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The Behavioral And Brain Sciences (1984) 7:4, pp.625-626
Behaviorism84.doc
Commentary On: Behaviorism at Fifty
B. F. Skinner, Department of Psychology and Social Relations, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138
Original Abstract: Each of us is uniquely subject to certain kinds of stimulation from a small part of the universe
within our skins. Mentalistic psychologies insist that other kinds of events, lacking the physical dimensions of stimuli, are
accessible to the owner of the skin within which they occur. One solution often regarded as behavioristic, granting the
distinction between public and private events and ruling the latter out of consideration, has not been successful. A science
of behavior must face the problem of privacy by dealing with events within the skin in their relation to behavior,
without assuming they have a special nature or must be known in a special way.
The search for copies of the world within the body (e.g. the sensations and images of conscious content) has also had
discouraging results. The organism does not create duplicates: Its seeing, hearing, smelling, and so on are forms of
action rather than of reproduction. Seeing does not imply something seen. We know that when we dream of wolves,
no wolves are actually there; it is harder to understand that not even representations of wolves are there.
Mentalistic formulations create mental way stations. Where experimental analyses examine the effects of variables
on behavior, mentalistic psychologies deal first with their effects on inferred entities such as feelings or expectations
and then with the effects of these entities on behavior. Mental states thus seem to bridge gaps between dependent and
independent variables, and mentalistic interpretations are particularly attractive when these are separated by long
time periods. The practice confuses the order of events and leads to unfinished causal accounts.
Keywords: actions; behaviorism; consciousness; images; mentalism; methodology; mind-body problem; private events;
representation; self-reference
Undifferentiated and "mote-beam"
percepts in Watsonian-Skinnerian
behaviorism
John J. Furedya and Diane M. Rileyb
a
Department of Psychology, University of
Toronto, Ont., Canada, M5S 1A1 and bAddiction
Research Foundation, Toronto, On, Canada M5S
2S1
Behaviorism, like most influential “isms,”
requires qualification by proper names to
differentiate between its many forms. The
behaviorism whose 50th birthday was celebrated
in the target article is obviously different from
the approaches of other behaviorists such as Hull
(who used beneath-the-skin, internal hypothetical
explanatory constructs) and Tolman (who was
both mentalistic and teleological in his
approach). Watsonian-Skinnerian behaviorism is
radical in its rejection of many of the
assumptions of approaches such as those of Hull
and Tolman. That is, radical behaviorism not
only rejects teleological explanations, it also
rejects "internal" hypothetical constructs, especially mentalism. However, approaches that
seek to cleanse us root and branch tend to offer
judgments that are undifferentiated in that there
is no attention paid to some critical distinctions.
Another feature of such approaches is that the flaws
that appear writ large in the opposition are ignored
in the favored approach; this selectivity results in (in
reference to the biblical phrase) “mote-beam”
percepts. We briefly discuss two undifferentiated
distinctions. The first is between teleological and
mechanistic mentalism, the second between
knowledge and ability. Finally, a case of "motebeam" perception of explanatory circularity is
presented.
Regarding mentalism, it is true that in an
approach such as that of Tolman, there was a link
between teleology (the inclusion of purpose as an
intervening variable) and mental events (the
inclusion of the concept of the cognitive map as an
intervening variable). The link between teleology and
mentalism, however, is historical rather than logical.
Instances of mechanistic (ateleological) mentalist
positions are available even from Tolman's era (see,
e.g., the attack on teleology in the concept of
homeostasis by Maze 1953). Moreover, many current
cognitive experimental psychologists are not
teleological inasmuch as their basic analogy - the
computer - does not involve purposes but only
mechanistically determined programs. Finally,
specific issues under current investigation involve
Commentary /Skinner: Behaviorism at fifty
examining a form of cognitivism that is not
teleological but mechanistic. For example, the
claim that awareness of the CS-US relationship
is necessary, but not sufficient, for autonomic
conditioning (see, e.g., Dawson 1973; Dawson &
Furedy 1976; Furedy 1973) is a position that
involves no talk of purposes whatsoever.
Skinner's "Behaviorism-50" does not appear
to make this important distinction between
teleology and mentalism. For example, in the
discussion of "mental way stations," the account
of the student explanations or "responses"
lumps together the mechanistic and teleological
forms of mentalism, in that it does not
differentiate between explanations in terms of
the organism's mechanistic knowledge and its
purposive intentions. It bears emphasis that,
especially because Skinner's main charge against
mentalism is that its explanatory constructs are
circular, the distinction between teleological and
mechanistic mentalism is of more than mere
scholastic significance. Teleological concepts
have a built-in circularity as explanations,
because any contrary-to-prediction outcome can
be explained away as a result of a change in
purpose of the (implicit) agent (see, e.g., Maze
1953).
This is not to imply that mentalism when
used in explanations is without problems numerous difficulties arise over issues such as
the nature of representation. However, these
problems are not as intractable as those of
teleological explanations. The problem with
ateleological, mentalist explanations is that they
appear to be less parsimonious than those of
radical behaviorism. However, to the extent that
one seeks to account for what complexly occurs,
it is necessary to recognize that the feeling of
striving appears to be a real feature of human
mental activity. This feature then requires
explanation, rather than excision by Ockham's
razor. And the ateleological mentalist would
argue that such explanation has the virtue of
providing some account of events that do, in fact,
occur. By analogy, and related to Skinner's
discussion of representation, it may seem more
parsimonious to explain moving pictures in
terms only of the events that are actually
visible on the screen, and to dismiss references
to movie projectors as constituting unnecessary
mysticism. However, in terms of the way things,
in their complexity, are, accounts of the process
that include reference to movie projectors are
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4
more appropriate, because they are more accurate.
Such accounts are more complex than those of the
radical-behaviorist form, and may require reference
to "a new mechanism," but this is because the
phenomena require it, and not just because
theorists do.
The other distinction that the target article
appears to neglect is that between knowing
propositions and having the ability to perform
responses, or knowing that and "knowing" (in
quotes, because, strictly speaking, only propositions
can be known) how (Ryle 1949). The running
together of this distinction occurs most obviously in
Skinner's discussion of the acrobat. In this account, it
is suggested that not only the performance
(handsprings) but also the account of that
performance (propositions concerning the important
actions needed to produce successful performance)
are all responses, the latter sort of expressions being
“verbal responses” which “arise from contingencies
. . . arranged by a verbal community.” However, on
this account, we would not be able to discriminate
between so-called verbal responses that state false
propositions (i.e. a champion hand-springer who,
however, is a poor coach inasmuch as he is
cognitively unaware of the nature of good
handspringing) and those that state true ones (i.e.
one who can cognitively teach as well as produce
correct performance responses). The reason this
discrimination cannot be made is because responses
are not prepositional, being expressions that it
would be a “category mistake” (Ryle 1949) to speak
of as either true or false (see also Furedy & Riley
1982; Furedy, Riley & Fredrikson 1983). In Ryle's
terms, knowing that and knowing how are different
processes, and neither can be reduced to the other
without a serious loss of the ability to make
factually, and therefore scientifically, relevant
distinctions.
Concerning the “mote-beam” perception of
circularity in explanatory concepts, we have already
noted that "Behaviorism-50" roundly condemns
positions opposed to radical, Watsonian-Skinnerian
behaviorism for such concepts, and therefore
charges their theories with being untestable.
"Mentalism," with its “way stations,” is portrayed as
the main villain in the piece, but behaviorisms like
those of Hull would also be suspect, because they
make use of internal, within-the-skin constructs
instead of sticking to the presumably noncircular
external, environmental concepts like various
“schedules of reinforcement,” the "verbal
environment," and past reinforcement history.
Commentary /Skinner: Behaviorism at fifty
Because in the target article the focus is on
mentalism rather than nonradical behaviorist
systems, we restrict the discussion to the
comparison between mentalism and radical
behaviorism. The circularity in mentalism is less
problematic or more mote-like than Skinner
would have it, because, as indicated above, it is
only in the teleological form of mentalism that
circularity is inherent in the explanations, and
the theory is hence untestable. The beamlike
perception, we suggest, is due to a commonly
made error of not recognizing the teleologicalmechanistic distinction (discussed above) in the
unfavored mentalist camp and that at least some
mentalist accounts are not teleological but
mechanistic.
On the other hand, radical behaviorists have
continued to appear quite insensitive to the
beam of circularity in their own eyes when it
comes to explanations. The point is that,
contrary to certain metaphysical prejudices,
circularity is determined not by the "stuff" of
which the explanatory concept is made, but by
the extent to which theorists specify their
explanatory constructs so that they can be
assessed independently of the effects they are
supposed to explain. So the gravity and libido
constructs are equally intangible, but gravity
theory is more testable than the Freudian libido
theory. The former theory (asserting that all
physical objects are influenced by gravity) is
vulnerable to specifiable, disconfirming events
such as hovering 10 feet above the ground
without any mechanical aids in a way that the
latter theory (asserting that all human behavior
is influenced by the sex drive) is not, because
there is no specifiable behavior that would, if it
did occur, falsify the libido hypothesis. This is
because Freudian theory has constructs like "repression" in it that are not specifiable
independently of the (apparently asexual)
behavior that they, in conjunction with the
libido, are taken to explain.
However, the environmental, “tangible”
constructs used in “Behaviorism-50” appear to
be no more adequately specified than the libido
and repression. What behavioral outcome would
it take to produce a disconfirmation of the
explanatory concept of “various reinforcement
schedules”? Again, is there any conceivable
verbal utterance that would, if it did occur,
require Skinner to give up the radically
environmentalist explanation that the utterance
was caused by “the verbal community”? To the
extent that no such outcomes (even were they to be
hypothetical rather than actual) can be specified, it
would seem that the circularity in the eye of radical
behaviorism's modes of explanation is, indeed,
beamlike in proportions.
In discussing the problem of circularity, we have
deliberately used the scientifically low-status
Freudian system. Our reason for doing so is to
reinforce our contention (not argued for in detail
here) that the problem of explanatory circularity
must be dealt with by adequately specifying the
explanatory constructs, rather than by thinking that a
move from internal to external referents is
sufficient for the task.
Author’s Reply
B. F. Skinner
Department of Psychology and Social Relations,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 02138
The teleological side of Furedy & Riley's
commentary could have found a more appropriate
place in “Consequences.” What they call
mechanism seems to be the current state of the
organism described in the language of physics and
biology. The organism behaves as it does because
of its present state. What they find missing is
intentionality. Others might have spoken of
purpose, expectation, and anticipation. These are
not aspects of the present state of the organism but
of its selective phylogenic and ontogenic history.
Behavior seems to be directed toward future
consequences, but only because it is a product of
past consequences. The hand is not made for the
purpose of holding things; it has evolved in a given
way because it has held things well. A boy does
not go to the cookie jar with the purpose of getting
a cookie; he goes because he has got cookies in the
past. (If he goes because he has been told that there
are cookies there, a different set of selective
contingencies must be invoked, as discussed in
“Problem Solving.” The contingencies will be
much more complex but nevertheless only
contingencies.)
In common use, knowledge refers to a personal
possession
resulting
from
exposure
to
environmental contingencies. To use it only for
propositions is in violation of tradition and
common sense. Most people would say that a boy
who learns to ride a bicycle well knows how to
ride. But does he possess knowledge or has his
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4
Commentary /Skinner: Behaviorism at fifty
behavior simply been well shaped by the
contingencies maintained by bicycle? When a
hungry rat presses a lever, receives food, and as
a result presses the lever more rapidly, many
cognitive psychologists say that it has "learned
(and hence knows) that pressing the lever
brings food." "Pressing the lever brings food"
is a description of the contingencies. Somehow
or other a version is said to pass into the head
of the rat. A human subject could, of course,
describe the contingencies and know them in
the sense in which adperson knows a poem.
Has anyone shown that there is an advantage in
creating these internal simulacra of
environmental contingencies? We "impart
knowledge" through environmental means. We
test for its existence through environmental
measures. We determine its essential properties
by examining what the supposed possessor
does. If there is any circularity it is in the eye of
the cognitive psychologist, as a hypothetical
internal knowledge inferred from behavior is
used to explain the behavior.
References
Dawson, M. E. (1973) Can classical conditioning
occur without contingency learning? A review
and
evaluation
of
the
evidence.
Psychophysiology 10:82-86. [JJF]
Dawson, M. E. & Furedy, J. J. (1976) The role of
awareness in human differential autonomic
classical conditioning: The necessary gate
hypothesis. Psychophysiology 13:50-53. [JJF]
Furedy, J. J. (1973) Some limits of the cognitive
control of conditioned autonomic behavior.
Psychophysiology 10:108-11. [JJF]
Furedy, J. J. & Riley, D. M. (1982) Classical and
operant conditioning in the enhancement of
biofeedback: Specifics and speculations. In:
Clinical
biofeedback:
Efficacy
and
mechanisms, ed. L. White & B. Tursky.
Guilford Press. [JJF]
Furedy, J. J., Riley, D. M. & Fredrickson, M.
(1983) Pavlovian extinction, phobias, and the
limits of the cognitive paradigm. Pavlovian
Journal of Biological Psychology 18:126-35.
[JJF]
Maze, J. R. (1953) On some corruptions of the
doctrine of homeostasis. Psychological
Review 60:405-12. [JJF]
Ryle, G. (1949) The concept of mind. Hutchinson.
[JJF, WL]
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1984) 7:4