Catnic Components Ltd. v. Hill & Smith Ltd.
(1982) R.P.C. 183 (H.L. per Lord Diplock)
In the Catnic case, Catnic's patent claimed a lintel (the bar that goes across the top of a
window to support the weight of the bricks laid above it) having a rear wall member
"extending vertically". A cross-sectional view of the Catnic lintel from the Catnic patent
drawings is shown in Figure 1 below. The rear wall is highlighted in yellow.
Hill copied the Catnic design. After receiving a writ from Catnic, Hill changed its design
so that the rear member was inclined 6 or 8 degrees off the vertical, as shown in Figure
2 above. The sloping of the rear wall made the Hill lintels 0.6 to 1.2% weaker in their
load bearing capacities. Functionally, this was a negligible difference from that of the
lintel illustrated in the Catnic patent.
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-2At p. 242-243:
"My Lords, a patent specification is a unilateral statement by the patentee, in words of
his own choosing, addressed to those likely to have a practical interest in the subject
matter of his invention (i.e. "skilled in the art"), by which he informs them what he claims
to be the essential features of the new product or process for which the letters patent
grant him a monopoly. It is called "pith and marrow" of the claim. A patent specification
should be given a purposive construction rather than a purely literal one derived from
applying to it the kind of meticulous verbal analysis in which lawyers are too often
tempted by their training to indulge. The question in each case is: whether persons with
practical knowledge and experience of the kind of work in which the invention was
intended to be used, would understand that strict compliance with a particular
descriptive word or phrase appearing in a claim was intended by the patentee to be an
essential requirement of the invention so that any variant would fall outside the
monopoly claimed, even though it could have no material effect upon the way the
invention worked.
The question, of course, does not arise where the variant would in fact have a material
effect upon the way the invention worked. Nor does it arise unless at the date of
publication of the specification it would be obvious to the informed reader that this was
so. Where it is not obvious, in the light of then-existing knowledge, the reader is entitled
to assume that the patentee thought at the time of the specification that he had good
reason for limiting his monopoly so strictly and had intended to do so, even though
subsequent work by him or others in the field of the invention might show the limitation
to have been unnecessary. It is to be answered in the negative only when it would be
apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a particular descriptive word or phrase used
in a claim cannot have been intended by the patentee, who was also skilled in the art, to
exclude minor variants which, to the knowledge of both him and the readers to whom
the patent was addressed, could have no material effect upon the way in which the
invention worked."
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-3-
O'Hara Manufacturing Ltd. et al v. Eli Lilly & Co. et al
(1989), 26 C.P.R. (3d) 1 (F.C.A. per Pratte J.A.)
"After observing that the question does not arise where it would be obvious to the
informed reader at the date of publication of the specification that the variant would
have a material effect upon the way the invention worked, Lord Diplock pursued:
Where it is not obvious, in the light of then-existing knowledge, the reader is
entitled to assume that the patentee thought at the time of the specification that
he had good reason for limiting his monopoly so strictly and had intended to do
so, even though subsequent work by him or others in the field of the invention
might show the limitation to have been unnecessary. It is to be answered in the
negative only when it would be apparent to any reader skilled in the art that a
particular descriptive word or phrase used in a claim cannot have been intended
by a patentee, who was also skilled in the art, to exclude minor variants which, to
the knowledge of both him and the readers to whom the patent was addressed,
could have no material effect upon the way in which the invention worked.
If those principles are applied in this case, the question to be answered may be
formulated by adapting to the facts of this case the language used by Lord Diplock at p.
244: would the specification make it obvious to a reader skilled in the art that the
description of the patented machine as comprising "an exhaust inlet flexibly biased
against the exterior" of the drum could not have been intended to exclude machines in
which exhaust was not "flexibly biased against" the drum but was mounted in a fixed
position as close as possible to the drum?
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-4It should be realized that the answer to that question depends on the interpretation that
is put on the claims. That answer, therefore, must be consistent with the text of the
claims. A court must interpret the claims; it cannot redraft them. When an inventor has
clearly stated in the claims that he considered a requirement as essential to his
invention, a court cannot decide otherwise for the sole reason that he was mistaken. I
also wish to add that, as the court, in interpreting the claims, is merely trying to find out
what was the intention of the inventor, it cannot conclude that strict compliance with a
word or phrase used in a claim is not an essential requirement of the invention unless it
be obvious that the inventor knew that a failure to comply with that requirement would
have no material effect upon the way the invention worked."
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-5-
The Improver Decision
In the Improver1 case, the Court rephrased the Catnic test as one closer to one
interpreting the language of the claim, rather than re-writing the claim:
“If the issue was whether a feature embodied in an alleged infringement which
fell outside the primary, literal or acontextual meaning of a descriptive word or
phrase in the claim (“a variant”) was nevertheless within its language as
properly interpreted, the court should ask itself the following three questions:
1.
Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention
works? If yes, then the variant is outside the claim. If no?
2.
Would this (i.e. that the variant had no material effect) have been
obvious at the date of publication of the patent to a reader of the patent
skilled in the art? If no, the variant is outside the claim. If yes?
3.
Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood
from the language of the claim that the patentee intended that strict
compliance with the primary meaning was a essential requirement of the
invention? If yes, then the variant is outside the claim.2
On the other hand, a negative answer to the last question would lead to the
conclusion that the patentee was intending the word or phrase to have not a
literal but a figurative meaning (the figure being a form of synecdoche3 or
metonymy) denoting a class of things which include the variant and the literal
meaning, the latter being the most perfect, best-known or striking example of the
class.4 [emphasis added]
1
2
Improver Corporation v. Remington Consumer Products Ltd. [1990] F.S.R. 181
Improver, supra, at p. 189.
3
It is ironic that in a judgment meant to assist one in knowing how to interpret words or phrases, one must resort to a
dictionary to understand it:
“synecdoche” is defined by the Merriam Online dictionary as “a figure of speech by which a part is put for the
whole (as fifty sail for fifty ships), the whole for a part (as society for high society), the species for the genus
(as cutthroat for assassin), the genus for the species (as a creature for a man), or the name of the material
for the thing made (as boards for stage)”
“metonymy” is defined as “a figure of speech consisting of the use of the name of one thing for that of
another of which it is an attribute or with which it is associated (as "crown" in "lands belonging to the
crown")”
4 Kirin-Amgen, supra, at para. 51.
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-6-
Free World Trust v. Electro Santé Inc. et al.
(2000) 2 S.C.R. 1024; neutral cite: 2000 S.C.C. 66; (2001) 9 C.P.R. (4th) 168 (S.C.C.
per Binnie J.)
[31, pp. 183-184] The appeal thus raises the fundamental issue of how best to resolve
the tension between "literal infringement" and "substantive infringement" to achieve a
fair and predictable result. There has been considerable discussion of this issue in
Canada and elsewhere, which I will discuss briefly in support of the following
propositions:
(a)
The Patent Act promotes adherence to the language of the claims.
(b) Adherence to the language of the claims in turn promotes both fairness and
predictability.
(c) The claim language must, however, be read in an informed and purposive
way.
(d) The language of the claims thus construed defines the monopoly. There is
no recourse to such vague notions as the "spirit of the invention" to expand it
further.
(e) The claims language will, on a purposive construction, show that some
elements of the claimed invention are essential while others are non-essential.
The identification of elements as essential or non-essential is made:
(i) on the basis of the common knowledge of the worker skilled in the art to
which the patent relates;
(ii)
as of the date the patent is published;
(iii) having regard to whether or not it was obvious to the skilled reader at the
time the patent was published that a variant of a particular element would not
make a difference to the way in which the invention works; or
(iv) according to the intent of the inventor, expressed or inferred from the
claims, that a particular element is essential irrespective of its practical effect;
(v)
without, however, resort to extrinsic evidence of the inventor's intention.
(f) There is no infringement if an essential element is different or omitted. There
may still be infringement, however, if non-essential elements are substituted or
omitted.
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-7-
The Kirin-Amgen Decision
In 2004, in the Kirin-Amgen decision,5 the U.K. House of Lords took a fresh look at
claim construction and distinguished Catnic stating that it should not be used as a rule
of general application in claim construction.
Unlike Catnic, the patent in issue in Kirin-Amgen was granted after 1977 and had to be
interpreted under the newer U.K. Patent Act which had to take into consideration Article
69 of the European Patent Convention (“EPC”). Although the language of the European
Patent Convention with respect to the extent of protection afforded by patent claims is
amenable to a broad interpretation, the House of Lords used it as a basis for departing
from the Catnic decision.
For patents granted after 1977, the UK Patent Act gave effect to article 69 of the EPC
which applies to infringement proceedings in the domestic courts of all Contracting
States:
“The extent of protection conferred by a European patent or a European patent
application shall be determined by the terms of the claims. Nevertheless, the
description and drawings shall be used to interpret the claims.”
Article 2 added to the Protocol by the Munich Act revising the EPC, dated November 29,
2000 (and not yet in force) provides:
“For the purpose of determining the extent of protection conferred by a European
patent, due account shall be taken of any element which is equivalent to an
element specified in the claims.”
In contrast, the laws of Germany and the Netherlands allowed their Courts to use the
specification as a whole to determine the inventive achievement. What mattered was
the essence of the invention or the inventive concept and the role of the claims was
“extremely modest”. This is sometimes described as “central claiming”.
The U.K. approach was perceived by “central claiming” states as being narrow and
literal. The “central claiming” approach which had previously looked to the “essence of
the invention” rather than the actual terms of the claims should not carry on as they had
before under the guise of giving the claims a generous interpretation.
The Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 provides that Article 69 is to be
interpreted at a position between the extremes of applying a strict, literal meaning of the
wording used in the claims on the one hand and extend to what the patentee had
contemplated: namely, to combine a fair protection for the patentee with a reasonable
degree of certainty for third parties. [para. 25] Thus, neither extreme is to be used.
Under U.K law, construction of the claims is not to be concerned with what the author
meant to say, rather, it is concerned with what a reasonable person reading the patent
5
Kirin-Amgen Inc. et al v. Hoescht Marion Roussel Ltd. at el [2004] UKHL 46, [2004] All ER (D) 286 (Oct)
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-8would understand the author to mean using those words. The language chosen by the
patentee is thus of critical importance.
The Court reviewed the history of the U.K. infringement of the “pith and marrow” rather
than “literal infringement” and the U.S. “doctrine of equivalence”, the effect of the latter
of which is to “extend protection to something outside the claims which performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”
[para. 38]
The Court said that the U.S. “doctrine of equivalence” was a way of adhering to
literalism and evolve a doctrine which supplements the claims by extending protection
to equivalents. On the other hand, Catnic was said to have abandoned literalism and to
adopt an approach that gave effect to what the person skilled in the art would have
understood the patentee to be claiming. [para. 43]
Article 69 “firmly shuts the door on any doctrine which extends protection outside the
claims.” [para. 44]
Re Catnic:
“If Lord Diplock did not invent the expression [“purposive construction”], he
certainly gave it wide currency in the law. But there is, I think, a tendency to
regard it as a vague description of some kind of divination which mysteriously
penetrates beneath the language of the specification. Lord Diplock was in my
opinion being much more specific and his intention was to point out that a person
may be taken to mean something different when he uses words for one purpose
from what he would be taken to mean if he was using them for another. The
example in the Catnic case was the difference between what a person would
reasonably be taken to mean by using the word “vertical” in a mathematical
theorem and by using it in a claimed definition in the building trade.”
Here, Lord Hoffman appears to be creatively applying “revisionist history” to say what
Lord Diplock should have said in Catnic: that words should be read in their technological
context and be given the scope (or, as discussed above, “precision”) with which it is
used in that technology or industry. As discussed above, this is exactly what Lord
Diplock said in his “near enough” statement, immediately prior to going on to divide the
claim into essential and non-essential elements:
“it seems to me that the expression "extending vertically" as descriptive of
the position of what in use will be the upright member of a trapezoid-shaped box
girder, is perfectly capable of meaning positioned near enough to the exact
geometrical vertical to enable it in actual use to perform satisfactorily all
the functions that it could perform if it were precisely vertical;”6
In Kirin-Amgen, Lord Hoffman described his own rephrasing of the Catnic test in the
Improver case, as follows:
6
Catnic, supra at p. 244.
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-9Does the feature fall outside the primary, literary or acontextual meaning of a
descriptive word or phrase in the claim (“the variant”). If it does, is it nevertheless
within the language as properly interpreted? – the latter question answered by
asking the following:
1.
Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention
works? If yes, then the variant is outside the claim. If not,
2.
Would the fact that the variant had no material effect have been
obvious, at the date of publication of the patent, to a reader of the
patent skilled in the art? If no, the variant is outside the claim. If
yes,
3.
Would the reader have understood from the language of the claim
that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary
meaning was a essential requirement of the invention? If yes, then
the variant is outside the claim. If no, it is within the claim.
A negative answer would lead to the conclusion that the patentee was intending
the word or phrase to have not a literal but a figurative meaning denoting a class
of things which include the variant and the literal meaning, the latter being the
most perfect, best-known or striking example of the class.7
Lord Hoffman said that “The Protocol Questions” have been used “… as a framework
for deciding whether equivalents fall within the scope of the claims”. In contrast, the
“Catnic principle”, namely that of purposive construction, which gives effect to the
requirements of the Protocol, is the “bedrock of patent construction”, universally
applicable. The Protocol questions are merely a guideline, more useful in some cases
than in others.8
“I am bound to say that the cases show a tendency for counsel to treat the
Protocol questions as legal rules rather then guides which will in appropriate
cases help to decide what the skilled man would have understood the patentee
to mean.”9
“The determination of the extent of protection conferred by a European patent is
an examination in which there is only one compulsory question, namely that set
out in article 69 and its Protocol: what would a person skilled in the art have
understood the patentee to have used the language of the claim to means?
Everything else, including the Protocol questions, is only guidance to a judge
trying to answer that question. But there is no point in going through the motions
of answering the Protocol questions when you cannot sensibly do so until you
have construed the claim. In such a case – and the present is in my opinion
7
Kirin-Amgen, supra, at para. 51.
Kirin-Amgen, supra, at para. 52.
9 Kirin-Amgen, supra, at para. 52.
8
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- 10 such a case – they simply provide a formal justification for a conclusion which
has already been reached on other grounds.”10
“No doubt there will be patent lawyers who are dismayed at the notion that the
Protocol questions do not provide an answer in every case. They may feel cast
adrift on a sea of uncertainty. But that is the fate of all who have to understand
what people mean by using language. The Protocol questions are useful in
many cases, but they are not a substitute for trying to understand what the
person skilled in the art would have understood the patentee to mean by the
language of the claims.” [para. 71]
10
Kirin-Amgen, supra, at para. 69.
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