AUTHORITY AND DISOBEDIENCE
2015-2016
Time: Wednesdays, 10am-12
Location: CGIS K401 (unless otherwise stated)
Course convenor: Laura Valentini (l.m.valentini@lse.ac.uk; Harvard email address coming soon)
Office hours: Wednesdays, 2.30-4.30pm, in CGIS K436 – please email me to book an appointment
Please note that the first introductory session (pre-lottery) will take place on Thursday, the 3rd of
September, in K262, from 10am to 11am. You are not expected to do any readings for this
session.
I. COURSE OVERVIEW: TOPICS, AIMS, ASSESSMENT
TOPICS
This course critically examines the ethical and philosophical questions surrounding the relationship
between individuals and the entities claiming authority over them, focusing specifically on states.
Methodologically, the course is situated within contemporary Anglo-American analytic political
philosophy. It is not a course in the history of political thought (although the themes covered in it
are central to that history). Substantively, the course addresses three clusters of issues/questions.
1. Political authority: It is often said that the state has the right to rule, and its citizens the
obligation to obey its commands, but what are the grounds of these rights and obligations?
Is the state’s right to rule compatible with the autonomy of the individual?
2. Disobedience: Under what conditions may subjects to political authority permissibly
disobey the authority’s commands? Is there a right to engage in civil disobedience? Is there
a duty to resist injustice? When, if ever, might violent revolution be justified?
3. Responses to disobedience (punishment & forgiveness): The state not only claims authority
over us, but also the right to punish us when we disobey its directives. Under what
conditions is punishment justified? And what role, if any, do mercy and forgiveness play in
responding to disobedience? Might the state justifiably punish crimes that are
“necessitated” by social injustice (e.g., crimes the poor commit to survive)?
AIMS
Substantively, the course aims to familiarise students with the contemporary literature on political
authority, obligation, disobedience and punishment. Methodologically, it seeks to enable students
to develop analytic and interpretive skills, allowing them to construct sophisticated arguments
1
pertaining to authority and disobedience, in relation to both the abstract philosophical literature
and real-world events.
ASSESSMENT
The course is assessed as follows:
A. In-class

General participation (attendance, verbal contributions, preparation etc.): 35% of final
grade
Students are expected to come to class having read the required reading material (typically 4
papers per week). These readings will form the basis for our in-class discussion. Each week, I will
very briefly introduce the class, and then open the floor for debate. During the last 15-20 minutes
of each week’s session, I will offer a short presentation, providing an overview of the topics to be
discussed during the subsequent week’s session. For each weekly topic, the syllabus also includes
a list of “further readings.” You are not expected to read any of these for the weekly class. The
readings are there for you to look at, as a starting point in preparation for your final research
paper.
B. Individual research paper

Prospectus: 15% of final grade
The course will culminate in a research paper, on a topic of your choice (relevant to the course!),
to be discussed and agreed with me by the date stated below. Approximately one month prior to
the submission date of your paper, you will have to submit a “research prospectus” outlining the
topic, importance, and argumentative strategy of your paper, as well as a bibliography. A
dedicated form will be circulated for this purpose.

Final class paper (5000 words): 50% of final grade
You are expected to write a substantial piece of research, on a topic to be agreed with me. The
requirements for the final paper are as follows.
Word limit: your final paper should not exceed the specified word limit (5000 words, all inclusive,
except the bibliography). There is no “lower limit,” but a paper that is too short is unlikely to be a
good one.
Deadlines are strict. Late submissions will result in deductions of marks (i.e., 1/3 of the grade for
each day past the deadline). If you do submit your paper or prospectus late, in order to avoid a
penalty, you must have evidence of extenuating circumstances.
2
Plagiarism: Plagiarism is a serious academic offense. Any instance of plagiarism will be reported to
the Harvard administration. This is the full statement of the Harvard Honor Code.
Harvard Honor Code: “Members of the Harvard College community commit themselves to
producing academic work of integrity – that is, work that adheres to the scholarly and
intellectual standards of accurate attribution of sources, appropriate collection and use of
data, and transparent acknowledgement of the contribution of others to their ideas,
discoveries, interpretations, and conclusions. Cheating on exams or problem sets,
plagiarizing or misrepresenting the ideas or language of someone else as one’s own,
falsifying data, or any other instance of academic dishonesty violates the standards of our
community, as well as the standards of the wider world of learning and affairs.”
Final paper requirement: Please ensure that you (i) word-process your essay, (ii) use font of size
12, (iii) indicate page numbers, (iv) include references using the same notational conventions
consistently throughout your paper (any convention is fine, so long as it’s consistently used), (v)
provide a bibliography containing all and only those works cited in the paper.
Deadlines:
 The prospectus will be due at the end of October/beginning of November. The deadline will
be set within the first two weeks of the semester.
 The final class paper is due on the 17th of December 2015, at 2pm. Please upload the
paper on the course page.
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II. COURSE OUTLINE
Part I: Authority

Authority and the anarchist challenge

Consent and instrumentalism

Fair play and associative duties

Natural duty and democracy
Part II: Disobedience

Civil disobedience

Boycotts and whistleblowing

Resistance

Revolution
Part III: Responses to Disobedience

The problem of punishment: deterrence vs retribution

The communicative and educative dimensions of punishment

Forgiveness and mercy

Punishment and injustice
4
PART I: AUTHORITY






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
GENERAL READINGS/OVERVIEWS
Tom Christiano, “Authority”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/authority/
Leslie Green, “Legal Obligation and Authority”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter
2012
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/legal-obligation/
Richard Dagger and Lefkowitz, David, “Political Obligation”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
(Fall
2014
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/political-obligation/
A. J. Simmons, “Authority,” in D. Estlund (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy
(Oxford University Press, 2012), available via Oxford Scholarship Online,
http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195376692.001.0001/oxf
ordhb-9780195376692-e-1
A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979).
John Horton, Political Obligation, 2nd edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
David Lefkowitz, “The Duty to Obey the Law,” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006): 571–598.
Tom Christiano, “Democracy”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/democracy/
5
1. AUTHORITY AND THE ANARCHIST CHALLENGE
The state is often thought to have the right to rule, and its citizens the obligation to obey its
commands by virtue of the fact that the commands emanate from an authoritative agent. But why
should anyone have an obligation to perform a particular action “just because” someone else has
directed them to do so? Wouldn’t such an obligation undermine the autonomy of the individual?
Required readings:
 M. Huemer, The Problem of Political Authority (London: Palgrave, 2013), Part I, Chapter 1,
up
to
section
1.5
included
(available
online
here):
http://spot.colorado.edu/%7Ehuemer/1.htm
 A. J. Simmons, “Philosophical Anarchism,” in his Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on
Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Also available here
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344425
 R. P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), section I.
 H. Frankfurt, “The Anarchism of Robert Paul Wolff,” Political Theory, 1 (1973): 405-414.
Further readings:
 R. B. Friedman, “On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy,” J. Raz (ed.), Authority
(New York: New York University Press, 1990).
 M.B.E. Smith, “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?,” Yale Law Journal 82 (5)
(1973), 950-976.
 D. Miller, Anarchism (London: Dent, 1984).
 R. Dagger, “Philosophical Anarchism and its Fallacies: A Review Essay,” Law and Philosophy
19 (2000): 391-406.
 J. Raz, ”The Obligation to Obey: Revision and Tradition,” 1 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub.
Policy 139 (1985) Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol1/iss1/10
 L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 24-36.
 R. Tuck, “Why is Authority such a Problem?,” Philosophy, Politics and Society (eds.) P. Laslett
et al. (Oxford, 1972).
 A. J. Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” Ethics, 109 (1999), pp. 739-771.
 R. Dworkin, “The Puzzle of Legitimacy,” in his Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap
Press, 1986).
 J. Wolff, “Anarchism and Skepticism”, in For and Against the State (eds) J. Sanders and J.
Narveson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996).
Sample questions:
 What is political authority?
 What types of anarchism are there?
 Why, if at all, should I stop at a red light if there’s nobody around/no risk?
 Is Wolff’s claim that authority and autonomy are necessarily incompatible convincing?
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2. CONSENT AND INSTRUMENTALISM
This week we consider two competing grounds of political authority. Some theorists believe that
political authority is based on consent. If authorities enjoy the consent of the governed, so the
argument goes, then the latter’s autonomy is preserved. Others believe that the obligation to
obey authorities rests on the positive effects of obedience (i.e., on obedience being conducive to
better compliance with the reasons that apply to one). What are the strengths and weaknesses of
these two perspectives?
Required readings:
 H. Pitkin, “Obligation and Consent: Part I,” American Political Science Review, 59 (1965),
reprinted in P. Laslett, W.G. Runciman, and Q. Skinner (eds), Philosophy, Politics, and
Society, 4th ser (Oxford: Blackwell).
 A. J. Simmons, “Tacit Consent and Political Obligation,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 5 (3)
(1976).
 J. Raz, “Authority and Justification,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 14 (1) (1985).
 S. Hershovitz, “The Role of Authority,” Philosophers’ Imprint, 11 (7) (2011).
Further readings:
 J. Locke, 1690, Second Treatise on Civil Government, C. B MacPherson (ed.) (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, 1990).
 D. Hume, 1748, “Of the Original Contract”, in Hume’s Ethical Writings, Alasdair MacIntyre
(ed.) (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1965).
 J. Horton, Political Obligation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), chaps. 2, 3 and 4.
 G. Klosko, Political Obligations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
 H. Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
 C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation: A Critical Analysis of Liberal Theory
(Chichester: John Wiley, 1979).
 R. Dworkin, “The Original Position” in N. Daniels, Reading Rawls, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).
Sample questions:
 Is it possible to consent to the state’s authority?
 Should we obey the law because, by doing so, we are more likely to comply with reasons
that independently apply to us?
 Does the most plausible version of consent theory collapse into a form of instrumentalism?
 What, if anything, is wrong with Raz’s service conception of authority?
7
3. MEMBERSHIP AND FAIR PLAY
This week we look at two other grounds for political authority: membership and fair play. Some
believe that, by virtue of being members of communities that satisfy certain minimal ethical
requirements, we are obligated to obey these communities’ rules (e.g., think about family
membership). For these theorists, our obligation to obey the law is grounded in state
membership. Other theorists, by contrast, believe that our obligation to obey the law is grounded
in a principle of “fair play.” Since sustaining society is a joint enterprise that benefits all citizens, so
the argument goes, each should do their part in it. Failing to obey the law, on this view, would be
equal to free riding on others’ obedience. Does either of these perspectives offer a plausible
account of political obligation?
Required readings:
 R. Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998), pp. 195-215.
 R. Dagger, “Membership, Fair Play, and Political Obligation,” Political Studies, 48 (2000),
104–17.
 G. Klosko, “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 16 (1987), pp. 241-259.
 A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979), ch. V.
Further readings:
 A. J. Simmons, “Fair Play and Political Obligation: Twenty Years Later,” in Simmons:
Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge: The University Press 2001), pp. 27-42.
 J. Horton, Political Obligation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), chap. 4.
 G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 1992).
 J. Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play,” in his Collected Papers (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001), pp. 117-129.
 R. Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 93−5.
 J. Horton, “In Defense of Associative Political Obligations: Part One,” Political Studies, 54
(2006): 427–43.
 J. Horton, “In Defense of Associative Political Obligations: Part Two”, Political Studies, 55
(2007): 1–19.
Sample questions:
 Is political obligation based on fair play?
 Does membership in a particular community automatically give us obligations to abide by
the rules governing that community?
 Might we be obligated to do our fair share in an enterprise we have not voluntarily joined?
8
4. NATURAL DUTY AND DEMOCRACY
Some argue that the obligation to obey the law is grounded in a “natural duty” everyone holds to
comply with and support just institutions. But what exactly count as “just institutions”? Must just
institutions be democratic? Or are the connections between justice and democracy merely
contingent? Furthermore, how can a natural-duty approach explain our obligation to obey the
laws of the particular societies in which we reside—as opposed to the laws of any institution that
happens to be just?
Required readings:
 J. Waldron, “Special Ties and Natural Duties,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 22 (1) (1993).
 T. Christiano, “The Authority of Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 12 (3) (2004).
 R. Arneson, “Democracy is Not Intrinsically Just,” in Dowding, Goodin and Pateman eds,
Justice and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), also available here
http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/democracyandjustice1.pdf
 L. Valentini, “Justice, Disagreement and Democracy”, British Journal of Political Science, 43
(1) (2013).
Further readings:
 A. Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and Democracy,” Ethics, 112 (2002): 689-719.
 G. Klosko, “Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 23 (3) (1994): 251-70.
 Kit Wellman, “Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation,” Ethics, 111 (4) (2001).
 A. Stilz, Liberal Loyalty (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).
 C. Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-Instrumentally Just Procedure,” Journal of Political
Philosophy, 11 (1) (2003), 111-121.
 R. Arneson, “Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy”, Journal
of Political Philosophy, 11 (1) (2003), 122-132.
 J-J. Rousseau, The Social Contract, 1762, especially Book 1, chapters 6-8, Book 2, Book 3,
chapters 10-18, Book 4.
 J. Cohen, “Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 15 (3) (1986).
 J. Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy” in A. Hamlin and P. Pettit (eds) The
Good Polity (Wiley-Blackwell, 1989) and in R. Goodin and P. Pettit (eds) Contemporary
Political Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007) and in D. Estlund (ed.)
Democracy (2002).
Sample questions:
 Do we have a duty to comply with just institutions? If so, which particular set of such
institutions?
 Does democracy have any authority?
 What role does the existence of disagreement play in the justification of democracy?
 Is democracy to be valued primarily because of the quality of its outcomes?
9
PART II: DISOBEDIENCE
GENERAL READINGS/OVERVIEWS








Kimberley Brownlee, “Civil Disobedience”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter
2013
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/civil-disobedience/
Cass Sunstein, Why Societies Need Dissent, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2003).
Peter Singer, Democracy and Disobedience (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).
Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction: The Case for Civil Disobedience (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
Vittorio Bufacchi, Violence: A Philosophical Anthology (London: Palgrave, 2009).
C. A. J. Coady Morality and Political Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008).
Howard Caygill, On Resistance: A Philosophy of Defiance (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
David Lyons, Confronting Injustice: Moral History and Political Theory (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2013), chapters 8 & 9.
10
5. CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
Figures like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. inspire admiration, and are taken as
paradigmatic examples of civilly disobedient agents. But what, exactly, is civil disobedience? And
what is its moral status? Can disobedience to the law, even if “civil,” ever be justified under
conditions where the law has legitimate authority? Should citizens be granted a right civilly to
disobey?
Required readings:
 Kimberley Brownlee (2007) “Civil Disobedience” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/
 D. Lyons, “Moral Judgment, Historical Reality, and Civil Disobedience,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs, 27 (1) (1998): 31-49.
 A. Sabl, “Looking Forward to Justice: Rawlsian Civil Disobedience and Its Non-Rawlsian
Lessons,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 9 (3) (2011): 307-30.
 J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), chapter 14.
Further readings:
 J. Rawls, “The Justification of Civil Disobedience” and “The Role of Civil Disobedience”, in A
Theory of Justice (1971 or 1999 ed.).
 R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977), chapter on civil
disobedience.
 A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1979), ch. VIII sec. I.
 K. Brownlee, “Features of a Paradigm Case of Civil Disobedience,” Res Publica, 10 (4) (2004):
337-351.
 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) chapters 14, 15.
 H.A. Bedau (ed.), Civil Disobedience in Focus, (London: Routledge, 1991), various pieces.
 V. Haksar, “Rawls and Gandhi on Civil Disobedience,” Inquiry, 19 (1976): 151-192.
 D. Lefkowitz, “On a Moral Right to Civil Disobedience,” Ethics, 117 (2007): 202-233.
Sample questions:
 What is civil disobedience?
 Under what conditions, if any, is it justifiable to engage in civil disobedience?
 What role, if any, does civil disobedience play within a reasonably just society?
 Does civil disobedience require “special” justification?
11
6. BOYCOTTS, WHISTLEBLOWING
Boycotts and whistleblowing are particular techniques employed to convey politically motivated
disobedience and resistance. Under what conditions, if any, are they justified? And how do they
relate to the familiar category of civil disobedience? We shall address these questions by applying
philosophical reflection to real-world instances of boycotting and whistleblowing (e.g., Edward
Snowden’s case and academic boycotts of Israeli institutions).
Required readings:
 M. Davis, “Some Paradoxes of Whistleblowing,” Business and Professional Ethics Journal, 15
(1) (1996), 3-19.
 W. Scheuerman, “Whistleblowing as Civil Disobedience: The Case of Edward Snowden,”
Philosophy & Social Criticism, 2014.
 C. Mills, “Should We Boycott Boycotts?,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 27 (3) (1996), 136-48.
 D. Rodin and M. Yudkin, “Academic Boycotts,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 19 (4) (2011),
465-85.
Further readings:
 Avner De-Shalit, “The Ethics of Academic Boycott,” manuscript (available upon request, but
please do not circulate further).
 Rebecca Gould, “To Boycott or Not? A Moral Conundrum,” Peace Review: A Journal of
Social Justice, 25 (4) (2013), 584-89.
 Terrence McConnell, “Whistle-blowing” in the Blackwell Companion to Applied Ethics, R. G
Frey and C. H. Wellman eds., (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2003).
 Raffi Khatchadourian, “No Secrets: Julian Assange’s Mission for Total Transparency” The
New
Yorker,
7
June
2010.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/06/07/100607fa_fact_khatchadourian
 Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1984).
 Candice Delmas, “The Ethics of Government Whistleblowing,” Social Theory and Practice
41, 1 (2015): 77-105.
 Michael Davis, “Whistleblowing” in The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003).
 John
Kleinig, “Loyalty,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2007).
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/loyalty
 Monroe Friedman, “Ethical Dilemmas associated with Consumer Boycotts,” Journal of Social
Philosophy, 32 (2) (2001).
Sample questions:
 What is whistleblowing?
 Is whistleblowing ever permissible, or even obligatory?
 When, if ever, are boycotts morally admissible forms of political behaviour?
 Are “academic boycotts” special?
12
7. RESISTANCE
The world is in many ways unjust, and this due to the particular institutional structures that
currently characterize it. What are individuals permitted, or indeed obligated, to do in response to
this injustice? Is there a duty to resist injustice and oppression? If there is, what are appropriate
means of discharging it? And who is bound by this duty and why?
Required readings:
 Simon Caney (forthcoming 2015) “Global Injustice and the Right to Resist,” Social
Philosophy and Policy.
 Bernard Boxill, “The Responsibility of the Oppressed to Resist their own Oppression,”
Journal of Social Philosophy, 41 (1) (2010), 1-12.
 Candice Delmas, “Political Resistance: A Matter of Fairness,” Law and Philosophy, 33 (4)
(2013), 1-24.
 Daniel Silvermint, “Resistance and Well‐being,” Journal of Political Philosophy, 21 (4) (2013),
405-425.
Further readings:
 C.A.J. Coady, “The Idea of Violence,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 3 (1) (1986), 3-19.
 Elizabeth Frazer and Kimberly Hutchings, “On Politics and Violence: Arendt contra Fanon,”
Contemporary Political Theory, 7 (1) (2008), 90-108.
 Bernard R. Boxill, “Self-Respect and Protest,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 6 (1) (1976), 5869.
 Carol Hay, “The Obligation to Resist Oppression,” Journal of Social Philosophy, 42 (1) (2011),
21-45.
 Michael Walzer, “The Obligation to Disobey,” Ethics, 77 (3) (1967), 163-175.
 Candice Delmas, “On Michael Walzer’s ‘The Obligation to Disobey’,” Ethics, 125 (4) (2015),
1145-1147.
Sample questions:
 Is there a duty to resist injustice? If there is, what are its justifying grounds?
 What are the oppressed permitted/obligated to do in response to their plight, and why?
 How does the (putative) obligation to resist relate to theories of political authority?
13
8. REVOLUTION
The most extreme form of resistance to injustice is full-blown revolution, aimed at replacing an
existing political order with a different one. The so-called “Arab Spring” offers a recent example of
this phenomenon. Revolution is often a traumatic and violent process. Under what conditions, if
any, is it justified?
Required readings:
 Katrin Flikschuh, “Reason, Right, and Revolution: Kant and Locke,” Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 36 (4) (2008), 375-404.
 Matthew Noah Smith, “Rethinking Sovereignty, Rethinking Revolution,” Philosophy & Public
Affairs, 36 (4) (2008), 405-440.
 Adil Ahmad Haque, “The Revolution and Criminal Law,” Criminal Law and Philosophy 7
(2013), 231–53.
 Allen Buchanan, “The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the Ethics of
Intervention,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 41 (4) (2013), 291-323.
Further readings:
 Thomas Hill, “A Kantian Perspective on Political Violence,” The Journal of Ethics, 1 (2)
(1997), 105-140.
 Christine Korsgaard, “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution,”
in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: Essays for John Rawls, ed. Andrews Reath et al.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 297–328.
 Peter Nicholson, “Kant on the Duty Never to Resist the Sovereign,” Ethics, 86 (3) (1976),
214-230.
 Lea Ypi, “On Revolution in Kant and Marx,” Political Theory, 42 (3) (2014), 262-287.
 Allen Buchanan, “Revolutionary Motivation and Rationality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 9
(1) (1979), 59-82.
 Ned Dobos, “A State to Call Their Own: Insurrection, Intervention, and the Communal
Integrity Thesis,” Journal of Applied Philosophy, 27 (1) (2010), 26-38.
 Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009),
chapter 11, on revolution.
Sample questions:
 Can there be a right to revolution (both a moral and a legal right)?
 What, if anything, is special about the political act of revolution?
 What is the relationship between revolution and humanitarian intervention?
 What is the relationship between sovereign power and a legal right to revolution?
 How do criminal injustices impact on the legitimacy of the state, and on the justifiability of
revolutionary action?
14
PART III: RESPONSES TO DISOBEDIENCE
GENERAL READINGS/OVERVIEWS









H. Bedau, and Kelly, Erin, “Punishment”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2010
Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/punishment/
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1968).
T. Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications, rev. ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1976).
K. Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1989).
N. Walker, Why Punish? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
P. Hughes, “Forgiveness”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2015 Edition),
Edward
N.
Zalta (ed.),
URL
=
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/forgiveness/
J. Bluestein, Forgiveness and Remembrance: Remembering Wrongdoing in Personal and
Public Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
C. Griswold, Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007).
M. Holmgren, Forgiveness and Retribution: Responding to Wrongdoing (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012).
15
9. PUNISHMENT: DETERRENCE VS RETRIBUTION
The state not only issues commands, but also claims the right to punish us when its commands are
violated. But what can possibly justify the institution of punishment? Is punishment justified
primarily as a means of deterrence, to prevent others from offending in the future? Or is
punishment the type of treatment that those who violate the law “deserve”?
Required readings:
 J. Rawls, “Two Concepts of Rules,” Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), 3–32.
 H. Morris, “Persons and Punishment,” Monist, 52 (1968), 475‐501.
 D. Farrell, “The Justification of General Deterrence,” Philosophical Review, 94 (3) (1985).
 R. Dagger, “Playing Fair with Punishment,” Ethics, 103 (1993), 473–88.
Further readings:
 Joel Feinberg, “The Classic Debate” in Philosophy of Law Fifth Edition. Feinberg and Gross
(eds.), (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing, 1995).
 Erin Kelly, “Criminal justice without retribution”, Journal of Philosophy, 2009.
 H.L.A. Hart, “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment,” in his Punishment and
Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
 A. John Simmons, “Locke and the Right to Punish,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 20 (4)
(1991).
 Corey Brettschneider, “The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy,”
Political Theory, 35 (2) (2007).
 Burgh, R.W., 1982, “Do the Guilty Deserve Punishment?,” Journal of Philosophy, 79: 193–
210.
 M. Phillips, “The justification of punishment and the justification of political authority,” Law
and Philosophy, 5 (3) (1986).
 C. Bennett, “Expressive Punishment and Political Authority,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal
Law, 2010.
 A. Ellis, “A Deterrence Theory of Punishment,” Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (2003): 337–51.
 D. Husak, “Why Punish the Deserving?,” Noûs, 26 (1992), 447–64.
 W. Sadurski, “Distributive Justice and the Theory of Punishment,” Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies, 5 (1985): 47–59.
 W. Quinn, “The Right to Threaten and the Right to Punish”, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 14
(1985), 327–73.
Sample questions:
 What justifies punishment?
 Are retributivist or consequentialist justifications more persuasive?
 Is there a right to be punished?
 How do different accounts of political authority relate to different justifications of
punishment?
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10. THE COMMUNICATIVE AND EDUCATIVE DIMENSIONS OF PUNISHMENT
Some argue that a key function of punishment, and one that contributes to its justifiability, is
expressive. Punishment is unique in its ability to convey a particular kind of reproach towards the
law-breaker’s actions. Others, relatedly, hold that punishment may be justified as a form of moral
education. Are these approaches to the justification of punishment successful?
Required readings:
 J. Feinberg, “The Expressive Function of Punishment,” in his Doing and Deserving
(Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), 95–118; also in The Monist, 49 (1965).
 N. Hanna, “Say What? A Critique of Expressive Retributivism,” Law and Philosophy, 27
(2008), 123–150.
 J. Hampton, “The Moral Education Theory of Punishment,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13
(1984): 208–38.
 R. Shafer-Landau, “Can Punishment Morally Educate?,” Law and Philosophy, 10 (1991):
189–219.
Further readings:
 A.R. Duff, Punishment, Communication, and Community (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001).
 Herbert Morris, “A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment,” American Philosophical Quarterly 18
(1981): 263-71.
 I. Primoratz, “Punishment as Language,” Philosophy, 64 (1989), 187–205.
 von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), ch. 2.
 C. Bennett, The Apology Ritual: A Philosophical Theory of Punishment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
 M. M. Falls, “Retribution, Reciprocity, and Respect for Persons,” Law and Philosophy, 6
(1987), 25–51.
 J. Kleinig, “Punishment and Moral Seriousness,” Israel Law Review 25 (1991), 401–21.
Sample questions:
 Does punishment provide a uniquely fitting form of criticism for certain acts?
 What is the moral education theory of punishment? Is it superior to its rivals?
 Can punishment be said to benefit offenders in a way akin to how schooling benefits
children?
17
11. MERCY AND FORGIVENESS
As we have seen, a familiar, but still morally complex, response to wrongdoing is punishment. But
is punishment always morally appropriate? Might in some conditions pardon and forgiveness be
morally required instead? This week, we explore ethical questions involved in these more
“generous” responses to wrongdoing and disobedience.
Required readings:
 Lucy Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean: The Heart of Forgiveness,” Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 36 (1) (2008), 33–68.
 Brandon Warmke, “Two Arguments Against the Punishment-Forbearance Account of
Forgiveness,” Philosophical Studies, 165 (3) (2013): 915–920.
 John Tasioulas, “Mercy,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103 (2) (2003): 101-132.
 Dan Merkel, “Against Mercy,” Minnesota Law Review, 88 (2004), 1421-80.
Further readings:
 Martha C. Nussbaum, “Equity and Mercy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 22 (2) (1993), 83125.
 John Tasioulas, “Mercy,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103 (2) (2003): 101-132.
 Murphy, J. G., & Hampton, J., Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988).
 J. Tasioulas, “Punishment and Repentance”, Philosophy, 81 (2006): 279–322.
 E. Cole, “Apology, Forgiveness, and Moral Repair,” Ethics and International Affairs, 22 (4)
(2008), 421–428.
 P. French et al., “Forgiveness and Resentment,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7 (1982):
503–516.
 J. Kekes, “Blame versus Forgiveness,” The Monist, 92 (4) (2009), 488–507.
 L. Zaibert, “On Forgiveness and the Deliberate Refusal to Punish: Reiterating the
Differences,” Journal of Moral Philosophy, 9 (2012): 103–113.
 J. Murphy, “Mercy and Legal Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy, 4 (1) (1986): 1–14.
 G. W. Rainbolt, “Mercy: An Independent, Imperfect Virtue,” American Philosophical
Quarterly, 27 (2) (1990), 169-173.
Sample questions:
 What is forgiveness, and when might it be morally appropriate?
 What is mercy?
 Is mercy unjust?
18
12. PUNISHMENT AND INJUSTICE
In many societies today, poverty is a widespread phenomenon, and one that breeds crime and
law-breaking: think, for instance, of a homeless person trespassing on someone’s property, or an
indigent individual stealing food. Does the fact that disobedience is partly motivated by misery
make a difference to the justification of punishment? And what if crimes are being committed by
the victims of injustice?
Required readings:
 Tommie Shelby, “Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 35 (2)
(2007), 126-160.
 Barbara Hudson, “Punishing the Poor: Dilemmas of Justice and Difference,” in From Social
Justice to Criminal Justice, in Hefferman and Kleinig eds (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000).
 Andrew von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), ch. 5
 John B. Mitchell, “Crimes of Misery and Theories of Punishment,” New Criminal Law
Review, 15 (4) (2012).
Further readings:
 Peter Chau, “Temptations, Social Deprivation and Punishment,” Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies, 30 (4) (2010), 775-85.
 Dorothy E. Roberts, “Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality,
and the Right of Privacy,” Harvard Law Review, 104 (7) (1991), 1419-1482.
 Various essays in From Social Justice to Criminal Justice, Hefferman and Kleinig eds, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000).
Sample questions:
 Does poverty justify disobedience in general?
 Should disobedient victims of injustice be punished for their conduct?
 May the victims of oppression and injustice be justifiably criticized for their “deviant”
behaviour?
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