To mix or not to mix, is that the question

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Social mix and passive revolution
A neo-Gramscian analysis of the resilient marginality of the social mix
rhetoric in Flanders, Belgium
Maarten Loopmans, Pascal De Decker and Chris Kesteloot
Working paper (please do not quote without permission of the authors). A revised
version has been published as:
Loopmans, Maarten P. J. , de Decker, Pascal and Kesteloot, Chris(2010) 'Social Mix and Passive
Revolution. A Neo-Gramscian Analysis of the Social Mix Rhetoric in Flanders, Belgium', Housing
Studies, 25: 2, 181 —200
1
1. Intro
Advocacy of 'social mix' (also referred to as 'social diversity' or 'social balance') has a
long history going back to the mid nineteenth-century (Arthurson, 2008; Sarkisian
and Warwick, 1978). Sarkissian (1976) demonstrated how the idea that at a certain
spatial scale the composition of the population should reflect the diversity of wider
society, was an ideal in planning throughout the 20th century (see also Arthurson,
2008).
Recently renewed interest in ‘social mixing’ in Europe has re-invigorated
scientific debate on is effects (Ostendorf, Musterd & De Vos, 2001; Kleinhans, 2004;
Ruming, Mee & McGuirk, 2004; Musterd & Andersson, 2005; Galster, 2007).
Generally, these studies echo earlier analyses (e.g. Orlans, 1952; Kuper, 1953;
Gans, 1961) in being critical of social mixing policies. Their sophisticated models
show moderately positive results at best, raising the question whether such meager
results legitimize widespread policy attention.
Puzzled by the unchallenged popularity of social mix amongst policy makers,
observators have started ‘unpacking’ the concept and its variegated uses. Social mix
covers numerous overlapping population indicators, including class, income,
employment status, age, ethnicity and lifestyle. The concept is applied to various
spatial scales: -municipality, neighborhood, housing project or apartment building.
Social mix can reflect a variety of objectives –from fighting social exclusion to
stabilizing a municipal tax base- and can be embraced by those espousing
ideologies ranging from egalitarian to neo-liberal (Cole and Goodchild, 2001).
We start our analysis with the finding that in Flanders social mix, while being on
the agenda since the 1970’s, has maintained a marginal position in policy making.
Deploying a neo-Gramscian approach to the social mix rhetoric, we reveal how in a
2
context of entrenched anti-urbanism, the inherent flexibility of the social mix idea
was instrumental to pacify and co-opt counter-hegemonic forces challenging
Flemish urbanization policies status quo. However, such co-optation did not result
in the translation of the social mix ideal into policy practice.
In the following section, we present an overview of the literature on social mix. We
conclude that previous analyses have neglected the political role of the concept.
Hence, in a second section, we turn to Gramscian theory on the political role of
discourse and introduce the concepts of hegemony and passive revolution. These
concepts are deployed in the sections thereafter to understand how social mix was
instrumental in deflecting challenges to the hegemonic anti-urban model. In a final
section, we analyze how social mix affects the power of the traditional counterhegemonic model of social rental housing in urban settings.
2. The discourse of social mix in policy formulation
Various suggestions have been made to explain why and how social mix has
entered mainstream policy discourse. Sarkissian (1976) argued how the use of
social mix is related to crises in the management and control of inner cities.
Deploying
poststructuralist
discourse
analysis,
Goodchild
and
Cole
(2001)
emphasize how the social mix discourse is multilayered and cannot be understood
as resulting from a sole political ideology developed in an autonomous power centre;
rather, social mix is interpreted and used differently in discourses at various levels
of social reality. Shying away from an analysis of power and the state, they do not
explain how social mix forms part of a political ideology or of central state
discourses. Uitermark (2003) does address the question as to why and how social
mix becomes an element of central state policies. Zeroing in on the Netherlands, he
argues that the social mix discourse should be analyzed in relation to the dynamics
of the State’s regulatory framework –the set of interrelated institutions working
together to regulate social life-.
3
Uitermark emphasizes how inter-institutional relations are dynamic, as
actors and social forces actively try to (re)organize them. It follows that two
interrelated questions need to be answered: ‘First, how, when and why do actors
identify certain problems and develop a reaction to these problems (see van Dijk,
1997)? And, secondly, how does their position within a dynamic regulatory
framework allow them to make their discourse dominant and to mobilize the state
apparatus?’ (Uitermark, 2003, p. 536). The (re-)appearance of social mix in the
context of Dutch Urban
Restructuring Policies is resulting
from growing
interdependencies between central state actors and actors involved in neighborhood
social management (in particular the powerful Dutch housing corporations), and
the difficulties these actors face to carry out key tasks. Uitermark emphasizes the
importance of bureaucratic networks between different state scales to explain how
local social mix can become a goal in central state policy, but, working from the
bureaucratized context of the Netherlands, neglects the purely political role of ideas.
His perspective is too narrow to explain the salience of social mix in current
political discourse. Fairclough (1989) explains how the real importance of policy
statements goes beyond the reflection of social practices; rather, Fairclough
emphasizes their concrete political relevance as politicians try to appropriate
notions of common sense as a means of justification and persuasion. “Social
phenomena are linguistic, in the sense that language activity. . . is not merely a
reflection or expression of social processes and practices, it is a part of those
processes and practices. For example, disputes about the meaning of political
expressions are a constant and familiar aspect of politics… such disputes are
sometimes seen as merely preliminaries to or outgrowths from the real practices and
processes of politics. . . they are not: they are politics.” (Fairclough, 1989, p. 23)
4
Drawing upon neo-Gramscian theory, we develop a framework to understand the
use of social mix as a political project. Gramsci (2001) is an interesting source of
inspiration for this question as he combines institutional and economic analysis
with less tangible questions of ideology and discourse (Loopmans, 2008). We claim
that from this perspective social mix in Flanders can be understood as a repeatedly
used instrument for establishing what Gramsci calls a passive revolution.
3. Gramsci, hegemony and discourse
One of the most influential ideas in Gramsci’s political theory is hegemony. Gramsci
introduced the concept of ‘hegemony’ to capture the “ideological predominance of
bourgeois values and norms over the subordinate classes” (Carnoy, 1984). Hegemony
allows the state to rule by consent rather than coercion, and connects to Gramsci’s
understanding of the state as deeply intertwined with civil society (the integral
state).
In a diverse society with a variety of different and opposing interests,
hegemony is always potentially unstable. There is always the risk that counterhegemonic discourses are produced by social groups whose interests are not
furthered by the operations of the state. These discourses threaten to undermine
widespread popular consent. To sustain hegemony, the state engages in a
hegemonic project, a permanent “consciously planned struggle for hegemony” (Gill,
2003, p. 58; Jessop, 1997, p. 62) involving the active search for compromises,
shared interests, common goals, institutional links with various social forces in civil
society and the development of a common, congruent discourse to win the public’s
hearts and minds. Ives (2004) explains how the transformation, reinterpretation
and reordering of words and concepts is an important political activity. For Ives “the
goal is to achieve a common language, not a singular dominant interpretation of
everything that happens in the world and all human activity. Various and opposing
perspectives can be expressed in such a language”.
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Using military terminology, Gramsci (2001) describes such an active and
conscious development of alliances around a common worldview a ‘war of position’
(Simon, 1991, p. 25) and emphasizes how it is more important than and must
precede a ‘war of manoeuvre’ to take over state power. Like in actual warfare, the
trench war ultimately determines success or failure of the war of manoeuvre.
Gramsci introduces ‘passive revolution’ to refer to the situation where such a
war of position results in ‘a revolution without revolution’: “changes occur and often
they are reactions to problems and tensions of previous political and economic
arrangements, but they rarely resolve such problems and are not really democratic in
the true sense of the term –they do not come from the people. Rather leaders propose
policies that the people do not reject”(Ives, 2004, p. 104).
A passive revolution is realised by creatively re-shaping state discourses to
incorporate the claims of adversaries without changing the core of the hegemonic
project. Hence, the potential development of counter-hegemonic discourses is
curbed, without, however, preserving the active support of civil society.
In the following section, we contend that social mix (in Flanders) has been
instrumental for a passive revolution as it has been deployed to undermine the
development
inherent
of
potentially
flexibility
of
the
destabilizing
concept
counter-hegemonic
has
enabled
discourses.
repeated
tackling
The
of
counterhegemonic attacks, without altering the dominant path of urbanization
policies: the heavy state-funding of suburbanization and homeownership. The
above theoretical discussion offers us a framework for this analysis. Central
elements to this analysis are the discursive actions of organisations challenging the
hegemonic state project, and the re-formulation of their claims by state actors. The
development of policy ideas and concepts is analyzed in relation to the interactions
between state actors and civil society, and to the problem of consent in civil society.
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In the following sections, we analyze how the usage of ‘social mix’ by state actors in
Flanders was instrumental for the establishment of passive revolution. First, we
describe the development of the hegemonic postwar project on urbanization in
Flanders. We will uncover the social forces behind it, describe its core concepts and
explain the relative powerlessness of the main historical counter-hegemonic model.
Then we discuss three moments since 1970 when this hegemonic project is
challenged, and analyze how social mix has been deployed to disempower
challengers. First, a coalition arose between local government actors and urban
social movements contesting the destruction of the housing function in the city
centre by ‘citification’ and suburbanization. Social mix was a solution to ameliorate
housing conditions in the inner city, and social housing is to guarantee social mix
at the neighborhood level. Second, intercultural conflicts arise in inner city
neighborhoods affected by disinvestment as newly arriving immigrant groups settle
primarily in these areas. Social mix becomes ethnic mix and social housing is to
decrease ethnic concentrations in private rental neighborhoods. Simultaneously,
urban local governments are complaining about suburbanization’s social selectivity
and decreasing central city tax bases. The concept of social mix renders the
stimulation of gentrification –or the suburbanization of the centre- acceptable to the
wider urban population.
In a final section we present the effect of the various uses of social mix on the
main historical counter-hegemonic model of urbanization, inner city social rental
housing. Whereas first, it appears to regain strength through the introduction of
social mix, in the third phase social rental housing is progressively marginalized.
4. Institutionalized anti-urbanism as a background of the social mix
debate
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Flemish urbanization is characterized by sprawl. The origins of this can be traced
back to the geography of the 19th century Belgian industrial revolution and its
political consequences (Saey e.a., 1998; De Decker et al, 2005). The industrial
revolution gave rise to a Walloon industrial axis where the concentration of workers
in cities incited secularization and socialism, threatening catholic cultural and
political domination.
Industrialization and urbanization arrived much later in Flanders. Meanwhile, the
papal encyclical letter Rerum Novarum (1891) paved the way for the Church in
Flanders to prevent socialism gaining ground by developing catholic labor
organizations (Joye & Lewin, 1967; Gerard, 1998). This created Belgium’s regional
pillarization into a Flanders-based catholic and a Wallonia-based socialist pillar
(Terhorst & Van den Ven, 1997). To defend its dominance in industrializing
Flanders, the Catholic pillar fiercely resists the concentration of workers in large
cities. Catholics consistently proposed, first, interventions to increase mobility so as
to stimulate commuting instead of migration to the city and second, the stimulation
of homeownership of single family houses on rural land. Whereas these catholic
measures promoted the centrality of family values and community cohesion, the
socialist movement intended to stimulate class cohesion. Hence, socialists
promoted the concentration of workers in (urban) working class neighborhoods,
preferably in mass public housing to prevent workers to get a taste of capitalist
property-ownership.
Whereas socialists were numerous in the Walloon industrial axis, catholic
hegemony retained its strongholds in more populous Flanders and Wallonia’s rural
south. Resultantly, the catholic pillar remained hegemonic in unitary Belgium and
could successfully implement its containment strategy vis-à-vis the socialist
movement through housing and planning policies (Mort Subite, 1990; Marissal et
al., 2007). In 1869, the Catholics introduced cheap railway tickets, stimulating
8
commuting and suburbanization along the dense railway network (Van der Haegen,
1984). In 1889 the catholic party wrote a housing law encouraging homeownership
for workers. In 1918 the socialist party entered government for the first time and
installed the National Society for Cheap Housing supporting housing cooperatives
(Goossens, 1983). However, its effect was limited and in 1922, the Catholic party
introduced a law to subsidize private homeownership. In 1948, the Catholic law ‘De
Taeye’ installed a premium for the construction of ‘moderate’ houses by private
owners. In 1949, the Socialist Brunfaut reacted with a law stimulating large scale
social housing construction, but he cannot compete with the De Taeye premium. In
20 years time, more than 400 000 De Taeye premiums were conceded; More than
one-third of all post war new housing construction is co-financed this way (Theunis,
2006). Furthermore, Belgian town planning legislation was purposively generous
designating land for housing to guarantee housing affordability while post-war
Keynesian infrastructure provision supported the development of remote areas.
Together, planning legislation, Keynesian development and De Taeye resulted in
unprecedented sprawl. State support for homeownership was underpinned by a
massive Catholic ideological campaign to install a ‘rural Flemish housing culture’
around the rural single family house ideal (Floré, 2006).
Meanwhile, urban mass social housing remained the main ideological
alternative, but never achieved cultural hegemony and could not rival with private
homeownership in terms of housing production.
5. New challengers: (urban) social movements of the 1960s-1970s
In the late 1960s, suburbanisation was challenged by new contenders. First,
urban social movements arose campaigning against the combination of sprawl and
demolition of urban heritage sites and residential neighbourhoods. These struggles
9
united heritage conservationists with progressive intellectuals and feminist activists
reclaiming public space from traffic and local shopkeeper organisations loosing
clients as inner city housing is under pressure (De Smit, 2003; Verschueren, 2003,
p. 165; Buyck, 1988). Moreover environmentalism awoke, criticizing urban sprawl
for the loss of open space and the stimulation of car traffic.
These critics found support amongst young urban planners (e.g. Vanhavre; 1967;
Anselin, 1967). In Antwerp, a local non-governmental planning organ ‘Schelde-Dijle
vzw’ summarized their arguments in a report on the inner city (Schelde-Dijle vzw,
1971). When in 1971 one of its members (Bob Cools) was appointed alderman for
spatial planning, these ideas also entered official planning discourse (Loopmans,
2008; see Stad Antwerpen, 1973). The Schelde-Dijle study identifies ‘the
degradation of the living environment’ as the main problem for the city, and points
to suburbanization and ensuing disinvestment in urban housing, as well as the
pressure from tertiary sector investment and a growing demand for traffic and
parking space as its causes. There is little or no mention of the social selectivity of
suburbanization.
When inner city problems takes root in municipal planning circles, the tone
of the debate alters. The first Flemish secretary of state for spatial planning, the
Christian democrat Luc Dhoore (1973-1977), writes three policy notes on urban
renewal but never implemented them. Knops (1979), describes how Dhoore
transforms the original concerns over suburbanisation and urban decay into a
problem of physical deterioration of the built environment coinciding with a
marginalising inner city population. The call to renew the built environment is
translated in a need to renew the population, and the concept of social mix is
introduced. To improve inner urban social mix, Dhoore suggests attracting higher
income groups (Van den Broeck & Baelus, 1992).
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In 1981, Ghent planners write a note called ‘Housing setting the tune’ (Stad Gent,
1981). It introduces ‘the immigrant question’ and problematizes a high share of
foreigners in some neighbourhoods for possibly stimulating social conflict (Stad
Gent, 1981, p. 14). The note suggests improving neighbourhood diversity. “One can
state that it is necessary to have an age structure similar to the city average to have a
lively neighbourhood. The same counts for the distribution of social classes: the city
should combat class segregation. And in order to stop the decrease of the household
size, more households with children should move to the city” (p. 38). Foreigners
“should be spread to adjacent neighbourhoods” (p 38). “In neighbourhoods were the
share of foreigners is too high (more than 15%), the concentration should be lowered.
The situation should be stabilised in wards with a share between 11% and 15%. The
wards with a share between 6% and 10% can function as reception areas for foreign
people. In areas with shares lower than 5% a further growth is not necessary” (p 5051).
6. Social mix and social urban renewal
In 1980, a campaign for social urban renewal starts initiated by the European
Council to stimulate awareness. A small ‘steering group’ of engaged academics and
bureaucrats developed the social renewal campaign in Flanders and delivered the
first elaborate working papers on the future of Flemish cities. The interests of urban
residents, depicted as the prime victims of suburbanization, are their prime
concern: “[t]he population and the policy makers have to be convinced, first, that it is
necessary to stop suburbanisation and to give priority to the liveability of existing
cores, and second, that it is necessary to put the problems and interests of the
inhabitants first” (Van den Broeck & Baelus, 1992, p. 55).
11
In the steering group’s reports, neighbourhood segregation is a major
problem: “The population of unattractive neighbourhoods is increasingly onesided:
elderly, singles, and marginal households who cannot (yet) afford a suburban house.”
(Secretariaat Stadsvernieuwingscampagne, 1982, p. 5).).
Segregation is explained by economic developments (the city is a site for
speculation) and socio-cultural tendencies, reinforced by politics: “In looking back at
the urbanisation process, one can see that who could afford it, moved to the fringes of
the city. (…) Government, planners, developers followed this development and
reinforced it through policies. We built and planned urban decay” (Secretariaat
Stadsvernieuwingscampagne, 1982, p.7 ).
Concentrating on segregation, proposed policy measures reflect some
important shifts in discourse. First, policy formulation involves a transformation of
scale: Instead of tackling the regional problem of suburbanization head-on, the
policy scales the problem down to a problem of deficient local ‘inner city
communities’. The Steering group emphasizes the need for “the creation of balanced
communities, based on social justice’ (Secretariaat Stadsvernieuwingscampagne,
1981, p 9-10).
Balanced communities are not just a model for a more solidary society: the
aim is first, like with Dhoore, to counter inner city decay. Hence the discourse also
transforms the culprit. Instead of blaming suburbanization, the remaining inner
city population is related to urban decay: “The financially well off can afford a villa.
Workers and middle classes go to social housing located at the city fringes. The
remaining urban population consist, consequently, of marginal and poor people:
elderly, singles, young families with small children and particularly migrants. (…)
With limited finances and, for some, no intention to stay in the city, these don’t
renovate their dwelling. Deterioration of the dwelling and the surroundings follow.
12
Leading, finally, to the decay of the city?” (Secretariaat Stadsvernieuwingscampagne,
1981, p 19).
The Steering group links urban liveability with population diversity and hence
social mix becomes a prime goal of the social renewal campaign. “If the balance
cannot be restored, this can be fatal for the survival of the city” (p 19).
The campaign awakens government interest in urban renewal and in 1982, the new
Christian democrat minister Paul Akkermans, installs a regional urban renewal
policy. For Akkermans, the housing circumstances and participation of the most
vulnerable groups in the city are key concerns and social mixing is one of the
instruments to achieve better living conditions. The “attraction of newcomers must
focus on a demographic rejuvenation and revival of neighbourhoods, for the benefit of
those who already live in the neighbourhood” (Akkermans, 1983, p57). “The renewal
process must result in: better dwellings, more pleasant surroundings, and… a
socially mixed population. A mix of diverse social classes is favourable above
homogeneous populations” (Akkermans, 1983, p 75).
As social mix is to be achieved for the betterment of the sitting population,
displacement should be avoided. “We need to attract new inhabitants to poor
neighbourhoods. [...] Newcomers can lead to a more diverse population, which will
contribute to better and more diverse services in the neighbourhood. One thing should
be prevented: that newcomers displace the sitting tenants” (Akkermans, 1983, p 7475). To prevent displacement social housing is to be provided for those who can’t
afford to buy their own residence.
In the wake of the Flemish policy, the cities develop new policy visions. Of
particular importance is the Antwerp Global Structure Plan. The Global Structure
Plan is developed in the course of the 1980s, and shifts the discourse from a focus
on physical urban renewal to wider concerns of social and economic improvement.
In the course of preparation, De Brabander et al. (1992) are entrusted a study on
13
the fiscal consequences of suburbanization which will become highly influential in
the decade to come. This study reveals how in Antwerp and Ghent selective
suburbanisation of more well-to-do residents undermines the inner city’s tax base.
The study makes the municipality itself, instead of its lower income residents, a
victim of Flemish anti-urbanism. It will become an important argument to restore
social mix through gentrification.
In practice, Akkermans’ policy did little to alter Flemish anti-urbanism.
Compared to the ongoing de Taeye-subsidies, the social renewal campaign struggles
with tight budgets. Consequently, the objective of improving the urban living
environment and social mix is hardly met. Rather to the contrary: the policy further
stimulated planner’s blight by quickly designating areas for redevelopment while
turning to action belatedly with limited budgets (De Decker, 1987). When in the
end, housing got constructed, social mix wasn’t reached: in the context of
continued suburbanization, the renewal campaign did not succeed in stimulating
homeowners to renovate and nearly all renovation was done by social housing
companies for sitting lower income residents.
By emphasizing social mix, Akkermans’ policy, and the preceding Social
Urban Renewal Campaign, did change the discourse on the urban question
considerably. It altered the scale at which the problem was described (from a
regional problem of suburbanization to a local or neighborhood problem of
degeneration), and changed the culprit: by emphasizing the need of a social mix,
the problem was no longer suburbanization, but the concentration of elderly and
low income groups (and in some instance, also ethnic minorities) who were not able
to invest in the amelioration of their living conditions.
Finally the larger cities succeed in changing the victim as well: instead of lower
income groups, municipal government portrays itself as the main victim of the loss
of social mix on its territory by loosing tax revenue. While not yet sanctioned
14
through the social renewal policy, this would become a central argument in later
phases of urban policy formulation.
7. Addressing the immigrant question through neighbourhood social mix
The issue of ethnic mix was rarely mentioned in the 1970s-1980s, but this would
change drastically in the 1990s. By the late 1980s, the extreme right party Vlaams
Blok introduces a virulent anti-immigrant discourse in electoral campaigns.
Gaining strength election after election, they turn the ‘immigrant question’ into a
major urban problem and force government parties to react. Firstly, federal
government installs a royal commissioner to investigate the immigrant question,
who will make the link between social mix and the immigrant question. Secondly,
Flemish government initiates an official urban policy.
Flemish policy discourse
introduces social mix as a way to address the concerns of Vlaams Blok voters while
at the same time striving for immigrant emancipation.
7.1. The Royal Commissioner on Migration
9 October 1988 is the first time when the Vlaams Blok gains substantially in (local)
elections (De Decker et al, 2005). In Antwerp the party jumps to 17%, in Ghent 5%.
In its campaign, the party emphasized an anti-immigrant stance linking minorities
with crime and urban decay. It explains the ‘immigrant problem’ as ‘uprootedness’
and redundancy; there is no work for them anymore. Vlaams Blok calls for closed
borders and the deportation of non-nationals from Belgian territory. The federal
government
appoints
former
catholic
minister
Paula
D’Hondt
as
Royal
Commissioner on Migration (further RCM) with the task to analyze causes and
propose measures to deal with the problems of migration. In her report, she
downscales and transforms the ‘immigrant question’ from what Vlaams Blok had
called failed assimilation into national culture to a problem of deprivation in
15
particular urban neighbourhoods. She emphasizes the lack of opportunities for
young urbanites of immigrant descent “The problems of social cohesion are caused
by social exclusion, in particular of youngsters, in urban contexts” (RCM, 1993, p 1112).
Focusing on the issue of youngsters in deprived neighbourhoods, RCM formulates
proposals to stimulate coexistence of natives and aliens focused on education, work
and housing. RCM criticizes the unfairness of housing policies for the middle
classes which force immigrant households into low quality housing concentrated in
rundown neighbourhoods. She claims that concentration of immigrants harms their
integration into mainstream society. She emphasizes how their concentration
results from housing market forces and racial discrimination. Hence, social housing
is presented as a strategic but underused instrument to achieve social mix. RCM
emphasizes
how
immigrants’
inability
to
enter
social
housing
reinforces
concentration in areas dominated by a residual private rental market. She criticizes
housing companies for purposively deploying subtle exclusion mechanisms to keep
out immigrant families, even though nationality does not figure among legally
defined eligibility criteria; she pleads for stricter controls on allocation procedures.
She argues that the share of immigrant households in social housing estates should
be comparable to the city average; this would improve immigrants’ housing
conditions and prevent ‘irresponsibly high concentrations’ (RCM, 1989, p. 25).
7.2. Bridging integration and urban policies
More than federal government, Flemish regional government feels the urge to react
to Vlaams Blok. Analysts of the Flemish socialist party depict the Vlaams Blok
success as the revenge of urban poor (Huyse, 1992). Vlaams Blok is popular, not
because of immigrants’ lagging cultural integration, but because of urban decay,
16
social deprivation and lack of adequate housing for urban poor in general: the
urban poor (native ànd immigrant) have been neglected for long, and take revenge
by supporting an ‘anti-establishment party’.
These analyses result in a number of hasty measures (Loopmans et al.,
2003). First, in 1990, Flemish government starts a fund for ‘the integration of the
underprivileged’ (Vlaams Fonds voor de Integratie van Kansarmen or VFIK), to
stimulate a territorial approach to social exclusion in cities with many deprived and
immigrant households. Second, after a long period of neglect, Flemish government
re-engages with social housing. Eligibility criteria and allocation procedures are
streamlined and enforced to give low income households priority, irrespective of
nationality or descent. An emergency program of social housing construction is to
catch up with demand after a decade of near zero production and reduce immigrant
concentrations in neighbourhoods with a large private rental stock. 10 000 extra
social housing units are constructed in 4 years, but to the detriment of housing
quality. The minister’s policy letter specified that “the creation of ghettos should be
avoided and that the necessary attention should be given to costs, housing quality,
housing comfort, architectural design, the living environment” (De Batselier, 1992, p
130), but comfort and quality was generally low and the ambitious scale of the
projects creates new concentrations of poverty.
A more structural response is developed in 1995, when a new Flemish government
fuses its older discourse on inner city decline with the immigrant question. A
minister for urban policy (socialist Leo Peeters) is put in charge of a ‘Social Impulse
Fund’ (SIF). The SIF replaces VFIK and subsidizes “specific actions of urban
regeneration and the improvement of the quality of life in deprived neighbourhoods”
(Van den Brande et al, p. 5). The aspiration is that ‘our cities must again be good
and safe to live in. We need an integrated approach, fitting smaller projects and
actions in a coherent and global vision. The communities themselves are best
17
positioned to indicate where to take which measures, giving due consideration to
the needs of the very poor.’ (Van den Brande et al, 1995, p. 4)
Peeters writes an elaborate policy note introducing two innovations to official
discourse. First, Peeters integrates the concerns of urban municipalities about their
declining tax base into a discourse on urban regeneration. The minister emphasizes
warns for socially selective suburbanization. This undermines the city’s tax base
and contains the danger of social closure: ‘the danger exists that suburban
municipalities create their own safe havens of affluence. [...] There are plenty of
foreign examples of affluent neighbourhoods protecting themselves with cctv and
private security” (p64). To turn the tide, the minister sees opportunities to exploit
the attractions of urban life for the new class of young urban professionals: “For the
(new) household types, highly educated and well earning, the (inner) city provides
better opportunities. Double income households have limited time budgets and benefit
from the proximity of facilities (shops, schools, work, culture). The challenge is to
create neighbourhoods that keep these people in the city in such a way that also the
poor and vulnerable people take advantage of it” (Peeters, 1995, p. 64)).
Indeed, a second concern of Peeters is concentrated deprivation. For Peeters,
concentration exacerbates social deprivation: “The chance to become poor is higher if
a child grows up in a deprived neighbourhood. There is a poverty spiral: a limited
interest for education and inferior schools result in low educational outcomes. The
final consequences are: irregular or badly paid work, a low income and a rental
house in poor neighbourhoods” (Vandenberghe et al, 1997, p. 12). Peeters stresses
that inhabitants of poor neighbourhoods do not have the capacity to improve. “The
social composition of neighbourhoods and the spatial fragmentation of cities imply
that poor urban neighbourhoods can only regenerate through an energetic policy”
(Peeters, 1995, p 62).
18
‘Deprived neighbourhoods’ appear as a pivotal concept. An ‘Atlas of deprived
neighbourhoods’ (Kesteloot et al., 1996) delimits neighbourhoods on the basis of
demographic and housing indicators. The Atlas is used for the distribution of
subsidies and cities with ‘deprived neighbourhoods’ are to develop a ‘development
plan’ for them. Poverty concentrations are combated by attracting better-off
residents, improving the housing stock and the living environment and welfare and
employment measures. Higher income groups will support the local economy by
their spending capacity and deliver better role models for children. (Vandenberghe
et al, 1997, p. 13).
In practice, minister Peeters’ policy emphasizes the betterment of living conditions
for the urban poor; Attracting middle classes to the city is a secondary
preoccupation. This is changing drastically when a new government comes to power
in 1999. The new policy statement reads “Such a policy should halt suburbanization
in the first place. In the past decades, this flight to the suburbs has resulted in middle
and upper class families changing their inner city residence for a house in the leafy
fringe. This has resulted in smaller families and more in general in the
impoverishment of the city. Hence the fiscal basis of the city, but also the social tissue
and community life is weakened. Simultaneously increased auto mobility undermines
the ecological basis. Therefore, cities need to be turned into attractive living
environments for families again” (Dewael et al, 1999, p. 91).
The new policy turns the city itself into the prime victim of suburbanization, instead
of the urban poor. Hence, also focus and scale of the policy alters: “Today we
concentrate efforts on the most dilapidated neighborhoods, with no care for areas in
early stages of decline. Today postwar neighborhoods are losing population.
Disinvestment in the housing stock (ageing population) and inadequate public spaces
render these districts unattractive to families. Using the SIF-budget and deploying an
integral, neighborhood oriented approach, we can make these houses and public
19
spaces attractive again and prevent further degradation.” (Dewael et al, 1999, p. 93).
When the urban poor are no longer the main policy beneficiaries, deprived
neighborhoods lose primordiality too; the city itself is the first and foremost scale at
which to establish a social mix. The SIF changes into the ‘City Fund’ (Loopmans,
2007). The City Fund is to attract middle classes to the city again by improving the
quality of life and reducing ‘dualisation’ in the city (Anciaux, 2000, p. 3-4).
8. Preaching the passive revolution through social mix: consequences
for the social rental housing model
At first instance, the historical counterhegemonic model of inner city social rental
housing seemed to profit from the social mix discourse. Social mix diverts protest
against suburbanization policies to concerns over particular neighbourhoods, but
equally paves the way for social rental housing as a problem-fixer. Social renewal
policy needed social housing to prevent displacement and realize social mix; RCM
asks for more accessible social housing to diminish concentrations of poor
immigrants neighbourhoods with private rental dwellings.
But in the course of the 1990s, social mix turns against social housing. Stricter
enforcement of eligibility rules allows poor immigrant families access to social rental
housing and higher income groups increasingly aspire homeownership. The average
income in social housing declines sharply, bringing social housing companies in
troubled financial waters. By the second half of the 1990s, they adopt the same
discourse as urban governments: we need a better social mix to increase rental
income. Their claims are echoed by the mainly white organized estate residents.
Relating the rapid influx of poor and immigrant residents to liveability problems,
they mobilize side-by-side with social housing companies to restrict access for
immigrants and poor people. Geerts, secretary of a syndicate of social housing
companies, explains that (De Morgen, 30 Nov. 2001), “Antwerp social housing
20
tenants are fed up with the poor, mostly foreign risk groups who threaten the
liveability of their dwellings. (…) Poor people have another culture, which is hard to
live with for original inhabitants of social housing. These neighbourhoods no longer
reflect the social mix of before. Income eligibility rules have decreased, changing the
social composition of estates.”
Pressured by the electorate, local politicians join the choir. In the built-up to
the 1998 local elections, Antwerp Christian-Democrat Marc Van Peel discusses
social mix in social housing estates under the heading ”security, tolerance and
justice”: “The presence of ethnic minorities is a richness, not a threat. Nevertheless
we should, by 2002, realize a ‘social mix’ in urban areas. The share of vulnerable
people, migrants and other socially weaker persons should not be higher than 20%.
A higher concentration of migrants and other vulnerable persons can be a major
source of intolerance. We need a policy of dispersal and mix.” Van Peel, 26 march
1998)
In response, Flemish social housing legislation underwent considerable changes.
First, eligibility income levels rose expecting to attract more prosperous households.
Furthermore, access at the bottom is increasingly restricted. Asylum seekers and
undocumented migrants face restrictions, while since 2005, access is dependent
upon the will to learn Dutch.
The negative discourse on social mix in social housing estates puts the very concept
of social housing under strain. Large estates are increasingly considered a threat to
‘social mix’ in cities. Since Domus Flandria, the construction of large estates is
stopped. Rather, social housing is to become ‘invisible’: minister Peeters presented
small-scale, mixed tenure estates as the future social housing model (see Peeters &
De Decker, 1997; Vervloesem et al, 2008). Minister Anciaux repeats: “Previously too
many large scale, unattractive social housing estates are developed without much
consideration. We produced neighborhoods, in particular in cities, that are too one-
21
dimensional, holding a population of largely vulnerable residents. […] This resulted in
various problems of livability (insecurity, vandalism, social isolation,…), stigmatizing
the residents. The earlier policy change in this respect will be continued and
reinforced” (Anciaux, 2000, p. 3) His successor Gabriels puts it more bluntly: ‘In
some dwellings, I wouldn’t even house my rabbits’ [...]I don’t want to renovate these
high-rises, because than I would maintain them, while they are a regular eye-sore”
(Minister Gabriëls in Dag Allemaal, 26 january 2002).
By 2000, urban development discourse equals social mix with gentrification.
Concentrating lower income groups, social housing itself is now increasingly
problematic from a social mix perspective. At the local level, policy makers refuse to
construct new social housing for reason of a better social mix. Instead, sub-urban
communities are told to take responsibility, as they have refrained from
constructing social rental housing in the past.
Antwerp refuses to increase its social housing stock until it can decide
autonomously on the allocation procedure (Vandenberghe & Claeys, 2008).
Moreover new construction is refused in neighbourhoods where its share already
exceeds the city average of 12% but stimulated in large projects in areas with lower
proportions.
Ghent still wants more social housing but under certain conditions. This includes
tenure and size mix for dwellings and sufficient quality. In neighbourhoods with
over 30% of social housing no further construction is allowed except where the
private housing quality is very bad. Large development projects are required to
provide for 20% social housing, but an upper limit of 100 dwellings is enforced for
social housing projects.
9. Conclusion
22
Gramsci’s theoretical articulation of hegemony emphasizes the role of discourse in
shaping the way we understand the world. Policy discourse is instrumental for
hegemonic forces, not just to get to grips with ‘real’ social problems, but also for
shaping and developing consent in civil society around a common understanding of
the world.
The concept of social mix in Flanders is a case in point. Social mix has been
introduced in relation to the hegemonic struggle over related themes of how to
organize urban development and provide housing for the masses. Social mix was
instrumental for what Gramsci calls passive revolution as it has been deployed to
undermine potentially destabilizing counter-hegemonic discourses by integrating
them in the hegemonic discourse on urbanization. By introducing the social mix
concept, hegemonic government actors are not merely addressing concrete policy
problems; the concept of social mix is also deployed to shape and reframe
understanding of the policy problem itself in the face of counterhegemonic
challengers.
The dominant post-war model for the provision of housing for the masses was
homeownership support for detached single family houses in rural settings. This
model was introduced by the hegemonic catholic pillar and opposed the less
influential socialist pillar model of collective social rental housing in dense urban
settings.
In the late 1960s, urban social movements criticized this model for producing
urban decay and neglecting the interests of poor inner city residents (table 1).
Catholic policy makers reacted not by reversing actual policies; instead they
introduced the concept of social mix to alter the definition of ‘the urban problem’.
Downscaling the regional problem of suburbanization to a question of social mix in
inner city neighbourhoods, deflected the challenge to the hegemonic model to a
particular and clearly located problem. The urban social renewal policy installed to
23
respond to this problem, was oriented in such a way that it posed little threat to the
suburbanization-cum-homeownership
model.
Focusing
on
particular
urban
neighbourhoods, not suburbanization but a concentration of poor people was held
to be the main problem. Whereas the living conditions of inner city residents were
the main reason for mobilisation, these residents themselves are now presented as
causing urban decay as they have no means to invest in their living environment.
A second challenge comes from the extreme right Vlaams Blok which mobilizes
against the presence of immigrants with a different cultural background in cities,
considering them incompatible with national culture. Two instances mobilize the
social mix concept to deflect this discourse. First, describing ethnic concentration
in opportunity-poor, deprived urban neighbourhoods as the crucial hindrance to
integration, RCM changes the scale at which the issue is to be addressed from the
national to the neighbourhood, and introduces social (i.e. ethnic) mix as an
instrument to stimulate interethnic integration.
Linking the urbanization question to the integration debate, the SIF-approach
expands this reasoning to all poor citizens. While recognizing suburbanization as
the final cause of urban decay, the SIF focuses on the way deprived urban
neighbourhoods affect the living conditions of poor inhabitants of varying cultural
backgrounds. SIF addresses poverty by improving the neighbourhood context. But
the SIF-approach to social mix is also a preliminary attempt to deal with a third
challenger: central city governments calling for a halt to suburbanization as it
undermines their tax-base. Presenting social mix as a means to improve the
neighbourhood context for the urban poor through the attraction of more wealthy
inhabitants, the SIF attempts to address three issues at once.
When SIF is transformed into the City Fund, the concerns of urban governments
are taking prominence. More than before, social mix equals the attraction of higher
income groups to reinforce the city’s tax base and create a ‘more lively city’. The
24
neighbourhood is no longer the focus of attention, but social mix is to be attained at
city level. As such, it deflects attention away from the living conditions of inner city
residents to an issue of ‘urban attractiveness’. The main victim of ‘unattractive
neighbourhoods’ is now the city itself, instead of the poor resident. Rather, this poor
residents are increasingly regarded as the cause of the city’s troubles, for they don’t
contribute to the city’s attractiveness.
The above analysis of social mix reveals the use of the concept as an instrument for
passive revolution. When faced with contenders, the hegemonic model of
suburbanization is rarely questioned. The De Taeye-subsidies have survived well
into the 1990s, only to be replaced by other forms of support for suburban
homeownership. Today, suburbanisation is still the dominant process (Moortgat
and Vandekerckhove, 2007) and Flemish government is discussing a legislation
allowing more Greenfield development by private builders. The use of social mix
helps those in power to deflect attention away from the main causes of problems to
a different set of explanations operating at other scales, with different culprits and
victims involved.
The faith of the main counter-hegemonic model has been variable. In the 1980s and
early 1990s, social housing was turned to as one of the main instruments to realize
social mix. Gradually social mix turned against social rental housing as the concept
was deployed to reconcile the Vlaams Blok and urban governments’ claims.
Problems of social housing estates were related to a unsatisfactory ethnic and social
mix. When urban governments complained about shrinking tax bases, social mix
was translated as attracting higher income groups to the city and social housing
estates are depicted as making cities unattractive.
To conclude, the use of social mix has merely reinforced the hegemony of the
suburbanization-cum-homeownership model, not just because
it served to
undermine potentially counter-hegemonic claims by new challengers, but also
25
because it gradually disempowered the main counter-hegemonic model which it has
always had to compete with: social rental housing in urban settings (see also De
Decker, 2005).
4.
Tabel 1: social mix and passive revolution: summary
Challenger
Critique raised
Urban
social
movements
Suburbanization Social
and
urban
homeownership
renewal
cause inner city
disinvestment
and worsen the
living
and
housing
conditions
Vlaams
Blok
electorate
Cultural
RCM
differences
of
immigrant
groups
are
unwelcome
in
Flemish society
Urban
municipal
government
s
Social mix and passive revolution
a)
Social mix is to
increase
investment
in
housing
b)
Change of scale: from
regional to neighbourhood
c)
Change of culprit:
from
subsidizing
of
suburban homeownership to
urban poor who can’t afford
to invest themselves
a)
Ethnic
mix
will
improve integration
b)
Change
of
scale:
national to neighbourhood
c)
Change of culprit:
from
non-assimilating
immigrants to opportunitypoor neighbourhood
SIF
a) Social mix will improve
social
and
economic
integration
b) Change of scale: regional
to neighbourhood
City
Fund
a)
Social
mix
will
improve tax base and create
‘lively city’
b) Change of scale: from
region to city
c) Change of victim: from
poor resident to city
government
d) Change of culprit: from
suburbanization to poor
Suburbanization
undermines
central city’s tax
bases
Consequences
for
social
rental
housing
model
Social rental
housing
supports
social mix by
preventing
displacement
Social rental
housing
supports
social mix by
channelling
immigrants
away
from
private rental
housing
Social rental
housing
estates suffer
from lack of
social
mix
(cultural
differences
and financial
revenues)
Social rental
housing
threatens
social mix at
city level.
26
resident
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