Floods and Mudslides in Algiers:
Why No Warning?
Why Poor Drainage?
Why?
Dr. Ben Wisner
Visiting Research Fellow
Development Studies Institute
London School of Economics
14 November 2001
bwisner@igc.org
Allah Akhbar! God is Great; yes, but He did not do this.1
In the early hours of Saturday, 10 November 2001, a huge wave of mud engulfed lowincome neighborhoods of Algiers, capital of Algeria. At least 579 people died as houses
in which people were still sleeping were swept away, cars and buses were trapped in the
mud. Rainfall of 99 mm in 24 hours had fallen in the northern slopes of the Atlas
Mountains. Algiers is situated between these mountains and the Mediterranean, and its
drainage system could not cope.
The storm that produced this large amount of rain had been forecast by meteorological
authorities days in advance. The flood hazard is well known. Why were there not
evacuations or at least warnings?
Another disturbing question being asked in Algeria and by experts in France casts light
on the tight coupling between political and natural hazards, and the deadly surprises that
can result. Several years ago, the government sealed off an extensive subterranean storm
drainage system in Algiers because they feared that fundamentalist terrorists could use it
as a hiding place. The question now is whether the availability of this additional drainage
capacity would have prevented the flood disaster.
In a country with many experienced engineers and great wealth from export of oil, why
has there been so little investment in such basic infrastructure as storm drainage? Why so
little investment in the housing sector – a market (and policy) failure that has produced a
housing shortage nation wide of seven million units? In this instance the overcrowding
that is the result could have contributed to the high death toll.
Visiting the working class districts most affected, the Algerian Prime Minister and
Interior Minister were greeted with crowds shouting “Murderers!”, “God is Great!”, and
“Long Live Osama bin Laden!”2 The populace seems to believe that the government has
shown little interest in the safety of the common people and had neglected public works.
They are not alone in these opinions. An official of Algiers’ office of civil protection
1
said to Le Monde: “One could have avoided this catastrophe if some simple measures had
been taken in good time” and went on to criticize the neglect of public works. Others
called this disaster “genocide by negligence”.3
Several general lessons can be drawn from this disaster, even at this early date.

Cities in the 21st Century are becoming more and more dangerous in part as a
function of their complexity. Hazards include natural extreme events,
technological hazards, and political (or social) hazards such as terrorism.
Complexity in this case means that in focusing attention on one hazard,
authorities may inadvertently increase vulnerability to another one.

Environmental management in cities is not sufficient to meet the challenges of
increased population growth. Land use and resource use must be planned and
regulated in a comprehensive way. As in many cities in the world, the affected
districts in Algiers (Qued-Koriche, Bab-El-Qued, El-Kittan) had been allowed to
develop chaotically in response to market forces. Algiers is a city of 4 million
inhabitants spreading into a steep topography. There has been much deforestation
of slopes as the city has grown and little control of construction through building
permits.4

When governments are seen by the population, especially the poor and
marginalized, as incapable or unwilling to provide minimum social protection,
great alienation results. The cries of “Long Live Osama bin Laden” give
additional salience to the warning by UNDP’s administrator, Mark Malloch
Brown, that foreign aid diverted from least developed countries by the need to
rebuild Afghanistan could end up producing more terrorists. He uses as an
example how the void left by withdrawal of the state from primary education in
large parts of Africa and Asia has been filled by Islamic schools.5

It is possible to prevent this and many other types of disaster associated with
extreme natural events. There is not a lack of knowledge. Weather forecasting is
available and early warning systems are not expensive. Drainage systems are not
rocket science. Algeria has many accomplished engineers and considerable oil
wealth. Why aren’t they being applied to this problem?6 In a similar way,
enforcement of existing building codes would have prevented much of the death
in the earthquake in Gujarat, India, and the landslide that killed 700 people in the
outskirts of San Salvador, El Salvador, in the aftermath of it January 2001
temblor.7

Political will is required and an “organic” or minimally trusting relationship
between government and the inhabitants of urban districts and neighborhoods
exposed to risk. In the end, one cannot “fix” disaster risk with technology alone.
It is also a matter of enacting and enforcing laws, building and maintaining
institutions that are accountable, and producing an environment of mutual respect
and trust between government and the population.8
2
State television in Algeria has called the disaster “a test from God, and that which God gives, no one can
reproach Him for” (“La colere gronde a Alger alors que le bilan des inundations approache les 600 morts.”
Le Monde, 14 November 2001, p. 10).
1
2
Le Monde, 13 November 2001, p. 6.
3
Le Monde, 13 November 2001, p. 6 and Le Monde, 14 November, p. 10.
4
“Les consequences d’une gestion anarchique de la ville.” Le Monde, 14 November 2001, p. 10.
Geoffrey Lean, “Western Aid ‘Could Spread Extremism’.” The Independent on Sunday, 11 November
2001, p. 14, citing Malloch Brown.
5
6
Algeria has a foreign exchange surplus of US$18 billion due, in large part, to export of petroleum. A
recent report by the International Federation of the Rights of Man (FIDH) describes Algeria as a rich
country with an impoverished population. Concentration of oil wealth in the hands of a small elite is one
reason. Implementation by Algeria of a World Bank structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1994-5 is
cited as another. Since 1994 the cost of living has risen and also has unemployment. There is also a
growing housing shortage in Algeria that causes overcrowding and increases vulnerability to disaster. The
average number of people per house in Algeria is 7.2, compared to 5.7 in Morocco and 4.9 in Egypt. Since
1994 education and heath sectors have been weakened by decreased public finance. Meanwhile the oil
flows, while seven million Algerians (23%) live on less than one US dollar a day (40% on less than US$2
per day). The poorest 20% of the Algerian population consumes 7% of income; while the richest 20%
accounts for 49%. As a result, Algeria is mired well toward the bottom of the UNDP’s rankings of nations’
Human Development Index, at 100th position. See: Florence Beauge, “Un pays riche mais dont la
population s’appauvrit, selon un rapport de la FIDH.” Le Monde, 13 November 2001, p. 7 and Le Monde’s
editorial, “Pauvres Algeriens,” p. 18.
7
See my analyses of the El Salvador earthquake http://www.afsc.org/emap/help/wisner/razwire.htm and
“Risk and the Neoliberal State: Why Post-Mitch Lessons Didn’t Reduce El Salvador’s Earthquake Losses.”
Disasters 25,3 (2001), pp. 251-268, and my analysis of the Gujarat earthquake
http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/2000/issue4/0400p6.htm and well as other commentaries on both El
Salvador and Gujarat at the RADIX web site, http://www.anglia.ac.uk/geography/radix .
8
By contrast, I have recently argued that so few people died when hurricane Michelle hit Cuba very hard
because of the existence of precisely that sort of organic link between government and the people ( “Storms
and Socialism.” The Guardian 14 November 2001, p. 21).
3