1
Sander Gerrits 0399832
Zuiderweg 11
1221 HE Hilversum
5th of June 2011
On Ambiguity and Scope in English, Chinese, and Dutch1
1.0 Introduction
The main purpose of language is to be a means of communication. However, there are many
instances where communication with language fails. One possible cause of such failure can be that
the chosen words or sentence structures are unclear or under-defined. In other words sentences and
words can be vague or ambiguous. Vagueness arises when the linguistic meaning of a sentence
leaves open some aspects of meaning. For example, the word blue leaves open exactly which color
of the spectrum counts as blue. The Japanese say that a stoplight turns “blue” when a green signal is
given, while the same light would be called “green” in English or Dutch. Ambiguity, on the other
hand , arises when a word or sentence has more than one linguistic meaning. There are many ways
in which language can be ambiguous. For instance, there is lexical ambiguity, where a word has two
or more distinct meanings. The words bank and fly are two English examples of words that have
more than one meaning2.
Another form of ambiguity is syntactic ambiguity. This occurs when there are two or more
different possible structural analyzes of a sentence, one for each meaning or reading. For example
this sentence, They are hunting cats has three different meanings, which are represented in (1a),
(1b), and (1c), respectively. In the first reading (1a) hunting is part of the DP hunting cats, giving
1
2
I would like to thank the International School Hilversum “Alberdinck Thijm” for their time and effort. For the
pictures drawn for the bully-story I would like to thank Daan Westendorp. And finally I would like to thank my
supervisor for this paper William Philip.
Here are some examples of lexical ambiguity for the words bank and fly. The first ambiguity can arise from the same
word referring to two separate objects. For instance bank can mean a financial institution or a raised area of ground
along the edge of a body of water (i.e. a river bank). The same applies to fly which can mean the insect, or a zipper.
A second form of ambiguity arises from the distinction between noun and verb. Fly, for example, can mean moving
through the air, or an insect with two wings. Bank can mean the financial institution, or the act of entrusting your
money to this financial institution. A third possible ambiguity can occur if one word refers to two actions. To fly can
mean moving through the air, or operating a plane. It must be noted that only definitions exemplifying the possible
forms of lexical ambiguity have been used here.
2
the meaning that these cats are specifically meant for hunting. In (1b) hunting is parsed as the main
verb, giving the meaning that the cats are being hunted. And thirdly, as shown in (1c), hunting can
be used as an adjective, giving the meaning that the cats are in the process of hunting something.
(1)
a.
b.
c.
For syntactic ambiguity the surface form, that which we hear, is the same with both meanings, but
the deep structure differs for each meaning, as can be seen in (1). Ambiguity has long been of
interest to linguists since when a single phrase with one surface structure has several meanings it
means that there must be more levels of linguistic representation than meets the eye.
3
Another interesting feature of ambiguity is that it differs per language. Through comparing
and studying the differences between languages more can be learned about the structure and
acquisition of language in general. One form of ambiguity that is not found in every language is the
ambiguity of quantifier scope. Scopal ambiguity in English arises when a sentence has an indefinite
subject, a transative verb and a direct object that is a universally quantified noun phrase (QP
henceforth) headed by each or every. An example of a scopally ambiguous sentence is illustrated in
(2a). For clarification both the “surface scope” reading (SS henceforth) and the “inverse scope”
reading (IS) are paraphrased in (2b) and (2c), respectively. The conditions for these readings to be
true are visually represented in (2d) and (2e), where the arrows represent the kicking action.
(2)
a. A child has kicked each/every ball.
(scopally ambiguous)
b. 'One child has kicked all the balls'.
(SS reading)
c. 'Each/every ball has been kicked by a child'.
(IS reading)
Ball 1
↑
d.
Child 1 → Ball 2
↓
Ball 3
e.
Child 1 → Ball 1
Child 2 → Ball 2
Child 3 → Ball 3
In the situation shown in (2d) there is only one child who has kicked all the balls. In contrast, in the
situation represented by (2e) all the balls get kicked by some child or other (this can be one, but also
two or more). Thus, under the SS reading (2b) the sentence (2a) is true of situations of the type
4
represented by (2d) but false of situations of the kind in (2e). In contrast, under the IS reading both
situations would be truthful representations of (2a). In this case (2b) is a special case of (2c).
Evidence for this ambiguity in English has been found not only in the native speaker intuitions of
linguists but also in the comprehension performance of participants of psycholinguistic experiments
(c.g. Kurtzman and MacDonald 1993) when they investigated this sentence structure for English.
Regeling (1995) investigated the analogous structure of these sentences in Dutch and found
that for native speakers of Dutch the IS reading would seem to be unavailable if the sentence in (1a)
were translated as closely as possible using the words elke and iedere as the universal quantifiers.
The Dutch sentence in (3) only yields the SS reading for Dutch native speakers.
(3)
Een kind heeft elke bal geschopt.
Philip (2005) did further empirical research on this specific structure, and noted the apparent
existence of this “scope constraint” for Dutch in comparison with English.
This paper is a continuation and expansion on Philip (2005) and the main purpose of this
paper is to provide a more theoretical framework and suggest an experiment that can further
confirm whether or not a constraint is present at birth in correspondence with the Innateness
Hypothesis. The alternative possibility is that the Dutch scope constraint is learned over time
through the construction of a separate rule. The section below will outline the theory of “Logical
Form” (LF), the syntactic level at which meaning and truth conditions are resolved in the
Government and Binding theories (GB)3. Section 3 will focus on Aoun and Li's (1993) theory of
relative quantifier scope. The strength of this proposal lies in the fact that it is a cross-linguistic. It
attempts to explain the intricacies of the interaction between quantifier scope and quantifiers as well
3
The focus is on GB-theories and not Minimalism (Chomsky 1993) since Aoun and Li's (1993) proposal is based on
GB-theory and it is this proposal that is used in Philip (2005) to exemplify a possible UG based hypothesis for the
existence of the Dutch scope constraint. Further research is needed to see how the Dutch scope constraint fits into
the Minimalist program.
5
as quantifier scope and WH-words. Kuno, Takami, and Wu's (1999) criticism of Auon and Li's
proposal will be discussed in section 4. Kuno et al.'s functional account of quantifier scope in
English will be dealt with in section 5. Section 6 will place the proposal of Philip (2005) in the
framework established in the previous paragraphs. Finally, section 7 is a proposal for a new
experiment which can provide further evidence for the claim made in Philip (2005) that the Dutch
scope constraint should be considered as a pragmatic and construction-based constraint rather than a
constraint derived from Universal Grammar (UG) and present at birth.
2.0 Logical Form, Quantifier Raising, and Scope
In the late 1970's linguists attempting to explain the interaction between syntax and
semantics came to the conclusion that their then current model, the Revised Extended Standard
Theory, could not adequately explain how the semantic interpretation of a sentence related to the
syntactic representation of a sentence. Their solution was to add another syntactic level to the
already existing levels. Where previously the S-Structure had carried all the semantic information it
was now suggested that a new level called “Logical Form” (LF) preformed this task. LF can be
defined as “the level of linguistic representation at which all grammatical structure is relevant to
semantic interpretation is provided.” (Hornstein 1995). May (1977) proposed that the LF can be
derived from the S-Structure through Quantifier Raising (QR). QR is a 'Move α'-transformation.
The rule May (1977) postulated as QR may be formulated as in (4):
(4)
Chomsky-adjoin Q (to S)
Here Q stands for NP's with a quantifier in SPEC(N')4. As with other movement QR leaves
coindexed traces. An example of a representation of QR is given in (5b) which is the LF of the
sentence in (5a).
4
Actually the rule refers to the quantifier only in May's theory, but he assumes the Condition of Analyzability which
states: “If a rule γ mentions SPEC, then γ applies to the minimal [+N]-phrase dominating SPEC, which is not
immediately dominated by another [+N]-phrase.” (May 1977). The end result is moving the quantified noun phrase.
6
(5)
a. [Si John kicked [NP [Q every] ball]]
(S-structure)
b. [S[NP[Q every] ball]t [John kicked t]]
(LF)
As theories in transformational grammar evolved so did the theory for LF and QR. For
example, as S is split up in CP and IP or TP this is also reflected in here. QR no longer occurs up to
S but to IP/TP. In accordance with this, May (1985) adopts a revised QR-rule in which QP's can be
adjoined to A'-positions like V', VP, and IP, but not CP. LF describes the logical structure of a
sentence through the concepts of binding and c-command. May uses the notion of c-command as
defined by Reinhart (1976):
(6)
“A node γ c-commands a node φ iff the first branching node dominating γ also dominates φ
and γ does not dominate φ”.
May further defines the conditions for well-formed (correctly representing the logical structure of a
sentence) logical forms into three separate conditions. Firstly the “Predicate Condition” in (7):
(7)
“Every argument position of a predicate must either be a referring expression or a properly
bound variable.”
Argument positions of a predicate are its subjects and any other noun phrase for which it is
subcategorized. Secondly the “Condition on Proper Binding” in (8):
(8)
“Every variable in an argument position of a predicate must be properly bound.
7
And closely related the “Condition on Quantifier Binding” in (9):
(9)
“Every quantified phrase must properly bind a variable.
These conditions help determine “what sort of structures at LF can be interpreted by the rules of
quantifier interpretation in natural languages” (May 1977). They also allow a grammatical
representation of “scope.” The scope of a quantified phrase is everything which it c-commands. For
example, in sentence (5a), for clarity represented again in (10a) and its LF in (10b), the scope of the
quantified phrase every ball is [John kicked t].
(10)
a. [Si John kicked [NP [Q every] ball]]
(S-structure)
b. [S[NP[Q every] ball]t [John kicked t]]
(LF)
The ability of LF to show the logical structure of a sentence becomes clearer when sentences with
more than one quantified phrase are seen in their logical forms. For the sentence in (11a) there are
two possible interpretations each of which has their own logical form, as seen in (11b) and (11c).
(11)
a. [Every boy kicked some ball].
b. [[every boy]α [some ball]β [α kicked β]]
'For every boy there is some ball or other that he has kicked.'
c. [[some ball]β [every boy]α [α kicked β]]
'There is a ball, such that it was kicked by every boy.'
Both (11b) and (11c) are well-formed logical forms, since both quantified phrases c-command, and
thus, properly bind, the variables 'α' and 'β'. (11b) is called the “surface scope” reading (SS-reading)
and (11c) is called the “inverse scope” reading (IS-reading) since it's representation in LF is inverse
from the representation in S-Structure. Also in (11b) every boy has a wider scope than some ball
8
since every boy c-commands both some ball and kicked, whereas some ball only c-commands
kicked. The inverse is true for (11c). Having established the basic theory and terminology for LF
and scope we can now look more closely at Aoun and Li's cross-linguistic interpretation of scope.
3.0 Aoun and Li's cross-linguistic model for scope
Aoun and Li (1993)5 assume, in their attempt to explain the differences between scopetaking in English and Chinese, that scope is not only derived from the QP's but also from the traces
that the QP's leave after QR. The exact rule is (12) which they call the “Scope Principle.”
(12)
X takes scope over Y when X c-commands some part of Y's A'-chain.
Since the original trace of a argument moved by either WH-movement or QR is in a A-position it
has no role in scope. It must be noted that Aoun and Li (1993) use an extended version of ccommand as described by Reinhart (1983) as seen in (13).
(13)
A c-commands B iff the branching node α1 most immediately dominating A either dominates
B or is immediately dominated by a node α2 that dominates B, and α2 is of the same category
type as α1.
A third assumption Aoun and Li make is the Minimal Binding Requirement (MBR) in (14).
(14)
Variables must be bound by the most local potential A'-binder.
Multiple quantifiers in front of a phrase marker are blocked by the MBR. Thus, structures like (15)
5
Aoun and Li's proposal dealt with here is the proposal that is evaluated in Kuno, Takami, and Wu's (1999). There are
two more proposals by Aoun and Li in their 1993 book. All of their proposals are based the difference between
Chinese, Japanese, and English scope and on the idea that Chinese Japanese do not have overt subject movement
whereas English does. However, as we will see, Kuno et al. attempt to disprove some of the basic assumptions,
which hold for all three proposals.
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are not allowed.
(15)
Qi Qj […]
They also assume the condition on QR as in (16):
(16)
QR applies obligatorily to a QP in a θ-position and is optional otherwise.
This follows, according to Aoun and Li from the θ-criterion, because QP's, like WH-operators are,
non-referential and therefore cannot have θ-roles assigned to them. This forces them to move;
otherwise the θ-criterion would be violated. After QR a variable is left in it's original position which
can have θ-roles assigned to it.
The last assumption Aoun and Li make is that in English subjects are base generated in
SPEC[VP] and then raised to SPEC[IP]. (17) illustrates the structure the sentence in (11a) will have
at S-Structure (17b) and at LF (17c and 17d) given these assumptions.
(17)
a. Every boy kicked some ball.
b. [IP [NP every boy]i [I ' [I] [VP ti [V ' [V kicked] [NP some ball]]]]]
c. [IP [NP every boy]i [IP [ti1][I ' [I] [VP ti0 [VP [NP some ball]j [V ' [V kicked] [t j]]]]]]]
'For every boy there is some ball or other that he has kicked.'
d. [IP [NP some ball]j [IP [NP every boy]i [I ' [I] [VP ti [V ' [V kicked] [t j]]]]]]
'There is a ball, such that it was kicked by every boy.'
Through argument movement, every boy is moved to a θ'-position at S-structure, and leaves a trace
at SPEC[VP] as seen in (17b). Because of it's θ'-position in the S-structure it can optionally QR one
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projection up in (17c), it is depicted in this LF as having moved, leaving another trace at the second
SPEC[IP]. For the IS-reading in (17d) only the QP some ball is moved to SPEC[IP]. As stated
above, the QP every boy is not obligated to move, therefore the condition on QR was not violated.
The MBR is not violated in either (17c) or (17d) since all variables are checked by their most local
potential A'-binder. According to Aoun and Li their proposal should also be able to correctly predict
the ambiguity of double object and dative constructions.6 Whereas, dative sentence constructions
are ambiguous, the double object sentence construction only allows one reading. Aoun and Li show
this with the examples in (18a) and (18b).
(18)
a. John assigned one student every problem. (unambiguous)
b. John assigned one problem to every student. (ambiguous)
When the S-structures of (18a) and (18b) are compared the only noticeable difference is the Case
assigner to in the dative construction, as can be seen in (19a) and (19b) respectively.
(19)
a. [IP JohnK [VP1 tK [V '1 [v assign one student]i [ VP2 every problemj [V '2 [V '3 ti] tj]]]]]
b. [IP JohnK [VP1 tK [V '1 assignedi [VP2 one problemj [V '2 [V '3 ti to every student] tj]]]]]
Since the Case assigner to is not present in the double object construction, Case has to be checked
between the NP2 every student and the verb assign. Thus, when the verb moves, the NP has to move
along with it, as is shown in (19a). Similarly, the subject John and the NP1 every problem/one
problem are raised for Case checking. We can now apply the transformations and conditions for the
LF level resulting in (20a) and (20b), respectively.
6
Aoun and Li also discuss the interaction between WH-words and Quantifiers and Kuno et al. convincingly
argue against Aoun and Li's proposal applied in this manner. This however is not the focus of this paper. For more
information please refer to Aoun and Li (1993) and Kuno, Takami, and Wu (1999).
11
(20)
b.
a.
12
In the LF representation of the double object construction (20a) only one student c-commands every
problem but not the other way around. This indicates that there is only one reading. This sentence is
correctly predicted to be unambiguous. For the dative construction (20b) every student and one
problem c-command each other. Here there are two possible readings and Aoun and Li's proposal
correctly predicts that sentence is ambiguous.
The next step is to apply this theory cross-linguistically. Aoun and Li's main argument for
the difference regarding scopal ambiguity between English and Chinese is based on the fact that in
English the subject is base generated in SPEC[VP] and raised to SPEC[IP], whereas in Chinese it
remains in situ at SPEC[VP]. Because of this, both the subject and the object are still in a θposition and are forced to QR. Take for example the sentence in (21a) and it's S-structure (21b)
which is unambiguous in Chinese. The only LF that would be well-formed in Aoun and Li's
proposal would be (21c).
(21)
a. Meige nanren dou xihuan yige nüren. (unambiguous)
every man
all
like
one woman
'Every man loves a woman.'
b. [IP [VP1 meige nanren [VP2 dou xihuan [NP yige nüren]]]]
c. [IP [VP1.1 meige nanreni [VP1.0 ti [VP2 yige nürenj [VP2 dou xihuan [NP tj]]]]]]
In (21c) only meige nanren 'every man' has scope since yige nüren 'a woman' does not c-command
any part of the A'-chain of the QP meige nanren 'every man'. Since this is the only reading, Aoun
and Li's proposal correctly predicts that this sentence is unambiguous. At first blush, it would seem
that Aoun and Li's proposal for quantifier scope works without much trouble. However, Kuno,
Takami, and Wu (1999) raise some valid arguments against this proposal.
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3. Kuno, Takami, and Wu's response on Aoun and Li
One of the first objections Kuno, Takami, and Wu (1999) raise is Aoun and Li's
hypothesized S-structure for the double object sentence pattern [V NP NP]. For example, the
sentence in (22a) which has the S-Structure represented in (22b) according to Aoun and Li's
proposal.
(22)
a. They assigned Mary a tutor.
b.
In (22b) NP1 and NP2 c-command each other according to the definition of c-command used by
Aoun and Li. Consequentially, the sentences in (23) become hard to explain.
(23)
a. John showed Maryi herselfi (in the mirror).
b. *John showed herselfi Maryi (in the mirror).
Since both herself and Mary c-command each other in these sentences, according to Aoun and Li's
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definition of c-command, the ungrammaticallity of (23b) cannot be explained. Aoun and Li theorize
that herself c-commands Mary against Principle C in their framework. However, Kuno et al. point
out that this would then also apply for (23a) incorrectly predicting this sentence to be
ungrammatical. This leads Kuno et al. to conclude that Principle C does not function properly for
Aoun and Li's proposal. This is problematic since other structures, including the double object
construction in (18a), depend on Priciple C applying. Thus, double object constructions can not be
adequately explained by Aoun and Li's proposal.
Serious theoretical and empirical problems also pop up for Chinese for Aoun and Li's
proposal. For instance, there appears to be another possible LF representation for sentence (21a) as
shown in (24)
(24)
[IP [VP1 yige nürenj [VP1 meige nanreni [VP1 ti [VP2 dou xihuan [NP tj]]]]]]
Kuno et al. point out that Aoun and Li claim that this interpretation is not possible. However, it does
not follow from the assumptions that have been made. Kuno et al. then explain that in (24) yige
nüren is the most local A'-binder for tj, since binding tj to meige nanren would result in a Principle
C violation. MBR is satisfied and the sentence is predicted to be ambiguous. Kuno et al. note that an
identical argument had been used to explain ambiguity in a sentence containing WH-elements.
Aoun and Li explain the ungrammaticallity of (24) by assuming that, unlike variables bound by
WH-elements, variables bound by QP's are not subject to Principle C. However, as Kuno et al. point
out, this assumption will prove to be problematic for other sentences. Take for example sentence
(25a). Its S-structure is represented by (25b), and (25c) and (25d) are the two LF representations
that would follow from Aoun and Li's proposal. They show with sentence (25a) that there are
sentences which cannot correctly be predicted by Aoun and Li's proposal if this assumption were
held.
15
(25)
a. Zhexie shu dangzhong de jibui, yixie xuesheng kanguo ti.
these book among
several some student
read
several > some: 'Several of these books, some students have read.'
b. [IP zhexie shu dangzhong de jibui [IP [VP yixie xuesheng [VP kanguo ti]]]]
c. [IP zhexie shu dangzhong de jibui [IP [VP yixie xueshengj [VP tj [VP kanguo ti]]]]]
d. [IP yixie xueshengj [IP zhexie shu dangzhong de jibui [IP [VP tj [VP kanguo ti]]]]]
Because ti in (25c) is a trace of a QP, Principle C does not apply. The most local potential A'-binder
for ti is yixie xueshengj 'some students'. However, since there is no co-indexation (25c) does not
qualify as a well-formed LF representation of (25a) because MBR is violated. (25d) does not offer a
solution to this problem since zhexie shu dangzhong de jibui 'several of these books' would be the
most local potential A'-binder for tj. Again neither are co-indexed and MBR is violated. Aoun and
Li's proposal cannot produce a LF representation for this sentence.
Kuno et al. also point out that there are empirical problems for Aoun and Li's proposal.
Sentences like those in (26) and (27) are of the same pattern as (21) but are ambiguous.7
(26)
a. Henduo xiaohar qian-zhe liang-zhi gou. (ambiguous)
many child
pull-ASP two-M dog
'Many children are pulling two dogs.'
b. many > two (strong): 'There are many children each of whom is pulling two dogs.'
c. two > many (weak): 'There are two dogs each of which is being pulled by many children.'
(27)
a. Meige xuesheng dou pa
every student
yige nan laoshi. (ambiguous)
all afraid one male teacher
'Every student is afraid of a male teacher.'
b. every > one (strong): 'For each student, there is a male teacher whom (s)he is afraid of.'
7
For more examples refer to the original text.
16
c. one > every (weak): 'There is a male teacher such that every student is afraid of him.'
Finally, Aoun and Li claim that all passive sentences are ambiguous. In Wu (1992) it is
demonstrated, however, that not all passive sentences are ambiguous in Chinese. Kuno et al.
consider the possibility that one of the possible scopes for the passive sentences might be ruled out
by other, non-syntactic, factors. This is another indication that Aoun and Li's proposal cannot
accurately predict ambiguity for Chinese.
Kuno et al. also mention that, according to Aoun and Li, the proposal can be extended to
Japanese with some further assumptions. Kuno et al. then argue that the same problems would still
remain. For instance, Aoun and Li's proposal would predict both sentences in (28) as unambiguous,
since they have the same structure. But as shown, only (28a) is unambiguous, whereas (28b) which
is ambiguous in Japanese8.
(28)
a. Daremo-ga
dareka-o
aisite-iru. (unambiguous)
everyone-NOM someone-Acc love
'Everyone loves someone.'
b. Dareka-ga
daremo-o
aisite-iru. (ambiguous)
someone-NOM everyone-ACC love
'Someone loves everyone.'
Kuno et al. extend their criticism to other theories and proposals. They show that, since most
of these works use similar theories or are based upon Auon and Li (1993), problems occurring in
Aoun and Li's proposal also extend to May (1985), Stroik (1996), Huang (1982). Kuno et al. also
refer to Hornstein (1995), because Hornstein uses the data provided by Aoun and Li (1993). Since
8
These sentences, and especially (30b), have been investigated thoroughly. However, opinions still differ on the
ambiguity of both sentences. Most linguists see (30b) as unambiguous, but according to Kuno et al. this sentence is
perceived ambiguous by many Japanese.
17
this data was already shown not to represent Chinese ambiguity correctly, Kuno et al. argue that
Hornstein (1985) is also untenable.
4.0 Kuno, Takami, and Wu's functional account of scope in English9
Having noticed the lack of a syntax-based theory of scope that can accurately predict
whether or not a sentence is ambiguous or not, Kuno, Takami, and Wu (1999) propose a different
approach to this problem. They suggest an expert rule system based on artificial intelligence
decision making. In such a system each rule in the system independently judges the circumstances
and expresses its opinion on them. This type of decision making is used in artificial intelligence
when the decision has to be made on multiple “non-absolute factors”. A non-absolute factor in
artificial intelligence is a factor which is expressed in a series of probabilities. For example, in a
word recognition system the first expert in the system could be an acoustic analysis of the input.
The output would not be a specific word but rather multiple words along with the probability of the
input being that word. Other factors, such as the probability of one word following another, could
be other expert rules in this word recognition system. Add up all the results these experts produced
and you have the end-output. The end-output of this word recognition system would be one word,
but non of the experts was absolutely sure of their answer.10
Kuno et al. suggest these expert rules for English, as seen in (29). Besides these rules, Kuno
et al. argue that since every sentence with multiple quantifiers can, at some level, be ambiguous,
each quantifier has to be assigned at least one vote, a baseline vote.11 It must also be noted that
Kuno et al. include WH-elements in this system as well. They have done this because certain
sentences with a quantifier and a WH-element can also be ambiguous.
9
10
11
For Kuno et al.'s successful application of the expert rule system to Chinese and Japanese see Kuno, Takami, Wu
(1993) and Kuno and Takami (1999).
This expert rule system bears striking resemblance to the Competition Model (Mac Whinney 1987, Mac Whinney &
Bates 1989). The difference between the two is that the expert rule system is applied to L1A and the Competition
Model to L2A. However, this difference does not negate the most important argument against a proposal like the
Competition Model. The Competition Model has difficulty explaining why (some) cues seem to appear across
languages. Kuno et al. do not explain why their expert rule system should apply cross-linguistically. They simply
assume that they do because their system is proven to work cross-linguistically. Thus, Kuno et al.'s proposal lacks a
significant step in explaining why scope appears to have similar qualities across languages.
This seems to be a nothing more than a symbolic gesture, because when evaluating the tallied scores for the expert
rule system a score of 3 to 1 is ruled as unambiguous since it one of the quantifiers only received the baseline vote.
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(29)
a. Subject Q > Object Q > Oblique Q:
b. Left-hand Q > Right-hand Q:
c. Human Q > Nonhuman Q:
d. Speaker/Hearer Q > Third-Person Q:
e. More D(iscourse)-linked Q > Less D-linked Q:
f. More Active Participant Q > Less Active Participant Q:
g. Each > Other Quantified Expressions:
h. Topicalized Q > Non-topicalized Q:
The expert rules can be read as follows. The expert rule (29a) specifies that a quantified
expression in a subject NP tends to have wide scope over one in a non-subject NP, and a quantified
expression in an object NP tends to have wide scope over one in an oblique-case NP. An observed
tendency in which quantified expressions on the left have wide scope over quantified expressions
on the right resulted in expert rule (29b). Both (29a) and (29b) are based on syntax. On semantic
grounds, Kuno et al. also argue that a quantified expression in a human NP tends to have wide
scope over one in a nonhuman NP (29c). Noting that discourse-related factors also play a role in
scopal ambiguity, Kuno et al. postulate (29d-f). (29d) specifies that a quantified expression in the
speaker/hearer NP tends to have wide scope over one in a third-person NP. And (29e) specifies that
a quantified expression that has been talked about in the preceding discourse tends to have wide
scope over one that has just been introduced into discourse. When a quantified expression in an NP
that refers to an active participant in the action represented by the sentence it tends to have wide
19
scope over a quantified expression in an NP that refers to a less active participant (29f). (29g) is
based on idiosyncratic properties of lexical items and specifies that each tends to have wide scope
over other quantified expressions. More specifically: each > a/some( + Nsg) > every > all > most >
many > several > some( + Npl) > a few. Finally another syntax-based rule which is absolute. This
means that a syntactically topicalized quantified expression will always have wide scope over a
syntactically non-topicalized quantified expression (29h).
The observations on which the rules are based can be seen below. Take for example the
sentences in (30).
(30)
a. Who did everyone nominate?
Object
Subject
b. Who did you introduce to everyone?
Object
Oblique
c. Who did you introduce everyone to?
Oblique
Object
According to Kuno et al. the sentences in (30) show that the every > who interpretation is easier to
obtain in (30a) than in (30b) because every is a subject in (40a) and not in (40b). Similarly in the
every > who interpretation is easier to obtain in (40b) than in (40c) because every is an object in
(40c) and not in (40b). This results in the first expert rule (29a). Kuno et al. explain that the
difference between the sentences in (31) is caused because of the rule (29b).
(31)
a. Last year, they assigned several new students to two teachers.
b. Last year, they assigned to two teachers several new students.
They argue that since the reading several > two is more difficult to obtain this must be because of
20
their position in the sentence. The 'human Q > nonhuman Q' rule (29c) is explained by Kuno et al.
though the difference between the sentences in (32).
(32)
a. What was worrying everyone?
(ambiguous)
[-human]
b. Who blamed everyone?
(unambiguous)
[ + human]
Kuno et al. justify (29d) with the sentences in (33).
(33)
a. Many of them hate some of us/you.
(ambiguous)
b. Many of us/you hate some of them.
(unambiguous)
It is, however, not clear why Kuno et al. consider these sentences to differ in ambiguity. Perhaps it
is based on native speaker intuitions, or empirical evidence, but Kuno et al. do not stipulate either of
them. Their reasoning for (29d) is that since the only difference between the sentences is the status
of the participants (i.e. speaker/hearer or third-person) this must be the cause of the difference in
ambiguity. Using the sentences in (34), Kuno et al. observe that a quantifier that has been talked
about in the preceding discourse tends to take wide scope more easily than one that has not (29e).
(34)
a. Six courses were taken for credit by more than fifty students.
b. Six of these courses were taken for credit by more than fifty students.
The more than fifty > six reading seems to be very difficult to obtain in (34b), whereas it is easier to
21
obtain in (34a). This must be because the quantifier six has been previously mentioned in the
discourse in (34b). The difference in ambiguity of the sentences in (35) is explained by the fact that
in (35b) one advisor is a recipient of the action, and thus a more active participant in the action (see
29f). This difference in the level participation is not found in (35a).
(35)
a. The chair assigned one advisor every student.
b. The chair assigned every student to one advisor.
(29g) is explained by examining the sentences (36).
(36)
a. Someone invited everyone.
b. Someone invited each person.
Kuno et al. argue that the reading everyone > someone in (36a) is more difficult to obtain than the
reading each person > someone in (36b). According to them, this is partly because the set of
members over which each varies must be defined in preceding discourse (i.e. D-linked). Because
the everyone reading is easier to obtain, Kuno et al. reason that it must have a part in the
determining of scope, resulting in rule (29g). In Kuno (1991) the rule (29g) is further elaborated and
an extended version of the one offered by Ioup (1975) is used to further define the rule. Kuno et al.
note that the syntactic topicalization of a quantified expression results in that quantified expression
having wide scope over other quantifiers (29h). An example of this are the sentences in (37).
(37)
a. Many people come to New York every summer.
(ambiguous)
b. Every summer, many people come to New York.
(unambiguous)
The most efficient way of explaining how this system works on language is by analyzing a
22
sentence. Consider the sentences in (38).
(38)
a. What did everyone buy for Max?
(unambiguous)
b. Who did you assign every problem to?
(ambiguous)
c. What did John give to everyone?
(ambiguous)
If we apply the expert rule system to sentence (38a) we will see that it is indeed correctly predicted
as unambiguous. In this sentence the Q who is the subject of the sentence, a left-hand quantified
expression, and [+human]. Who would in this case receive four votes. One baseline vote and three
from the following rules: Subject Q > Object Q > Oblique Q, Left-hand Q > Right-hand Q, and
Human Q > Nonhuman Q. Everything does not receive any vote apart from the baseline vote. The
tally now is four votes for who and one for everything. This sentence is unambiguous according to
the expert rule system. Because this is a quantitative system, it does not produce results in a binary
fashion, i.e. a choice between ambiguous and unambiguous. Instead, this system displays ambiguity
in degrees. This can be seen if we look at the sentences (38b) and (38c). In (38b) who receives four
votes since it receives a baseline vote and is a left-hand Q, a [+human] Q, and a more active Q. In
contrast, every problem receives only two: the baseline vote and Object Q. (38b) is ambiguous with
a slightly stronger interpretation for who > every problem, than for every problem > who. In the
sentence (38b) both Q's receive three votes. For what: baseline vote, object Q, and left-hand Q. For
everyone: baseline vote, human Q, and more active Q. In this case the system predicts that there will
be no favor for either reading. The sentences in (39)12 show how the expert rule system would
function in situations where Aoun and Li's proposal would wrongly predict the ambiguity of a
sentence.
(39)
a. Every student admires some professor. (ambiguous)
b. Each student admires some professor. (unambiguous)
12
Just as in (33), Kuno et al. do not stipulate the basis for judging the ambiguity for these sentences differently.
23
The score for (39a) is three votes for every student (baseline vote, subject Q, left-hand Q) and two
for some professor (baseline vote, some(Nsg) > every), thus correctly predicting it to be ambiguous.
The score for (39b) is four votes for each student ( baseline vote, subject Q, left-hand Q, each >
some(Nsg) and one vote for some professor (baseline vote), thus correctly predicting it to be
unambiguous.
There is one other stipulation to these rules. Ambiguity or an indicated reading can be ruled
out because a sentence is pragmatically implausible.
(40)
An oak grew from each acorn.
For example the system would suggest a an > every reading with a score of four to one in sentence
(40). It is, however, very implausible for one oak to have grown out of all the acorns combined, and
therefore this reading is ruled out. Kuno et al. reason that the ideolectal variation of scope
interpretations of multiple quantifier sentences can be explained by people assigning different
values to a rule. If this is the case then it is likely that these rules are empirically acquired instead of
being innate. Kuno et al. leave this question to future research.
5.0 A pragmatic constraint on Dutch scope
After having looked at both a UG based account of scope and a possible alternative we can
take a look at how Philip (2005) fits into this framework. Philip (2005) states that for the scope
constraint to be accepted as an instance of linguistic knowledge derived from UG there are basically
three different possible scenarios. The first would be to derive the scope constraint from another
constraint which has already been shown to have been derived from UG. Another scenario is to try
and link the scope constraint directly to UG. The third possible origin of the constraint entails an
interaction between UG and general cognition Philip calls Universal Cognition (UC). Philip
explains the term UC as follows: “[it is] a hypothetical set of innately specified cognitive principles
24
that are domain-neutral.” A possible principle of UC might be general pattern recognition, which is
not language specific but does play a role in language acquisition and language processing. It is,
however, present from a very early age, if not from birth. Since this last option does not necessarily
depend on syntactic or semantic competence Philip attributes it to pragmatic competence. Philip
raises valid arguments against the first two scenarios.
For the first scenario Philip suggests that the specificity constraint might be a likely choice
from which the scope constraint could be derived.. This is because as of yet no languages have been
found that have the scope constraint but do not have the specificity constraint. The specificity
constraint on scope does not allow the subject to have a narrower scope than the universally
quantified direct object in a sentence because this interpretation is ruled out by the specificity
constraint. As Philip considers this possibility he raises four arguments against this option. Firstly
the specificity constraint does not hold true for all possible sentences. For instance Philip points out
,by referring to Ruys (1992), that if the specific indefinite takes intermediate scope then it can have
a narrower scope than the universal quantified direct object, and the specificity constraint would
therefore need a modification for Dutch specifying that the specificity constraint only holds when
applied to a root clause. As Philip states, that since all other conditions are equal, it would be
simpler to refer to the scope constraint immediately instead of using the specificity constraint to
refer to the scope constraint. However, as Philip points out, if this specification can not be linked to
any UG principle, it would then be reduced to a construction-based theory.
Secondly Philip notes that there are examples of sentences in Dutch that do not adhere to the
scope constraint as well as sentences that do adhere to it in English, as shown in (41)
(41)
a. Een koning ging op elke/iedere schildpad zitten.
A king
went on each
turtle
(ambiguous)
sit [-FIN]
'A king sat on every turtle. '
b. Santa Clause gave a child each toy.
(unambiguous)
25
The expert rule system of Kuno, Takami, and Wu (1999) predicts (41a) correctly as ambiguous, and
indicates that for (41b) there is a strong preference for the surface scope reading. For (41a) the score
is four for Een (basevote, subject Q, left-hand Q, [+human] Q) and two for elke/iedere (basevote,
each > a). This results in an ambiguous sentence with a preference for the Een > elke/iedere reading
which correctly reflects reality. In (41b) the score is five for a (basevote, object Q, left-hand Q,
[+human] Q, more active Q) and two for each (basevote, each > a). Even though (41b) would be
considered ambiguous according to the expert rule system, it is clear that there is a strong
preference for the SS-reading. This result, however, is incorrect. This might be an indication that the
expert rule system is not a valid way for predicting scope, or that an extra rule is needed to solve
this problem.
Philip's strongest argument against the scope constraint being derived from the specificity
constraint points out that many Dutch speakers do not adhere to the specificity constraint in
sentence structures such as (42a)
(42)
a. Een vogel moet die bosbes opgegeten hebben.
A
bird must that blueberry up-eaten have.
'A bird must have eaten that blueberry.'
b. 'It is very likely that that blueberry was eaten by some bird or other.'
(non-specific)
c. 'It is very likely that a specific bird has eaten that blueberry.'
This sentence structure either the specific or the non-specific reading of the indefinite subject
(Reuland 1988). The non-specific interpretation of this sentence would be (42b). To allow the
specificity constraint to apply to Dutch there would need to be a rule that specified that it applied
only to sentences with sentence-initial indefinite subjects and a universal quantified object.
However if this is the case then again it would be easier to learn the scope constraint instead of
26
learning another rule and then apply the scope constraint.
The fourth argument states that at the moment when children already have an adult-like
performance for the specificity constraint they seem to lack an equal competence in the scope
constraint as is shown in Philip and Termeer (2003) and Krämer (2000).
As Philip notes, this is only one possible constraint that could have linked the scope constraint to
UG principles, he does not exclude the possible existence of other constraints but simply tries to
show the difficulties this process would encounter.
The second scenario that Philip suggests is the directly linking the constraint to a UG
principle. Philip uses Auon and Li (1993) as an example of trying to link scopal ambiguity directly
to syntax, basically because their proposal is capable of being applied cross-linguistically. However,
this option is also not without its problems. Firstly Aoun and Li's proposal falsely predicts Dutch
sentences to be scopally ambiguous. This is because Dutch, like English, moves the subject out of
its base generated VP-internal location. Dutch can therefore not rely on the same reason that Aoun
and Li argue for the Chinese constraint.
For his second argument he refers to English minimal pairs which vary in ambiguity. Since
the minimal pair only differs in the direct object QP, as shown in (43), Philip reasons that it must
either be a syntactic or semantic difference within the direct object or a lexical property of one of
the direct objects constituents.
(43)
a. A bird has eaten each blueberry.
(ambiguous)
b. A bird has eaten all the blueberries.
(unambiguous/only SS)
It is not a very strong argument against Auon and Li's proposal since it might only need an
additional rule to be able to predict this difference, and, as Philip points out, this rule might well fall
into the syntactic realm. This then would not disprove the relation between scope and UG, but rather
strengthen it.
27
For his third argument Philip refers to Wyngaerd (1992) for an example sentence (44) which
has a similar structure to (3), shown again as (45), but is scopally ambiguous.
(44)
a. Een weerhaan heeft elke kerktoren gesierd.
(ambiguous)
'A weather vane has decorated each church spire'.
b. 'There is one weather vane which has decorated all the church spires.' (SS reading)
(45)
c. 'There was one weather vane on each church spire.'
(IS reading)
a. Een kind schopte elke bal.
(unambiguous)
'A child has kicked each/every ball.'
b. 'One child has kicked all the balls'.
(SS reading only)
Philip explains that it is difficult to imagine the SS reading, but then states that it could in principle
be true if there was a weather vane that had been transported from church to church and had been
atop all the churches spires for a while. Turning again to Kuno, Takami, and Wu's (1999) system we
do get some insight into the possible ambiguity of (44a). In both (44a) and (45a) Een receives the
base, subject Q, and the left-hand Q votes and elke receives the base, and each > a votes. The
difference between the two sentences is the [+human] factor for (45a) for Een. It would indicate that
(45a) could be considered less ambiguous than (44a). This effect can, however, easily be negated as
sentence (46) shows.
(46)
A car hit each tree.
A more important problem with Aoun and Li's proposal are the erroneous predictions made
for Chinese and Japanese by their system. As seen above, Kuno, Takami, and Wu (1999) show that
28
some of Aoun and Li's assumptions are ill conceived and are no longer tenable because of this. They
also show that Aoun and Li's system predicts unambiguous sentences to be ambiguous and
ambiguous sentences to be unambiguous. While the former could be construed as an underrepresentation of the system, the later again makes the system untenable as a valid representation of
quantifier scope. Kuno, Takami, and Wu's rule system is a possible alternative for the interpretation
of quantifier scope. Unlike Aoun and Li's system theirs does not restrict itself solely to syntax, but
also allows other factors like pragmatic, semantic, and idiosyncratic factors. However, if one takes
into account that they have separate rules for scope in Chinese and Japanese, one can expect that the
predictions for English and Dutch will be the same.
After having supplied several arguments against the two possible options for a UG derived
scope constraint, Philip (2005) turns to this third option. He offers that, instead of linking the scope
constraint directly or indirectly to UG, it could be a constraint which is acquired through interaction
between the UG and a general pragmatic principle which would ultimately derive from UC. Philip
notes that UG in this case does not provide the rule itself but rather the framework and the building
blocks, namely linguistic primitives to define the construction and the syntactic conditions needed
for this construction. Since the empirical research that follows focuses on Dutch, Philip decides to
leave the extension to Japanese, Chinese, or other languages to future researchers. Philip takes care
to point out that he assumes that UC can help in language processing and acquisition, but is not as
effective as UG might be. This is in line with what many proponents of the Critical Period
Hypothesis believe (e.g. Clahsen & Muysken 1989, Bley-Vroman 1990, Neeleman & Weerman
1997), since UG is inaccessible after the end of the critical period something else must facilitate the
language acquisition, in this case UC.
Philip then proceeds to define the construction-based interpretive rule for the scope
constraint. It is a two part rule. The first part being a structural condition as given in (47a), and the
second part is the semantic condition and function as given in (47b).
29
(47)
a. [DP[+ TOPIC]...[QP[+ TOPIC]V]VP...]CP
b. If a sentence instantiating the construction in (47a) has scalar truth conditions because of
the logically possible scopal interaction of DP and QP, then assign the strongest possible
reading consistent with the context of use
The similarities between (47b) and the expert rules as proposed by Kuno, Takami, and Wu (1999)
are striking, and could be considered as a Dutch-specific expert rule. The “scalar truth conditions”
are defined as follows. The IS reading (2c) of sentence (2a) has scalar truth conditions since the
situation (2d) is a more specific, and thus narrower/weaker reading, of (2e). The difference with the
other expert rules is that this rule is focused solely on a specific sentence construction. This should
not be a problem since the system is learned on a construction basis.
Philip also assumes that UG supplies the substansive universal described in (48a), the
Dutch-specific interpretive rule described in (48b), and the universal interpretive principle in (48c)
in which the [+ TOPIC] feature is considered as a primitive.
(48)
a. Elke and iedere carry a lexical feature that causes the phrases they head to be obligatory
lexically marked [+ TOPIC].
b. In Dutch, a sentence-intitial DP is obligatorily syntactically marked [+ TOPIC]
c. If a DP is lexically, morphologically, or syntactically marked [+TOPIC], then, (i) it can
denote a subset of the objects that make up the “discourse topic” or “protagonist set” and
(ii) it can take scope over any clause-mate scope-taking expressions.
If this rule is then applied to the Dutch sentence as shown in (2) it correctly predicts that this
sentence should not be ambiguous, since the truth values in this sentence are scalar and therefore
30
the strongest meaning applies.13 If it is true that the Dutch scope constraint does not, or derives
only in a limited way from UG, it should be, as Philip points out, noticeable in the acquisition of this
constraint. The general idea behind UG is that it should function as a LAD for a child and facilitate
and speed up the acquisition of language at such a rate that children can actually learn a language in
a surprisingly fast and efficient manner. Philip notes that it is currently agreed upon by most
acquisitionists that most of the major syntactic, morphological, and phonological parameters are set
to the to-be-acquired-language's parameter settings by the age of 4. If the scope constraint is not
derived from UG then it stands to reason that the acquisition of it should be considerably delayed.
In Philip's original experiment he assumes the null-hypothesis that if the scope constraint is
in some way UG derived, it should be acquired at a similar rate to other constraints and everything
else that is considered to be driven by UG as a LAD in concordance with the Strong Continuity
Hypothesis. Since the Critical Period is often considered to end at the age of 8 (e.g. Long 1990)
Philip adopts this as the upper limit for proving the null-hypothesis. If the scope constraint is not
acquired before this age, its acquisition can then be considered not to be driven by UG, but rather
something else. To test this theory Philip used a truth-value judgment task that tested the use of the
scope constraint in five different age categories. The results of this are shown in table (1). The
conclusions Philip draws from these results are that (i) all children including the twelve-year-old
children preformed significantly worse than the adult group indicating that the scope constraint is
learned very late, and does in all likelihood not have a UG driven acquisition, and (ii) there is no (or
near)perfect attainment for every adult (15% of the adults did not obey the scope constraint), unlike
UG driven acquisition which has a success rate of about 97%, again hinting that it is not a UG
driven acquisition.
7.0 More evidence for a pragmatic construction-based constraint
The following experiment is similar to the experiment that Philip carried out. Its goal is to
provide more evidence for a construction-based account for the Dutch scope constraint. To do this a
13
For further examples of the rule applied to sentences please refere to the original paper by Philip (2005).
31
group of (successive) English/Dutch bilinguals is compared with a group of adults who have
learned Dutch after the end of the Critical Period. If the Dutch scope constraint is part of UG, then
the performance of the bilinguals should be significantly better than that of the adult L2'ers since
the adult L2'ers do not have access to UG when learning this constraint. However, if the bilinguals
do not preform significantly better or worse than the adult L2'ers then it can be assumed that either
the constraint is not UG derived, or the Critical Period Hypothesis is false and adult L2'ers do have
(some) access to UG. The age group for the bilinguals would be from 8 years old and up, making
sure that they have lived at least six years in a Dutch speaking environment before age 8, and have
had not lived long periods in a non-Dutch speaking environment. For the adult L2 group the lower
limit would be 20 years old. This is to make sure that they are no longer in puberty and are no
longer in a possible second period of easier language acquisition. To prevent the length of time in a
Dutch-speaking environment to become a factor both groups should have spent about the same
amount of time in such an environment. The same holds for the length of exposure to English. Since
the experiment used is continuation on Philip's (2005) experiment many elements have been
borrowed from it. This experiment uses a truth-value judgment paradigm presented in a quiz-like
form. The test sentences will be presented only once to each subject. These are presented at the end
of the story to which the test sentence related. The three stories can be found in the appendix. The
three Dutch test sentences to be used are:
i. “Heeft een kwajongen elk meisje geraakt met een waterballon?” → Has a bully hit each girl
with a waterballoon?
ii. “Heeft een aap elke banaan gestolen?” → Did a monkey steal each banana?
iii. “Heeft een eekhoorn elke dennenappel begraven?” → Has a squirrel buried each pine cone?
These test sentences will be presented after twelve control sentences for each test sentence. These
sentences are interspersed throughout the stories. Ten of the test sentences are simple yes/no
32
questions. These are used as filler questions to make sure that the subjects did not recognize the test
sentence after hearing one or two similar stories. To counter a possible yes-response bias there are
five 'yes' and five 'no' responses, that is if all the filler-questions were answered correctly. Two of
these ten yes/no control sentences are labeled PA and PD. These also prevent pattern recognition
and make sure that the subjects have mastered the experimental task. They also satisfy the so-called
felicity of conditions of “plausible assent” (PA) and “plausible dissent” (PD) of Crain, Thorton,
Boster, Conway, Lillo-Martin, and Woodams (1996). The procedure for the experiment involves one
experimenter. The experimenter reads the story to the subject and asks the questions when required.
The only thing the subject has to do is to answer the questions. A quiet area without any distractions
is required to carry out the experiment. All thirteen responses will be recorded by hand on an
answer sheet by the experimenter. Extra stress will be used on the indefinite article in the PA and
PD questions to affirm the only correct structure used in Dutch, namely the surface scope reading.
In this way, any significant deviation from this structure by the bilingual group is only strengthened
since it would show that they are consciously applying the inverse scope reading. The stories will
be read only once to each subject and the questions will be repeated once if the subject fails to
respond.
33
Works Cited
Aoun, J. and Y.A. Li. Syntax of Scope. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
Bley-Vromann, R. “The logical Problem of Foreign Language Learning.” Linguistic Analysis 20
(1990): 3-49.
Chomsky, N. “The minimalist program for linguistic theory.” The view from building 20 (1993):152.
Clahsen, H. and P. Muysken. “The UG Paradox in L2 Acquisition.” Second Language Research 5
(1989): 1-29.
Crain, S., R. Thornton, C. Boster, L. Conway, D. Lillo-Martin, and E. Woodams.
“Quantification without Qualification.” Language Acquisition 5 (1996).
Hornstein, N.: 1995 Logical form: From GB to minimalism. Oxford: Blackwell, 1996.
Ioup, G. “Some universals for quantifier scope.” Syntax and semantics 4 (1975): 37-58.
Huang, J. Logical Form Constraints and Configurational Structures in Japanese. PhD
Dissertation: University of Washington, 1982.
Krämer, I., Interpreting Indefinites: An Experimental Study of Children's Language
Comprehension. PhD Dissertation: Utrecht University, 2000.
Kurtzman, H.S. and M.C. MacDonald. “Resolution of Quantifier Scope Ambiguities,” Cognition 48
(1993) : 243-279.
Kuno, S., K. Takami, Y. Wu. “Quantifier Scope in English, Chinese, and Japanese.” Language 75
(1999) : 63-111.
Long, M.L. “Maturational constraints on Language Development.” Studies in Second Language
Acquisition 12 (1990): 251-285.
MacWhinney, B. “The Competition Model.” Mechanisms of language acquisition. Hillsdale:
Lawrence Erlbaum (1987): 249-308.
MacWhinney, B., & Bates, E. The crosslinguistic study of sentence processing. New York :
34
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
May, R. The grammar of quantification. Cambridge: MIT dissertation, 1977 .
May, R. Logical form: Its structure and derivation. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985 .
Neeleman, A. and F. Weerman. “L1 and L2 Word Order Acquisition.” Language Acquisition 6
(1997): 125-170.
Philip, W. “Pragmatic Control of Specificity and Scope: Evidence from Dutch L1A.”
Proceedings of Sin und Bedeutung 9 (2005): 272-285.
Regeling, D. “Het bereik van iedere in NP...NP-structuren. [The scope of iedere in NP...NPstructure]” MA thesis. Utrecht University, 1996.
Reuland, E. “Indefinite Subjects.” NELS, 18 (1988): 375-394.
Ruys, E.G. The Scope of Indefinites. PhD Dissertation. Utrecht University, 1992.
Stroik, T. Minimalism, scope, and VP structure. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1996.
Vanden Wyngaerd, G. “Een reviewer zal elk abstract nalezen [A reviewer will
read over each abstract].” Tabu 22.1 (1992): 65-74.
Wu, Y. Anaphora and quantifier scope in Chinese. Harvard University dissertation. Cambridge,
1992.
35
36
Appendix
Table 1
n
Mean Age
PD
PA
Test
6-year-olds
27
6;5
30.%
85.%
67.%
7-year-olds
33
7;5
16.%
94.%
65.%
9-year-olds
39
9;9
0.%
100.%
77.%
12-year-olds
43
12;8
0.%
100.%
64.%
adults
40
29
0.%
100.%
84.%
Story 1: Bullies
Picture 1
Dit verhaal gaat over drie kwajongens, Bob, Martijn en Erik. Bob had een gestreept t-shirt aan.
Martijn had een pet op. En Erik had een donkere trui aan.
Vraag 1: Wie had een pet op? (Martijn)
37
'This story is about three bullies, Bob, Martijn, and Erik. Bob was wearing a striped shirt. Martijn
was wearing a cap. And Erik was wearing a dark sweater.'
Question 1: Who was wearing a cap? (Martijn)
Picture 2
Op een warme zomer dag stonden ze op het balkon van hun flat. Ze hadden vijf waterballonnen
gevuld met water. “Laten we ze naar mensen op het plein gooien,” zei Erik. Er waren twee jongens
en drie meisjes aan het spelen op het plein.
Vraag 2: Wonen de drie kwajongens in een flat? (Ja)
Vraag 3: Stonden ze op het dak? (Nee)
Vraag 4: Hoeveel ballonnen hadden ze? (5)
On a hot summer's day they stood on the balcony of their appartment building. They had filled five
waterballoons with water. “Lets throw them at the people on the square below,” said Erik. Two boys
and three girls were playing on the square.
Question 2: Do the three bullies live in the appartment building? (Yes)
Question 3: Were they on the roof? (No)
Question 4: How many balloons did they have? (5)
38
Picture 3
“Haha, let maar eens op,” zei Bob en hij gooide twee waterballonnen tegelijk
“Haha, watch this,” said Bob and threw two waterballoons at once.
39
Picture 4
En hij raakte de twee jongens die boos schreeuwden en daarna ergens anders gingen spelen.
Vraag 5: Heeft één van de kwajongens elke jongen op het plein geraakt. (Ja) (PA)
And he hit the two boys who yelled angrily before leaving to play somewhere else.
Question 5: Has one of the bullies hit each boy on the square? (Yes) (PA)
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Picture 5
De meisjes hadden de kwajongens gezien en daagden hun uit. “Dat lukt je niet nog een keer,” zei
Martijn. Bob grijnsde en gooide nog een waterballon.
Vraag 6: Zijn de meisjes bang voor de kwajongens? (Nee)
The girls had seen the bullies and were challenging them. “You wont be able to do that again,” said
Martijn. Bob grinned and threw another waterballoon.
Question 6: Are the girls scared of the bullies? (No)
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Picture 6
En kijk, hij raakte een van de meisjes en ze liep kwaad weg.
Vraag 7: Hebben Martijn en Erik allebei al een waterballon gegooid? (Nee)
And look, he hit one of the girls and she walked away angrily.
Question 7: Have both Martijn and Erik thrown a waterballoon? (No)
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Picture 7
De twee overgebleven meisjes lachten en begonnen rondjes te rennen om de ballonnen te
ontwijken. “Jullie raken ons toch nooit!” riepen ze.
Vraag 8: Heeft één van de kwajongens elk meisje geraakt met een waterballon? (Nee) (PD)
The two remaining girls laughed and started running around in circles to avoid the balloons. “You'll
never hit us!” they yelled.
Question 8: Has one of the bullies hit each girl with a waterballoon? (No) (PD)
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Picture 8
Toen zei Bob: “Ik heb al een meisje geraakt, nu kijken of jullie dat ook lukt.” Erik stroopte zijn
mouwen op, pakte een van de ballonnen mikte, en gooide.
Vraag 9: Hebben Bob en Erik allebei al een waterballon gegooid. (Ja)
Then Bob said: “I've allready hit a girl, now let's see if you can do it too.” Erik rolled up his sleeves,
picked up a balloon, aimed and threw.
Question 9: Have both Bob and Erik thrown a waterballoon? (Yes)
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Picture 9
Raak! Erik had er ook één geraakt. Ze gilde door het koude water in de ballon en rende weg.
Vraag 10: Gilde het meisje door het koude water? (Ja)
Score! Erik has also hit one. She screamed because of the cold water in the balloon and ran away.
Question 10: Did the girl scream because of the cold water? (Yes)
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Picture 10
“Er is nog één ballon over,” zei Bob tegen Martijn, “nu is het jouw beurt.” “Nee gooi jij maar, ik
ben er niet zo goed in,” zei Martijn. “Niet zeuren, maar gooien!” riepen Bob en Erik in koor.”
Vraag 11: Durft Martijn niet te gooien? (Nee)
Vraag 12: Zeiden Bob en Erik tegelijk dat Martijn moest gooien? (Ja)
“There's one balloon left,” said Bob to Martijn, “now it's your turn.” “No, you throw it, I'm not very
good at it,” said Martijn. “Don't whine, throw!” Bob and Erik said in unison.
Question 11: Is Martijn scared to throw? (No)
Question 12: Did Bob and Erik tell Martijn to throw in unison? (Yes)
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Picture 11
Martijn haalde zijn schouders op, en gooide de waterballon.
Martijn shrugged and threw the waterballoon.
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Picture 12
Tot zijn verbazing raakte hij het laatste meisje op haar arm. “Zie je nu wel dat je het wel kunt,” zei
Bob.
Vraag 13: Heeft een kwajongen elk meisje geraakt met een waterballon? (Test)
To his amazement he hit the last girl on her arm. “I told you you could do it,” said Bob.
Question 13: Has a bully hit each girl with a waterballoon? (Test)
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Story 2: Monkeys
Picture 1
Dit verhaal gaat over drie apen die in een stad leven. Een heeft een hanenkam omdat hij dat stoer
vindt. De tweede heeft gips om zijn arm omdat hij weer eens uit een boom was gevallen. En de
derde een rugzak op zijn rug die hij gevonden had.
Vraag 1: Waarom heeft één van de apen een verband om zijn arm? (Hij was uit een boom gevallen)
This story is about three monkeys who live in a city. One has a mohawk, because he thinks it's cool.
The second monkey has a cast on his arm because he fell out of a tree again. And the third has a
backpack on his back that he had found.
Question 1: Why does one of the monkeys have a cast on his arm? (He fell out of a tree)
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Picture 2
Op een middag zaten ze in een boom op de markt toen ze zagen dat een van de fruitkraampjes
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onbewaakt was. Het was laat op de dag en er waren nog maar drie bananen, twee appels, en een
peer over. “Kijk,” zei de stoere aap, “dit is onze kans.”
Vraag 2: Is het kraampje nog bewaakt door een marktkoopman? (Nee)
Vraag 3: Ziet de gewonde aap het onbewaakte fruit als eerste? (Nee)
On an afternoon the monkeys were sitting in a tree on the market when they saw that one of the
stalls was unattended. It was late in the day and there were only three bananas, two apples, and a
pear left. “Look,” said the cool monkey, “this is our chance.”
Question 2: Is the stall guarded by a marketvendor? (No)
Question 3: Does the wounded monkey see the fruit first? (No)
Picture 3
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De aap met de rugzak is als eerste uit de boom en steelt snel twee appels en een banaan, stopt ze in
zijn rugzak en rent dan weg.
Vraag 4: Zitten er nog twee apen in de boom? (Ja)
Vraag 5: Zit de aap met de hanenkam nog in de boom? (Ja)
Vraag 6: Heeft een aap elke appel gestolen? (Ja) (PA)
The monkey with the backpack is the first out of the tree and quickly steals two apples and a
banana, puts them in his backpack and runs away.
Question 4: Are there still two monkeys in the tree? (Yes)
Question 5: Is the monkey with the mowhawk still in the tree? (Yes)
Question 6: Has a monkey stolen each apple? (Yes) (PA)
Picture 4
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Nu komt de marktkoopman van het kraampje even terug naar zijn kraampje, maar zag niet dat er
iets weg was, en gaat weer weg. “Schiet op voordat hij terug komt,”zei de stoere aap tegen de
gewonde aap. “Maar ik durf niet,” zei de gewonde aap.
Vraag 7: Was de marktkoopman de hele tijd bij het kraampje? (Nee)
Vraag 8: Hoeveel stukken fruit liggen er nu nog op het kraampje? (3)
The stall's vendor returns briefly to his stall, but doesn't notice anything is missing, so he leaves
again. “Hurry up before he comes back,” said the cool monkey to the wounded monkey. “But I'm
scared,” said the wounded monkey.
Question 7: Was the marketvendor with his stall the whole time? (No)
Question 8: How many pieces of fruit are there on the stall now? (3)
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Picture 5
“Nou,” zei de stoere aap, “dan ga ik wel.” En hij sprong met een salto uit de boom en landde in een
handstand.
Vraag 9: Heeft één van de apen elke banaan gestolen? (Nee) (PD)
“Well,” said the cool monkey, “then I'll go.” And he summersaulted out of the tree and landed in a
handstand.
Question 9: Has one of the monkeys stolen each banana? (No) (PD)
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Picture 6
Nadat de marktkoopman weer zijn naar zijn kraampje had gekeken rende de stoere aap langs het
kraampje en stal de peer en een banaan.
Vraag 10: Ligt er alleen nog een banaan op het kraampje? (Ja)
The cool monkey ran past the stall, after the marketvendor had looked at his stall once more, and
stole the pear and the banana.
Question 10: Is there still a banana on the stall? (Yes)
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Picture 7
De marktkoop man liep naar een andere collega nog verder van zijn kraampje. “Snel, hij kan je
nooit pakken nu, en anders heb je helemaal niks te eten!” riepen de andere twee apen vanuit een
andere boom naar de gewonde aap.
Vraag 11: Zit elke aap in een boom? (Ja)
Vraag 12: Zit elke aap in dezelfde boom? (Nee)
The marketvendor walked to another vendor even further away from his stall. “Quick, he can't catch
you now, and otherwise you don't have anything to eat!” yelled the other monkeys from a different
tree to the wounded monkey.
Question 11: Is every monkey in a tree? (Yes)
Question 12: Is every monkey in the same tree? (No)
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Picture 8
De gewonde aap had best wel honger en besloot het toch maar te proberen. Voorzichtig klimt hij uit
de boom, want hij wou niet nog een keer vallen. Daarna stal hij vlug de laatste banaan en klom de
andere boom in bij de andere twee apen.
Vraag 13: Heeft een aap elke banaan gestolen? (Test)
The wounded monkey was rather hungry and decided to try it anyway. He climbed down the tree
very carefully, because he didn't want to fall again. Then he quickly stole the last banana and
climbed up the other tree with the other two monkeys.
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Question 13: Has a monkey stolen each banana? (Test)
Story 3: Squirrels
Picture 1
Dit verhaal gaat over drie eekhoorn vrienden. Een was groot en sterk, de tweede was klein en snel,
en de derde had een grote pluimstaart.
This story is about three squirrel friends. One was big and strong, the other was small and fast, and
the third had a big fluffy tail.
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Picture 2
Op een dag in het bos hadden ze samen eten verzameld op een voor de winter. Ze hadden twee
eikels en drie dennenappels gevonden, en ze hadden het eten op een steen gelegd om het te
verdelen. Ook hadden ze hadden elk een eigen kuil gegraven om hun eten in te bewaren.
Vraag 1: Zijn er evenveel eikels als dennenappels? (Nee)
Vraag 2: Waarom hebben de eekhoorns een elk een kuil gegraven? (Om hun eten in te begraven)
One day in the forest they had been collecting food for the winter. They had found two acorns and
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three pine cones, and put them on a stone to devide them. They had dug their own hole as well to
keep the food in.
Question 1: Are there as many acorns as there are pine cones? (No)
Question 2: Why did the squirrels each dig a hole? (To bury their food in)
Picture 3
De grote eekhoorn zei: “Ik neem de twee eikels want ik heb het meeste gedragen,” en hij liet ze in
zijn kuil vallen.
Vraag 3: Hadden alle eekhoorns evenveel werk gedaan? (Nee)
Vraag 4: Ligt al het eten nog op de steen? (Nee)
The big squirrel said: “I'll take the two acorns since I've carried the most,”and he dropped them in
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his hole.
Question 3: Did each squirrel do an equal amount of work? (No)
Question 4: Is all the food still on the stone? (No)
Picture 4
Daarna pakte hij ook een van de dennenappels en begroef zijn eten in zijn kuil. De kleine eekhoorn
was bang dat de grote eekhoorn de rest ook zou pakken en zei: “Wij hebben ook hard gewerkt voor
ons eten, de rest is voor ons.”
Vraag 5: Welke eekhoorn heeft zijn eten al begraven? (De grote)
Vraag 6: Hebben alle eekhoorns gewerkt voor hun eten? (Ja)
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After that he also took one of the pine cones and buried his food in his hole. The small squirrel was
afraid that the big squirrel would also take the rest of the food and said: “We've worked hard for our
food, the rest is ours.”
Question 5: Which squirrel has buried all his food already? (The big one)
Question 6: Have all squirrels worked for their food? (Yes)
Picture 5
De kleine eekhoorn ging tussen de grote eekhoorn en de dennenappels staan en de grote eekhoorn
zei: “Wees maar niet bang, ik had de rest wel voor jullie overgelaten.”
Vraag 7: Heeft één van de eekhoorns alle eikels begraven? (Ja) (PA)
Vraag 8: Heeft één van de eekhoorns alle dennenappels begraven? (Nee) (PD)
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The small squirrel stood between the big squirrel and the pine cones and the big squirrel said:
“Don't worry, I would have left the rest for you anyway.”
Question 7: Has one of the squirrels buried all of the acorns? (Yes) (PA)
Question 8: Has one of the squirrels buried all of the pine cones? (No) (PD)
Picture 6
Daarna begroef de kleine eekhoorn een van de dennenappels en zei tegen de pluimstaart: “De
laatste is voor jou.”
Vraag 9: Zit er in twee van de kuilen eten? (Ja)
Vraag 10: Ligt er nog een dennenappel op de steen? (Ja)
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After that the small squirrel buried one of the pine cones and said to the fluffy tail: “The last one is
yours.”
Question 9: Is there food in two of the holes? (Yes)
Question 10: Is there still food on the stone? (Yes)
Picture 7
“Nee dank je wel,” zei de pluimstaart, “ik heb al genoeg verzameld in andere kuilen, neem jij die
maar.” Maar de kleine eekhoorn zei: “Doe niet zo gek, wij hebben ook andere kuilen, deze is voor
jou.” en gaf de laatste dennenappel aan de pluimstaart.
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Vraag 11: Heeft elke eekhoorn een andere kuil? (Ja)
Vraag 12: Wil de kleine eekhoorn de laatste dennenappel ook hebben? (Nee)
“No thanks,” said the fluffy tail, “I've allready gathered enough in other holes, you can have that
one.” But the small squirrel said: “Don't be stupid, we've also got other holes, this one is yours.”
and he gave the last pine cone to the fluffy tail.
Question 11: Does every squirrel have another hole? (Yes)
Question 12: Does the small squirrel want the last pine cone as well? (No)
Picture 8
“Ah okee, dat wist ik niet,” zei de pluimstaart en begroef de laatste dennenappel in zijn kuil.
Vraag 13: Heeft een eekhoorn elke dennenappel begraven? (Test)
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“Ah okay, I didn't know that,” said the fluffy tail and buried the last pine cone in his hole.
Question 13: Has a squirrel buried each pine cone? (Test)