Copyright © 2012
Avello Publishing Journal
ISSN: 2049 - 498X
Issue 1 Volume 2:
The Unconscious
META-ONTOLOGY AND SYSTEM THEORY TOWARDS A LOGICAL AND
PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO COMPLEXITY
Fausto Fraisopi, University of Freiburg, Germany.
Ontology as a science of being as such and System Theory have never been considered as two
fundamental aspects of the same enquiry, from the holistic point of view. In order to explain the
possibility of bridging gaps between a philosophical and a systemic approach to complexity, we
will try to define four basic principles that can articulate a method for understanding,
interpreting, and building many-dimensional models which can be applied to complex
phenomena. The dimensions of this object (model) as a meta-theoretic model are regional
ontologies as singular frameworks that are able to fix certain aspects of the exponential
complexity of manifestation. If the complex phenomenon is the manifestation of an object that
exceeds the simple form of “objectivity” given within a singular “frame,” our model will provide
for new ideas to organize not only more classes of objects, but ontologies in themselves in the
horizon of the “Life / world.” This will show in which sense Holism can represents the horizon of
the contemporary philosophical and systemic approach to complexity. In his introduction to
Philosophy of Complex Systems, Cliff Hooker affirms: The impact of complex systems on science
is a recent, ongoing and profound revolution. But a few honourable exceptions, it has largely been
ignored by scientists and philosophers alike as an object of a reflective study. Unfortunately, those
“honourable exceptions” of reflective studies didn't touch the question of being or ontological or
meta-ontological modeling of a Complex Systems as such.
1
System Theory as a contemporary approach to complexity is an interdisciplinary
approach to “objects” that require non-classical modeling. System Theory also requires a radical
discussion about the “nature” of “objects” that cannot be reduced to the classical model of
“phenomenality.” From a phenomenological point of view, the complex phenomenon is the
manifestation of an object that exceeds the simple form of Gegenständlichkeit given
by a singular “frame” or a singular “regional ontology.” Introducing multi-disciplinarity in the
field of ontology, the phenomenological approach to the “complexity of manifestation” brings
about a new idea of Ontology as such. Both quantum mechanics and the analysis of CAS
(Complex adaptive systems)3 have shown that there are many manifestations of nature for which
modeling requires a framing of frames, a framing between (regional) ontologies which together
(in their systemic organization) can grasp and fix the richness of such objects.
I aim to propose a meta-ontological model for the systemic approach that is based on an analogy
with knowledge engineering. This model consists of a “meta-theoric object” whose parts are
regional ontologies and the informational treatment of any kind of object that a singular frame
can give. In the same way that Riemann’s geometry has broadened the intuitive, naïve approach
to the object of space by introducing the systematization of many-dimensional spaces, the metaontological approach to ontology can introduce the systematization of dimensions of metatheoric objects as regional ontologies. In providing a new model of “ontology” (and not only of
“objects”) the phenomenological and logical approach to complexity can define, on the side of
philosophy, some logical and epistemological principles. First I shall introduce and define the
principle of ontological complexity. This principle states that complexity or ontological
complexity consists of a manifestation in which the richness exceeds the treatment of
information from a single frame (regional ontology).
What is “Complexity”? Edgar Morin, who is among the pioneers of Complexity Theory, answers
the question in this manner: “On first sight, Complexity is a tissue (complexities means “what is
2
tossed together) of heterogeneous constituents inseparably associated. Complexity presents us
regional Ontologies and only discernible from an interdisciplinary point of view. The metatheoretic object called “Complexity” appears to be the cardinal theme of a scientific and
epistemological reflection that develops in two principal ways: first, as a study of complex
Systems and emergent “global” phenomena that is understandable through the models of
complex systems; second, as a theoretical reflection on the philosophical, logical and
epistemological basis that allows us to orient, integrate and give an historical background to this
first part of our research. Complexity Theory – essentially determined by interdisciplinarity – is
the larger domain in which can be founded, for example, studies of adaptive Systems, studies
about AI and knowledge engineering, studies about computational Complexity, Cybernetics, and
studies about physical theory of chaos. Problems such as those concerning geopolitics,
migrations, sustainable development, contemporary urbanism, and global economy6 can only be
approached, at present, from the point of view of Complexity. This latter, however, has yet to
be firmly established as a philosophical discipline.
The origin of the idea of Complexity can be found at the point where the Cartesian paradigm
of “objectum purum et simplex” and of “ego cogito” collapses under the weight of recent
discoveries in Quantum Mechanics, Logic and Mathematics – and, more generally, due to the crisis
of the fundamentals of science in the first three decades of the 20th century. The awareness of the
limits of the traditional idea of the relationship between subject and object [Subjekt-Objekt
Beziehung], which presupposes a disinterested and neutral subject (as the Baconian
kosmoqewroς), shows new horizons of knowledge and new ideas, such as the idea of a systemic
Complexity. This latter is not only understandable as the Complexity of this or that other system
– as if a more powerful subject (integrated by linear computational tools) could make complexity
linear and reduce it to the traditional domain of objects – but furthermore as “complexitysystem,” as a set of situations, as a context, as a horizon wherein every subject, observer and
3
object finds itself in a reciprocal, constitutive interaction.
The field of research defined by the perspective of complexity can lead classical philosophical
theory (for example, Ontology, rational Psychology, Ethics) to a virtual interaction with enquiries
that are traditionally different from and external to the domain of philosophical questioning.
The fact that, for example, complex algorithmic models are used in computing and technical
analyses of brain processes are performed, not only opens new epistemological fields of research
– such as those pertaining to the cognitive sciences, AI, the theory of complex Mathematics –We
shall acknowledge, first of all, that in order for a system to be defined as “complex,” a
minimum number of parameters or structures or analysis are required for its description. As
such, we can see the obvious opposition between the idea of complexity and the ontological
paradigm of Cartesian object, objectum purum et simplex. For if the definition of complexity
depends on multiple parameters (and many proportional structures of analysis) that are required
to build a determined model, it follows that Complexity is not an intrinsic property of objects but
something that is projected on a informational stock by a modeling subject. That is to say that
complexity belongs not to the thing in itself (the “Ding an sich” of the Kantian theory of
experience and epistemology), but rather belongs to the theory ladenness10 that the modeling
subject applies to the informational stock. This subject is consequently not constituted from an
ontologically fixed set of cognitive categories, but only from the capacity of forming modular
ontological models of objectivity – in interaction with its environment, with the semantic field,
and thus completely opposed to the image of a kosmoqewroς.
If we consider, for example, the case of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS), we can see that the
complex adaptive beings are capable of developing new operative structures through experience
and operation. We can characterize these Systems in themselves as objects in a very special
sense, that is to say as objects that can actively develop sub-sets of feed-back actions due to the
need to increase their dynamic relationship with their environment. In the domain of CAS there
4
is a large set of phenomena that escape the traditional form of Ontology and the classical theory
of the object: organic systems, micro- and macro-climatic systems, social systems, economical
systems, for example. A CAS can be described as an instable aggregate of agents and
connections, self-organized to warrant to themselves their adaptation to environment. In
following with Holland11, a CAS is a system emerging in time under a coherent form, adapting
and organizing itself without a singular form of identity and without a singular intentional
control. Adaptation is acquired by the constant redefinition of the relation between the system
and its environment (co-evolution).
The adaptive nature of the system exposes the subject – the “observer” – to emergent
comportments that are determined by the organization of sub-structures and individual parts of
systems, by auto-organization as well as to phenomena of spontaneous re-adaptation that cannot
be fixed from “classical theories” (standard theories) of objects. In this way, these types of
objects – insofar as they are thematic objects of an epistemological inquiry – escape the he field of
philosophical enquiries, an explicit and massive elaboration from the ontological
point of view. In spite of this significant elaboration, systemics did not radically develop the
ontological problems of Complexity by orienting itself towards the question of possible
applications to technology. In other words, the intellectual and philosophical movement of
Systemics failed to acknowledge the deeply rooted relationship between ontological questions
and practical problems of Complexity. The richness and epistemological importance of
Systemics must be achieved by ontological developments of inner structure of complex systems.
This becomes clear upon consideration of both the genesis and the forms of development of the
systemic approach. The idea of a System essentially comes from engineering. Furthermore, all
applications of Systemics, in all fields of knowledge, are oriented without a rigorous inquiry
concerning its fundamental concepts and philosophical foundation. Systems are not yet of a
philosophical and ontological nature because the concept itself is foreign to the field of classical
5
Ontology and ontological questioning.
This dynamic synergy between different disciplines has contributed to the development of
Systemics and has also generated an exponential enrichment of the complex phenomena –
without, however, developing a philosophical inquiry into the nature of phenomena in a complex
field of Modeling. While this idea of Systems, which is a definitive acquisition from Complexity
Theory, is found in complex mathematics (the theory of computational and algorithmic
Complexity), we do not at present know what it is to which – ontologically speaking – this
computational thinking can be applied. It is precisely so as to understand complexity as an
“entity” and to present a project of knowledge that is powerful enough to grasp complex
situations that we have constructed and developed our meta-ontological idea of modeling.
In order to answer the question about the possibility of a Mathesis universalis, that is to say about
an idea of knowledge that should both comprehend and shape the complexity of manifestation
(and, from an historical point of view, the emergence of the idea of complexity as such), it is
necessary to study the ways in which Complexity – as a thematic problem for philosophy – has
thus far been defined in the field of traditional (Galilean and Cartesian) philosophy and science.
This means that we must study Complexity as non-homgeneous phenomenal emergence in the
ontological and epistemological horizon of the Neuzeit. Complexity was first defined as a
philosophical and epistemological problem at the point of awareness of the contradiction
between the philosophy of the Neuzeit and the epistemological problem of classical science.
Methodological principle: complexity (or ontological complexity or complexity from an
ontological point of view) consists of a manifestation whose richness exceeds the treatment
of information of a singular frame (regional ontology). What is a regional ontology? In what
sense does a regional Ontology exceed a formal Ontology?
6
Furthermore, in what sense does Complexity exceed a regional Ontology, thus also exceeding
the formal characterization of beings provided by a formal Ontology? We shall try to
understand the emergence of complexity from the point of view of Phenomenology, that
appears essentially as a “radically ontological un-engaged” questioning:
The distinction between formal and material Ontology in Phenomenology is that between the
formal and the empirical: formal Ontology is descriptive and involves analytic a priori judgements
while regional Ontologies involve synthetic a priori judgements. In its most general sense, formal
ontology is concerned with characterizing the simple “something.” Depending on how this
“something” is conceived, Husserl adds, the “province of a formal ontology is said to be the
'formal region' of the object as conceived generally.”
Nevertheless, regional Ontologies can instead be conceived of as material Ontologies from a
non-genetic yet descriptive point of view: they are cognitive partitions of the world, giving
special accounts of the nature of a limited (though variable) range of entities. Regional
Ontologies derive the form of a certain something that is given (in its full coherent determination)
by formal Ontology. However, this articulation between the determination of this “certain
something” [gewisses Etwas], which is provided by the formal, and the determination of the
determination must accept a surplus (a residual rate) of phenomenality that is noncomprehensible and non-compressible by the system of determination. We can conceive of the
formal ontology as a syntactic system, as a class of rules that provide the structure of apophantic
determination of objects as objects, in their formal structure. Similarly, we can also define
regional Ontologies as semantic systems, providing to present the representative content of
certain classes of beings each time integrated to the formal structure of object.
If a certain manifestation A is supposed be determinable by the class of formal predicates: FO=
{f1, f2, f3….fn} and by a certain class of empirical or regional predicates ROx={r1, r2, r3…rn}, in
the complex phenomena there is at less a property (ax) that can’t be determined by the cartesian
7
articulation between FO and RO.
From a meta-theoretical perspective, it can be assumed that formal ontology only provides the
form of a theory, whereas regional ontology implements this empty form with a concrete
framework of that theory. Formal Ontology and Regional Ontology in Husserl’s phenomenological
language, grammar and ideology in Quine's, both must be integrated with another fundamental
element – one that gives ontology its capacitiesto present the world – image (objective world). This
element is the ontological commitment by Quine, the attribution of transcendence by Husserl and
the existieren of Meinong. PRINCIPLE OF ONTOLOGICAL FRAMING AS META-THEORY:
we can conceive of frames as mereo-logical components of a model of objects whose parts are
theory, frames, and ontologies. This mereo-topo-logical composition provides the so called
The construction of meta-theoric or meta-ontological objects is the same of construction of
multi-dimensionnal algebraic spaces: in meta-ontological modeling we try to give to any
ontological determination a particular topology. Our approach must, at this point, enrich the metaontological principle with a rigorous interpretation of the historical and structural limits of the
traditional method of ontological determination. Ontology appears, in the conceptual space of a
phenomenological approach to Complexity, as a three-dimensional object in a conceptual space: the
first dimension is that of the syntax or grammar of an ontological theory; the second dimension that
of semantics or ideology;the third dimension represents the ontological commitment. This is the
result of projection of two-dimensional system of determination on the ground (the horizon) of
experience: sense data or, in a more sophisticated conception, the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt).
At this point in our inquiry, we can arrive at the same question that Bernard Riemann has raised
in relation to space, which is the following: why must the space be necessarily three-dimensional?
If we surpass the naïve ontology of a linear three-dimensional space to the point of arriving at a
non-linear three-dimensional space, then why can we not posit a space that is not necessarily
linear or three-dimensional?
8
Regarding ontology, we find ourselves in exactly the same situation. In other words, the threedimensionality of ontology as a system of determination of phenomenal entities is the same as
the Euclidean presupposition of a fixed ontology of space. What is it that forces us to accept an
ontological theory as necessarily articulated in a three-dimensional way? Why must ontology, as
a system for determining entities of our phenomenal world, not have more than three
dimensions?
We are here in a different position, not more an ontological position, that is to say, we are no
more in an ontological context. For the naïve approach to Phenomenality, the ontology is the
three-dimensional space in which objects and entities are localizable, and on the basis of this
three-dimensionality we can determine their interactions. This is a meta-ontological situation, in
a meta-ontological dimension, in which, instead of objects and entities, ontologies as objects and
entities find their places. On the basis of this dimensionality we can determine their “possible”
interactions.
Meta-ontology is neither an object nor a theory of higher order, but rather a cognitive space. It
is within this space that we see, observe, and describe the different structures as well as the
different kinds of theories, among which we also find many different configurations of ontology.
Meta-ontology is not synonymous with Meta-theory: is an application of Meta-theory to the
problem of determination of being. But the problems of Meta-theory still remain. But what is real?
Is it not merely a tautology? Real is what there is ? And what is there? In following with the
beginning of Quine's From a Logical Point of View it can be answered everything. There is a
remarkable difference between an ontological commitment and a meta- ontological commitment,
which lies in the proportion between the complexity of the model and
the steadiness of our commitment about reality. In other words, the weakness of the
commitment is proportional to the complexity of the model. With a concept – insofar as it
9
results from a morphogenetic process of stabilization – our commitment cannot be stronger
instead, with a very complex meta-ontological model of understanding, our commitment about
reality is asymptotically close to zero. Reality is almost totally absorbed by the model. There
necessarily remains, however, a psychological residue which allows us to stay in the field of
knowledge, in the horizon of science, thereby breaking through the limit of the Cartesian
paradigm and its absolutism. There always remains, as a residuum, a proto-thesis about the
existence of reality independent from modeling. That is the key to understanding and
interpreting holism from a non-metaphysical perspective. As a project of understanding of
reality, the holistic position is always necessarily a part of that reality that cannot be absorbed by
a meta-ontological modeling. There does not exist a complete meta-ontology for reality.
Moreover, meta-ontology is not an object as such but an open contextual perspective.
Bibliography
HUSSERL, E., Formal and Transcendental Logic, M. Nijoff, The Hague, 1969, 106.
QUINE W. v. O., From a logical point of view, Cambridge (Mass.), Harvard University Press, 1953, 1.
QUINE W.V. O., Ontological relativity and other essays, New York – London, Columbia University
Press, 1969,
26-68.
VAN INWAGEN P., Existence, Ontological Commitment, and Fictional Enities, in LOUX M.J. −
VAN INWAGEN, P., Meta-Ontology, in Erkenntnis, 48, 1998, 233-250.
WELTY J. − SMITH B. (ed.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems. Collected Papers from the
Second international Conference, ACM Press, New York, 2001.
ZIMMERMANN D.W. (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2003, 131157.
10