Badcock & Crespi (2008)
1. The gene IGF2 (an insuline-like growth factor) is inherited from both parents.
Expressed is normally
(a) only the IGF2 inherited from the mother
(b) only the IGF2 inherited from the father
(c) the IGF2 inherited from the mother, or IGF2 inherited from the father, but not both
(d) the IGF2 inherited from the mother with a 25% probability, or IGF2 inherited
from the father with a 75% probability
2. If the IGF2 gene of both parents are expressed, the result is
(a) Beckwith-Wiedemann syndrome (paternal bias)
(b) Silver-Russell syndrome (maternal bias)
(c) Jackson-Forbes syndrome (paternal bias)
(d) Master’s syndrome (maternal bias)
3. Badock and Crespi view autism and schizophrenia primarily as disorders with
(a) overlapping symptoms
(b) opposite symptoms
(c) independent symptoms
(d) partly overlapping, and partly independent, symptoms
4. Autism is, in part, characterized by
(a) a poor sense of self, good social skills, single-mindedness
(b) megalomania, poor social skills, ambivalence
(c) megalomania, good social skills, ambivalence
(d) a poor sense of self, poor social skills, single-mindedness
5. If gene expression in a baby is maternally biased, the baby is expected to be
(a) small and demanding
(b) small and not very demanding
(c) large and demanding
(d) large and not very demanding
6. Prader-Willi syndrome results from a maternal bias in gene expression. Having this
syndrome increases the chance of developing
(a) autism
(b) schizophrenia
(c) Angelman syndrome (“happy puppet” syndrome)
(d) Asperger syndrome (possibly with savant skills)
7. Theory-of-mind skills develop relatively late during development. This is
consistent with
(a) a late developmental onset of schizophrenia
(b) a decrease of schizophrenia with age
(c) a late developmental onset of autism
(d) an early developmental onset of schizophrenia
8. Which situations seem to lead to the most severe symptoms:
(a) autism in females and schizophrenia in males
(b) autism in males and schizophrenia in females
(c) autism in females and schizophrenia in females
(d) autism in males and schizophrenia in males
9. Which is more common:
(a) autism in females and depression in males
(b) autism in males and depression in females
(c) autism in females and depression in females
(d) autism in males and depression in males
Haggard et al. (2002)
10. If an involuntary movement is made, then the moments in time at which the
movement and its presumed consequence are perceived to occur are
(a) biased toward each other (binding effect)
(b) biased away from each other (repulsion effect)
(c) bias free
(d) unknown, because only voluntary movement has been studied
11. A tone is perceived to occur later if it is preceded by TMS of the
(a) frontal cortex
(b) temporal cortex
(c) parietal cortex
(d) motor cortex
12. The moment a tone is perceived to occur remains unaffected by “sham” TMS of
(a) the motor cortex
(b) the parietal cortex
(c) either the motor cortex or the parietal cortex
(d) the temporal cortex
13. Haggard et al. (2002) suggest that misattributions of cause and effect that lead to
confusion about agency (i.e., about who actually performed an action) might be
involved in
(a) schizophrenia
(b) autism
(c) both autism and schizophrenia
(d) various mental disorders, among which autism and schizophrenia
Moore et al. (2009)
14. If an action is not followed by an effect (e.g., a tone), then subjects
(a) cannot predict the effect
(b) cannot “postdict” the action
(c) can neither predict the effect, nor “postdict” the action
(d) can nevertheless still both predict the effect and “postdict” the action
15. If the probability of an effect given an action is low, then subjects
(a) do not predict the effect, but do “postdict” the action
(b) do not “postdict” the action, but do predict the effect
(c) neither predict the effect, nor “postdict” the action
(d) both predict the effect and “postdict” the action
16. If the probability of an effect given an action is high, then subjects
(a) do not predict the effect, but do “postdict” the action
(b) do not “postdict” the action, but do predict the effect
(c) neither predict the effect, nor “postdict” the action
(d) both predict the effect and “postdict” the action
17. If someone performs an action and the probability is high that a tone follows that
action after 250ms, then
(a) the tone and the action are perceived accurately (except in case of mental disorders
related to schizophrenia)
(b) the tone and the action are perceived closer together than they actually are
(c) the tone and the action are perceived further apart than they actually are
(d) the action is perceived correctly, but the tone is perceived to occur earlier than it
actually is
18. If someone performs an action, and the probability is high that a tone follows that
action after 250ms, but no tone actually occurs at all, then the action is perceived
(a) correctly
(b) later than it was performed
(c) earlier than it was performed
(d) as having been performed by another agent
Soon et al. (2008)
19. Subjects chose between a left or right response and indicated the moment of their
decision. The subjects made their left or right response
(a) before indicating the moment of their decision
(b) after indicating the moment of their decision
(c) as they wished, following their free will, either before or after indicating the
moment of their decision
(d) contemporaneously with their verbal indication of the moment of their decision
20. Most subjects thought they had decided
(a) at the moment they had responded
(b) shortly after they had already completed their response
(c) shortly before they had responded
(d) several seconds before they had responded
21. The subjects’ responses were predicted by brain activity in the motor cortex that
emerged
(a) after the subjects thought they had decided
(b) before the subjects thought they had decided
(c) during the subjects’ response
(d) before, during, and after subjects thought they had decided
22. The study provides evidence for the hypothesis that subjects
(a) are able to make conscious decisions
(b) may not be aware of their decisions
(c) have an unconscious free will
(d) do not have free will
Amodio et al. (2007)
23. Relative to liberals, conservatives respond to unexpected no-go trials with
(a) larger lateralized readiness potentials on their scalp
(b) smaller lateralized readiness potentials on their scalp
(c) larger error-related negativity potentials on their scalp
(d) smaller error-related negativity potentials on their scalp
24. According to Amodio et al. (2007), scalp potentials can be used to predict political
attitudes, because they reveal related
(a) cognitive styles
(b) unconscious emotions
(c) personal styles
(d) subtle emotions
25. According to Amodio et al. (2007), political attitudes
(a) remain fairly stable over time
(b) vary substantially over time
(c) vary substantially until early adulthood and become more stable after that
(d) remain stable until early adulthood and become variable after that
26. According to Amodio et al. (2007), sensitivity of the general mechanism for
monitoring response conflict is
(a) greater in liberals than in conservatives
(b) greater in conservatives than in liberals
(c) a confound that they were able to control
(d) an issue that requires further study
Brugger et al. (1995)
27. Trying to produce random responses, subjects who do not believe in extrasensory
perception avoid making the same response twice in a row
(a) less often than they should
(b) more often than they should
(c) about as often as they should
(d) more often than believers in extrasensory do
28. Believers in extrasensory perception who perceive an ambiguous picture as
representing a duck avoid responding
(a) rabbit immediately after carrot, but not immediately after duck
(b) rabbit immediately after duck, but not immediately after carrot
(c) carrot immediately after duck
(d) reed immediately after duck
29. According to Brugger et al. (2008) belief in extrasensory perception arises from
(a) an overestimation of the meaningfulness of naturally occurring coincidences
(b) an underestimation of the meaningfulness of naturally occurring coincidences
(c) a failure to recognize ambiguous pictures as indeed ambiguous
(d) a failure to see unambiguous pictures as indeed unambiguous
30. According to Brugger et al. (2008) belief in extrasensory perception has
(a) scientific merit
(b) scientific merit, but only in ambiguous situations
(c) no scientific merit, and may be associated with delusions
(d) no scientific merit, but is not associated with delusions
Ariely (2008)
31. Consider the following two methods for offering subscriptions
First method:
- internet-only for 59$
- print-only for 125$
- print-and-internet for 125$
Second method:
- internet-only for 59$
- print-and-internet for 125$
Ariely found that clients tend to spend
(a) more money if the first method is used
(b) less money if the first method is used
(c) the same amount of money whether the first, or the second, method is used
(d) beyond their means
Cosmides & Tooby (1994)
32. According to Cosmides & Tooby (1994), we have evolved a brain that is
(a) not designed for specific tasks, but flexible
(b) designed for specific tasks
(c) not designed to reason quickly
(d) not designed to reason accurately
33. In the Wason-selection task, subjects must
(a) turn over one or more cards
(b) select the proper category
(c) select the proper response
(d) turn over the correct card as quickly as possible
34. In the Wason-selection task, subjects perform better if the logical argument
(a) is consistent with a social contract
(b) is consistent with a personal contract
(c) contains a familiar situation
(d) contains an abstract situation
35. The following argument is presented in a Wason task:
“If a man eats cassava root, then he must have a tattoo on his face.”
Situation 1: Men who eat cassava root, and do not have a tattoo on their face, are
cheaters.
Situation 2: Cassava root grows where the married men live, and molo nuts grow
where single men live, but both can eat whatever they want.
Subjects who imagine themselves in either Situation 1 or Situation 2 perform
(a) better in Situation 1 than in Situation 2
(b) better in Situation 2 than in Situation 1
(c) equally well in both situations
(d) equally poorly in both situations
36. Cosmides & Tooby (1994) argue that, hitherto, cognitive scientists have not paid
enough attention to
(a) computation theory
(b) algorithms
(c) hardware implementations
(d) evolved maioses
Loftus (1993)
37. According to Loftus (1993) false memories
(a) do not really exist
(b) exist
(c) only emerge in laboratory conditions
(d) are an indication of schizophrenia
Roediger & McDermott (1995)
38. Whereas “remember judgments” reflect a mental reliving of the learning
experience, “know judgments” do not. Roediger & McDermott (1995) conclude that
false memories occur
(a) only in remember judgments
(b) only in know judgments
(c) in both remember and know judgments
(d) in normals only in know judgments, and in schizophrenics in both know and
remember judgments
39. Roediger & McDermott (1995) conclude that false memories occur
(a) only in free recall
(b) only in recognition
(c) in both free recall and recognition
(d) in normals only in recognition judgments, and in schizophrenics in both
recognition and recall judgments
40. Roediger & McDermott (1995) argue that false memories require
(a) associations from the studied words to the word that was not studied
(b) associations from the word that was not studied to the studied words
(c) both (a) and (b)
(d) either (a) or (b)
41. Falsely remembered words tend to be produced
(a) after correctly remembered words
(b) before correctly remembered words
(c) equally often before, as after, correctly remembered words
(d) before incorrectly remembered words
Goodale et al. (1991)
42. Goodale et al. (1991) believe that visual perception in preparation for action takes
place in the
(a) ventral stream
(b) dorsal stream
(c) temporal stream
(d) occipital stream
43. Goodale et al. (1991) believe that conscious visual perception takes place in the
(a) ventral stream
(b) dorsal stream
(c) temporal stream
(d) occipital stream
44. Goodale et al. (1991) believe that
(a) object identification is performed exclusively in the ventral stream
(b) spatial localization is performed exclusively in the dorsal stream
(c) both (a) and (b) are true
(d) neither (a) nor (b) are true
45. According to Goodale et al. (1991) there are two different processing streams that
are
(a) tightly interconnected
(b) largely independent
(c) tightly interconnected in the occipital cortex, but largely independent elsewhere
(d) largely independent in the occipital cortex, but tightly interconnected elsewhere
46. Patient DF suffered from visual form agnosia and had difficulties orienting a card
such that it matched the orientation of a slot. She had these difficulties when she had
her eyes
(a) closed and was not asked to post the card into the slot
(b) open and was not asked to post the card into the slot
(c) open and was asked to post the card into the slot
(d) closed and was asked to post the card into the slot
Franz et al. (2000)
47. If two equally large disks are placed next to each other, and one of them is
surrounded by small disks and the other by large disks, then the former appears larger
than the latter (Ebbinghaus illusion). Goodale and colleagues found that the illusion
affected visual perception for
(a) grabbing of one of the two disks while lights remained on
(b) grabbing of one of the two disks while lights were turned off
(d) a comparison of the two disks
(d) a comparison of one of the disks with a disk that was not surrounded by other
disks
48. For the same stimuli, unlike Goodale and colleagues, Franz et al. (2000)
investigated
(a) the grabbing of one of the two disks while lights remained on
(b) the grabbing of one of the two disks while lights were turned off
(d) a visual comparison of the two disks
(d) a visual comparison of one of the disks with a disk that was not surrounded by
other disks
49. Franz et al. (2000) found that the Ebbinghaus illusion affected visual perception
(a) for grabbing disks, but not for comparing disks
(b) for comparing disks, but not for grabbing disks
(d) both for grabbing disks and for comparing disks
(d) neither for grabbing disks, nor for comparing disks
50. Consider these two facts:
- If a disk surrounded by small disks is compared to a disk of the same size that is not
surrounded by disks, then the former looks larger than the latter.
- If a disk surrounded by large disks is compared to a disk of the same size that is not
surrounded by disks, then the former looks smaller than the latter.
Together these two effects are
(a) equally large as a regular Ebbinghaus effect
(b) smaller than a regular Ebbinghaus effect
(d) larger than a regular Ebbinghaus effect
(d) either larger, or smaller, than a regular Ebbinghaus effect, but never equally large
51. Franz et al. (2000)
(a) support the perception-versus-action hypothesis
(b) reject the perception-versus-action hypothesis
(d) support the what-versus-where hypothesis
(d) reject the what-versus-where hypothesis
Bonneh et al. (2001)
52. Motion-induced blindness is thought to consist in the illusion that
(a) dim stationary items temporarily disappear due to the motion of bright items
(b) bright stationary items temporarily disappear due to the motion of dim items
(c) dim items temporarily disappear when they are moving
(d) bright items temporarily disappear when they are moving
53. If one item has a vertical orientation and another item has a horizontal orientation,
then motion-induced blindness
(a) affects the vertical one more than the horizontal one
(b) affects the horizontal one more than the vertical one
(c) nevertheless affects them both contemporaneously
(d) affects them at different moments in time
Simons (2000)
54. Consider a display containing rotated, yellow Ts (distracters) and a blue T (the
target). Subject must determine the presence or absence of the target as quickly as
possible. An additional red T will
(a) attract attention, because it fits the attentional set
(b) attract attention, because it does not fit the attentional set
(c) not attract attention, because it does not fit the attentional set
(d) not attract attention, because it fits the attentional set
55. In the pre-cuing paradigm, four equal symbols are replaced by four letters (one
target and three distracters). Of the four symbols, one has a different color (the cue).
The cue does not provide any information about the location of the target.
If the cue is replaced by a distracter, then reaction time is
(a) slowed down if the target is a “sudden onset”
(b) slowed down if the target has a different color
(c) slowed down if the target has the same color
(d) is not slowed down
56. In the irrelevant-feature-search paradigm, letters (distracters) replace figure-8s.
The target may also replace a figure-8, or may appear without replacing anything.
Reaction time is particularly fast if the target is
(a) a “color oddball” (has a different color than the distracters)
(b) a “sudden onset” (is not preceded by a figure-8 itself)
(c) either (a) or (b)
(d) neither (a) nor (b)
57. Inattentional blindness is
(a) a failure of explicit attentional capture
(b) a failure of implicit attentional capture
(c) either (a) or (b)
(d) neither (a) nor (b)
58. Inattentional blindness for something that is in the line of sight suggests that
(a) attention need not be object based
(b) attention can be object based
(c) inattention need not be object based
(d) inattention can be object based
Enns & Di Lollo (2000)
59. In meta-contrast masking, the mask
(a) has a high contrast
(b) has a low contrast
(c) does not cover the target
(d) precedes the target
60. In object-substitution masking, the mask
(a) has a high contrast
(b) has a low contrast
(c) does not cover the target
(d) precedes the target
61. In object-substitution masking, the mask
(a) precedes the target and remains visible after target offset
(b) precedes the target and is turned off before target onset
(c) does not precede the target and remains visible after target offset
(d) does not precede the target, but is turned off before target offset
62. Consider an attentional-blink experiment containing a rapid-serial-visual
presentation (RSVP) of 7 digits followed by a letter, another digit, another letter, and
another digit. Subjects often fail to see
(a) the digit that was presented between the two letters
(b) the digit that was presented after the second letter
(c) the first letter
(d) the second letter
63. “Display size” is the number of items on the display. Object-substitution masking
(a) is independent of display size
(b) increases with display size
(c) is a U-shaped function of display size
(d) decreases with display size