Allida: Craig has reviewed this annotation.
Despite directives from Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ordering him to stop commenting on the war, 1 UN Forces Commander Douglas MacArthur continued to argue publicly for widening the Korean War. In the April 5 issue of The Freeman, a conservative
Republican periodical, he blamed “basic political decisions beyond my authority” for the failure to arm Korean volunteers who wished to fight with UN forces. That same day the Daily
Telegraph of London quoted MacArthur as saying, “United Nations forces were circumscribed by a web of artificial conditions.” 2
Also on April 5 Minority Leader Joe Martin (R-MA), a MacArthur supporter, quoted a private letter from MacArthur in a speech to the House of Representatives.
3
In that letter which responded to Martin’s query regarding the use of Nationalist Chinese troops, MacArthur wrote:
It seems strangely difficulty for some to realize that here in Asia is where the
Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to
Communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.
4
These pronouncements on top of his previous March 24 statement in which he offered to
“confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in earnest effort to find any military means” to accomplish the UN’s objectives in Korea “without further bloodshed” fueled rumors that Truman would discipline or perhaps fire MacArthur.
5
My Day
April 9, 1951
NEW YORK, Sunday—I have a very great admiration for General MacArthur as a soldier and, from all I hear, he has been a good administrator in Japan who has made some wise and far-reaching reforms. I feel that this country owes him a debt of gratitude for the part he played in World War II,
6
and I hope when he comes home he will be received with the honors due one of the great American generals of that war.
I can not feel, however, that a commanding general in the field, particularly when he commands for a group of nations, should take it upon himself to announce the policy that in his opinion should be followed in the area of the world where he commands troops. I can not speak for any other citizen of the United States, and I know there are Representatives in the House and in the Senate who are in complete sympathy with the things that have been said lately by General
MacArthur
7 —but, for myself, I am unhappy about them.
As a citizen, I have two great concerns at the present time; first, that the United States policy and the United States troops should continue to support the United Nations in an effort to show the world clearly that aggression by any nation is going to be withstood by the U.N. as a

whole. Second, my concern is that we, as a nation, should do all we can to bring about a peaceful world. We will not help in that direction if any overt act, or anything said by responsible officials, is taken by Communist China as an excuse for charging that we are aiding and abetting aggression against the Communist Chinese government or against USSR-controlled territory in
Asia.
Why should we, at this juncture, ally ourselves with any portion of the Chinese people?
8
Whatever difficulties now exist in China must be settled by the Chinese people themselves. It may be they can settle their difficulties without further internal strife. Certainly that is a solution much to be desired. But that we should in any way support a government that could not remain in control of the Chinese people because it was unable to bring about a unified government or the reforms that would give the people hope of a better life in the future, seems to me a mistake.
Again we seem to be lining up on the side of reaction simply because we can not approve of Communism which is on the opposite side. I think we would be justified in refusing to recognize the Communist Chinese government for some time. In any case, I would think we could not recognize them until they did represent all the Chinese people and had proved their ability to accept the requirements that go with becoming a member of the United Nations. If the
Chinese people as a whole live under a Communist regime, I think that regime will either have to satisfy some of their needs or it will cease to be acceptable to the people. Chinese people are a patient people and heaven knows they have lived with civil war a long time. But, having made up their minds to get some reforms, they will be critical, I think, of any sham reforms and will be quick to resent anything which gives them reforms only in name and not in fact. To accept the suggestions made for our foreign policy by General MacArthur would seem to me to put us in a very equivocal and undesirable position.
TMs AERP, FDRL
1 MacArthur received two warnings one in December 1950 and one in March 1951. Truman’s
December 5 order to the heads of departments forbade “the release of any speech, press release or other public statement” concerning foreign policy or military policy until it had received clearance from either the State Department (foreign policy) or the Defense Department (military policy). The order also directed that advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy be submitted to the White House “for information.” Truman further directed the Secretaries of State and Defense that:
Officials overseas including military commanders and diplomatic representatives whould be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines, or other publicity media in the
United States.
Truman took this action “to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United State Government.”
In their message of March 24, 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reminded

MacArthur of this order and added that “The President has also directed that in the event
Communist military leaders request an armistice in the filed you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions” (JCS to CINCEUR Heidelberg Germany, CINCFE
Tokyo Japan, CINCAL Ft Richardson Alaska, CINCLANT Norfolk Virginia, CINCARB
Quarry Heights CZ, CINC Pearl Harbor, TH, Land, CGUSFA Salzburg Austria,
CinCAFE Wiesbaden Germany, CGRUST Trieste, CGSA OFFUTT AFB Omaha,
Nebraska, 6 December 1950, JCS to CINFE Tokyo Japan, 24 March 1951, HSTSF,
HSTL. These documents were attached to Harry S. Truman to Omar Bradley, 7 April
1951, HSTSF, HSTL). For more on MacArthur’s disregard for the directives, see n# [Doc
180 1951-03-29 WNBC Radio].
2 After quoting MacArthur, the Daily Telegraph correspondent described the general as a man who “found himself in a war without a definite objective . . . .It was not the soldier who had encroached upon the realm of the politician [but the other way around] . . . . The true object of a commander in war was to to destroy the forces opposed t him. But this was not the case in
Korea. The situation would be ludicrous if men’s lives were not involved” (James, vol. 3, 590-
91, Manchester, 638).
3
Besides quoting MacArthur’s letter in his speech, Martin also made copies available to the press. Martin, a longtime admirer of MacArthur, sent the general a copy a copy of his February
12 speech calling which called for the US to open a second front on the Chinese mainland using
Nationalist Chinese forces. In a note that accompanied the speech, Martin told MacArthur, he would “deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point either on confidential basis or otherwise.” For more on Martin’s February 12 speech, see n 1 [Doc 180 1951-03-29 WNBC
Radio] (Frank, 161; Manchester, 638; Donovan, Tumultuous , 351-52).
4 MacArthur’s did not ask March to keep his reply confidential although Martin had offered to do so (Frank, 161; Donovan, Tumultuous , 351-52; Anthony Leviero, “M’Arthur Wants Chiang
Army Used On China Mainland,” NYT , 6 April 1951, 1, 5).
5
The New York Times reported April 8 that rumors of disciplinary action, against General of the Army Douglas MacArthur for publicly disputing current Administration policies abroad ranged from the relatively mild possibility that the United Nations Commander would get a sharp verbal rebuke from President to the more drastic possibility that he would be relieved of his command.
The first was deemed the better bet.
(Walter H. Waggoner, “M”Arthur Rebuke By Truman Likely; High Aides Confer, NYT , 8 April
1951, 1, 4). For more on MacArthur’s March 24 statement, see n # [Doc 1951-03-29 WNBC
Radio].
6
As commander of Allied Forces in Southwest Pacific Area in World War II, MacArthur devised the leapfrogging strategy that enabled US air, land and sea forces to recapture New
Guinea, the Admiralties, western New Britain and Morotai in 1943-1944. The capstone of his

wartime career came with the Allied liberation of the Philippines in July 1945, which allowed him to fulfill his vow that he would return to the country he had left under orders in 1942.
(MacArthur had commanded the troops defending the Philippines when World War II began in
December 1941.)
Promoted to the new rank of five-star general in December 1944, MacArthur became commander of all American army forces in the Pacific in the spring of 1945. From 1945 to 1950 he directed the occupation of Japan as Supreme Allied Powers Commander. In that role, he commanded the American forces that occupied Japan and headed the military-civil administration that gave the country a modern, democratic government. Among his accomplishments in Japan were a western-style constitution, land reform, trade unions, the promotion of women’s rights, the restructuring of the Japanese educational and police systems along American lines and the development of large-scale public health programs ( OCAMH under
‘MacArthur, Douglas’;
FDRE under ‘MacArthur, Douglas’; HSTE under ‘MacArthur, Douglas’).
For more on MacArthur, see biographical portrait.
Allida: I have information on ER’s relationship with MacArthur which I am planning to put in his biographical portrait.)
7
For example, Senator Robert Taft (R-OH) in an April 7 interview called for an end to “the tragic and ridiculous policy of. . .neutralizing the Chinese Nationalist Army.” The US, he said, should give the Nationalist Chinese the means to invade mainland China and “take pressure off our boys fighting in Korea.” That same day, two congressmen visiting Korea, Rep. W.J. Bryan
Dorn (D-SC) and Rep. O.K. Armstrong (R-Missouri) issued a joint statement saying that Allied planes should be permitted to bomb Chinese bases in Manchuria if they served the war effort.
“We fail to see how the war can be won if our forces cannot carry the action to enemy territory.”
Macarthur and his field commanders “should not be restricted in military actions which they consider necessary.”
On Capitol Hill, Senator Styles Bridges (R-NH), said “There’s something radically wrong when MacArthur cannot be given enough men and equipment to finish the job [in Korea]
He recommended that MacArthur return to the US to report to Congress on the status of the war
(“Taft Supports General,” NYT , 8 April 1951, 4; “Congressmen Resent Bombing Curb,” NYT , 7
April 1951, 2; “Policy Holds, Is Intimation To MacArthur,”
WP , 7 April 1951, 1, 9).
8 In his February 12 speech House Minority Leader Martin had called for a US alliance with
Chiang Kai-shek (Manchester, 638). For more on Martin’s February 12 speech, see n 1 [Doc 180
1951-03-29 WNBC Radio].