Todd Sechser
Political Science 311
Response Paper #4
6 December 2001
Rational Choice Pathologies in Fearon’s Explanation for Ethnic Conflict
As international relations scholars have paid increasing attention to ethnic conflict, they
have imported well-developed sets of tools from other branches of political science in order to
explain this phenomenon. One such tool set is rational choice “theory,” which argues that
individuals’ attempts to maximize their personal expected utility can explain broad patterns of
political behavior. This essay concentrates on one particular rational choice explanation for
ethnic conflict – James Fearon’s “commitment problem” – and argues that his theory suffers from
some of the more serious methodological pathologies of the rational choice camp. The essay
proceeds in two parts: first, I review Green and Shapiro’s Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory
in order to summarize many of the criticisms brought against rational choice theory; second, I
examine the applicability of these arguments to Fearon’s model of credible commitments, and
argue that his theory requires a great deal of reformulation and empirical verification in order to
be considered valid.
Green and Shapiro’s Critique
Green and Shapiro advance three fundamental points in their critique of rational choice
theory. First, rational choice theory suffers from post-hoc theoretical development, in which
scholars toy with the assumptions of stylized models in order to create the conditions that explain
why a particular event occurred in the past. Second, rational choice theory fails to formulate
effective empirical tests for its “slippery” predictions. Third, scholars of the rational choice
tradition are selective and biased in their use of evidence.
Post-hoc theory development
The first line of argument in Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory is that rational choice
scholars seek to explain historical events rather than predict future outcomes. This is another
way of saying that rational choice theorists select on the dependent variable – all of their cases
contain outcomes predicted by their models. Instead of testing outcomes against predictions,
Green and Shapiro argue, rational choice scholars first observe an empirical regularity and then
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design the assumptions of their model so that the model “predicts” the outcome that is observed.
These scholars make no predictions about the future against which their model can be tested. 1
A consequence of constructing models to fit empirical outcomes is that rational choice
hypotheses become unfalsifiable.2 In many cases, models are tested against absurd null
hypotheses that have no chance of being true; some studies use no null hypothesis at all.
Without a valid null hypothesis against which to test the model’s predictions, the model’s
predictions become tautological – it is unclear what, if any, hypothetical piece of evidence could
possibly disconfirm the theory. As a result, such a theory is not useful.
Furthermore, Green and Shapiro argue, rational choice scholars fail to consider
alternative explanations for the empirical regularity they seek to explain. 3 Without addressing
other processes that might have produced the observed result, the theory’s strength is limited.
Test formulation
A second contention of the book is that rational choice theory fails to construct adequate
tests for its claims. This problem manifests itself in two ways.
First, the predictions of rational choice theory are too “slippery.” When empirical
outcomes fail to match the predictions of a particular rational choice explanation, the theory’s
proponents generally resort to the argument that some aberration prevented the model’s
assumptions from being met.4 Used too many times, this argument undermines the applicability
of the theory – if its conditions never hold, then the usefulness of the theory is questionable.
Poorly specified predictions also produce testability problems. Without distinct
quantitative predictions, any empirical outcome can often be construed as support for the theory.
Collective-action theorists, for example, claim that the absence of selective incentives will
preclude cooperation to solve social dilemmas. Yet in many such dilemmas, some level of
collective action exists – individuals contribute to environmental organizations, for example, even
though rational choice theory predicts that they should free-ride. Rational choice scholars do not
specify beforehand whether this should be considered evidence in favor of the theory (due to the
small ratio of contributors to potential beneficiaries of environmental protection) or against it (due
to the fact that collective action occurred, if only at a low level). This vagueness renders
falsifiability nearly an impossible task.
Second, rational choice theory suffers from predictions that are “vaguely operationalized”
and difficult to verify.5 Green and Shapiro argue that this vagueness results from elusive
switching between predictions about specific equilibrium outcomes (point predictions) and
1
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory : A Critique of Applications in Political Science
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 35.
2
Ibid., pp. 36-7.
3
Ibid., p. 37.
4
Ibid., p. 39.
5
Ibid., p. 41.
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predictions about an equilibrium’s direction of movement (marginal predictions) after a change in
an exogenous variable. When a theory’s point predictions fail, its proponents cite successful
marginal predictions, and vice versa. Confirmation of the theory becomes too easy; falsifiability
becomes impossible.
Selecting and interpreting evidence
The third broad pathology identified by Green and Shapiro relates to the search for and
use of evidence to test rational choice theory. The authors identify three objectionable practices
within this class of problems.
First, rational choice scholars search actively for evidence confirming their theory by
collecting illustrations that support their conclusions while neglecting disconfirming evidence.
Green and Shapiro liken this procedure to collecting “advertisements that show one’s brand
achievements while mentioning neither its failings nor the achievements of its competitors.” 6
Similarly, scholars sometimes conduct lab experiments with no control group, seeking
only an example to help confirm their theory.7 But without a control group to assess the
consequences of an absence of one’s independent variable, it is impossible to evaluating with
any certainty the consequences of its presence.
Second, rational choice theorists “project” evidence from their theories: either they
imagine data that would be consistent with their theory and assume it to be empirically true, or
they assert that a particular piece of evidence confirms the theory without fully explaining the
evidence.8 This does not constitute adequate theory-testing.
Third, rational choice theories often suffer from arbitrarily-restricted domains of
application.9 Specifically, a theory’s proponents sometimes deal with disconfirming evidence by
excluding the situations found in that evidence from the set of situations that the theory claims to
explain. The domain of applications is thus limited to instances where the theory appears to hold,
although no explanation is given for this restriction. Green and Shapiro argue that this practice
leads rational choice scholars to neglect disconfirming evidence and disproportionately
emphasize supporting illustrations.
Application: Fearon’s Explanation for Ethnic Conflict
Below I assess the validity of Green and Shapiro’s criticisms with regard to a well-known
rational choice explanation for ethnic conflict: James Fearon’s piece on commitment problems
6
Ibid., p. 43.
Ibid., p. 44.
8
Ibid., pp. 43-44.
9
Ibid., pp. 44-46.
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and ethnic warfare.10 A brief glance at this work demonstrates that it suffers from many of the
deficiencies outlined in Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory.
Fearon’s “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict” argues that ethnic
conflicts arise when four conditions hold: first, the disintegration of a state presents a minority
ethnic group with a choice between joining a new state ruled by an ethnic majority (with which the
minority once peacefully co-existed) or fighting for independence. Second, the minority must
calculate its expected costs from fighting and winning to be smaller than the expected costs of
suffering indefinite exploitation at the hands of the majority in the new state. Third, the minority
must feel that its chances of winning a war are better today than they would be in the future.
Finally, the ethnic majority must be unable to commit to not exploiting the minority in a new,
majority-ruled state. When these four conditions hold, Fearon argues, minority ethnic groups will
reason that it is in their best interest to fight for independence, because the majority cannot
commit to not exploiting them in the future. Moreover, it is best to fight immediately, because the
minority expects the odds of success to decline over time. Fearon employs this model to explain
the revolt by the Serbian minority in the newly independent state of Croatia in 1991.
Fearon’s analysis suffers from a number of problems identified in Green and Shapiro’s
book. First, it is not clear what Fearon’s null hypothesis is. Against what alternative possibility is
he testing his explanation? Indeed, as Green and Shapiro would predict, some potential null
hypotheses of the theory seem absurd: for example, the proposition that the Serbs thought war in
the future would be better than war today but still decided to fight today. The most reasonable
null hypothesis is that the Croats were able to credibly commit to not exploiting minorities, but
hatred or some other mechanism drove the Serbs to war nevertheless. But Fearon offers no
description of what a credible commitment would look like, other than one enforced by an external
third party. As a result, his hypothesis is not falsifiable – there is no hypothetical evidence that
could disconfirm his theory. As argued below, he explains away cases of non-conflict by
asserting (with no evidence) that one of the conditions of his model must not have held.
A related observation is that Fearon fails to consider alternative explanations for ethnic
conflict. The only alternative perspective offered in his article is a straw-man reference to the
“standard view” among journalists that ancient animosities explain ethnic warfare, although no
citation is provided to verify that anybody actually subscribes to this view. 11 Without explaining
the inadequacy of alternative theoretical perspectives, it is difficult to evaluate the relative merits
of his theory.
Second, Fearon “projects” his evidence rather than conducting a systematic empirical
study. Perhaps for Fearon the Croatian commitment to protect Serb rights was not credible, but
James Fearon, “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict,” in David Lake and David Rothchild, eds.,
The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998),
pp. 107-126.
11
Ibid., pp. 108 and 115.
10
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there is no evidence provided to suggest that the Serbs themselves shared this perspective.
Were the Serbs really worried about exploitation, and if so, why? The strength of the crediblecommitment explanation relies on this assumption, but there is no empirical support given for it.
This raises a larger question with implications for the predictive power of the model: under what
conditions will a minority be worried about exploitation by a majority during the formation of a new
state? Simply asserting that minorities always worry about exploitation, as Fearon seems to do,
is not a compelling defense of the theory.
Fearon’s explanations of confirming cases of ethnic conflict also suffer from the projection
problem. In citing the war over Nagorno Karbakh as evidence for his credible-commitment
explanation, he merely states that the conflict resulted from the inability of the Azerbaijani
government to commit to protecting the rights of its Armenian minority. 12 No evidence
whatsoever is provided for this assertion – the reader is expected to take this description at face
value. This is precisely what Green and Shapiro would identify as “projecting evidence from
theory” – claiming by assertion that reality mirrors the model at issue.
Finally, Fearon’s predictions are what Green and Shapiro would term “slippery.” There is
no hard standard against which to measure the success or failure of his explanation, and there
are no guidelines with which to evaluate future evidence about ethnic conflicts. How can we tell if
a credible commitment exists? How do we know whether a minority viewed war today as better
than war tomorrow? Fearon’s only mechanism for doing this is to evaluate the outcome and infer
from revealed preferences: if war occurred, then a credible commitment was lacking, and war
today must have been seen as preferable to war tomorrow. The result is a tautological claim –
using this standard of evidence, a war that occurred despite the availability of a credible
commitment is not even hypothetically possible. Furthermore, it is impossible to predict future
conflicts with Fearon’s model, because he fails to explain how we can identify the conditions for
his model beforehand. This is the curse of post-hoc theory development.
An example of such a tautological claim is Fearon’s explanation for non-conflict in
Kosovo. Fearon argues that the minority Kosovars “did not fight en masse to secede because
they lacked any serious prospect of success at a reasonable cost – it was better to accept greater
oppression (and probably a lower ability to fight for secession in the future) than to fight for
secession in the present.” 13 Yet Fearon does not offer a single piece of evidence for this claim.
His only “proof” that the Kosovars assigned a higher expected utility to acquiescence is that they
did not go to war. This is tautological rational choice theory at its worst – the conditions for the
theory are defined by the outcome. There is no evidence that could disconfirm Fearon’s
explanation, because the independent and dependent variable are defined by the same empirical
result.
12
13
Ibid., p 120.
Ibid., p. 122.
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The appeal of Fearon’s argument lies in the fact that his assertions usually match
empirical outcomes. But in the case of Kosovo, they did not. The rebellion and war that erupted
after Fearon wrote his article would seem to confound all of Fearon’s explanations: both that
Kosovars viewed oppression as preferable to war, and that the appeal of war for Kosovo declined
over time. This empirical fact should cast serious doubt on Fearon’s method, if not his model
altogether.
The accusations of Green and Shapiro thus appear to apply well to Fearon’s explanation
for ethnic conflict. Fearon advances unfalsifiable hypotheses, asserts the applicability of his
evidence, neglects alternative explanations, and defines his independent variable in terms of the
dependent variable. This is not to say that his theory is false, or that a rational choice approach
to ethnic conflict is hopelessly flawed. Rather, it appears that greater attention must be paid
within the rational choice camp to the methodological problems that are endemic to such
explanations. Reformulation of Fearon’s theory is thus both necessary and possible.
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