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The Role of Chularajmontri/Shaikh al-Islam in Resolving
Ethno-religious Conflict in Southern Thailand - The Human Security Dimension
Dr. Imtiyaz Yusuf
Graduate School of Philosophy and Religion
Assumption University
Bangkok, Thailand
1) Introduction
In light of 2007 Human Rights Watch report on the southern Thailand titled,
“No One is Safe” it may be too late to apply the human security approach to resolve
the southern Thailand conflict. The everyday turmoil situation on the ground made of
violence and fear with daily incidents of killings targeting civilians, arrests,
disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and other human rights violations, etc one may
say that there is no solution in sight. As of July 2007 there have been 2,400 deaths
and 4,000 people have been injured. 1
The use of force approach of the Thaksin regime has deteriorated the situation
tremendously making Krue Se (April 28, 2004) and Takbai (October 25, 2004)
incidents part of Malay Muslim memory which cannot be erased. The present
government’s apology and dialogue approach has to be supplemented with other
measures to become effective in producing results.
The post Cold War approach of human security which stresses on human or
people centered approach to security can be a supplement to the ongoing process of
seeking peace in deep South Thailand.
If human security as defined means the following:
-
absence of violence;
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-
encompassing of human rights, good governance, access to education and
health care and the ensuring that each individual
has opportunities and
choices to fulfill his or her own potential;
-
freedom from want;
-
freedom from fear;
-
the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environmentthese are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national
security.2
it is absent in current southern Thai situation and needs implementation build peace
in a conflict ridden situation which is not an easy task.
The century old conflict in southern Thailand which began with the Siamese
annexation of the formerly Malay sultanate of Negara Patani3 in 1902 has re-merged
viciously since 2004. The 2004 event also illustrated the multi-ethnic nature of Thai
Islam which does not think, act and respond in concert in matters concerning
national integration in a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious Thailand.
While there is a Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand exhibiting signs of unintegration, the Thai Muslims residing in the other parts of the country are well
integrated into Thai nation. The Thai Muslim community is made up of southern
Muslims who are ethnic Malay while those in the rest of the country belong to
different ethnic groups such as Persian, Indian, Burmese, Chinese and Cham. The
ethnic Malays constitute about 44% of the total Thai Muslim population of about 5–7
million.4
This paper contends that institution of cultural security recognizing cultural
rights within a democratic framework is essential for solution of the southern
Thailand crisis. This paper also contends that there are two interpretations of Islam in
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Thailand, one which is prevalent in areas where the Muslims speak Thai which is
integrative. And second, the local Malay ethnic interpretation of Islam prevalent in
southern Thailand where the religion of Islam is interpreted along ethno-religious
perspectives. And thirdly, that the office of the Chularajmontri or Shaikh al-Islam
which was established to integrate the southern Malay Muslims into Thai nation
through the “Patronage of Islamic Act of 1945” has not been equipped to conduct the
task of
building human security. This paper calls for revamping the office of the
Chularajmontri in assisting in the tasking of building human/cultural security in the
case of southern Thailand.
The Incorporation of Patani into Thai State
The former state of negara Patani populated by majority Malays along with
the Siamese, Javanese, Chinese, Indians, Japanese and Arabs was located at the
southern part of Siam and was ruled by the Malay sultans. The Portuguese arrived
there in 1516 and the Dutch in 1602.5 With the coming of Patani under Siamese
control in 1906, the seven Malay provinces of Patani (Tani), Yala, Sai Buri, Yaring,
Nong Chik, Raman, Ra-ngae, were dissolved and united as “monthon Pattani” or subdivision of Pattani. In 1932, following the transformation of the political system
from the absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy with the aim to centralize
administration the monthon system was dissolved and replaced by that of changwat province. Under this transformation, the monthon of Pattani was divided into 3
changwat - provinces of
Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, each administered by a
governor appointed by the central government in Bangkok. The current southern Thai
unrest is taking place in these three deep southern provinces.
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2) Methodology
The methodology adopted in conducting this study and analysis is of interdisciplinary nature benefiting from religious studies and political science disciplines.
It involved both documentary research and field work activity including interviews
with relevant sources.
First, a note about the usage of the term “Thai Islam” in this research. The
official “Patronage of Islamic Act of 1945” of Thailand uses the term “Thai Islam” in
reference to the Muslims of Thailand. But this term is seen as ethnically offensive
especially by the Malay Muslims of the South who view it as imposition by the
Siamese ethnic group from Bangkok. Hence the deep Southerners prefer to refer to
themselves as “Malay Muslims.” But the term, “Malay Muslims” has an ethnic,
regional and sectarian limitations for it overlooks the other sections of Thai Muslim
community spread across the country whose ethnic, provincial and even sectarian
affiliations are different from those in the deep South. The Muslims residing in
provinces other than the deep South do not find the term “Thai Islam” or “Thai
Muslims” as offensive. In fact, they use them to refer to themselves. Therefore, I
prefer to use the term “Thai Islam” and “Thai Muslims” when referring to the Muslim
community of Thailand. I make reference to the ethnic variety within the Muslim
community when discussing it in its provincial contexts by using terms “Malay
Muslims” in reference to those residing in the deep South and
“Thai-speaking
Muslims” for those residing in the territory between the upper South to the North.
In conducting this research a total of thirty focus group interviews were
conducted over a period of two months in the following provinces and regions of
Thailand viz., the deep South (comprising Narathiwat, Yala, Pattani), the upper South
(Songkla, Satun, Nakorn Sithammarat and Phuket), the Central plains (Bangkok and
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vicinity), the North (Chiangmai and Chiangrai) and the Northeast (Khon Kaen,
Kalasin, Sakon Nakorn and Udon Thani). There were two reasons for choosing these
provinces. One, most of the studies about Islam in Thailand covered so far focus only
on the deep South portraying as if there is no presence of Islam in the other parts of
the country hence the need to highlight the geographic spread, ethnic and sectarian
variety within Thai Islam.
The focus group interviewees comprised Muslim scholars, community leaders,
educators at public and private universities, mosque officials holding the positions of
imams, members of youth organizations, Muslim social
activists, women
representatives and those involved in official Muslim community organizations such
as the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs (PCIA) in southern, central and northern
parts of the country.
The Institution of Shaikh al-Islam – History
The institution of Shaikh al-Islam was established during the medieval Islam.
Its institution was necessitated by the need to streamline Islamic religious hierarchy
or the ulama within the state by appointing one of them who is often the learned in
Islamic religious sciences. The Shaikh al-Islam would function as the chief mufti chief jurisconsul, an expert on Islamic law and an advisor on matters of religious
import to the state. The Shaikh al-Islam would give legal opinions on the matter of
religion both private and public. But his advice was not legally binding upon the
political authorities; they only carried moral authority.The intention here was to give a
bureaucratic status to the religious leadership within the political structure of the
evolving and expanding state.
The first office of the Shaikh al-Islam in the Islamic world was established in
Khurasan in the 10th century, and it was soon adopted in the other part of Islamdom
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in Anatolia (Turkey), Egypt, Syria, Safavid Iran, Central Asia, the Delhi Sultanate
and China.6 Between the 14th-16th centuries the office of Shaikh al-Islam served
different functions in different countries. The Shaikh al-Islam was the chief
jurisconsult in Ottoman Turkey, a judicial official of some sort in Safavid Iran, one
who distributed gifts to the Sufis in India and as an examiner of Islamic teachers
credentials in Central Asia and China.7
Turkey abolished the office of the Shaikh al-Islam in 1922. Today, the office
of Shaikh al-Islam continues to exist in different formats in different countries, either
in the form of a ministry, a council or a person both in the contemporary Muslim
majority countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Bosnia and Tanzania and
also in Muslim minority country such as Thailand.
4) Office of Chularajmontri in Thailand – History and Contemporary Status
In former Thailand known as Siam, the Muslim community was made of two
different components. First, there were the native Malay Muslim in the neighboring
southern part of the country made up of independent Malay kingdoms who managed
their own political and social affairs. Second, there were the immigrant Muslims who
had come to settle in Siam since the ancient kingdom of Sukhothai (1228-1438) and
the subsequent Ayudhya (1351-1767) kingdom.
4 a) Islam in Thailand
Islam came to Thailand from three directions from the South, Central and
North. It first arrived in southern Thailand in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries
C.E. when it was brought by the Arab traders.8 Secondly, Islam arrived in Central
Thailand during the Sukhothai period when Persian, Arab and India traders visited
Siam. And they were also present in the court of Ayudhya. The Persian Shia Muslims
played an influential role in the court of Ayudhya. The Cham Muslims migrated to
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Ayudhya due to the collapse of the Champa kingdom in 1491. While Indonesian
Macassar Muslims settled in Ayudhya following the Dutch conquest of Macassar
between 1666–1669 C.E. Thirdly, the Indian, Bengali and Chinese Muslims arrived in
the North of Thailand between the 1870s and 1890s.9
The establishment of the new capital of Bangkok in 1782 by king Rama I of
the Chakri dynasty saw the settlement of Iranian, Indian, Pakistani, Cham, Indonesian,
and Malay Muslims in different part of the capital and also the country.10
Islam functions in Thailand in three configurations defined by history,
ethnicity and location: 1) the ethnic Malay-speaking Islam is practiced in the
provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat of the deep South; 2) the integrated ethnic
Malay but Thai-speaking Islam is practiced in the province of Satun and upper South
such as Songkla, Nakorn Si Thammarat, Phuket, Krabi, and Phangnga; and 3) the
multi-ethnic integrated Thai speaking Islam of central Thailand provinces of Bangkok
and Ayudhya and also that of North and northeast Thailand; this group comprises
Muslims of Persian, Malay, Cham, Indonesian, Indian, Bengali, Pathan, and Chinese
ethnic backgrounds.11 These migrant Muslims from neighboring countries came to
settle in Thailand for economic and political reasons. They also fled from religious
persecution at the hands of the communists in China and the nationalists in Burma.
There are also Thai converts to Islam either through marriage or religious
conversions.
The first type of Islam has been largely historically resistant to integration
within Thai polity while the second and third types have been integrative. Thus the
Thai Muslim community is made up of two groups: the “native/local Muslims” and
the “immigrant settler Muslims.” Hence, there is ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and
political variety within the Thai Muslim community. The “immigrant Muslims” of
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Thailand also belong to different Muslim sects. For example, Persian Muslims
belonging to the Shia sect served at the court of the Ayudhya Kingdom in different
official capacities.12 The majority of Thai Muslims belong to the Sunni sect but there
is also the presence of a small Shia community belonging to the Imami, Ismaili and
Bohras/Mustali Ismailis sub-groups from within the Shia sect.13
4b) The History of the Office of Chularajmontri in Thailand
The office of the Chularajmontri or Shaikh al-Islam of Siam came into being
during the Ayudhya period which had a substantial population of Shia Muslims who
had migrated from Iran, they lived along side with Sunni Muslims immigrants from
Champa,
Indonesia and India. Other foreign communities in Ayudha were the
Chinese, Portuguese, etc.
The Ayudhya period witnessed increased contacts with the Muslim world
following expansion of maritime trade in the Southeast Asian waters. In the case of
then Siam, this resulted in Muslim settlements in and around the province of
Ayudhya. These early settlers comprised Shia Muslims from Persia. The local Persian
merchants and scholars in Ayudhya not only engaged in trade but also served as
ministers at the court of Ayudhya. They managed the Ayudhya navy and maritime
trade as part of their professional expertise. There was also an exchange of embassies
between the Persian and the Ayudhya courts.14
The first Chularajmontri or Shaikh al-Islam of Siam appointed by the
Ayudhaya King Phrachao Songtham (1620-28), was the Persian Shia scholar Shaikh
Ahmad Qomi (1543-1631). Shaikh Qomi also served as the King’s Minister of
Foreign Trade. Shaikh Qomi was entrusted with the task of Muslim community
affairs.15
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The first thirteen Chularajmontris were Shia Muslims who were the
descendants of Shaik Qomi. During those times until 1934 which marked the end of
the last Shia Chularajmontri, the religious jurisdiction of Chularajmontris did not
extend to the southern independent Malay kingdoms. But with the incorporation of
Malay kingdom of Patani in 1906, Islam became the largest minority religion of
Thailand; this also created the problem of integration of southern Malay Muslims into
Siamese/Thai nation. Thailand became a constitutional monarchy in 1932; it
continued to face new linguistic, ethnic, cultural and religious problems relating to
Malay Muslim majority provinces of southern Thailand. In 1945, the Thai
government passed the Patronage of Islam Act which sought to “institute a link
between the central authority and the religious notables of the Muslim community.”16
The Patronage of Islamic Act of 1945 marked the official establishment of the Islamic
Centre of Thailand headed by the Chularajmontri/Shaikh al-Islam and also the
Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs. Since then the last three Chularajmontris until
the present one have been Sunni Muslims. The present Chularajmontri Mr. Sawad
Sumalyasak took office in 1997.
The 1932 transformation from Thai absolute monarchy into constitutional one
and the subsequent brief embarkation on the path of both participatory politics
alternated by strongmen rule during the political reigns of Phibun Songkram (19381944; 1948-1957), Pridi Banomyong (1946-1949) and Sarit Thanarat (1957-1963)
witnessed efforts at centralization of Islamic affairs in Thailand.
The Patronage of Islam Act of 1945 sought to break the political deadlock
between the southern ulama – religious scholars - and the government. The southern
ulama were infuriated by the previous government of the military strongman Phibun
Songkram who declared the national policy of rathaniyom – asserting the superiority
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of Thai race and forced assimilation of the minorities stressed on Thaiisation. The
rathaniyom policy also emphasized on the centrality of Thai language, adoration of
nation, saluting of the national flag and singing of national anthem. It did not allow
space of cultural difference, the southern Malays were forbidden from wearing Malay
dress such as the sarong and speaking in the local Malay dialect of Yawi and
celebration of Muslim festivals. Majority of southern Muslims in the deep South
speak Pattani-Malay or Yawi as the main language of communication. The Pattani
Malay which is identical with Kelantanese Malay spoken across the border is an
important identity marker of the southern ethnic Muslim community who are not
fluent in Thai which is the official language. Pattani-Malay language has also served
as medium of education for Pattani Muslims. The Malay Muslims of the South did
not welcome the Thaiisation policy for it sought to remove the ethnic and cultural
identity of the southern Muslims or “Thaiise” the Malays. This clash between the
Siamese or Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslim ethno-religious identities has been at the
root of the conflict until now. The rathaniyom policy further stirred the movement of
southern Thai separatism. The Patronage of Islam Act of 1945 while proclaiming the
Thai king as patron of all religions sought to recognize the presence of religious
diversity in the country in form of the presence of Islam in the South. “The Act
stipulated that new institutions be established to serve as the mediator between the
Muslim community and the government. One of these was the office of the
Chularajmontri, which was the equivalent of the Shaikh al-Islam of the early Islamic
empires. The occupant would be considered the spiritual leader of all Muslims of
Thailand. He would advise the king and his government on the ways and means to
assist the Muslims and their religious activities. The Chularajmontri would be “His
Majesty’s personal aide fulfilling His royal duties in the patronage of Islam. (Article
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III)” Again, the office was established as counterpart of the Sangharaja (the Supreme
Patriarch) of the Buddhist religious hierarchy.”17
The first Chularajmontri under the Act was Mr. Chaem Phromyong, a Muslim
senator from Bangkok, he was appointed by the then prime minister Pridi
Phanomyong. This marked the end of the leadership of the Shia Chularajmontris.
The new Chularajmontri was appointed to his office by the King of Thailand
upon the recommendation of the Ministry of Interior. His term of office was for life
and could only be removed by the king. Chaem Phromyong was a close associate of
Pridi, he held office for two years. He fled to China with Pridi when his government
was overthrown through the second military coup led by Phibun Songkram.
During the second reign of Phibun Songkram came the Royal Decree of 1948.
It concerned the organization and administration of mosque committee and the
establishment of the National Council of Islamic Affairs (NCIA) and the Provincial
Council for Islamic Affairs (PCIA).18 The 1948 decree lowered the status of the
Chularajmontri from being advisor to the King to being advisor to the Religious
Department in the Ministry of Education (presently to the Ministry of Culture after
the recent reformation of the cabinet structure). The 1948 decree also stated that the
Chularajmontri would from now on be elected by the presidents of the Provincial
Islamic Committees and would hold office for life. The next two Chularajmontris
viz., Nai Tuan Suwannasat who held the office between 1948-1981 and Prasert
Mahamad who held office between 1981-1997 were elected to office under this
procedure.
The modern Thai state ideology is centered around the notions of Chat,
Sassana, Pramahakasat” – Nation, Religion (Buddhism) and the Monarchy with the
expectation that all parts of the country have to be integrated into Thai nation. The
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Patronage of Islamic Act of 1945 gave the responsibility of integrating the Muslims
living in the different regions of Thailand to the Chularajmontri along with the
National Council of Islamic Affairs (NCIA) and the Provincial Councils for Islamic
Affairs (PCIA). 19
With the further democratization of Thailand in 1990’s there emerged a move
in the Thai parliament to reorganize the office of the Chularajmontri along
democratic lines. The 1992 Islamic Administrative Bill proposed that:
(1) the Chularajmontri, the head of the National Council of Islamic Affairs and the
Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs who had so far held their offices for life, from
now on be elected to their posts for certain terms;
(2) the term of office for members of the National Council of Islamic Affairs and the
Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs Committees be limited to six years; and that the
Chularajmontri retire at the age of 70;
(3) an election process be introduced to select the members of the National Council of
Islamic Affairs and the Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs leading to greater
efficiency in the functioning of the official Islamic institutions in the country;
(4) the administrative structure of the National Council of Islamic Affairs, including
the office of the Chularajmontri be reorganized.
The bill became law in 1997, it introduced the process of election for the
Chularajmontri who would from then on be elected by all the members of the
National Council of Islamic Affairs and the Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs
and hold office for life. The then Chularajmontri Prasert Mahamad died on 1 August
1997. New election for the next Chularajmontri under the new law were held on 16
October 1997, it was contested by nine candidates. Sawad Sumalyasak, then 80 years
old was elected as the sixteenth Chularajmontri of Thailand, he was confirmed in
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office by the king on 5 November 1997, he is still holding office.20 The main
functions of the Chularajmontri are:

To represent Thai Muslims as the national level; to provide notarial services;

To issue fatawa (religious rulings);

To regulate the administration of the registered mosques;

To distribute subsidies and grants to the mosques;

Publish Islamic religious literature;

Declare the celebrations of Islamic festivals such as Id al-Fitr at the end of the
fasting of
the month of
Ramadanand Id al-Adha at the end of the Hajj
pilgrimage;

To organize the annual Mawlid celebrations marking the birthday of the Prophet
Muhammad;

To coordinate the travel arrangements for the annual hajj pilgrimage;

And formerly grant religious certification of halal for the food items produced by
Thai food industries – this function is now managed by the Central Islamic
Committee.
The office of the Chularajmontri carries with it religious and social prestige at
the national level and it includes various socio-economic benefits.
The southern Thai Muslims have always looked upon the Chularajmontri with
an askance, as an official of the Thai state. During the tenure of Chaem Phromyong,
the southern Muslims looked upon their local religious scholar viz., Haji Sulong bin
Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad al-Fatani (d. 1954) a Meccan educated religious scholar
as their de facto Shaikh al-Islam. Haji Sulong was a religious scholar influenced by
the philosophy of Islamic reformism in the Middle East associated with Muhammad
Ibn Abdul Wahab (1703-1792), Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Muhammad
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Abduh (1825-1905).21 He believed in the philosophy of
“political cooperation
without cultural interference.”22 Upon returning to Pattani in 1930 he engaged in the
reform of the Malay Muslim community and represented Malay Muslim interests by
seeking political autonomy within a federal system as proposed by the then Thai
prime minister Pridi Phanomyong.23 In 1947, Haji Sulong made seven ethnoreligious
demands to the central government. These demands centered on the issue of political
freedom for the Malays and the preservation of Malay language, the only religious
demand put forward by him concerned the recognition and enforcement of Muslim
law.24 Haji Sulong served as the chairman of the Provincial Council of Islamic Affairs
of Pattani without getting a chance to become the Chularajmontri of Thailand. Since
his death in 1954 under mysterious circumstances, Haji Sulong has become a symbol
of resistance to the Thai state. There has never been a Chularajmontri from the deep
South. All the Chularajmontris since the introduction of Islamic Patronage Act of
1945 have been from Bangkok and its vicinity provinces.
The Chularajmontri is respected by the Muslims in different parts of the
country other than the deep South. The southern Malay Muslims see him as an official
of the Thai state who does not have their interests at heart. For example, he was not
welcomed in Pattani in December 1975 when there were demonstrations against the
government. The southern Malay Muslims leaders saw him as an agent of the central
government.25 They see his role as being influenced by the Thai authorities. The
Malay Muslims of the deep South prefer to
seek advice from the local Malay
religious scholars such as the tok guru (owner of the local pondok or madrasa) and
ustaz (religious teachers) of their own community. The tok guru and ustaz receive
their education in local pondok (Malay religious schools) and some of them have
obtained higher Islamic education in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Malaysia
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or Indonesia. They are seen as authorities in matters of religio-social dimension and
thus more respected by the southern local communities.
5) Horizontal Inequalities in Thailand
Professor Frances Stewart has stressed the need to pay attention to horizontal
inequalities in addressing issues of political instability in different countries. She
points out that the traditional approach among the development specialist is to pay
attention to vertical inequalities i.e. between individuals but such an approach does
not highlight the main causes for political instability.26
Professor Stewart calls for the need to understand that conflicts around the
world are actually between cultural and ethnic groups bound by religion, race, region
or class e.g. in Rwanda, Uganda, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Northern Ireland, Fiji,
Malaysia, Brazil and the USA. These are caused by horizontal inequalities i.e. due to
political, economic and social differences/gaps between the cultural groups. She
comments that, “Unequal access to political/economic/social resources by different
cultural groups can reduce individual welfare of the individuals in the losing groups
over and above what their individual position would merit, because their self-esteem
is bound up with the progress of the group. But of greater consequence is the
argument that where there are such inequalities in resource access and outcomes,
coinciding with cultural differences, (emphasis by author) culture can become a
powerful mobilizing agent that can lead to a range of political disturbances.”27
Horizontal inequalities between groups are exhibited through unequal access
to education, distribution of public goods and open expression of prejudices by the
dominant over the dominated group. Thus addressing reduction of group inequalities
is indispensable for social stability. And this needs to be done within short time
otherwise the horizontal inequalities will widen over time.28
16
Horizontal inequalities most likely lead to conflicts if group inequalities are
consistent and across the board. In the area of economics they include inequality in
asset ownership, employment and other economic opportunities, leading to
inequalities in incomes and social horizontal inequalities include inequality to
services, such as education, health and housing, associated with inequalities in health
and educational outcomes. In case of southern Thailand most of the horizontal
inequalities exist in the economic and social arenas, while the Thai democratic
process has helped bridge those in the areas of politics. Many of the southern Muslims
have had equal opportunity to contest in politics without any restrictions.
The presence of economic and social horizontal inequalities can be exploited
by those with vested interests to mobilize people along group lines through recall of
historical memories when there is history of conflict.29 And these can further
exploited by international jihadist groups to make the local conflict a part of their
international agenda.
Joel Selway, has highlighted the presence of economic inequality in Thailand
in the context of the southern Thai situation. Thailand’s national policy has stressed
on all minorities, the Lao, Khmer, Malay and others to assimilate into central Thai
identity i.e. “to speak and act as a Central Thai.”30 He further comments that, “Thus,
membership in Thai society is unequal, and exclusion buttresses the very structure of
society.”31 This has resulted in the social exclusion of the southern Malay Muslims in
the areas of education and formal civil society participation in the bureaucracy. 32
6) Human Security Approach – The Need for Stress on the Cultural Security
Dimension
17
Nobel prize laureate Prof. Amartya Sen remarks that, “Human security is
concerned with reducing and - when possible - removing insecurities that plague
human lives.33
The “Human Security Now” report of the United Nations’s Commission on
Human Security stresses that paying attention to the people and their needs plays an
important role in building security. It offers an alternative to the traditional approach
to national security which largely focuses on arms and weapons. The report insists on
enhancing of human rights, protection against threats to individuals and communities
and empowering of the people which in turn will enhance security and development.
As a liberal and democratic approach to conflict resolution and human development
the human security it defines the aim of human security as being, “to protect the vital
core of all human lives in the ways that enhance human freedoms and human
fulfillment. Human security means protecting people from critical (severe) and
pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means using the processes that build
on people’s strength and aspirations. It means creating political, social,
environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the
building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity,” 34 This description can be applied
more easily in a situation of relative social and political peace and post conflict one
rather than the one in which there is an on-going conflict. In other words, the human
security approach contributes more towards the prevention and diffusing of conflicts
before they occur rather than one which is conflict-ridden yet it is not too late. The
application of human security approach in a conflict situation requires alternative type
of application that the one which is conflict-ridden.
The human security approach’s stress on economic, food, health,
environmental, personal, community and political security needs is essential for
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building of security. But the ethnic, cultural and religious dimension of conflicts such
as the one in southern Thailand demands that the human security approach also stress
on cultural security of the minority group in the conflict. For all conflicts are not
merely economic or political but also have a cultural dimension. This demands
paying attention to or building of or reforming of institutions of cultural concerns as a
way of diminishing conflicts which have an ethnic, cultural and religious dimension.
It means that the human security approach should also stress on the nation wide
adoption of cultural and religious pluralisms as an avenue and means of resolving
conflict, be it in a democratic or any other political environment. This may require
reform and renewal of traditional institutions and even establishing of new ones
directed towards the aim of conflict resolution.
7) Human Security in Conflict Situations
The ongoing violence in southern Thailand indicates lapse in the connection
between development and security which cannot be repaired unless there is the
institution of cultural security. Undertaking efforts for the development of human
security has been seen as a way to prevent rising of conflicts, for conflicts arise out of
state of insecurity and hopelessness. Human security programs with their focus on the
people can help when implemented in pre, during or post conflict situations can help
alleviate conflict situations.
Most of the conflicts are centered around issues such as: competition over land
and resources; sudden and deep political and economic transitions; increasing crime,
corruption and illegal activities; weak and instable political regimes and institutions;
identity politics and historical legacies, such as colonialism.35 The southern Thai
conflict is rooted in the last of the above mentioned factor. It can be effectively
addressed through undertaking measures which support recognition of the cultural
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aspect of the Malay Muslim culture, this requires taking of step to assure political
recognition of the local culture, thereby assisting in the local southern Thai Muslims
over come their fears of cultural insecurity. This has to be done before things go out
of control leading prolonging of the conflict. In this light, the political recognition of
and taking measures to implement the recommendations of the National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) led by former Thai prime minister Anand
Panyarachun such as the implementation of Islamic law, recognition of cultural
diversity including the recognition of the local Malay dialect of Jawi as working
language in the three southern provinces, will go a long way in helping assuage the
local Malay Muslims fears of cultural insecurity.36 The NRC’s recommendations
calling for the recognition of the above cultural items indicates that there is much
need for understanding the role of ethno-religious factor in handling the conflict and
approaching peace in southern Thailand. Only in this way will it be possible to seek
negotiated resolutions and building the capacities of the local population thereby
prevent the local conflict from being exploited by those with vested interests. The
adoption of the recommendation of the NRC and using the office of the
Chularajmontri and the central and provincial Islamic committee to implement
measures which will build cultural security will go a long way in helping the state to
address and resolve one of its long ongoing conflict. It will also make the local
southerner Malay Muslims become effective citizens.
Promotion of cultural security for both the majority and the minorities will
promote the spread of culture of respect and equal access to political, social and
economic resources for the sake of building both peace and development in the whole
country. All this requires the taking of following measures:
1) Streamlining human security in the provincial and national security agendas.
20
2) Instilling respect for human rights for the protection and empowering of
people in conflict.
3) Taking of efforts to both mitigate and also completely resolve conflict through
upholding of all rights.
4) Undertake measures to enable effective citizenship with aim to foster human
security.37
5) It is crucial for democracies to protect its minority through devising “political
morality that is guided by equal respect and concern for all cultural/religious
traditions.38 And instituting “protections for groups whose cultures may be
vulnerable to majoritarianism.39
8) The Chularajmontri and the Challenge of Ethno-Religiosity in Southern
Thailand.
8 a) The Ethno-Religious Nature of Southern Thai Conflict
An important but neglected dimension by the researchers of the southern Thai
conflict is its ethno-religious dimension. A serious consideration of this dimension
will help us to understand how the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand perceive
their identity in ethnic and religious terms.
It is a matter of fact that the Malay Muslims place strong emphasis on the
ethnic aspect of their adherence to the religion of Islam. The Malay Muslims of the
South give primacy to their ethnic identity and view their life experience from within
the context of the local practice of the agama (Malay – religion) of Islam. Thus the
ritual, mythic/narrative, experiential/emotional, ethical and legal, social, material, and
political dimensions of life are all interpreted and perceived through the lenses of
ethnic identity. Here ethnicity and religion are intermixed resulting in the formation of
an ethnicized view of Islam.
21
In an ethno-religious perspective, ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a
group’s identity which sets it apart from others in its own and others’ eyes. It serves
as the foundation for the interpretation of nationalist and religious aspirations of the
group. Thus often religion can be used for ulterior ethnic interests as a tool or veil.
Such ethnoreligious identification of identity is also evident in the conflicts in Sudan,
Sri Lanka, Tibet and China, India, Nigeria, Lebanon, Bosnia, the Philippines and
Northern Ireland.
The combination of ethnicity and religion often results in explosive conflicts
in the political arena to which solutions are not easy to be found.
Religion and ethnicity, as social and political concepts, have many
similarities. While ethnicity is not always congruent with a framework
of belief, it is often associated with nationalism, which does provide
such a framework. This framework can include rules and standards of
behavior such as the requirement or at least the desirability of forming
or maintaining a state for one’s ethnic group. Even for ethnic groups
which do not express such national sentiments, ethnicity is a basis for
identity that can influence beliefs and behavior. Ethnicity, both in its
nationalist and other manifestation, can provide legitimacy for a wide
variety of activities and policies and ethnic symbols can be as potent a
political and social mobilizing force as religious symbols.40
The above described phenomena of ethnoreligiosity which gives primacy to
ethnicity in religion is not exclusive to the Malays but similar tendency is also found
in the other ethnic groups of Southeast Asia viz., the Thai, the Filipino and the
Chinese communities settled here.
Overall, the Thai Muslims make up the largest minority religious group in the
country making them “a national minority rather than as a border minority.” 41 One
may say that, Islam in Thailand has two main local narratives distinguished by the
geographic areas they occupy within the territory of the kingdom of Thailand. First,
the ethnic Malay speakers of the deep South who are the majority Muslim and second,
22
the multi-ethnic Thai speaking Muslims residing in the different regions of the
country. The two groups converge as adherents of the same religion but diverge when
it comes to giving prominence to ethnicity and language over other forms of identity.
This distinction is not based on the differences in the doctrinal dimension of Islam but
in the practice and lived experience of the religion and the country. In other words,
the difference lies in being a Malay speaking or a Thai speaking Muslim.
The main distinction between the two sections of Muslims in Thailand is that
the southerners are mono-ethnic and while the others are multi-ethnic; this also affects
their cultural orientation. The Malays are attached to Malay culture and resistant to
the Thai social and cultural practices, while the non-Malays practice a syncretic
culture of Thai social culture combined with Islam as religious belief and practice. In
terms of political views, the southern Malays have also participated in the Thai
political process. Some sections among them aspire to self-determination, while the
Thai speaking Muslims who are less in terms of number are well integrated into the
Thai political process at the national level.
The Malay Muslims of southern Thailand, like those in Malaysia, give
primacy to their ethnic identity and view their life experience from within the context
of
the
local
practice
of
Islam.
Thus
the
ritual,
mythic/narrative,
experiential/emotional, ethical and legal, social, material and political aspects of life
are all interpreted and perceived through the lenses of ethnic identity. Here ethnicity
and religion are intermixed, both of which are perceived through ethnic perspective.
In such a perspective, ethnicity is the defining characteristic of a group’s identity
which sets it apart from others. Ethno-religious perspective also serves as the
foundation for the interpretation of nationalist and religious aspirations of the group.
This combination of ethnicity and religion often results in explosive conflicts in the
23
political arena to which there are no easy solutions as seen in the ongoing southern
Thai conflict.
The phenomena of ethno-religious nationalism in the case of the southern Thai
Muslims is the result of the merging of an ethnically Malay viewpoint or local Malay
Islam with both the puritanist Wahabbi and traditionally Shafite version of Islam
acquired through studying at local and foreign educational institutions in the Middle
East and South Asia.
The recent events in southern Thailand show that intermixing of ethnicity and
religion is one dimension of the conflict which has also resulted in destroying social
relations between the Thai Muslims and Thai Buddhists who have been living as
neighbors for centuries; this is evident in the killings of both Muslims and Buddhists
including monks.42
The Malay Muslims of southern Thailand view national integration as
entailing their own cultural disintegration for, according to them, Thai Buddhism and
Malay Islam belong to two different cosmological orientations.43 “They do not want
to be integrated into the Thai state. They do not want to lose their religious and
cultural autonomy. If the Thai state is the manifestation of the Buddhist cosmology,
the Malay-Muslim do not want to be a part of it.”44 The largely ethnic orientations of
the two communities of the Thai Buddhists and the Malay Muslims have been
described as “closed systems.”45
The Malay Muslims recoil from outsiders unless they are members of the
same ethnic group or speak the Melayu language. Similarly, mere religious
conversion to Islam is not enough, rather, according to them, one has to “masuk
Melayu”—become a Malay—to be accepted as a Muslim. This process is reinforced
through loyalty to the historical memory and the role played by the ‘ulama or tok
24
gurus asserting and maintaining the ethnoreligious identity of the Malay Muslim
community.
The network of the ulama and their role as custodians of religion and ethnic
tradition makes them important players in the conflict as custodians of the Malay
culture and local Islam. For example, Haji Sulong who in 1947 made seven
ethnoreligious demands to the central government. These demands centered on the
issue of political freedom for the Malays and the preservation of Malay language, the
only religious demand put forward by him concerned the recognition and enforcement
of Muslim law.46
Since the 1980s the Thai government has undertaken several efforts to
accommodate its Muslim population into the mainstream and also succeeded in this
effort as seen through those who identify themselves as “Thai Muslims,” but there are
still sections who see themselves differently in ethnoreligious terms. The
unassimilated inspired by contemporary politicization of religion engage in
“politicization of ethnicity” or “ethnoreligious nationalism.” They engage in what is
referred to as, “regional or subnational reactions and resistances to what is seen as an
over centralized and hegemonic state, … to achieve their own regional and local
sociopolitical formations.”47 And in their case, “Religion is not purely a matter of
belief and worship; it also has social political resonances and communitarian
associations. Likewise, language is not merely a communicative device but has
implications for cultural identity and literary creation, educational advantage,
occupation, and historical legitimation of social precedence. Similarly, territory has
multiple implications, which go beyond spatial location to include charged claims
about “homelands’ and “sons [and daughters] of the soil.”48 A similar interpretation
about the southern Malay Muslim identity was affirmed by a prominent southern
25
Muslim scholar Dr. Ismae-Alee of Prince of Songkla University, when he recently
remarked that ignorance about the Malay way of life and the role of religion in it is
the cause of conflict. He also remarked that the southern Muslims have a different
lifestyle and beliefs from that of Muslims in the other parts of the country. For
example, identity, nationalism and history are rooted deeply in the psyche of southern
Muslims.49
At the level of interreligious relations, the recent violent events and killings in
southern Thailand show that the intermixing of religion and ethnicity has also resulted
in destroying social relations between the Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists who
have been living as neighbors for centuries.50 At present, Muslim-Buddhist relations
are at their lowest level, with distrust and alienation of both sides.
8 b) The Role of Chularajmontri an the Southern Thai Incidents
As of February 2007, 2088 people had died in the ongoing conflict.51 The two
2004 violent events of the Krue Se mosque in the month of April and the Takbai
incident in the month of November have become part of the southern Malay Muslim
memory. They have further aggravated the situation.
On 19 September 2007, there was a military coup against the Thaksin
Shinawatra government led by a Thai Muslim general viz., Gen. Sonthi
Boonyaratkalin. The coup and the change in policy towards dealing with the southern
unrest may help in contributing towards the resolution of the southern Thai conflict.
The coup leaders cited the following reasons for staging the coup viz., corruption,
national disunity in relation to the unrest in the South, nepotism and abuse of power as
well as insults made to the monarchy. The present interim government is led by prime
minister general Sarayud Chulanont, he was installed by the Council for National
Security (CNS) headed by General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin. Prime minister Chulanont
26
has offered an apology to the southerners for the past events of Krue Se mosque and
the Takbai incident.
The Krue Se Jihad
Since the 4th of January 2004 event there has been an increase in the religious
dimension of the conflict. As a result of the government installed martial law in the
South, the situation peaked on 28 April 2004 with attacks on 15 security posts and
police stations in Yala, Songkla and Pattani resulting in the death of 107 Muslim
militants, five security personnel and 17 arrests. 37 of the Muslim militants were
killed in the blockade of the Krue Se mosque with shoot-to-kill order. Those holding
out in the mosques are reported to have been engaged in mystical religious prayer
services comprising recitation of sacred verses and drinking of holy water after the
evening prayer. The militants were led into believing that these rituals would make
them invisible to the police and make them invulnerable to bullets fired at them.52
These young militants are suspected to be members of a radical religious cell called
Hikmat Allah Abadan or Abadae (Brotherhood of the Eternal Judgement of God)
centered around a religious teacher by the name of Ustaz Soh.53 The cell was
secretive, cell members were indoctrinated with ideology of hate for the Thai
Buddhist and separatist aspirations cast in mystical Sufi interpretation.
The violent event at the Krue Se mosque shocked the nation and came to be
interpreted in the Muslim world as clash between minority Muslims and a repressive
Thai Buddhist state.54
Immediately following the incident, the Chularajmontri commented that, “The
government tried to make them surrender but they fought back and they had to act to
clean them out.”55 In a following televised interview, the Chularajmontri was
27
reported in the media to have “sided with the government against the popular
sentiment of Muslims by suggesting that the use of force against 32 suspected
insurgents holed up at the historic Krue Se mosque in Pattani was appropriate.”56 The
majority of the Thai Muslims in the South and other parts of the country were angered
by such comments coming from the Chularajmontri their official religious leader.
From then on the Chularajmontri has been viewed by the Thai Muslims in negative
light. The Krue Se event and the Chularajmontri’s response resulted in ending the
active role of Chularajmontri in resolving the southern conflict
The majority of the interviewees for this study criticized the Chularajmontri
for taking side with the government and remarked that he should not have made such
a statement.
Being a religious leader he should have refrained
and remained
independent. Some accused him of being a rubber stamp of the government. The
statement from the Chularajmontri has resulted in the southern Muslims distrust of
him. Others remarked that the Chularajmontri could have played a positive role in
resolving the southern crisis but in light of his statement, it does not seem so. Being
more than 88 years old he is seen as ineffective leader. Some respondents commented
that in view of the above made statements, the Chularajmontri has lost his legitimacy
as a leader of the Thai Muslim community. In light of the above mentioned blunder
by the Chularajmontri, the southern Muslims prefer to follow their ulama – their own
local religious leaders in preference to the Chularajmontri.
After the Krue Se incident a 34-pages book in Jawi/Malay language book
titled, “Berjihad di Pattani” was found on the body of a dead militant. The book
published in Kelantan, Malaysia uses the teachings of the Qur’an urging Jihad to
separate Pattani, extermination of people of different religious faiths, even one’s
parents if they leak information to the government.57 Chapter 1 of the book talks of
28
“jihad warriors” to engage in a religious war against “those outside the religion” for
the revival of the Pattani state. Chapter 3 talks of killing all opponents even it be one’s
parents, and to sacrifice one’s life in order to go to heaven to be with Allah. It
concludes by suggesting the formation of a constitutional state of Pattani based on
Sunni Shafii school of law.58 The reference to Shafii Islam refers to the traditional
Islam of the Pattani Malays distinguishing it from the Wahhabi inspired Islam which
is a later arrival in southern Thailand, hence, its criticism by Dr. Ismail Lutfi,
Rector of Yala Islamic College, a Wahhabi outfit.59 Yet, this is the first time that
direct references to the Qur’anic verses in relation to the southern Thai conflict calling
it a jihad. It may have been influenced by jihadist texts that have emerged in the
Middle East such as the al-Farida al-Gha’iba by Muhammad Farraj which inspired
the assassins of president Sadat of Egypt in 198160 and also other similar jihadist
texts such as those by Maulana Abul al-Maududi of Pakistan and Sayyid Qutb of
Egypt. The Berjihad text reads as follows:
From Allah we come and to Him we shall return.
Every soul will taste death …
The pen (writer) will also die, but the writing shall continue to survive.
Carried over by religious preachers (Da’wah), they shall inherit words
and take over the leadership. I name them as Wira Shuhada
(martyrdom fighters). Imam Shaheed, the Radiance of Jihad. The Wira
Shuhada will rise in Pattani with the radiance of Jihad Fi-Sabilillah
(Struggle in the Path of Allah). Wira Shuhada will come to the
children of the land (Pattani) who are in state of ignorance and
obsessed with material wealth and power.61
The dead at the Krue Se mosque were treated by their relatives as martyrs
(shuhada), whose corpses were buried unwashed following the prophet Muhammad’s
29
practice regarding the burial ritual of his companions who had died in the battles with
the Meccans.
The Chularajmontri along with the National Council of Islamic Affairs called
for the destruction of the above mentioned book and appointed a nine-member
committee to write a rebuttal in Thai language.62 The rebuttal titled, “Facts about the
Distortion of Islamic Teachings as Appeared in ‘The Struggle for Pattani’ (Berjihad
di Pattani) “ was published and distributed widely.63
Incidentally, the Krue Se mosque event took place on the same date as that of
“Dusun Nyur” rebellion of 26-28 April 1948, which was the first major uprising
against Bangkok after Pattani was annexed by Siam. That event, too, employed
Islamic mystical elements such as bathing in holy oil for immortality and wearing of
holy robes.64
The Takbai Incident
The violent Takbai
incident took place during the month of
Ramadan
coinciding with 25th October 2004, when a total of 86 Muslims died as a result of
demonstration outside Takbai district police station against the jailing of some local
Muslim suspected of being behind the violent incidents in the South. Six persons died
on the scene when soldiers and police moved against the rioters, while 78 died of
suffocation as they were put on trucks piled one upon another and transported to a
military camp. This incident became a major point of controversy about the methods
used in dealing with the situation. There were charges of using excessive force, harsh
methods and neglecting of human rights in dealing with the situation on ground.65
There were demands from the Thai public that Prime Minister Thaksin should
30
apologize for
mishandling the incident.66 The Takbai incident only resulted in
increased violence and killings.
After receiving sever criticism from the public relating to his comments
concerning the Krue Se mosque incident the Chularajmontri refrained from saying
anything regarding Takbai incident.
9) The Dai Program
In the view of the appearance of localized mystical and radicalized version of
Islam which was committed to jihad through the Krue Se and the Takbai incidents the
office of the Chularajmontri initiated the Dai (Islamic propagation) program in the
deep South. The program was carried out in cooperation with local religious leaders.
The aim of the program was to wean away especially the youth from being
recruited into the insurgent plot as being a jihad.67
The goal of the Dai program was to disseminate correct religious
understanding of the idea of jihad among the southerner through local dais - religious
propagators/scholars. The task before the religious propagators was to present a nonviolent interpretation of the southern unrest by explaining the historical, ethnic and
religious dimensions of the southern conflict.
The program was aimed at stopping
the spreading popularity of the religion-and violence-based interpretation of the
conflict among the southern Muslims.
The Dai program was conducted through 150 Imams visiting and propagating
religious teachings about peace in the 1,700 mosques in the three deep southern
provinces especially after the Friday congregational prayers.
The program has now taken a low profile due to attacks on the Imams
participating in the program.
31
10) New Islamic Administrative Bill 2007
In view of the continuing violence in the South and the need for effective role
to be played by the Chularajmontri, the national and provincial committees of Islamic
affairs, the Sarayud government set up an advisory team to give advice on how to
engage the chairmen of the Provincial Councils of Islamic Affairs in the deep South
more efficiently in order to deal with the southern crisis.
The advisory team proposed reorganizing the whole setup of Islamic affairs
management in the country. The team drafted a new Islamic Affairs Administration
bill aimed at revamping and replacing the current 1997 Islamic Organization
Administration Act and the 1981 and 1989 Hajj Affairs Promotion Acts. The draft
bill suggested setting up a national Islamic affairs office within the prime minister’s
office similar to the status of the current office of national Buddhism.68 In the team’s
opinion all the occupants of all religious officials at all levels be selected after
screening, this would replace the current of process electing the Chularajmontri, and
the members of the national and provincial councils of Islamic affairs.69 One reason
for this suggestion is to eliminate the possibility of candidates resorting to corrupt
practices such as vote buying during the elections for the seats as members of the
Islamic committees both at the national and provincial levels. Another reason for
reformation of Islamic affairs committees at the provincial level is to check or weed
out local southern religious leaders who may sympathize with the insurgent
separatists.70
The draft of the new Islamic Affairs Administration bill was submitted to the
post-coup appointed National Legislative Assembly on 6 April 2007. The bill calls
for:
32
1) The creation of 31 member National Islamic Council or Shura –
consultative body chaired by the Chularajmontri which will oversee the selection of
the Islamic religious leaders throughout the country. The Chularajmontri will be
selected from among the members of the National Committee for Islamic Affairs.
2) The National Committee for Islamic Affairs will work as a legislative body
which will consider and interpret controversial religious issues. Members of the
National Committee for Islamic Affairs will consist of Islamic leaders and experts
selected from registered Islamic religious schools across the country.
3) That the present Chularajmontri would remain in office for another 360
days upon the passage of the bill into law. The bill does not stipulate his term of office
leaving it to the legislators to decide upon the matter.
However, the members of the National Legislative Assembly did not pass
the bill. A Thai Muslim member of the National Legislative Assembly, Dr. Surin
Pitsuwan, called for holding of more public hearings and to put the bill on hold until
an elected government is in place. Other religious leaders opined
that public
participation can not be overlooked in managing religious affairs at the provincial and
national levels.71 The bill is currently on hold at the National Legislative Assembly.
11) Conclusion
The on-going conflict in southern Thailand does not show any signs of ending.
In fact, its intensity has increased in spite of the interim government’s apology and
change of policy from that of using force to peaceful strategy and seeking of
dialogue.
The interim Prime Minister has offered a public apology to the southerners for
the mistakes committed by the previous government and has opted for the method of
33
dialogue with the local Muslims.72 But in spite of all this, violence is on the increase
and there are now more intra-Malay Muslim killings taking place than before. Many
Malay Muslims who are government officials such as headmen of
villages or
teachers and those suspected of being government informants have been attacked or
killed by the insurgents.
Furthermore, as the number of victims rise amidst daily killings, bombing and
attacks on the public and security personnel by the insurgents, the conciliatory and
pro-dialogue policy of the interim government had come under severe criticism both
from public and the press.73
The office of the Chularajmontri which since 1945 has been assigned with
the task of assisting the state in building reconciliation between the state and the
southern Malay Muslims has failed in achieving its objective. It has also not been able
to assist the state in the process of building horizontal equalities in relation to the
southern Malay Muslims. The southern Muslims grievances concerning the cultural
insensitivity of the state officials posted in the South from other Thai provinces
remains a major complain. Since there is a little chance that Thailand will institute a
minorities commission as a forum for the expression and addressing of minorities
issues hence the need to revamp and use existing institutions such as that of the
Chularajmontri for the purpose of assistance in building human security.
Security will be restored only through adopting measures such as those of
allowing for the option of self-governance and recognition of the cultural diversity
within the country. The government and the Chularajmontri should undertake efforts
to build trust by working with local religious, political and social leaders, promote
civil society activities against drugs and for the promotion of peace and education,
etc. The election of a southerner Chularajmontri in the future will help alleviate the
34
distrust between the center and the southern periphery – an economically backward
region of Thailand. The Chularajmontri should maintain moral independence of his
status and should not be a mouthpiece of the government; this will improve his moral
standing within the Thai Muslim community.
In order to win the southerners’ trust, the government should undertake
measures to build horizontal equalities through implementation of economic and
educational programs, the present interim government is already committed to such
undertaking. It is hoped that this will be pursued by the next elected government. This
will help in the promotion of the recognition and acceptance of ethnic and cultural
diversity which exists not only in the context of southern Malay Muslim community
but also in the rest of Thailand.
Just as we undertake measures to reduce the negative impacts of economic
and social marginalization there should be efforts to treat cultural marginalization by
building cultural security. And this is not incompatible within a democratic
environment.
35
Endnotes
Human Rights Watch, “No one Is Safe” Vol. 19, No. 13 (c), August 2007, p. 5. Available
at: accessed on 14 September 2007.
1
2
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (Washington. D. C. :
Communications Development Inc. 2003) p. 4. Available at: www.humansecurity-chs.org
accessed 8 August 2007.
3
The former Malay Sultanate of “Patani” is now spelled as Pattani in Thai language.
Joel Selway, “Turning Malays into Thai-men: nationalism, ethnicity and economic
inequality” Southeast Asia Research Vol. 15 no. 1 (2007) p. 56.
4
5
Ibrahim Syukri, The Malay Kingdom of Patani (Chiangmai: Silkworm Books, 2005) p. 23,
32.
Richard W. Bulliet, “The Shaikh al-Islam and the Evolution of Islamic Society” Studia
Islamica No. 35 (1972) pp. 53-67.
6
7
Ibid., p. 58-59.
8
Raymond Scupin, “Thai Muslims in Bangkok: Islam and Modernization in a Buddhist
Society” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 1978) p. 1–2.
9
Suthep Soonthornpasuch, “Islamic Identity in Chiengmai City: A Historical and Structural
Comparison of Two Communities” (Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1977), pp. 37–75.
Raymond Scupin, “Thai Muslims in Bangkok: Islam and Modernization in a Buddhist
Society” pp. 19–29.
10
Raymond Scupin, “Cham Muslims of Thailand: A Haven of Security in Southeast Asian.”
JOURNAL Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs 10 (1989): 486-491. Also Seddik Taouti,
“The Forgotten Muslims of Kampuchea and Vietnam,” JOURNAL Institute of Muslim
Minority Affairs 4 (1982): 3–13. See also David Wilson and David Henley, “Northern
Comfort: The Contented Muslims of Chiang Mai.” Bangkok Post Outlook Section, January
4, 1995, pp. 33, 40.
11
Raymond Scupin, “Islam in Thailand Before the Bangkok Period,” Journal of Siam Society
68 (1980): 55–71.
12
See Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam s.v. “Ismailiya” and “Shi’a”. And Moojan Momen, An
Introduction to Shi'i Islam (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987).
13
14
John O’ Kane, The Ship of Sulaiman (London: Routledge, 2007).
Omar Farouk, “Shaikh Ahmad: Muslims in the Kingdom of Ayutthaya,” JEBAT – Journal
of the History Department Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia” 10 (1980/1) 206-14. Also
Raymond Scupin, “Islam in Thailand Before the Bangkok Period,” 63-64.
15
36
16
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of
Southern Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University, 1985), p.
100.
17
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern
Thailand p. 104.
Wan Kadir Che Man, The Administration of Islamic Institutions in Non-Muslim States –
The Case of Singapore and Thailand (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991)
p. 4. Currently, there are 45 members in the NCIA and PCIA in 36 provinces of the country.
18
Eiji Murashima, “The Origin of Modern Official State Ideology in Thailand” Journal of
Southeast Asian Studies Vol. XIX, no. 1 (1988) : 80-96.
19
Imtiyaz
Yusuf, “Islam and Democracy in Thailand: Reforming the Office of
Chularajmontri/Shaikh al-Islam” Journal of Islamic Studies 9:2 (1998) : 277-298
20
21
Ali Rahnema (ed.) Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 2005).
22
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern
Thailand p. 104.
23
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of Malay-Muslims of Southern
Thailand (Bangkok: Thai Khadi Research Institute Thammasat University, 1985) pp. 146–65.
M. Ladd Thomas, “Thai Muslim Separatism in South Thailand” ” in The Muslims of
Thailand Vol 2, edited by Andrew D. W. Forbes, General Editor, Sachchidanand Sahai
(Gaya, India: Center For South East Asian Studies, 1989) p. 21.
24
25
Wan Kadir Che Man, Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the
Malays of Southern Thailand (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1990) p. 165.
The term “horizontal inequalities” is borrowed from Frances Stewart, Horizontal
Inequalities: A Neglected Dimension of Development Working Paper 1, (Oxford: Center for
Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, October 2003) p. 2.
26
27
28
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 10.
29
Frances Stewart, Development and Security Working Paper 3, (Oxford: Center for
Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, October 2003) p. 16.
Joel Selway, “Turning Malays into Thai-men: nationalism, ethnicity and economic
inequality” p. 58.
30
31
32
33
34
Ibid., p. 60
These figures are taken from Selway, ibid., p. 56, 61.
Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 8.
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now p. 4.
37
35
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now. p. 21.
Kavi Chongkittavorn, “Much expected from NRC report on becalming South” The Nation,
13 March, 2006; “NRC feels continuity is key to peace” Bangkok Post, 23 March, 2006, p. 5;
“NRC formally completes task” Bangkok Post, 28 March, 2006, p. 5;
36
37
Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now. p. 33.
38
Neera Chandhoke, Beyond Secularism The Rights of Religious Minorities (New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 2002) p. 16.
39
Ibid.. p. 16.
40
Jonathan Fox, Ethnoreligious Conflict in Late Twentieth Century A General Theory
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002) p. 26.
Omar Farouk “The Muslims of Thailand” in Lutfi Ibrahim (ed.) ISLAMIKA (Kuala
Lumpur: Sarjana Enterprise, 1981) p. 97–121.
41
“Buddhists, Muslims on path to mistrust and fear” The Nation, 13 March, 2004, p. 6A;
Sanitsuda Ekachai, “What can the generals have been thinking” Bangkok Post, 5 August,
2004, p. 11; “Buddhists tell PM they live in fear” Bangkok Post, 8 November, 2004, p. 1;
“Violence doesn’t spare even peace-loving Buddhist monks” Bangkok Post, 4 January, 2005,
p. 4.
42
43
Surin Pitsuwan, Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case study of Malay-Muslims of Southern
Thailand, p. 8, 12.
Ibid., p. 13. See also, Surin Pitsuwan, “The Cosmology of the Southern Conflict” in
Understanding Conflict and Approaching Peace in Southern Thailand eds. Imtiyaz Yusuf
and Lars Peter Schmidt (Bangkok: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2006) pp. 281-293.
44
Donald Tugby and Elise Tugby, “Malay-Muslim and Thai-Buddhist Relations in the Pattani
Region: An Interpretation” in The Muslims of Thailand Vol. 2, eds. edited by Andrew D. W.
Forbes, General Editor, Sachchidanand Sahai (Gaya, India: Center For South East Asian
Studies, 1989) p. 73.
45
M. Ladd Thomas, “Thai Muslim Separatism in South Thailand” ” in The Muslims of
Thailand Vol 2, edited by Andrew D. W. Forbes, General Editor, Sachchidanand Sahai
(Gaya, India: Center For South East Asian Studies, 1989) p. 21.
46
47
Stanley J. Tambiah, Levelling Crowds Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence
in South Asia (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) p. 16.
48
Ibid., p. 22.
49
“Ignorance ‘cause of unrest’ ” Bangkok Post, May 12, 2006, p. 2.
“Buddhists, Muslims on path to mistrust and fear” The Nation, March 13, 2004, p. 6A;
Sanitsuda Ekachai, “What can the generals have been thinking” Bangkok Post, August 5,
2004, p. 11; “Buddhists tell PM they live in fear” Bangkok Post, November 8, 2004, p. 1;
“Violence doesn’t spare even peace-loving Buddhist monks” Bangkok Post, January 4,
2005, p. 4; Pradit Ruangdit “Stirring Religion into the cauldron” Bangkok Post, January 19,
2007, p. 12.
50
38
“Soft Approach in the South Failing” in The Nation 19 March 2007. Available at:
http://www.nationmultimedia.com
51
52
“Militants say fugitive cleric incited unrest” Bangkok Post, 13 May 2004, p. 1.
International Crisis Group, “Southern Thailand Insurgency, Not Jihad” p. 21 available at:
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/south_east_asia/098_southern_thailand_in
surgency_not_jihad.pdf
53
Imtiyaz Yusuf, “The Southern Thailand Conflict and the Muslim World” Journal of
Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 2, August 2007 forthcoming.
54
“Thai Muslim Leader Endorses Government Handling of Southern Crisis” The Nation, 29
April 2004, available at www.nationmultimedia.com
55
“Chula Rajamontri Calls for Unity”
www.nationmultimedia.com
56
57
The Nation, 30 April 2004, available at
“Countering Distortions” Bangkok Post, 10 June 2004, p. 11.
“Koran rewrite upsets PM” Bangkok Post, 6 June, 2004, p. 1.
Imtiyaz Yusuf, “Faces of Islam in Southern Thailand” Working Paper no. 7 (Washington,
D. C.: East-West Center, 2007).
58
59
60
Johannes Jansen, The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic
Resurgence in the Middle East, (MacMillan Publishing Company, 1986).
61
English translation of Berjihad di Pattani in Rohan Gunaratna, Arabinda Acharya,
Sabrina Chua, Conflict and Terrorism in Southern Thailand (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish
Academic, 2005) p. 119.
62
“Call to destroy ‘jihad manuals’ ” Bangkok Post, 11 June, 2004, p. 4.
63
“A welcome step by moderate Muslims” The Nation, 8 December, 2004.
Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “The Silence of the Bullet Monument Violence and “Truth”
Management, Dusun-nyor 1948, and Kru-Ze 2004” Critical Asian Studies 38/1 (2006) ; 1137.
64
65
“Extreme crowd control” Bangkok Post Perspective Section, 7 November, 2004, p. 1.
66
“Academics demand apology” Bangkok Post 8 November, 2004, p. 1.
“Tackling Koran Distortions” Bangkok Post, 20 June, 2005, p. 4; “Dissemination Down
South” Bangkok Post, 14 July, 2005, p. 11.
67
68
69
“Advisers Suggest National Islamic Affairs Office” Bangkok Post, 10 January, 2007, p. 2.
Ibid.
“Shura Council To Be Formed for South” The Nation, 23 March 2007 available at
www.nationmultimedia.com
70
39
“Muslim Scholars and Leaders Don’t Agree with New Bill” Bangkok Post, 7 April, 2007,
p. 3.
71
72
“Surayud apologizes for govt's abuses in South” The Nation, November 3, 2006, p. 1.
“ A Failure on all fronts in South” The Nation, May 12, 2007; “Harsh Realities Mar Peace
efforts in South” The Nation, May 16, 2007 both available at www.nationmultimedia.com
73