ADVANCED TOPICS IN METAPHYSICS
Metaphysics, ‘the science of Being’, aims to describe Reality at the highest level of
generality. This module asks whether there really exist such common-sense entities as
material bodies and persons, and raises some sceptical doubts about them. Then we ask
about facts and events: do these ‘philosophical’ entities really exist? We proceed by
seeking ‘criteria of identity’ for each of these categories:
 1) Material Objects. A ‘criterion of identity’ for material objects is a non-trivial
necessary and sufficient condition for the identity of the material objects x and y. If x
and y occupy the same places at the same times throughout their existence, does it
follow that x = y?
 2) Personal Identity. In what does the identity of persons consist?
 3) Facts and Events. Are there such entities as facts, or such entities as events? If so,
what is their criterion of identity? We look at the motivation for facts and events in the
Correspondence Theory of Truth and the theory of Causation. Then we study three
theories of events, namely Kim’s theory, which treats events as facts; Davidson’s
theory, which treats events as spatio-temporal particulars individuated by their causes
and effects; and Lewis’s theory, which treats events as regions of spacetime.
Lectures: The lectures for this module will be held in **, on Thursdays from 6-7pm in the
Autumn Term. The lecturer is Dr. Keith Hossack (k.hossack@bbk.ac.uk).
Seminars: The seminars for this module will be held in **, on Thursdays from 7-8pm in
the Autumn Term. They will be led by the lecturer and by **.
Readings: Every week there is one key reading that is the focus of the seminar discussion.
One of the purposes of the seminar is to help you to understand the reading, so do not
worry if you have not fully understood it in advance. Nevertheless, it is essential that you
attempt the seminar reading each week if you are to follow the lecture and to participate in
the seminar discussion. In addition, there are further readings listed for each essay topic.
Assessment (BA): This module is assessed by a two-hour exam in the Summer Term.
You may also write up to two essays during the course, taken from the titles below, and
receive feedback on them from your seminar leader. These can be useful practice for the
exam. You should submit the first such essay by the first seminar after reading week, and
the second by one week after the last seminar of term. [Notes: 1) You are welcome to
submit an essay earlier than these dates; 2) the seminar leader should not be expected to
comment on the same essay more than once.]
Essay (MA): This module is assessed by two essays of a combined total of around 3,500
words. These must be written in response to two of the set questions listed below, except
with permission from the module convenor. For details concerning submission of the
essays, including deadlines, see the MA Handbook.
Moodle: Electronic copies of course materials are available through Moodle, at
http://moodle.bbk.ac.uk. You will need your ITS login name and password to enter.
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Seminar Questions and Readings
Week 1. Criteria of Identity
Seminar question: ‘Does every species of object have its own criterion of identity?’

Lowe, E 1989. ‘What is a criterion of identity?’ The Philosophical Quarterly Vol.
39, No. 154: 1-21.
Week 2. Identity of material objects
Seminar question: ‘Are there non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for the
identity of a material object?’

Reading. Shoemaker, S 1979. ‘Identity, Properties, and Causality’ Midwest
Studies In Philosophy Volume 4, Issue 1, pages 321–342.
Week 3. Vague identity
Seminar question: ‘Are there any borderline cases of identity?’

Evans G, 1978. ‘Vague Objects’. Analysis 1978 p208
Week 4. Contingent identity
Seminar question: ‘Suppose that you and your body are in fact identical. Might you
nevertheless have had a different body?’

Lewis, D 1971. ‘Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies’. Journal of
Philosophy Vol. 68, No. 7, Apr. 8, 1971 203-211
Week 5. Personal identity
Seminar question: ‘What is it that matters in survival?’

Parfit, D ‘Personal Identity’. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 80, No. 1. (Jan.,
1971), pp. 3-27.
Week 6. Truth and fact
Seminar question: ‘If a sentence is true, must there exist a corresponding fact?’

Russell, B 1912. The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Read Chapter XII. (Widely available free online.)
Week 7. Property exemplifications
Seminar question: ‘“Events are property exemplifications.” What does this mean? Is
it true?’

Kim, J., 1976. ‘Events as Property Exemplifications’, in M. Brand and D. Walton
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(eds.), Action Theory, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 159–77. Reprinted in Kim’s
Supervenience and Mind; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993.
Week 8. Causation
Seminar question: ‘Assess the suggestion that, if e would not have occurred without c,
then c is a cause of e.’

Lewis, D. K., 1973. ‘Causation’. Journal of Philosophy 70: 556-67.
Week 9. Events as the causal relata
Seminar question: ‘Does Davidson make a convincing case for the existence of
events?’

Davidson, D., 1967. ‘Causal Relations’. Journal of Philosophy, 64, 691–703.
Week 10. What is an event?
Seminar question: ‘An event is a … class of spatiotemporal regions’. (Lewis) Is it?

Lewis, D. K., 1986. ‘Events’, in his Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. pp. 241–69.
(Available on Oxford Scholarship Online.)
Essay Titles and Readings
1) If x and y are material objects which throughout their existence are in exactly the
same places at exactly the same times, does it follow that x = y?
 Gibbard, A., 1975. ‘Contingent identity’, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4:
187 –221.
2) Can a materialist give a satisfactory criterion of personal identity?
 Shoemaker, S 1984. ‘Personal Identity’ in S Shoemaker and R Swinburne,
Personal Identity, Oxford; Basil Blackwell.
3) What is an event? What is the criterion of identity for events?
 Davidson D, 2001. ‘The Individuation of Events’. Chapter 8 of his Essays on
Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Available on Oxford
Scholarship Online.
4) What is a ‘criterion of identity’? Does singular reference require a criterion of
identity?
 Lowe, E 1989. ‘What is a criterion of identity?’ The Philosophical Quarterly
Vol. 39, No. 154: 1-21.
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