Brady Duty
"In Brady [v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),] this Court held 'that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.' 373 U.S., at 87.
We have since held that the duty to disclose such evidence is applicable even though there has been no
request by the accused, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,107 (1976), and that the duty encompasses
impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
Such evidence is material 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Id., at 682; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 433-434 (1995). Moreover, the rule encompasses evidence 'known only to police investigators
and not to the prosecutor.' Id., at 438. In order to comply with Brady, therefore, 'the individual prosecutor
has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in
this case, including the police.' Kyles, 514 U.S., at 437." Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 280-281 (1999).
"There are three components of a true Brady violation: The evidence at issue must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been
suppressed by the State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued." Strickler v.
Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999).
Brady and its progeny
Brady vs. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
Giglio vs. U.S., 405 U.S. 150 (1972)
U.S. vs. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
U.S. vs. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (1985)
Kyles vs. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, (1995)
Banks vs. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004)
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009)
Smith v. Cain, 132 S.Ct. 627 (2012)
Pennsylvania vs. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) – Ritchie was charged with rape
and other crimes against his daughter. He issued a subpoena to the social services agency that was
involved in the investigation. The agency refused to comply and claimed privilege. Ritchie was convicted
and appealed. The SCOTUS said Ritchie had a due process right to have the trial court review the file in
camera and disclose favorable evidence to him.
Pennsylvania vs. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) – SCOTUS noted that the “public
interest in protecting this type of sensitive information is strong,” but the “interest prevents disclosure in
all circumstances.”
First SCOTUS case addressing constitutional issue of obtaining information from a third party.
PA vs. Ritchie was decided on due process grounds – an offshoot of the right to favorable and material
evidence in the hands of the prosecution.
Must have “some plausible showing of how” the evidence is “both material and favorable to the defense.”
(See also Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305 (4th Cir. 1995).
Focus on “plausible”.
Define “plausible”: credible, believable.
Synonym: “reasonable” (i.e, “reasonable suspicion”) – use case law where defendants have been screwed
on suppressing evidence from stops and searches because of “reasonable suspicion” then draw the
analogy.
“Your Honor, there is a reasonable suspicion that the files of the agency contain exculpatory information. “