Comments on “Analysis and Continuity: Representing the First Hungarian
Soviet Republic” by Peter Apor
(Paper in Bo Stråth’s seminar series “Rewriting History”, given the 6 th of
March 2000)
In general it is a very interesting paper, which deals with many issues of general
interest to historians apart from being a very interesting inquiry into Hungarian
history. The following comments regard mainly some of the concepts used and
discussed in the paper, principally continuity vs. rupture/change, identity, and
history/History.
I think you are completely right in stressing that the Hungarian Communists
regarded history in a similar manner as in ancient Greece (as magistra vitae) and
as in the Classical period (in terms of “identical items”), and that the main scope
of history was to “learn” from it in order to solve current problems. But I think
this is a practice, which is often used in history as official discourse. Probably it
is even more so in authoritarian/totalitarian regimes where alternative discourses,
per definition, do not exist. The “learning” is always decided on prior to the
construction of the historical narrative, which makes the ideological aspects of
this use of history clear.
I read your paper very much as an exploration of constructions of continuity. In
your paper and in general, I think there exist two usages of the concept of
continuity: one, which connects distant epochs due to their perceived similarity
and a second, which on the contrary stresses the continuos flow of time.
The etymological origin of the concept is, without doubt, closest to the second
meaning, but I tend to think that the concept is just as often used with the first.
Indeed in your paper it is so, where I find it used in several places meaning
perceived similarity of epochs or events, for example:
“It seems that the party sought for legitimisation by evoking the memory of the
first communist state and demonstrating continuity with it.” (p. 4)
“Communists perceived Hungarian history according to this line while they were
looking at it from the continuity between 1919 and 1956.” (p. 24)
Only in one place do I find it in the second meaning:
“(…) the narrative created a consciousness of continuity. Occurances of the past
began to be perceived as continuous with the previous perception of the past
based on terminated episodes.” (p. 25)
There is, however, another interesting example where the two usages seem to
melt together:
“The president of the republic seemed to show the continuity of communism by
proving that the two regimes actually formed one.” (p. 5)
At a first glance it seems to be second meaning of continuity, uninterrupted flow
of time, which is evoked here. But in reality the two ‘continuous’ epochs are
distant, which makes the example belong to the first meaning (as well?). This, I
think, is the core of the ideological argument contained in the first usage of the
concept of continuity: distant epochs or events are seen as continuous and in this
sense representing the ‘real’ time, the ‘real’ sequence of events. What is in
between the ‘continuous’ but distant epochs is represented as deviations or
indeed perversions of the real course of history, which, nevertheless, continues to
flow unaltered underneath the perturbations on the surface. Although the first
usage is the most clearly ideological I would regard the second as equally
ideological. Both representations contain ideological arguments about what is
considered to be the real course of history.
Continuity, especially in the meaning similarity of distant epochs, is intimately
related to the concept of identity and it is probably the closest we in our
contemporary conception of history come to the “identical items” of the classical
conception of history. The concepts work in similar ways: when identity is
constructed with something, difference is constructed with something else.
Likewise, when continuity is constructed with a certain period or event,
discontinuity is constructed with other periods/events. They are put in
parenthesis, so to say.
This kind of constructions of continuity is at the same time constructions of
identity, of “we” and “them” groups, which you also exemplify in your paper.
When constructing continuity with the First Hungarian Soviet Republic that was
interpreted as a failure, the reasons for its failure (social democrats, foreign
powers etc.) are constructed as external to the “we” group (the communists) (p.
7).
I find it very interesting the way you frame and exemplify the problematic of the
“End of History” – “Return of History”. But I would question that the “End of
History” should be the end of uncertainty, as you state on page 12.
I read the “End of History” as a crisis, and I think this is confirmed by the phrase
“permanent construction of communism” (p. 12). This does not sound like a
period of tranquillity and certainty to me but rather as a breathless undertaking
aimed at deviating the attention from the critical lack of narrative. I, however,
also acknowledge that this reading inevitably is influenced by my Western
conception of history as progress. Nevertheless, in the logic of its own Master
narrative, the successful take-over of Communism is equal to the disappearance
of both past and future, indeed the “End of History”. The future and the idea of
progress dissolve into one enormous present. In this kind of situation, I would
think, it becomes quite difficult to construct a legitimising narrative because they
are most often constructed from the ideological arguments about the real course
of history exemplified above. This difficulty is shown in the constant need for
legitimising the regime in the frenetic activities of production contests etc. I
know that history did not disappear from the discourse of the victorious
Hungarian communists, and you show it in your paper when you demonstrate
that the First Hungarian Soviet Republic was commemorated also prior to 1956.
But I would insist on the importance of the Master narrative and read the
successful take-over of Communism as a crisis of their legitimising narrative.
In a way, the problem of the “End of History” related to the success of
Communism, as you present it, is also a problem of identity. Presumably, the
“we” group englobes everybody and everything – now Hungary is communist.
The conception of internal other thus is very poor. To construct identity of
everything is to have no identity.
I think you develop the idea of the immediate post-1956 as a “Return of History”
in a convincing way showing that the Master narrative of the Hungarian
Communists acquired a more national character, which helped to free it from the
problems of the universal Communist Master narrative. But I would have liked to
see you focus equally on the period 1948-1956 as a crisis, which had
repercussions in the narrative of legitimacy of the regime.
Carsten Humlebæk
A Response to Carsten Humlebaek
Honestly speaking I am very grateful to Carsten. His criticism pointed out weaknesses
in my argument that should be clarified in the future. Therefore, the response in general
is to clarify what I thought when I was writing the paper and also to clarify what should
I write when I shall think of the paper next time.
Firstly, Carsten pointed out that the ‘learning’ as a scope of history is not so unique as I
might represent it. That is right, however, I would like to argue that this was not even
the main purpose of historical representation. The aim was rather to use it as a mean of
mobilizing the population by providing pattern of action for the present.
Secondly, I did not think of my whole paper as a demonstration of different ways of
constructing continuity. Generally, I could accept Carsten’s elaboration of the two
distinct concepts of continuity, nonetheless, I would aim to point out that the communist
party in the 1950s attempted to form a consciousness of history that was based on a
sense of terminated episodes. That is to say, although different epochs could possess
similar or identical qualities they did not produce a relation of lineage, the previous age
did not generate the subsequent one. My aim would be to demonstrate how communists
aspired to create a consciousness like this in order to produce distinct and therefore
analyzable entities or units. It was required for ascertaining qualities and thereby
transforming the units into examples for present activity. (I admit that my usage of the
word ‘seem’ could be confusing since I did not clarify that it referred to something that
was an appearance but I did not consider it as real.)
Thirdly, constructions of continuity plausibly are at the same time constructions of
identity. Nevertheless, I mean that in the 1950s communists did not construct continuity
even because of the fact that they based their identity on present activity – the
permanent construction of socialism.
Fourthly, I accept Carsten’s criticism that I neglected the fact that the perception of the
end of history produced a sense of uncertainty as well. However, I believe that it was
not because of the difficulties in creating a Master Narrative. By the end of history
present action replaced the Master Narrative as a mean of achieving legitimacy. The
future was certain, therefore it was no need of a narrative of the historical process which
could provide evidence for the necessary direction of progress. Uncertainty was
produced exactly by this certainty: the only mean to prove the fulfillment of the Marxist
historical prophecy was permanent action. Consequently, uncertainty created action,
which was the mean of overcoming that uncertainty. Paradoxically, action could not
liquidate uncertainty as while there was action there was also an advance of history
which postponed further the finale of history. Thus, action and uncertainty presumed
each other’s existence.
Peter Apor