COUNTRY REPORT ON AEROSOL PROJECTS
EVALUATED IN ALGERIA
by
Montfort Johnsen
Consultant
July 2002
1
Table of Contents
1. Context and Background ............................................................................................................. 3
1.1 Status of Ratification ............................................................................................................ 3
1.2 Status of the Country Programme Implementation with Regard to Aerosols ................ 3
1.3 Import and Consumption Figures for the Aerosol Sector ................................................ 4
1.4 Number of Approved and Completed Aerosol Projects .................................................... 4
2. Policy Framework ......................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 Government Policies ............................................................................................................. 6
2.2 Prices and Availability of LPG/HAP and CFC .................................................................. 7
2.3 Choice of Technology............................................................................................................ 8
2.4 Role of Industry Associations ............................................................................................ 10
3. Common Experiences of Companies ......................................................................................... 10
3.1. Reasons for Project Implementation Delays .................................................................... 10
3.2. Marketing Aspects .............................................................................................................. 12
4. Remaining Tasks for Full Phase-out in the Aerosol Sector .................................................... 12
2
1.
Context and Background
1.1
Status of Ratification
1.
Algeria ratified the:
Vienna Convention in October of 1992
Montreal Protocol in October of 1992
London Amendment in October of 1992
Copenhagen Amendment in May of 2000
2.
Algeria has not yet ratified the Montreal and Beijing Amendments.
1.2
Status of the Country Programme Implementation with Regard to Aerosols
3.
In the Country Programme (CP) prepared in 1991, the consumption of CFCs in the
aerosol sector had been estimated to be 559 ODP tonnes, representing 25,2% of the country’s
ODS consumption of 2,221 ODP tonnes.
4.
In 2000, consumption of 323 ODP tonnes of CFC-12 was reported for the aerosol sector
in Algeria.
5.
In 1989, the consumption of CFCs for aerosols was reportedly higher than 2,000 tonnes
but then the largest filler (Asmidal), a public sector company, converted to HAPs at own expense
in order to reduce their production cost. Their CFC consumption was huge, in the order of about
1,500 tonnes per year, and initially they had planned to open a CFC production plant, jointly
with Tunisian interests. The Ozone Unit succeeded in dissuading them to realize this project, and
the early conversion of Asmidal enabled Algeria to be recognized as Article 5 country (by
reducing strongly its per-capita consumption of CFC). Asmidal suffered a disastrous fire in the
mid-1990s.
6.
During most of the 1990s, Algeria was a partly closed country due to political and
economic turmoil. International visitors became concerned about their security, and many
postponed their travel plans indefinitely. Consequently, there were limited opportunities to
corroborate company information with visits. This was particularly true outside the relatively
protected area around Algiers. Now that circumstances have largely normalised, some visits have
been made, and the NOU wants to correct consumption figures reported earlier. An updated
Country Programme (CP) has not yet been prepared, however.
7.
In the years since the CP was undertaken, significant changes have impacted the Algerian
aerosol industry. The aerosol industry grew somewhat, and their consumption of CFCs is
considered to have increased to about 680 to 700 tonnes per year by about 1995. The gradual
reduction of aerosol CFC consumption did not begin until 1997, and is almost completed today.
8.
As of mid-2002, CFC abatement in the aerosol sector, due to MLF projects, two firms
going out of the aerosol business, and other factors, is thought to be about 360 to 380 tonnes per
year. The aerosol filling business has recently contracted in Algeria, due to declining consumer
demand and increased competition from imports. Two fillers are operating at only 15% capacity,
and others are not running at all. If the remaining CFC consumption is 40 to 50 tonnes per year,
as seems likely, the CFC reduction is more than 90%, compared to the baseline.
3
1.3
Import and Consumption Figures for the Aerosol Sector
9.
When asked about the aerosol production of Algeria one beneficiary manager said he had
no idea, another said 28,000,000 units per year and a third said about 25,000,000 units per year.
The major product is insecticides, followed by personal deodorant aerosols.
10.
Rough calculations, based on the stated usage of about 5,000 tonnes of CFCs per year in
1989, and assuming an average propellant weight of about 160 grams per can, suggest around
35,000,000 units. Considering the current economic situation, the closure or non-production
status of several fillers, and so forth, the figure of about 26,500,000 units per year (2001) seems
fairly reasonable.
11.
One manager stated that imports served 80% and domestic production 20% of the
Algerian aerosol market. This is unlikely though in view of other information from fillers
suggesting that European imports (especially from France) have a market share of about 20%. If
this is so, and exports are at around 15% of production, the domestic consumption becomes
about 28,000,000 units per year (2001), or roughly 1.0 unit per capita.
12.
When two managers were asked about the legal or illegal status of imported aerosols,
they had no figures in mind, but felt that at least some were illegal, to escape customs duties
and/or taxation.
1.4
Number of Approved and Completed Aerosol Projects
13.
Algeria has in total 28 conversion projects completed or on-going excluding 2 cancelled
projects. 9 aerosol investment projects have been approved for Algeria. Implementation was
expected to cost US $1,455,511 to phase-out 380.6 ODP tonnes.
14.
By December 2000, 7 projects were reported as completed, phasing out 343.5 ODP
tonnes of CFCs. One of them, Laboratoire Bendi, project No. ALG/ARS/20/INV/18, had been
declared as completed already in December 1998 and a PCR was submitted by mistake in
September 1999, reporting "satisfactory, though not as planned" project completion. The project
has been cancelled by the 37th meeting of the Executive Committee. While Bendi stopped using
CFC based aerosol production, they never utilized the equipment supplied by the project which
remained untouched in five boxes as delivered to them. In about 2001, the owner decided to
leave the aerosol filling business and get into the hotel business instead. His unused equipment
with capital cost of US $53,700 now sits in his storeroom, awaiting disposition. As a possibility,
it may be shipped to another project, in another country, as there seems to be no more filler of
this size awaiting conversion in Algeria.
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15.
Using their own funds, Ets. Cophyd apparently ordered a complete aerosol line, plus
related equipment, from Pamasol in 1992. Payments were made for several years thereafter. Over
four years later, the firm was still producing CFC insecticides, using their old Coster equipment.
Their failure to utilize the new Pamasol line may have been due to extensive delays in the
purchase of a new, much larger production site, construction of buildings, and installation of
bulk storage facilities. The new site was required to comply with HAP bulk tank regulations.
Their conversion to HAP occurred in 1998. For the past few years the firm has reported to
produce about 2,000,000 units per year, calculated to be equivalent to an abatement of about 320
tonnes per year. It is noteworthy that the beneficiary requested that UNIDO consign the
approved US $53,024 toward the purchase of a Macromat P Gasser, costing about US $91,000,
with the company paying the US $38,000 difference. This would have allowed them more
capacity and flexibility. Permission was denied. Instead, COPHYD received a flammable gas
sensing system, which is now in use. Other parts, however, pumps, ventilation equipment and so
forth funded by the project are still in their original crates. Some are planned to be used as spare
parts but were, according to the company’s owner, selected rather to use up the budget than to
cover real needs. This information was somewhat surprising, since a PCR had been submitted in
December 1997 without describing these aspects.
16.
Another filler, Floreal, has received LPG storage and production equipment. It was
mostly assembled, but the firm was awaiting a final visit from the supplier (Nimmo) to complete
installation and conduct trial runs. That visit was four months overdue, with Nimmo stating that
they would make the trip only after the final payment from UNIDO had been received. (Note:
Nimmo is in serious financial difficulty, and is for sale). Without the knowledge of the NOU or
UNIDO, Floreal had installed a small propellant pipeline into their non-ventilated production
area. They explained that the Nimmo gasser could only gas one can diameter, and their business
profile demanded the use of four can diameters. Therefore, they planned to use their old Coster
CFC gasser, located in the production area, for the other three can sizes. UNIDO will look into
its contract with Nimmo, to see if change parts were ordered for other can diameters. The
beneficiary promised to install good ventilation in the production area. While Floreal is,
therefore, set up to use CFC cylinders if desired, there was no indication that this had been done,
or was planned. Their CFC consumption had been reported as 18.1 tonnes per year.
17.
The conversion of SACO (reported as completed in February 2002 in a draft PCR) is not
really complete, since the new plant site is still under major construction, the bulk-tank is not
emplaced or piped, the aerosol line is incomplete, and no compounding facilities exist.
“Completion” was based upon the gassing of about 100 aerosols, using a small LPG cylinder.
SACO’s other plant could not be visited, but was said to include their CFC gasser. Their
consumption of CFCs had been 19 tonnes per year.
5
Algerian Aerosol Project Beneficiaries and their Status (2002)
ODP
Project
Project
Status
(Tones)
Approval
Completion
Date Reported
ENAD
150
Nov. 1995
Dec. 1997
Completed*
Cophyd
15
Oct. 1996
Jul. 1997
Converted largely at own cost
Bendi
19
Oct. 1996
Dec. 1998
Cancelled**
Eta des Mohamed
23
Oct. 1996
Dec. 1998
Completed*
El Wouround
47
Oct. 1996
Dec. 1998
Completed*
Vague de Fraicheur
51
Oct. 1996
Dec. 1998
Completed*
Eta Djadir
38
Jul. 1998
Dec. 2000
Completed*
Floreal
18
Jul. 1998
Jul. 2001
HAP production not started
SACO
19
Jul. 1998
Feb. 2002***
HAP production not started
Beneficiary Firm
*
Completed in the sense that no CFC is used anymore and new production has started but old equipment has not
been destroyed.
** Project cancellation at the 37th Executive Committee, in spite of earlier PCR (submitted in September 1999).
*** May still produce CFC aerosols at one of two plants.
2.
Policy Framework
2.1
Government Policies
18.
The National Ozone Unit usually identifies projects and selects the implementing agency,
requesting it to put the projects in the business plan. The Agency then sends a consultant or staff
member who visits the company and prepares the project document. Due to the insecurity, the
World Bank and UNDP were reluctant to come to Algeria; most projects were implemented by
UNIDO. All aerosol projects have been prepared by a national consultant (Mr. Hamsa), because
international consultants were not ready to travel to Algeria during the 1990’s.
19.
In the early 1990’s, the Ministry of Industry was involved, but was reportedly only
interested in the large national companies. Now it is the Ministry for Small and Medium
Industries which is consulted for all regulations, along with the Ministry of Finance and the
Secretary General of the Government. The latter participated in the preparation of the Executive
Decree Number 2000-73 regulating and granting import licences for all ozone depleting
substances and related equipment imported into Algeria. This Decree requires detailed
information to be provided by the imported but has not foreseen advanced dates for phase-out.
This means that the phase-out of all ODS until 2004 which had been planned in the country
programme in 1991 has been abandoned. The principal reason given by the Ozone Unit for this
change is that the difficult years after 1991 have delayed implementation of the country
programme.
20.
It seems that the import licensing scheme so far is not fully operational and that there is
further training required for customs officers to recognise the different products. An awareness
rising campaign has been conducted with the customs officials and the regional offices of the
Ministry of Environment, which are all quite co-operative, although Ozone issues are not on the
top list of priorities.
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21.
Reportedly substantial amounts on undeclared imports of CFC enter the country often
mixed up with declared imports which makes them more difficult to detect. Small enterprises
often avoid to ask for import licences because they shy the contact with government institutions
and are often not registered due to the security risks for travelling outside Algiers. An update of
the country programme would be needed in order to make a census of all such enterprises and to
determine the remaining consumption of CFC.
22.
According to the Ozone Unit, the processing of project equipment through customs is a
well established routine handled by UNDP. UNDP transmits the authorization to the enterprise
to get the equipment out of the port once the formalities have been settled with customs. In some
projects though, there have been delays, and disputes between the implementing agency and the
company arose about who will pay for the resulting high storage charges.
2.2
Prices and Availability of LPG/HAP and CFC
23.
In all project documents, the cost of LPG/HAP has been assumed to be US $1.60, that
means about 8 times the level of actual cost for domestically available high quality LPG at the
time (about US $0.20 at the exchange rate of US $1 = 25 dinar in 1995). UNIDO applied in fact
international border prices similar to those prevalent in Tunisia at the time. However,
Decision 12/37, para. 62 of the Executive Committee clearly specified that national prices be
used. Moreover, some fillers like Asmidal and Cophyd already used exclusively domestic LPG,
like all projects afterwards, including ENAD which demanded particularly high quality
standards.
24.
The primary promoting factor for HAP aerosols is economics. In Algeria, LPGs are sold
to fillers through NAFTAL, the state-owned sole distributor of petrol and gas for presently about
US $0.05 per kg, possibly the cheapest price in the world. The CFCs are said to cost about
US $2.50 per kg. With this differential, and the fact that much less of the HAP formulas can be
fitted into standard size aerosol cans, marketers can sell the HAP aerosols to customers at
markedly reduced prices, compared with those of the CFC formulations. How much of this is
passed through the distribution chain is unknown, and any analysis would be complicated by the
severe inflation that Algeria has been subjected to during the past decade. Despite the advantages
of CFCs (like non-flammability), the low cost of HAPs provides a towering incentive for fillers
and marketers to utilize these formulas, and never to return to CFCs. Minor exceptions might be
found, such as in the example of a 20 or 30 ml cologne, where good odour is paramount, and
very little CFC is needed per dispenser. Higher priced pharmaceutical aerosols (if made in
Algeria) might be another minor example. In general, economics should force and sustain
virtually complete conversion.
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2.3
Choice of Technology
25.
Until the mid-1990s, companies in Algeria had to import CFCs using foreign exchange
quotas allocated to them. The quantity was restricted, and was allocated preferentially to larger,
publicly owned aerosol fillers --- compared to the generally smaller private ones. This provided
the smaller firms with an incentive to utilize local propellants, if they were to ever expand. The
only domestic propellant, both cheap and suitable for nearly all aerosol uses, was and is LPG. It
is extremely flammable, and has to be purified for cosmetic products, to eliminate the bad odour
of naturally-occurring impurities, but was the obvious choice, nevertheless. Some supplies of
LPG, in particular from a refinery in Arzew near Oran, are almost of HAP quality.
26.
The more advanced countries are using a choice of 8 to 10 propellants, including
mixtures, but Algeria is sufficiently isolated that these developments are essentially unknown.
Two fillers experimented briefly with carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide propellants, but without
knowing how to make the best formulas and valve selections. They were disappointed, and did
not pursue these options any further.
27.
One can predict that the domestic blend of about 25% propane, 25% iso-butane and 50%
n-butane, supplied from the national monopolistic gas distributor NAFTAL will constitute the
only Algerian propellant for some years to come. Some fillers might experiment with carbon
dioxide, possibly nitrous oxide, as European technology slowly drifts southward, but the other
propellants, such as dimethyl ether, are all higher priced and would have to be imported --making their use very unlikely in the foreseeable future.
28.
It is probable that most aerosol cans and valves, used in Algeria, will continue to be
imported from Europe. This means that the country will have the advantage of European
packaging technology, if fillers choose to utilize it. One example of what can happen as the result
of too little information: the Algerian fillers are ordering "18 bar" aerosol cans from Europe, at
about 25% higher prices than the same size cans of the more common "12 bar" strength rating.
There is no need for the stronger cans; they were simply advised by the supplier that it was a
more preferred container.
29.
Equipment selection in Algeria as in other countries has been founded on several general
principles:
(a)
Conversion must be from CFCs to HAPs.
(b)
Old CFC gassers leak and cannot be retrofitted; thus new gassers must be
purchased.
(c)
Hot water baths are needed to assure that HAP-gassed aerosols do not leak.
(d)
Equipment must be purchased from one of about 5 suppliers in the USA or
Europe.
(e)
Capacity of the HAP equipment must not exceed that of the CFC equipment.
(f)
The equipment supplier must be the lowest bidder.
(g)
The old CFC gassers must be destroyed --- to prevent recidivism.
(h)
A molecular sieve unit must be installed, to partly purify the LPGs.
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(i)
Bulk-tanks for LPG are safer than cylinders; they should be installed whenever
practical.
30.
In Algeria, much of the equipment contracts were awarded by UNIDO to Nimmo (U.K.),
simply on the basis that they were the lowest bidder. Unfortunately, Nimmo is virtually bankrupt
(and for sale). They have delayed visits, not only due to such events as the "9/11 terrorist attack",
but because they lacked the funds to send engineers to Algeria. In one case, they demanded to be
paid the final US $12,500 or so, prior to authorizing a visit. In another, they wanted to combine
visits to two or more beneficiaries into one trip -- to save airfares. All these factors have
contributed to significant delays.
31.
In at least one case (SACO), the filler apparently ran out of money, and could not
continue with his site preparation activities until more funds were generated or borrowed. He
blamed UNIDO for not paying certain disputed costs, and for instilling optimism and a sanguine
forecast about the ease of conversion. In actuality, the filler’s expenses were greatly in excess of
the original plan, and he has been out of the aerosol business for over three years. It may be an
additional year or two before he can again produce aerosols.
32.
According to several counterpart managers, the selection of the equipment supplier has
been made by UNIDO, almost always without participation by the counterpart firm. This has
been denied by UNIDO. The lowest bid supplier is not always the best supplier. Although
Nimmo (U.K.) was generally the lowest bidder, and thus the supplier selected, and although their
equipment was mechanically satisfactory, there were some problems:
(a)
Based on the "lowest bidder" premise, firms such as Pamasol, Terco and
Packaging Technologies often refused to provide bids.
(b)
Companies, who might strongly prefer a particular supplier, from past experience
and service considerations --- and who would be willing to pay the cost
differential --- reported that their wishes where often discoutned or by-passed.
(c)
Pamasol, whose equipment almost never wears or breaks down, was never
selected. It must be recognized that a significant equipment problem, in a country
relatively remote as Algeria, can result in serious down-time. The "lowest bidder"
equipment is probably the most susceptible to mechanical problems of all that are
available.
(d)
Nimmo equipment was generally purchased. With this firm on the verge of
bankruptcy, their long-term ability to provide change parts, replacement parts, and
engineering assistance is problematical.
9
2.4
(e)
The languages of Algeria are mainly French and Arabic. Many plant engineers
and production workers understand very little French, especially if technical
matters are being described. The Nimmo manuals and other instructional
literature are only in English, according to several counterpart managers. This is
countervailed by UNIDO, who propose that these same managers are making
excuses for delays and errors, and also, that Nimmo manuals are available in
French. In any case, the beneficiary factory people cannot make use of their
literature, in the event of problems, change-overs, or other circumstances. Since
people in over a dozen countries speak Arabic, a methodology and programme
should be developed to translate supplier manuals into this common language.
(f)
Equipment suppliers whose engineers speak a local language should be given
special attention in the selection process. This would enable those engineers to
provide instructions to the counterpart’s engineers during visits, or telecommunications. Nimmo could not provide this.
Role of Industry Associations
33.
Recently, the Association of Cosmetic and Aerosol Industries (ACAI) has been founded.
The objectives of the fledgling association are not clear, if they have actually been defined as yet.
Their President is actually the owner of one of the MLF project aerosol fillers. He complained
about the inequity of MLF funding, which he felt was more favourable to the larger, public
fillers, which had a larger consumption of CFC during the mid-1990ies.
34.
Actually, almost any filler embarking on a conversion project had contributed substantial
counterpart funding, and in several cases, fillers have become de-stabilised financially, due to the
combination of these costs, extended business interruption and increased competition, combined
with low demand.
3.
Common Experiences of Companies
3.1.
Reasons for Project Implementation Delays
35.
In many cases, fillers were obliged to move out of populated areas, in order to use the
extremely flammable LPG propellants without risk to the local populace. This was actually
mandatory, if a bulk storage tank for the LPG was planned. The typical 12 to 18 month project
duration becomes impossible to achieve, if the beneficiary must purchase land, erect buildings,
install bulktanks and equipment, conduct trial runs and so forth. Government approval is
required for many of these events, and that is inevitably time-consuming.
36.
The purchase and installation of bulk-tanks is a particularly sensitive issue. Official
certification is required in Algeria, and the highly respected ASME supplier certification, printed
on a bronze tab, is not necessarily accepted in this country. This has caused delays sometimes
measured in years.
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37.
A chronic problem, in Algeria as well as in other countries, has been the installation of
tanks that are too small. Such bulk-tanks may be in the order of 3 to 5 tonne capacity, whereas
the tank-trucks are generally 7.5 to 8 tonnes. LPG suppliers are extremely reluctant to send halffilled tank-trucks to these fillers, due to the sloshing effect, which affects the stability of the truck
when it must come to abrupt stops or negotiate sharp turns in the roads. In some cases, the oil
companies have refused to supply LPG under these conditions. The delay of obtaining a second
bulk storage tank may follow.
38.
Once MLF project equipment arrives at Algerian ports, officials typically check items,
line-by-line, against bill of lading lists. If discrepancies are found, the lot is impounded in the
customs house until the anomaly can be rectified. Typically, the beneficiary is required to pay for
resulting charges and storage costs. Usually, the companies have balked at the storage costs,
stating that they had no part in the transportation arrangements, and UNIDO should resolve the
matter. Steadily increasing storage costs occur, as negotiations continue.
39.
There is a general policy that MLF project equipment should not be ordered until site
preparations are completed. While this seems reasonable, it typically causes a delay of 5 to 8
months, before the equipment can be manufactured, crated, shipped and received by the
beneficiary. It may be useful for agencies to have some flexibility, so that orders can be placed
reasonably ahead of site completion, and simply stored at the site until the facility is ready for
assembly of the aerosol production line. This flexibility would be contingent on verification by
the agency and NOU that the beneficiary was doing its part, and that the site will be completed
by about the time the equipment would be received.
40.
Project implementation delays have been caused (mostly in the past) by the reluctance of
equipment suppliers to send engineers into Algeria. This reluctance continues, in the case of site
locations outside of the protected zone that surrounds Algiers. Suppliers also want to be assured
that all the equipment is on site, including items purchased by the beneficiary -- so the visit could
be productive.
41.
There have been a few problems with the equipment, such as failure to include a key item
in the shipment (causing a large delay in project completion), and a malfunction, resulting in
eventual replacement, prior to production. Such problems are likely to occur from time to time in
projects as complex as these.
42.
The presumption that all CFC gassers leak, and are unsuitable for HAP service, should be
challenged. With care, Pamasol and Coster gassers can last for decades. Any leakage is due to
elastomeric gasket problems, and these can readily be replaced. In non-Article 5 countries, many
ex-CFC gassers have been refurbished to virtually new condition, with only a modest
expenditure, and are now gassing HAP propellants.
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43.
Molecular sieves are designed to remove malodorous organo-sulfur contaminants in
LPG -- converting it to a (low-grade) form of HAP, which is generally low enough in remaining
odours to be used for aerosol products. They require a specific charge of chemicals, a certain
procedure for passing the liquid LPG upward through these chemicals, a fixed velocity, checking
for chemical saturation with the contaminants, and other operational parameters. In Algeria,
nearly all the fillers had no knowledge of how to set up and operate these devices. Molecular
sieves of all sizes were seen. Several were connected incorrectly, making them valueless, and
others were seen to be leaking HAP. In two plants, the special, plastic lined paper sacks of
Zeolyte 13X were seen to be open to the atmosphere. This allows the material to absorb moisture
from the air, ultimately making it unable to absorb the organo-sulfur compounds. None of the
plants were aware of the techniques used to show that the device is (say) 95% saturated, and that
the material must be replaced, lest the contaminants will get into the aerosol products.
3.2.
Marketing Aspects
44.
During the transition period of about 1996 to 2001, fillers and marketers had several
difficulties in selling aerosols based on the use of HAP. These are rather well known and will
simply be listed for brevity:
(a)
Light-weight dispensers. (Consumers think they are under-filled).
(b)
Formulation problems. (Many aerosols were of lower quality).
(c)
Flammability problems. (Increased consumer hazards, more insurance).
(d)
Odour problems. (Unsaturated hydrocarbon contaminants cannot be removed).
(e)
Storage problems. (Warehouses will burn completely, if any fire ignites HAP
aerosols).
45.
While none of these problems have been solved, consumers are now accustomed to HAP
aerosol products. A greater degree of precautionary labelling, including flame symbols, should
be used on the dispensers.
46.
Like many Article-5 countries, Algeria has a relatively limited diversity of aerosols in the
market places. The leading product is insecticides, amounting to over half the total production.
Others are "fragance products", such as colognes, personal deodorants, scented body sprays, air
fresheners and so forth. A small hair spray and furniture wax business exists.
47.
The myriad of cleaning products, so popular in North America and Europe, are unknown
in Algeria. They cannot be reasonably formulated with CFCs, but HAPs work well. With HAPs
now available in Algeria, and formulations available from consultants, trade publications and
other sources, perhaps the Algerian aerosol business can grow into this important area.
4.
Remaining Tasks for Full Phase-out in the Aerosol Sector
48.
At the 36th Meeting of the Executive Committee, funding of US $25,000 was approved
for the preparation of 8 additional aerosol projects. There is no list of these companies, however,
and it is doubtful that 8 such companies can be found. The NOU has stated that only one or two
small fillers in Algeria are still producing CFC aerosols.
12
49.
In any event, with the extremely low price of LPG in Algeria (about US $0.05 per kg) it
is almost certain that the IOS would be higher than the presumed project capital cost. Further
investigation seems appropriate -- perhaps starting with a better identification of other Algerian
fillers through the new Association of Cosmetic and Aerosol Industries (ACAI).
----
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