SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE COMPANY:
A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNANCE, STRATEGY AND THE
COMMUNITY
BY ADRIENNE VON TUNZELMANN
WITH DAVID CULLWICK, INSTITUTE OF POLICY STUDIES, 1996
Judy Brown
Senior Lecturer in Accountancy
Victoria University of Wellington
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) - what's in it for companies? Quite a lot, according
to business and public policy consultant Adrienne von Tunzelmann, in her recent book
Social Responsibility and the Company: A New Perspective on Governance, Strategy and
the Community. Ms von Tunzelmann argues that it is not necessary to suppose that
companies face an inherent conflict in the choice between the pursuit of commercial
success and contributing to the goals of society and the communities in which they
operate. She suggests that incorporating CSR policy into business strategy offers a
number of advantages. It, may, for example:
• be a way of motivating and building pride in employees and managers (p.33);
• contribute to the development of a "healthier" community (e.g. through a better
qualified workforce or a reduction in the level of crime), thus creating a more
favourable business environment (p.60);
• assist in identifying new markets and anticipating societal and consumer
preferences (p.19);
• allow differentiation from competitors (p.90);
• lead to an enhanced reputation - helping the company to be "well-liked" in the
community (p.32);
• encourage a climate of trust and goodwill, facilitative of business (p.32);
• help in overcoming problems associated with the implementation of operational
plans (p.40);
• and maintain public confidence in the legitimacy of business operations (p.19)
• minimise the prospects of future regulation (p.91).
Accordingly, rather than seeing CSR as a "distraction" from the main management tasks
of directors and executives, or as a tradeoff against profitable activity,. Ms von
Tunzelmann promotes the idea of corporations managing their "social environment" and
community relationships as part of their "core business". Indeed, she suggests, if there are
proven commercial benefits in good corporate citizenship, it can be argued that directors
are in breach of their fiduciary duty to "act in the best interests of the company" if they
fail to take care of key community relationships. She notes that there are some indications
that CSR activity is viewed positively by sharemarket investors (although she admits that
the empirical evidence is somewhat mixed)1. CSR (or "corporate social investment" as
Ms von Tunzelmann prefers to call it) can also be seen as a payback for the freedoms
corporations have gained in a deregulated business environment (p.32). Ms von
Tunzelmann also suggests that factoring "social considerations" into business decisions
may become more important in an MMP environment, with wider public involvement in
policy formation and implementation. Citing a speech given at a NZ Employers'
Federation conference, she notes that the leadership role business can play in advocacy
will rely in large part on establishing sources of knowledge and understanding about
matters of social and community concern" (p.13).
The term CSR means different things to different people. Ms von Tunzelmann openly
acknowledges that she has explored the topic from a business sector perspective; CSR is
set firmly in the context of "creating value for owners". The book draws on material from
interviews with a number of business leaders including Reserve Bank Governor Don
Brash, NZ Business Roundtable Executive Director Roger Kerr, NZ Employers'
Federation Chief Executive Steve Marshall and Telecom Chairman Peter Shirtcliffe.
Noticeably absent are the perspectives of trade unions, consumer advocates, church
groups and community action groups. While the book does not set out explicitly to
explore public policy perspectives on the social responsibilities of companies, Ms von
Tunzelmann does offer "some concluding thoughts" in this area. She notes, for example,
that CSR may be thought of as "a complement, or alternative, to government policies and
programmes", "an alternative to regulation of business activity" and that "commercial
opportunities are opening up in the provision of social services" (p.l03).
It is debatable how much is "new" in Ms von Tunzelmann's approach to CSR. "Cynics"
are likely to charge that it is nothing more than good old-fashioned profit maximisation
and that there is little evidence of any "moral underpinning". In many ways, they would
be correct. "Strategic CSR" rests on a traditional neo-classical economic view of the
corporation as a vehicle for maximising shareholder wealth. Consumers, employees and
local communities are to be "looked after" to the extent that it benefits corporate profits
and, ultimately, the "owners" of the firm. People are still treated instrumentally as a
means towards someone else's financial objective; all that has changed are views about
the most effective methods of managing "human" and "community" resources.
"Enlightened" managers recognise the potential impact of the social environment.
Stakeholder relationships are important to the extent that they produce "value for
shareholders"2 and managers remain accountable solely to shareholders for their "social"
1
For discussions of research on the relationship between CSR, profits and shareholder returns and the
difficulty of finding adequate measures of "social responsibility", see Wokutch and Spencer (1987), Poitras
(1994) and Parva and Krausz (1995). Investment analysts and fund managers interviewed by Ms von
Tunzelmann indicated that CSR on its own "was unlikely to be a material consideration in how they
assessed company performance", but felt that it could contribute as part of a strategy mix for "managing
risks in the external environment" (p.37).
2
By no means is there unanimity among proponents of the "managers as agents of financial capital" view that
CSR will ultimately bring benefits to shareholders. Some writers caution full consideration of the likely costs
and benefits. While CSR can make "good business sense", there are potential downsides. Fears have been
expressed, for example, that if managers start talking about their "social responsibilities" this will create a
"catalyst" or "snowball" effect which may encourage "stakeholders" to demand ever more of companies (see
decisions. Far from representing a genuine ethical development, such initiatives often
appear decidedly manipulative to those who wish to take a wider "stakeholder view" of
the firm3.
Ms von Tunzelmann concedes that financial self-interest is the clear motivation for
companies trying to be "good corporate citizens" and it is tempting to take the attitude, as
one reviewer did, that "if everyone wins", so what 4? To the extent that Ms von
Tunzelmann raises the issues for public discussion and highlights the interdependent
nature of business-society relationships, her work is to be welcomed. It will provide
managers, who wish to take account of the broader effects of corporate activity and make
more "socially efficient" decisions, with a commercially acceptable rationalisation5.
I have no quarrel with the idea that stakeholder-business relationships can be mutually
beneficial or that CSR can make "economic sense". In seeking to maximise profits,
business ignores employees, consumers and the wider community at its peril. Decently
treated employees, for example, may well work "more productively". Similarly, business
must have regard for changing social attitudes and expectations if it is to succeed
commercially. However, much of Ms von Tunzelmann's work seems to rest on an
underlying assumption of an automatic harmony of interests between "managers",
shareholders" and "other stakeholders". Where conflicts of interests are recognised, the
supremacy of shareholder claims is taken for granted. I struggle with both
presuppositions.
For me Ms von Tunzelmann's approach leaves too many questions unanswered. Why will
managers see the long-run benefits of CSR when they are rewarded so often on the basis
of short-term results (and are often "not around" to see the longer-term consequences of
their decisions)? If the economic benefits of CSR are so obvious, why do so many
managers report experiencing conflicts between what is expected of them as profitmaximising managers and what they are personally comfortable with?6 If the
commitment to CSR is genuine, why have managers (and indeed professional accounting
Gray, Owen and Maunders 1987). In the long-run, this could lead to a redistribution of wealth and power to
non-shareholder constituencies.
3
Steve Maharey, Labour MP for Palmerston North, has recently criticised New Zealand business leaders
for taking the view that "only narrowly defined financial interests and shareholders matter". He argues that
larger companies in particular should be accountable to the whole community (National Business Review,
22/11/1996). He also charges that "there is often a big difference between the rhetoric and reality" of those
directors and managers who purport to take a "stakeholder" approach to management. Companies often
espouse teamwork between themselves and customers, employees and local communities, but make
decisions that profit only shareholders.
4
See Ward (National Business Review, 27/9/1996).
5
Whether it provides those who wish to pursue "ethical management" with the most convincing case is
debatable. Michalos (1995: 54-9), for example, maintains that the idea that managers ought to be socially
responsible "because there is money in it" is the worst argument for CSR. One difficulty is that socially
irresponsible and even illegal activities may also have a positive expected value to shareholders (e.g. where
the expected gains are substantial relative to likely fines and/ or the probability of getting caught or affected
stakeholders are powerless to retaliate). In such instances, is social responsibility to be abandoned in favour
of profits? The philosopher Kant argued that a decision cannot be truly ethical unless it conflicts with selfinterest. This writer suspects the persuasiveness of the "good ethics is good business" line depends on the
audience - the problem for practising managers, of course, is that "profit-speak" may be the only language
their employers will listen to.
6
For some examples and a discussion of what managers can practically do when their sense of personal
morality is at odds with their organisation's behaviour, see Nielsen (1987).
bodies) been so reluctant to go beyond voluntary CSR reporting? Why do they not
support formal monitoring of corporate performance through the development of
mandatory "social" disclosures in annual reports?7 It is difficult to escape the conclusion
that many companies are more concerned with the image (rather than the substance) of
being "good corporate citizens".
From a public policy point of view, the ultimate test of the value of CSR cannot simply be
what it contributes to management or shareholder interests. What about CSR that "costs
profits"? To what extent should the community have to rely on "enlightened managers"
(and sharemarkets) seeing the value of CSR? What about companies that don't want to be
socially responsible? Why is the "the company" equated with "shareholders"? Is the point
of business simply to make money for shareholders? Are workers just "human resources"
for the owners of share capital? Do fiduciary responsibilities and reporting requirements to
groups other than shareholders need to be formalised in company law?8 Will "CSR-talk"
deflect attention from the need to construct adequate legal control of corporate activity, and
put more power into the hands of private managers? In an MMP environment is it time to
re-explore the concept of industrial democracy?
Many of these issues were debated during the 1930s (the Berle-Dodd debate), the 1950s
and again in the 1970s9. Then, as now, different approaches to CSR rested on different
views, both about the way the world is and the way it should be. Competing descriptive
and normative perspectives, in turn, gave rise to strongly conflicting political visions of
the firm and corporate governance structures. Like Millon (1993), I believe the
ideological rifts are deep and likely to persist. I suspect we are no closer to a consensus,
but it is good to see the issues being aired again.
7
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand's Statement of Concepts, for example, notes that
one objective of financial reporting is to provide information for assisting in the assessment of
accountability and compliance with relevant legislation (para 3.1). However, a proposal that companies
should make a declaration in their annual reports that they had complied with "all relevant and material,
legislative, regulatory or contractual obligations" was rejected on the grounds that it "might place an
unreasonable burden on the governing body" (NZ Society of Accountants 1991: 37).
8
In some states in the United States, concern about the extent to which non-shareholder constituencies can be
adversely affected by the managerial pursuit of shareholder wealth has led to amendments to company law
which empower (and sometimes require) managers to take the interests of non-shareholder constituencies into
account (see Millon 1993). The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance explicitly
permit boards to take into account ethical considerations reasonably regarded as appropriate to the responsible
conduct of the firm, even if shareholder wealth is not thereby advanced (ALI 1994).
9
In the 1970s, much of the debate centred around discussion of Milton Friedman's famous article, The
Social Responsibility of Business. Friedman was a strong advocate for the "managers as agents of capital"
view. He argued that actions done in the interests of the company should not be rationalised as CSR but
simply justified for what they are - actions which promote the company's interests. At the same time, he
recognised that it may be in the interests of companies to cloak their intentions in this way. From a societal
perspective, Friedman claimed that encouraging the view of managers as "agents of society" was likely to
makes managers more powerful and less accountable rather than the reverse. It was for Government and
stakeholders themselves (through private contracting) to "look after" non-shareholder constituencies. These
themes are also evident in recent contributions by NZ Business Roundtable Executive Roger Kerr to the
CSR debate (see, for example, The Independent, 13/12/1996: 9, where he argues that "CSR" activities "are
not typically 'social responsibilities' but remain discretionary acts for which managers should be held
responsible only to the shareholders employing them").
REFERENCES
American Law Institute (1994) Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis &
Recommendations.
Gray, RH., D.J. Owen and K T. Maunders (1987) Corporate Social Reporting, Prentice
Hall, London.
Michalos, A.C. (1995) A Pragmatic Approach to Business Ethics, Sage, California.
Millon, D. (1993) "Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law"
Washington and Lee Law Review, 50:1373-90.
Nielsen, R.P. (1987) "What Can Managers Do about Unethical Management?" Journal of
Business Ethics, 6:309-20.
NZ Society of Accountants (1991) A Proposed Framework for Financial Reporting in
NZ - A Package of Seven Exposure Drafts, Wellington.
Parva, M.L. and J. Krausz (1995) Corporate Responsibility and Financial Performance:
The Paradox of Social Cost, Quorum, Connecticut.
Poitras, G. (1994) "Shareholder Wealth Maximization, Business Ethics and Social
Responsibility" Journal of Business Ethics, 13:125-34.
Wokutch, R.E. and B.A. Spencer (1987) "Corporate Saints and Sinners: The Effects of
Philanthropic and illegal Activity on Organizational Performance" California
Management Review, 24(2):62-77.