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The Whys and Whens of Personal Uncertainty
David De Cremer
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University
Constantine Sedikides
University of Southampton
Address correspondence to David De Cremer, Rotterdam School of Management,
Erasmus Centre of Behavioural Ethics (www.erim.nl/behaviouralethics), Erasmus
University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, 3062 PA Rotterdam, PO Box 1738,
3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands; Email: ddecremer@rsm.nl; Phone: + 31 10
4081953.
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The Whys and Whens of Personal Uncertainty
Van den Bos (in press) argued for the regulatory importance of personal
uncertainty. He defined personal uncertainty as “a subjective sense of doubt or instability
in self-views, world-views, or the interrelation between the two” and as involving “the
implicit and explicit feelings and other subjective reactions people experience as a result
of being uncertain about themselves” (p. ###). Given that personal uncertainty is
uncomfortable or aversive, people are motivated to reduce it. They do so in a variety of
ways, most notably by adhering to cultural worldviews. Personal uncertainty, then, or its
reduction, is a self-regulatory process through which people assign value to their daily
practices and socio-cultural norms.
We concur that personal uncertainty reduction is a critical regulator of a range of
social behaviors, and we welcome the contribution to the study of these phenomena by
the uncertainty management model (Van den Bos, in press). In our commentary, we will
focus on the link between uncertainty reduction and procedural fairness (i.e., the
enactment of perceived fair vs. unfair organizational decision-making rules; De Cremer
& Sedikides, 2005), and we will highlight two issues that have implications for the
model. First, why do people want to reduce their uncertainty? Second, when do people
want to maintain or even increase their uncertainty?
The Whys of Personal Uncertainty Reduction
What do people want to achieve by reducing personal uncertainty? Alternatively,
what are the goals people want to promote when attempting to reduce personal
uncertainty? And are different types of goals associated with different types of personal
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uncertainty (Sedikides, De Cremer, Hart, & Brebels, 2010; Sedikides, Hart, & De
Cremer, 2008)?
Van den Bos (in press) has induced personal uncertainty by instructing
participants to describe “the emotions that the thought of your being uncertain arouses in
you” and “what you think physically will happen to you as you feel uncertain” (p. ###).
This manipulation was originally designed, in part, to disentangle the relative
contribution of personal uncertainty versus existential terror on adherence to sociocultural norms, values, or worldviews. As such, this operationalization of personal
uncertainty is suited to generic concerns about the social world, and that is why we (De
Cremer, Brebels, & Sedikides, 2008) labeled it in our research as general uncertainty.
We superimposed then a manipulation of procedural rules in terms of granting or denying
organizational members voice (i.e., opinion or input in the decision-making process;
Folger, 1977). We reasoned that, in this context, generic uncertainty would activate
organizational fairness concerns. Members would adopt the implicit goal of finding out
whether their organization is fair or unfair. Being granted voice would be a diagnostic
sign of organizational fairness, whereas being denied voice would be a diagnostic sign of
organizational unfairness.
Personal uncertainty, though, could also refer to one’s social belongingness, what
we labeled belongingness uncertainty. We operationalized this type of uncertainty
accordingly. We instructed participants to describe “the emotions that the thought of you
being uncertain about whether you belong to a group of other people arouses in you” and
“what you think physically will happen to you as you feel uncertain about whether you
belong to a group of other people” (De Cremer et al., 2008, p. 121). We then
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superimposed a manipulation of procedural rules in terms of granting or denying
members voice. We reasoned that, in this context, belongingness uncertainty would likely
activate concerns about one’s inclusionary status in the organization or about the strength
of one’s relationships with others. Members would adopt the implicit goal of finding out
the extent to which they are embraced by their organization or the extent to which they
belong to it. Being granted voice would be a diagnostic sign of belongingness prompting
stronger organizational identification, whereas being denied voice would be a diagnostic
sign of exclusion prompting organizational disidentification.
We obtained support for these hypotheses (De Cremer et al., 2008). When general
uncertainty was activated, participants deemed the organizational decision-making
procedures as fairer in the case in which they were granted than denied voice. However,
their strength of organizational identification was unaffected by procedural rules.
Conversely, when belongingness uncertainty was activated, participants identified more
strongly with the organization in the case in which they were granted than denied voice.
However, their judgments of organizational fairness were unaffected by procedural rules
Needless to say, our findings (De Cremer et al., 2008) leave several questions
unanswered. Our research, for example, is suggestive rather than conclusive about the
mechanisms that drove the obtained results. In particular, goals would need to be directly
manipulated either at the implicit or explicit level, and they would need to be so
independently of the type of uncertainty (i.e., general vs. belongingness) involved. Yet,
these findings call for a more refined specification of many of the effects that Van den
Bos (in press) reported. Such an empirical tack can clarify which type of personal
uncertainty produces what kinds of effects and why.
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The Whens of Personal Uncertainty Maintenance or Increase
Van den Bos (in press) acknowledged that people do not always attempt to reduce
their personal uncertainty. For examples, he states, and cites supportive work for his
statements, that “experiencing uncertainty may sometimes be sought out and occasionally
may instigate contemplation” (p. ###) and that “I do not want to suggest that people want
to reduce personal uncertainty all the time” (p. ###). We submit, however, that more than
lip service needs to be paid to this issue, and we discuss how people may maintain or
even search for uncertainty.
Theorists and researchers from a humanistic perspective (Aron, Aron, & Smollan,
1992; Erikson, 1963; Maslow, 1970) or an achievement framework (Csikszentmihalyi,
1980; Elliot & Thrash, 2001; Meece, Anderman, & Anderman, 2006) have long
advocated or demonstrated the benefits of psychological growth and self-expansion as
well as of furthering one’s skills and abilities. The notions of growth and improvement
are also reflected in cultural discourse (e.g., overcoming personal adversity or rising from
humble roots; McAdams, 2006). Self-improvement is indeed a potent human motive
(Sedikides & Hepper, in press). It is reflected in preferences for upward feedback
trajectories, upward comparison feedback, and feedback that may be self-threatening in
the present but useful in the future. Moreover, improvement-oriented feedback increases
satisfaction or positive affect and leads to better performance.
The self-improvement motive may underlie, in part, such life-style decisions as
relocation, occupational change, relationship dissolution, friendship formation, and
initiation of hobbies or interests. People can be consciously aware of their need or desire
to improve (Neiss, Sedikides, Shahinfar, & Kupersmidt, 2006; Tuckey, Brewer, &
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Williamson, 2002). Importantly, they are often also consciously aware of antecedents of
their self-improvement efforts such as failure (Taylor, Neter, & Wayment, 1995) or a
traumatic event (McFarland & Alvaro, 2000).
Given the desirability and cultural relevance of self-improvement, how do people
self-regulate in order to initiate or sustain self-improvement strivings? We propose that
one important self-regulatory tactic involves personal uncertainty. We assume that people
have a rudimentary insight into the relation between uncertainty and improvement: they
somehow know that uncertainty, albeit a temporarily uncomfortable state, can be
harnessed for long-term improvement purposes. People may then put this insight to use
by maintaining their personal uncertainty at current level or even by purposefully
increasing their personal uncertainty to a maximum tolerable level. They will endure, if
not nourish, high personal uncertainty to the point where their self-improvement efforts
have been initiated, are fully operative, or have achieved the desired outcomes (Sedikides
& Gregg, 2003; Sedikides & Strube, 1997). This self-regulatory process may be qualified
by individual differences: It will likely be more pronounced for persons high in need for
cognition, low in need for structure or closure, high in need for achievement, and high in
self-esteem or self-compassion.
Closing Remarks
We built on existing research on the uncertainty management model (Van Den
Bos, in press) to offer two suggestions. First, differentiating further the construct of
personal uncertainty can pave the way toward profitable empirical pursuits. In a
preliminary investigation (De Cremer et al., 2008), we demonstrated that general
uncertainty influences different judgmental domains than belongingness uncertainty
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perhaps by activating different goals. Second, incorporating work on the selfimprovement motive (Sedikides & Hepper, in press) raises questions about the
circumstances that result in the maintenance or increase (rather than reduction) of
personal uncertainty. We hope that the two suggestions can further strengthen the impact
and broaden the scope of the uncertainty management theory.
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