauthentic present lies in the sphere from which Dasein chooses possibilities for projection.
“But in so far as the potentiality-for-Being which is projected by inauthentic understanding is
projected in terms of things with which one can be concerned, this means that such
understanding temporalizes itself in terms of making present.” 14
GELVEN, M. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, A Section by Section Interpretation. New
York: Harper Torchbook, 1970, p. 192
12
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 387
“Er meint die entschlossene, aber in der Entschlossenheit gehaltene Entrückung des Daseins an das, was in der
Situation an besorgbaren Möglichkeiten, Umständen begegnet.“ S. 338
13
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 388
“Das Gegenwärtigen wird erst aus der zeitlichen Interpretation des Verfallens an die besorgte Welt deutlich
werden, das in ihm seinen existenzialen Sinn hat.“ S. 338
14
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 388
“Sofern aber das uneigentliche Verstehen das Seinkönnen aus dem Besorgbaren entwirft, heißt das, es zeitigt
sich aus dem Gegenwärtigen.“ S. 338
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The Past Ecstasis and Understanding
The authentic past is Repetition (Wiederholen). Heidegger is making it very clear that
repetition is constitutive for Dasein in its resolute taking over of an entity which it already is.
“This ecstasis makes it possible for Dasein to be able to take over resolutely that entity which
it already is.” 15
The inauthentic past is forgetting (Vergessenheit). The problem is similar as the one
mentioned when the problems of inauthentic present and future were discussed. Where does
Dasein draw possibilities from? In the case of inauthentic modes of temporality it is always
form the sphere of other entities that do not have the same ontological status as Dasein.
Heidegger states clearly that to draw possibilities from objects of concern and to project in
accordance with this, is possible only when Dasein has already forgotten itself. “But when
one projects oneself inauthentically towards those possibilities which have been drawn from
the object of concern in making it present, this is possible only because Dasein has forgotten
itself in its ownmost thrown potentiality-for Being.”
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It is also important to note here that
this forgetting is not just a lack of memory but a specific positive ecstatic mode of havingbeen (Gewesenheit).
Conclusion
What could we say is the main idea of this part of Being and Time? What have we got to
know? I think that R. Gelven’s words are precise and concise. “All that is really important for
15
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 388
„Diese Ekstase ermöglicht es, dass Dasein entschlossen das Seiende, das es schon ist, übernehmen kann.“ S. 339
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“ HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967 , p. 388
Das uneigentliche Sichentwerfen auf die aus dem Besorgten, es gegenwärtigend, geschöpften Möglichkeiten ist
aber nur so möglich, daß sich das Dasein in seinem geworfenen Seinkönnen vergessen hat.“ S. 339
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the reader here is to remember that all three ecstases, in both their authentic and inauthentic
modes, play the ontological role of ultimately justifying understanding as projection.”17
Bibliography

DREYFUS, H. L. Being-in-the-World, A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time.
Cambridge : The MIT Press, 2001.

GELVEN, M. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, A Section by Section
Interpretation. New York: Harper Torchbook, 1970.

HEIDEGGER, M. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006.
HEIDEGGER, M. Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.
GELVEN, M. A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, A Section by Section Interpretation. New
York: Harper Torchbook, 1970, p. 193
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