The Role of Race and Gender in State Legislative Ideology
Abstract
Prior research has conclusively demonstrated the presence of a gender and racial gap in
mass public opinion and voting behavior. Both African Americans and women are
generally more liberal, more supportive of social welfare programs, and more likely to
identify themselves as Democratic than white men. Research is mixed, however,
regarding the degree to which those differences are reflected in the legislative settings.
Research has provided conflicting findings regarding racial and gender differences in
legislative voting and legislative ideology, in part because of the powerful influence that
partisanship exerts on floor voting in legislatures. Moreover, very little research assesses
both the role of race and gender in floor voting in state legislatures, and virtually no
research assesses racial differences in ideology among female legislators, or gender
differences in ideology of African-American legislators. This study provides the first
attempt to study the influence of both gender and race on state legislative ideology across
a wide range of states. We find that the pattern of gender and racial differences in
legislative ideology reflects the pattern found in the mass public. Women and AfricanAmerican legislators are often significantly more liberal than their white male colleagues.
More important, it is white male Democrats in particular who tend to be ideologically
different than others in their party, and these differences are particularly pronounced in
the South.
Much attention has been paid in the last two decades to the gender and racial gap
in public opinion and voting. Scholars have long recognized that women tend to be more
supportive than men of government spending on education, health care and welfare, and
that the gender gap in presidential elections is rooted in gender differences in opinion on
these issues (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Likewise, research has consistently
demonstrated substantial racial differences in political beliefs and attitudes (e.g. Jackman
1994; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Winter 2001). African-Americans are by
wide margins more supportive of affirmative action, government protections of equal
employment opportunities, and federal spending on a variety of social welfare programs
involving education, poverty, and health care. In recent presidential elections, African
Americans and women have been more likely than white men – even white male
Democrats – to support the Democratic candidate.
Within legislatures, however, gender and racial differences in voting have been
less evident; differences tend to emerge in policy interests, as expressed through activities
such as bill sponsorship, to a much great degree than in voting behavior. This is not
surprising, given the degree to which legislative voting is shaped by partisan affiliation.
Nonetheless, prior research has found some evidence of a gender and racial gap in rollcall voting in both the U.S. Congress and state legislatures. Very little research, however,
examines both racial and gender gaps in legislative voting, and virtually no research
examines how the intersection of gender and race contribute to a gender gap in legislative
voting.
This paper explores racial and gender gaps in state legislative ideology, and
focuses in particular on the role that the intersection of race and gender plays in shaping
legislative ideology. We first review the extant scholarship on the gender and racial gaps
in behavior at both the mass and elite levels. We argue that recognizing the intersection
of race and gender is crucial to fully understanding gender or racial differences in
ideology. We then analyze legislative ideology in the lower chambers of eleven state
legislatures, assessing how race and gender, along with partisanship and constituency
characteristics, contribute to differences in legislative ideology.
Descriptive and Substantive Representation
A useful starting point for an examination of gender and racial differences in
legislative behavior and attitudes is Pitkin’s (1967) seminal distinction between
descriptive and substantive representation. Pitkin (1967, 61) writes that descriptive
representation "…depends on the representative's characteristics, on what he is or is like,
on being something rather than doing something." Substantive representation involves
legislative activity—through roll call voting or other actions—that furthers the interests
of a constituency. Scholars have long debated the normative benefits and costs of
descriptive representation (e.g. Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999). One potential benefit of
descriptive representation is that it may bring about increased substantive
representation—that is, descriptive representation is beneficial if it brings new issues to
the agenda, increases the quality of political deliberation, and produces policy outputs
that are in the interest of previously under-represented citizens. In short, descriptive
representation potentially provides for a greater variety of perspectives, opinions, and
interests in the lawmaking process. On the other hand, particularly with respect to race,
descriptive representation can bring about a trade-off with substantive representation.
Numerous scholars have examined whether redistricting, by creating large concentrations
of minorities in a few districts, creates a context in which a higher number of solidly
conservative, Republican districts are created—thus creating a link between descriptive
and substantive representation by a few individual legislators, but a trade-off between the
two forms of representation in the overall legislative body (Cameron, Epstein, and
O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Swain 1993). Therefore, a crucial question raised by
many scholars is whether descriptive representation is primarily symbolic (albeit not
without important benefits for the constituent community) or whether it leads to changes
in substantive representation. 1
The strength of any potential link between diversity in a legislature and the degree
to which the legislature represents the constituency's substantive interests clearly depends
on the degree to which there are group differences in individual political interests,
attitudes, and behavior at both the mass and elite levels. As noted above, the evidence is
clear that there are gender and racial differences in the mass public in political ideology,
partisanship, voting behavior, and public opinion. Women, as a whole, tend to be more
likely to support policy initiatives in areas once designated to the private spherechildcare, domestic violence, equal pay, equal rights, family issues, parental leave,
1
Other potential costs of descriptive representation include essentialism (or the assumption that all group
members and only group members can represent those with who share that identity—and presumably are
less able to represent others), weakened ties to other important political groups or institutions, and a loss of
accountability (Mansbridge 1999). Scholars have found some mixed evidence of other benefits of
descriptive representation, at least under some conditions, including increased voter participation
(Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Griffin and Keane 2006), enhanced
communication between constituents and representatives (Gay 2003), and increased constituent satisfaction
(Lawless 2004; Tate 2001).
reproductive rights, sexual harassment, and women’s health—in other words, those
initiatives that promote equality for women and address women’s concerns (Seltzer,
Newman, and Leighton 1997; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999; Pearson 2001). Racial
differences in the mass public are even more substantial--African Americans are more
liberal, more likely to identify themselves and vote as Democrats, and more supportive of
a variety of social welfare policies (Gurin, Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Jackman 1994).
Differences are particularly substantial on issues related to civil rights and racial equality
(Kinder and Sanders 1996; Kinder and Winter 2001). The research on race, gender, and
representation has therefore centered on the degree to which—and the conditions under
which—the same differences are seen in the legislative setting.
The extant scholarship consistently indicates that women and African Americans
do bring different policy issues to the legislative agenda. Survey research indicates the
women are more likely than men to prioritize measures involving women, children, or
families (Thomas 1994). Significant sex differences at the agenda-setting (bill
sponsorship) stage of the legislative process have been well documented at both the state
and national levels (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Reingold 2000; Swers 2002). Researchers
have found that African-Americans have likewise used their entry into elected office to
promote the interests of the black electorate. Sokolow (1971) found that black legislators
in the 1969 California state legislature were more likely to sponsor health, welfare,
education, and crime bills. Later research has demonstrated that black officials are more
likely than their white colleagues to focus on civil rights and liberties legislation and
social welfare legislation, such as redistributive programs, governmental guarantee of
jobs, increased funding for health care, economic initiatives for racial and ethnic
minorities, and increased spending for public education programs (Bratton and Haynie
1999; Canon 1999; Conyers and Wallace 1976; Orey et al. 2006). Sex differences in
committee behavior have also been found (Kathlene 1994; Rosenthal 1998), and there is
some evidence that gender diversity in legislative committees can under some conditions
translate into differences in policy outputs (Poggione 2004). Research on the effect of
race on behavior in committee is less plentiful, although recent scholarship indicates that
black representatives in the U.S. House are more likely to participate than white
legislators in committee debate over issues specifically relevant to African-Americans
(Gamble 2005).
The research that we present in this paper focuses on one of the last stages of the
lawmaking process: legislative roll-call voting. This stage of lawmaking offers a less
hospitable climate for the emergence of gender and racial differences. Researchers have
generally argued that while African American legislators and female legislators may be
relatively liberal, reflecting a race and gender gap that exists within the mass public, the
effects of partisanship and district demographics on legislative voting are likely to dwarf
the effects of race and (even more so) gender. A legislator can craft a piece of sponsored
legislation to reflect both his or her own interests and the interests and preferences of the
constituency. Roll-call votes simply do not offer the same degree of freedom to
legislators to define themselves individually in a way that preserves their standing in the
party and their electoral support. Given the important differences between agenda-setting
and roll-call voting, it is perhaps not surprising that the overall findings regarding the
effects of sex on roll-call voting have been relatively mixed, and that scholars continue to
debate the degree to which race exerts an independent effect on roll-call voting that is
independent of the effects of partisanship and constituency.
Despite the strong effects of partisanship, some evidence suggests women are
more likely than men to vote in support of women's issues at the state level (Day 1994)
and at the national level (Clark 1998; Swers 1998). Poggione's (2007) analysis of a
survey of state legislators indicates that female representatives are more liberal than their
male colleagues in their views of social welfare policy. Using interest group scores to
measure state legislator liberalism, Hogan (2007) concludes female Democratic
representatives are relatively liberal. Other research has found little evidence that gender
matters in roll call voting (Barnello 1999; Reingold 2000; Thomas 1990). Welch (1985)
finds that while women in the U.S. House are more liberal than men, the ideological
differences are substantially narrowed once district composition (and specifically the
urbanness of the district) is taken into account. Vega and Firestone (1994) find a
significant gender gap in voting in the U.S. House in two out of the twelve years studied.
In the few works that examine the effects of race, partisanship, and district
composition on voting behavior, race generally remains a significant influence on
legislative voting behavior. Canon (1999) found that African-Americans were
significantly more supportive of measures involving civil rights than other legislators,
even after controlling for partisanship and racial diversity within the district. Grose
(2005) found that African American legislators, Democratic legislators, and legislators
elected from districts with a relatively high proportion of African Americans were
significantly more liberal in roll-call voting and significantly more supportive of civil
rights measures brought to the floor.2
The Intersection of Gender and Race
In this paper, we build on prior research by providing one of the most extensive
analyses of the effect of gender and race on legislative voting at the state level. Perhaps
most important, we turn our attention to the intersection of gender and race. There have
been increased recognition by scholars of the importance incorporating intersectionality
into studies of descriptive and substantive representation (Hardy-Fanta et al. 2005;
Paxton, Kunovich and Hughes 2007; Garcia Bedolla, Tate and Wong 2005). Previous
studies applied broad generalizations of minority and female political activity and
performance to women of color. But if we know that both race and gender matter in
political behavior, then we need to examine how they matter together.
In one of the first studies of African-American women in the mass public, Baxter
and Lansing (1983) found that the exclusive models developed to explain the behavior of
black men and of white women were inadequate in explaining black female political
behavior. Prestage (1991) noted that African-American women faced a double
disadvantage which differentiated them from their white counterparts. Research has
illustrated that this ‘double minority status’ has impacted their behavior, in the sense that
African-American women are different than other African-Americans and other women.
Research has found that in the mass public, gender and racial identity are generally
complementary (Gay and Tate 1998; Simien 2005); black feminist consciousness in
particular is not contradictory to racial consciousness (Simien and Clawson 2004). At the
2
Both authors used LCCR scores as a measure of roll-call support for civil rights measures. The
Leadership Conference as Civil Rights (LCCR) identifies a set of floor votes in each Congress that are
important for civil rights. Grose (2005) also provides a separate analysis of DW-Nominate scores.
legislative level, studies on policy interests suggest that African-American women
legislators are unique in that their similarity to both African American men and white
women: they focus on the policy interests and priorities of both constituencies (Barrett
1995, 1997; Bratton, Haynie, Reingold 2006). It is unclear whether African American
women behave differently in their legislative voting behavior than white women and
African American men, given that all three groups have been found to be relatively
liberal in the mass public.
While much of the intersectionality literature has focused on African American
women, it may be that intersection matters in roll call voting behavior because of
differences between white men and their colleagues. Research indicates that much of the
gender gap in partisanship at the mass level is rooted in the increasing likelihood that
white men will identify with the Republican party (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999;
Norrander 1999b). Indeed, the gender gap in the mass public may be based in part on
gender differences in attitudes toward race-related issues. Hutchings et. al. (2004) argue
that affirmative action and civil rights are part of a larger set of "social compassion"
issues that are relatively salient to women, and on which men adopt more conservative
positions. This avenue of research suggests that African-American women, white
women, and African-American men may be relatively similar to each other—but that the
influence of race and gender in legislative voting is reflected primarily in the relative
conservativism of white men.
There is also substantial evidence that the intersection of race and gender may
matter most in certain contexts. In the mass public, the gender gap is due not just to the
behavior of white men in general, but of southern white men in particular (Kaufmann and
Petrocik 1999). Preuhs (2006) finds that increased racial diversity in legislatures can lead
to different policy outcomes, but that the effect of racial diversity is minimized in
racialized settings (that is, in southern states). Note that this does not mean that racial
differences in legislative preferences are not substantial—in fact, substantial racial
differences could be evidence that African-American legislators are not influencing the
opinions of their colleagues, much less translating those opinions and preferences into
policy outcomes.
Expectations, Data, and Methods
Based on the prior research, we expect that white men will be more conservative
in legislative voting than other legislators. Because prior research indicates that these
differences in the mass public are most pronounced in the South, we also expect that
racial and gender differences in legislative ideology will be most pronounced in Southern
states.
We collected data from the 2001 session in the lower chambers of eleven state
legislatures, chosen to maximize variance in descriptive representation, region, legislative
professionalism, state ideology, and party control of the chamber. Descriptive
information about the legislators is presented in Table 1, and descriptive information
about the states is presented in Table 2. The states provide a substantial range in partisan,
racial, and gender diversity, as well as majority party dominance in the legislature, and
legislative professionalism.3 Because our focus is on gender and racial differences in
public opinion, we also present information regarding how our states range on Brace et.
3
We use Squire's (2007) measure of legislative professionalism, which is based on salary and benefits, time
spent in session, and staff and resources.
al.'s (2002) state-level measures of opinion on feminism / gender roles and on racial
integration.4
[ Table 1 About Here ]
[ Table 2 About Here ]
To measure legislator ideology, we use the W-Nominate score, calculated based
on all roll-call votes (in the lower chamber of each state in 2001) that had at least 5%
disagreement.5 We agree with prior work that gender and racial differences in legislative
behavior are most marked with regard to legislation that is most salient to women or to
African Americans (e.g., Barnello and Bratton 2007; Hutchings 1998; Swers 2002).
Nonetheless, we argue that this does not preclude the possibility that African-Americans
are more generally liberal than their white colleagues, or that the racial composition of
the district is associated with the liberalism of the representative. Particularly in a state
legislative setting, where the power of legislative party caucuses and the power and
meaning of partisan affiliation likely vary substantially, racial differences may exist in
general roll-call voting. And, because we examine not only the effect of race, but also
the effect of gender, as well as the effect of the intersection of race and gender, it is
appropriate to use a general measure of legislator ideology.6
4
Brace et. al. (2004) used national public opinion surveys from 1974-1988 to construct state level measures
of public opinion. Public opinion on race was based on the average responses to five questions which
generally focused on integration in education, housing, socializing, and marriage. Public opinion on
feminism was based on the average responses to two questions, one which asked whether "women should
take care of running their homes and leave running the country to men" and one which asked whether
"most men are bettered suited emotionally to politics than women."
5
The W-Nominate score is obtained by employing a scaling procedure that produces an unfolding liberalconservative measure, ranging from -1 to 1 (-1 being most liberal and 1 being most conservative) over a
series of legislative votes. The program used to calculate the ideology measures can be found at:
http://voteview.org/w-nominate.htm.
6
Hutchings (1998) argues that although the LCCR is regarded as relying on a set of measures that are
relatively salient to African-Americans, the scale actually relies on both salient and relatively obscure
measures. Our use of the W-Nominate score is much different, since it captures all floor votes that had at
least 5% disagreement. That is, it is explicitly a measure of general ideology across issues.
We present eleven OLS regression analyses, predicting the W-Nominate score in
each of our eleven states. The W-Nominate scores are state specific, since the set of
issues that is brought to the legislative floor varies substantially from state to state.
Therefore, separate analyses are the ideal approach. Separate analyses also provide the
opportunity to assess state by state differences in the effect of race and gender.7
We control for two factors that have consistently taken the lead role in
explanations of legislative voting: partisanship and constituency. It is clear from prior
research that partisanship is the predominant influence on roll-call voting. Moreover,
prior research has found that gender differences are more pronounced in one party than in
the other (e.g. Hogan 2007; Swers 1998), although the direction and the substantive
magnitude of the findings are very inconsistent.8 We therefore measure the partisanship,
race and the sex of the legislator with several dummy variables: Black Male Democrat,
Black Female Democrat, White Female Democrat, White Male Democrat, White Female
Republican.
Several works focus on how the composition of the constituency influences
legislative voting. Combs, Hibbing, and Welch (1984) find that in both the northern and
southern urban areas, representatives in the U.S. Congress who were elected from
predominantly black districts were relatively liberal. Fleisher (1993) found that the
percentage black in the district was significantly related to legislative liberalism among
7
Hogan (2007) standardizes the interest group scores that he uses to measure legislator ideology.
However, it remains unclear whether the issues are comparable across states; in other words, a legislator
might be relatively conservative in one state, but may be relatively liberal compared to legislators in
another state. A relatively conservative Democrat in California may not be ideologically equivalent to a
relatively conservative Democrat in Arkansas. The fact that the interest group scores are gathered from a
single interest group, with a presumably coherent set of interests across states, likely minimizes this
possibility to some degree. In our research, the W-nominate scores are already scaled within states, and so
standardizing the scores is not appropriate.
8
Swers (2002), for example, finds significant gender differences among Republicans; Hogan (2007) finds
significant gender differences among Democrats.
Southern Democrats in Congress (as measured by ADA scores), although the effect was
relatively small and inconsistent compared to the effect of liberalism of white voters in
the district (measured as vote for Mondale in 1984). Hood and Morris (1998) find that
district demographics (including the percentage black in the district) contribute to an
explanation of the liberalization of Southern Democrats in Congress during the 1980s,
but that cohort change and, to a lesser extent, changes in seniority, are the most powerful
explanations. Hutchings (1998) argues that distinguishing between relatively salient and
relatively obscure civil rights proposals can be crucial to accurately evaluating the
influence of the presence of a sizable African-American constituency on roll-call voting;
he finds that district composition is significantly related to roll-call voting on civil rights
measures in Congress, but only on salient proposals. We therefore control for the
percentage black within the legislative district.
We include as well three other measures of the composition of the geographic
constituency: the average income in the district, the percentage of the district that
involved farming, and the percentage Latino in the district. Legislators elected from less
wealthy districts, less rural districts, or ethnically diverse districts may also be more
likely to support relatively liberal policies. The four variables that measure district
composition were gathered from Lilley, DeFranco, and Diefenderfer (1994). We
additionally control for whether a legislator is Latino.9
Previous research has indicated that policy interests as expressed through
committee membership can influence ideology (Hogan 2007; Swers 2002). Researchers
9
Information about legislator ethnicity was gathered through interest group and searches of newspapers
through Lexis-Nexis. Because of concerns about variance even in the three states (California, Florida, and
Texas) with substantial numbers of both Black and Latino legislators, we leave the questions of the
influence of ethnicity on legislative ideology, and gender differences among the legislative ideology Latino
state legislators to future work.
have found that at the mass level, opinions on social welfare substantially contribute to
the gender gap in partisanship (e.g., Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998; Norrander
1999a). In the legislative context, therefore, those who focus on social welfare policy
may be relatively liberal, since these are traditionally areas of government expansion. To
minimize collinearity concerns in our state-by-state analyses, we develop an index to
measure the degree to which a legislator has expertise in these policy areas. The index is
based on expertise both within and outside of the legislature. The range of values on the
index is from 1 to 3. The variable had a value of 1 if the legislator was a member of a
committee that focused on education, health, or welfare or had substantial occupational
experience in a field involving education, health or welfare. The variable had a value of
2 if the legislator both served on a committee that focused on education, health, or
welfare and had substantial occupation experience in one of those areas. A legislator
who did not have such occupational experience, but who not only served on but also
chaired a committee involving health, education, or welfare also scored a 2 on the index.
Finally, the variable had a value of 3 if the legislator not only served on but also chaired a
committee focusing on education, health, or welfare policy and had substantial
occupation experience in one of these areas. We expect that legislators who are relatively
knowledgeable about these policy areas will be relatively liberal.
Results
Our results are presented in Tables 3 through 5. For each state, we present three
separate analyses: one in which "Republican White Men" is omitted and serves as a
comparison category, one in which "Democratic White Men" is omitted and serves as a
comparison category, and one in which "Democratic Black Female" is omitted and serves
as a comparison category. Note that these are simply different presentations of the same
basic analysis, but the omission of different comparison categories makes clear the
significance and magnitude of racial and sex differences.
[ Table 3 About Here ]
[ Table 4 About Here ]
[ Table 5 About Here ]
First, we observe that partisanship is as expected the most important influence on
legislative ideology. Democratic legislators are in almost all cases more liberal than
Republican men and women. The one exception is Louisiana, where as a matter of
practice party tends to be somewhat less relevant in lawmaking; in Louisiana, there are
no significant party differences among women.
More important, for the purposes of this project, we also see that race and gender
do influence ideology, above and beyond the influence of partisanship. Moreover, race
and gender matter in a way that is compatible with what we know about racial and gender
differences in the mass public. As in the mass public, racial differences in legislative
voting are generally more pronounced than gender differences. And, consistent with our
expectations, it is white male Democrats that seem to be the group that is significantly
different than other legislators. After taking partisanship into account, racial differences
among women are seen in only two states (Louisiana and South Carolina), where
African-American women are substantially and significantly more liberal than
Democratic white women; there are marginally significant racial differences among
Democratic women in Illinois. But racial differences among male Democrats, and
differences between African American women and white male Democrats, are more
substantial and more consistent. Among Democrats, African Americans are significantly
more liberal than white men in four states (Louisiana, Michigan, South Carolina, and
Texas). African American women are significantly more liberal than white men in
Illinois, and African American men are significantly more liberal than white men in
North Carolina.
The intersection of race and gender matters in that it appears that when there are
differences in ideology, historically underrepresented groups (black men, black women,
and white women) tend to be more liberal than white men.
In keeping with our expectations, gender differences are somewhat smaller than
racial differences, and even though there is gender diversity in both parties, significant
gender differences in legislative ideology are found only among Democrats. Again, it
seems that white men are the group that most often anchors a racial or gender gap in
ideology. Women in the Democratic caucus are significantly more liberal than their male
counterparts in Michigan, Texas, North Carolina, and Montana.
We therefore find substantial support for the expectation that white men are more
conservative than other legislators. Recall that we also expected that differences would
be more pronounced in the South. We observe that there is some support for that
expectation: there are consistent racial differences in ideology in most Southern states
(the exception is Florida). Moreover, the two non-Southern states with a substantial
number of African American legislators are Illinois and Maryland. Maryland is the one
state that shows no evidence of a racial gap in legislative ideology, and only marginal
differences are seen in Illinois.
This is certainly suggestive of a pattern in which racial differences are more
evident in the South; however, it would be useful to examine other non-Southern states
(such as Missouri, New Jersey, and Wisconsin) in the future, to see if this pattern was
consistent. Moreover, it is difficult to determine (even with a more extensive database)
the role various factors play in producing racial differences: the racialized context that
might be present in the South, the general conservativism both in the white population
and among white elected officials, or by the existence of substantial racial diversity (and
perhaps an unusual high degree of cohesion among African-Americans) in the chamber.
What other factors influence legislative ideology? We leave a more thorough
discussion of ethnicity to another essay, but we observe here that Latinos tend to be more
liberal in both Florida and Texas, two of the three states (the other is California) with a
substantial number of Latino legislators. Surprisingly, the racial composition of the
district is associated with legislative liberalism only in Louisiana and South Carolina.
That these two states are in the South is more evidence for the argument that "race
matters" in the South in a way that it does not in other states, but it should be noted that
the effect of the racial composition is not consistent among Southern states.
The "policy index" that we constructed to measure how much a legislator is
involved with education, health, welfare, or children's policy is significant in four states
(Maryland, Montana, North Carolina, and Texas); as expected, legislators with
experience or activity in these policy areas are more liberal. And, as expected, in several
states (California, Illinois, Maryland, and Texas), legislators who represent districts with
a relatively high proportion of Latino residents are more liberal. Legislators who are
elected from such districts in Florida are more conservative; it should be noted that the
Latino population in Florida is much more diverse in terms of partisanship, and the
elected representatives are overwhelmingly Republican of Cuban descent. Indeed, in
Florida, Latino representatives are more liberal than their fellow Republicans—but
substantially and significantly more conservative than their Democratic colleagues.
Average income in the district has a significant effect on ideology only in Texas, where
legislators elected from wealthier districts are more conservative. In three states (Illinois,
Michigan, and Montana), legislators from relatively rural districts are more conservative.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study is the first systematic attempt to assess gender and racial differences in
legislative ideology across a wide range of state legislatures, and the first to address how
the intersection of race and gender shape ideological differences within parties. We
demonstrate conclusively that race and gender matter, even after controlling for policy
interests and expertise, partisanship, and district composition. We also demonstrate that,
as in the mass public, the group in legislatures most likely to contribute to gender or
racial differences is white male Democrats, who are often significantly more conservative
than others in their party.
Where do we go from here? Our results were very consistent, but there was still
variance in the magnitude and significance of effects. We believe that future research
would be most benefited by a focus on the causal mechanisms that are the foundation of
the gender and racial gap in legislative attitudes and behavior, and on the connection
between gender and racial differences and influence over policy outputs. Prior research
has indicated that the gender gap is rooted in views on "social compassion" issues, and
therefore at least some of the varying size of the gap across chambers may be due to the
salience of such issues within the legislative setting. The findings presented in this paper
may serve as a foundation for research that examines how changes across time in issue
salience within the legislative setting parallel changes in the legislative gender gap.
Works Cited
Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp. 2004. "Minority
Representation, Empowerment, and Participation." Journal of Politics 66(2):
534-556.
Barnello, Michelle A. 1999. "Gender and Roll Call Voting in the New York State
Assembly." Women & Politics 20: 77-94.
Barnello, Michelle A. and Kathleen A. Bratton. 2007. "Bridging the Gender Gap in Bill
Sponsorship." Legislative Studies Quarterly 32(3): 449-474.
Barrett, Edith J. 1995. “The Policy Priorities of African American Women in State Legislatures.”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 20(2): 223-47.
Barrett, Edith J. 1997. “Gender and Race in the State House: The Legislative Power.” Social
Science Journal 34(2): 131-144.
Baxter, Sandra, and Marjorie Lansing. 1983. Women and Politics: The Visible Majority. Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Berry, William D., Evan J. Ringquist, Richard C. Fording, and Russell L. Hanson. 1998.
"Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the American States, 19601993." American Journal of Political Science 42(1): 327-348.
Bobo, Lawrence, and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. 1990. "Race, Sociopolitical Participation
and Black Empowerment." American Political Science Review 84(2): 377-94.
Brace, Paul, Kellie Sims-Butler, Kevin Arceneaux, Martin Johnson. 2002. "Public
Opinion in the American States: New Perspectives Using National Survey Data."
American Journal of Political Science 46(1): 173-189.
Bratton, Kathleen A. and Kerry L. Haynie. 1999. "Agenda Setting and Legislative
Success in State Legislatures: The Effects of Gender and Race." Journal of
Politics 61(3): 658-679.
Bratton, Kathleen A., Kerry L. Haynie, and Beth Reingold. 2006. "Agenda Setting and
African American Women in State Legislatures." Women, Politics, and Public
Policy 28(3/4)
Cameron, Charles, David Epstein, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Do Majority-Minority
Districts Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?" American
Political Science Reviews 90(4): 794-812.
Canon, David T. 1999. Race, Redistricting, and Representation. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Chaney, Carole K., R. Michael Alvarez, and Jonathan Nagler. 1998. Explaining the
Gender Gap in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-1992." Political Research
Quarterly 51(2): 311-339.
Clark, Janet. 1998. "Women at the National Level: An Update on Roll Call Voting." In
Women and Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future. Eds., Sue Thomas and
Clyde Wilcox. New York: Oxford University Press.
Combs, Michael W., John R. Hibbing, and Susan Welch. 1984. "Black Constituents and
Congressional Roll Call Votes." The Western Political Quarterly 37(3): 424434.
Conyers, James E. and Walter L. Wallace. 1976. Black Elected Officials: A Study of
Black Americans Holding Governmental Office. New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Day, Christine L. 1994. "State Legislative Voting Patterns on Abortion Restrictions in
Louisiana." Women & Politics 14(2): 45-63.
Dovi, Suzanne. 2002. "Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman,
Black, or Latino Do?" American Political Science Review 96(4): 729-743.
Fleisher, Richard. 1993. "Explaining the Change in Roll-Call Voting Behavior of
Southern Democrats." Journal of Politics 55: 327-41.
Gamble, Katrina L. 2005. “The Face of Congress: The Impact of Race on Representation
and Deliberation.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Emory University.
Garcia Bedolla, Lisa, Katherine Tate, and Janelle Wong. 2005. "Indelible Effects: The
Impact of Women of Color in the U.S. Congress." Women and Elective Office:
Past, Present, and Future. Eds. Sue Thomas and Clyde Wilcox. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Gay, Claudine. 2003. "Spirals of Trust? The Effect of Descriptive Representation on
the Relationship between Citizens and Their Government." American Journal of
Political Science 46(4): 717-732.
Gay, Claudine, and Katherine Tate. 1998. "Doubly Bound: The Impact of Gender and
Race on the Politics of Black Women." Political Psychology 19(1): 169-84.
Griffin, John D. and Michael Keane. 2006. "Descriptive Representation and the
Composition of African American Turnout." American Journal of Political
Science 50(4): 998-1012.
Grose, Christian R. 2005. "Disentangling Constituency and Legislator Effects in
Legislative Representation: Black Legislators or Black Districts?"
Gurin, Patricia, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson. 1989. Hope and Independence:
Blacks' Response to Electoral and Party Politics. New York: Russell Sage.
Hardy-Fanta, Carol, Christine Marie Sierra, Pei-te Lien, Dianne M. Pinderhughes,
Wartyna L. Davis. 2005. "Race, Gender, and Descriptive Representation: An
Exploratory View of Multicultural Elected Leadership in the United States."
Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, September 1-4, Washington, DC.
Hogan, Robert E. 2007. "Differences in Policy Voting by Women and Men State
Legislators." Paper presented at the 2007 Annual Meeting of the Southern
Political Science Association, New Orleans, Louisiana, January 3-7.
Hood III, M.V. and Irwin L. Morris. 1998. "Boll Weevils and Roll-Call Voting: A
Study in Time and Space." Legislative Studies Quarterly 23: 245-69.
Hutchings, Vincent L. 1998. "Issue Salience and Support for Civil Rights Legislation
Among Southern Democrats." Legislative Studies Quarterly 23: 245-269.
Hutchings, Vincent L., Nicholas A. Valentino, Tasha L. Philpot, and Ismail K. White.
2004. "The Compassion Strategy: Race and the Gender Gap in Campaign 2000."
Public Opinion Quarterly 68(4): 512-541.
Jackman, Mary. 1994. The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class,
and Race Relations. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Kathlene, Lyn. 1994. "Power and Influence in State Legislative Policymaking: The
Interaction of Gender and Position in Committee Hearing Debates." American
Political Science Review 88(3): 560-576.
Kaufmann, Karen M. and John R. Petrocik. 1999. "The Changing Politics of American
Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap." American Journal of
Political Science 43(3): 864-887.
Kinder, Donald R. and Lynn M. Sanders. 1996. Divided by Color: Racial Politics and
Democratic Ideals. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Kinder, Donald R. and Nicholas Winter. 2001. "Exploring the Racial Divide: Blacks,
Whites, and Opinion on National Policy." American Journal of Political Science
45: 439-456.
Lawless, Jennifer L. "Politics of Presence? Congresswomen and Symbolic
Representation." Political Research Quarterly 57(1): 81-99.
Lilley, William, Laurence J. DeFranco, and William Diefenderfer III. 1994. Almanac of State
Legislatures. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Lublin, David. 1997. The Paradox of Representation: Racial Gerrymandering and
Minority Interests in Congress. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent
Women? A Contingent 'Yes'." Journal of Politics 61(3): 628-657.
Norrander, Barbara. 1999a. "Is the Gender Gap Growing?" In Reelection 1996: How
Americans Voted ed. Herbert S. Weisberg and Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, pp.
145-161. New York: Chatham House.
Norrander, Barbara. 1999b. "The Evolution of the Gender Gap." Public Opinion
Quarterly 63(4): 566-576.
Orey, Byron D'Andreá, Wendy Smooth, Kimberly S. Adams, and Kisha Harris-Clark.
2006. "Race and Gender Matter: Refining Models of Legislative Policy Making
in State Legislatures." Journal of Women, Politics & Public Policy 28(3/4): 97119.
Paxton, Pamela, Sheri Kunovich, and Melanie M. Hughes. 2007. "Gender in Politics."
Annual Review of Sociology 33(1): 263-284.
Pearson, Kathryn. 2001. "Legislating in Women's Interests? Congresswomen in the
106th Congress." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, San Francisco, California.
Pitkin, Hanna. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Poggione, Sarah. 2004. "Legislative Organization and the Policymaking Process: The
Impact of Women State Legislators on Welfare Policy." Paper presented at the
2004 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, New
Orleans, Louisiana.
Poggione, Sarah. 2007. "Exploring Gender Differences in State Legislators' Policy
Preferences." Political Research Quarterly 57(2): 305-314.
Prestage, Jewel L. 1991. "In Quest of African American Political Woman." Annals of
the American Academy of the Political and Social Sciences 515: 88-103.
Preuhs, Robert R. "The Conditional Effects of Minority Descriptive Representation:
Black Legislators and Policy Influence in the American States." Journal of
Politics 68(3): 585-599.
Reingold, Beth. 2000. Representing Women: Sex, Gender, and Legislative Behavior in
Arizona and California. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
Rosenthal, Cindy Simon. 1998. When Women Lead; Integrative Leadership in State
Legislatures. New York: Oxford University Press.
Seltzer, Richard A., Jody Newman, and Melissa Voorhees Leighton. 1997. Sex as a
Political Variable: Women as Candidates and Voters in U.S. Elections. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner.
Simien, Evelyn. 2005. “Race, Gender, and Linked Fate.” Journal of Black Studies 35(5): 529550.
Simien, Evelyn M. and Rosalie A. Clawson. 2004. "The Intersection of Race and Gender: An
Examination of Black Feminist Consciousness, Race Consciousness, and Policy Attitudes."
Social Science Quarterly 85(3): 793-810.
Sokolow, Alvin D. "Black Members—White Legislators." Black Politician 2: 23-30.
Squires, Peverill. 2007. "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index
Revisited." State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7(2): 211-227.
Swain, Carol M. 1995. Black Faces, Black Interests. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Swers, Michele L. 1998. "Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women's Issue Bills
than Their Male Colleagues?" Legislative Studies Quarterly 23(3): 435-448.
Swers, Michele L. 2002. The Difference Women Make: The Policy Impact of Women in
Congress. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tate, Katherine. 2001. "The Political Representation of Blacks in Congress: Does Race
Matter?" Legislative Studies Quarterly 26(4): 623-638.
Thomas, Sue. 1990. "Voting Patterns in the California Assembly: The Role of Gender."
Women & Politics 9: 43-56.
Thomas, Sue. 1994. How Women Legislate. New York: Oxford University Press.
Vega, Arturo, and Juanita M. Firestone. 1995. "The Effects of Gender on Congressional
Behavior and the Substantive Representation of Women." Legislative Studies
Quarterly 20(2): 213-222.
Welch, Susan. 1985. "Are Women More Liberal than Men in the U.S .Congress?"
Legislative Studies Quarterly 10(1): 125-134.
Table 1. Descriptive Information, Legislators, Eleven State LegislaturesA
Percentage
Republican
White
Female
Percentage Percentage
Republican Democratic
White Male Black
Female
Percentage
Democratic
Black Male
Percentage
Democratic
White
Female
4
27
0
5
19
California
12
44
4
9
7
Florida
12
35
7
7
8
Illinois
5
27
6
15
7
Louisiana
7
18
7
12
19
Maryland
11
41
6
10
8
Michigan
12
47
0
0
14
Montana
11
35
3
11
8
North Carolina
6
49
3
16
2
South Carolina
10
61
0
0
6
South Dakota
9
39
4
5
3
Texas
A
Percentages do not total to 100 within states because of Latino representatives.
Percentage
Democratic
White Male
20
12
28
40
37
24
28
30
23
23
21
Table 2. Descriptive Information, States and Chambers, Eleven States
Legislative
Partisan Percentage
Professionalism Control Majority
RankingA
Party
(1=most prof.)
California
Florida
Illinois
Louisiana
Maryland
Michigan
Montana
North Carolina
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
A
B
C
1
13
8
33
18
5
44
16
36
47
15
D
R
D
D
D
R
R
D
R
R
D
Measure taken from Squire (2007)
Measure taken from Berry et. al. (1998)
Measure taken from Brace et. al. (2002)
64
64
53
69
75
52
58
53
55
71
52
Citizen
LiberalismB
56.67
49.85
58.65
24.22
67.65
58.12
49.78
47.02
42.98
53.98
42.65
State Inst'l
LiberalismB
92.5
10.57
32.79
28.81
97.5
16.56
14.16
84.95
52.44
21.5
65.68
State Opinion
on Race
(ranking in
parentheses)C
State Opinion
on Feminism
(ranking in
parentheses)C
.81 (7)
.69 (34)
.74 (23)
.72 (28)
.80 (9)
.75 (22)
.70 (32)
.55 (40)
.77 (19)
.63 (38)
.71 (29)
1.52 (12)
1.36 (34)
1.47 (21)
1.33 (36)
1.49 (15)
1.46 (22)
1.45 (24)
1.17 (40)
1.79 (1)
1.25 (38)
1.4 (32)
Table 3. Influences on Legislator Ideology, Comparison to Republican White Men
Republican White
FemaleA
Democratic Black
FemaleA
Democratic Black
MaleA
Democratic White
FemaleA
Democratic White
MaleA
Latino
Policy Index
Percentage Black
in District
Percentage Latino
in District
Average Income in
District
% Farming in
District
Intercept
Adjusted R2
Number of
Legislators
A
b
CA
FL
IL
LA
MD
MI
MT
NC
SC
SD
TX
-.039
(.191)
N/A
-.005
(.075)
-1.59**
(.170)
-1.518**
(.156)
-1.654**
(.086)
-1.511**
(.071)
-1.047**
(.122)
-.010
(.030)
-.002
(.003)
.013**
(.002)
-.002
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
.862++
(.147)
.90
120
-.015
(.067)
-1.197**
(.140)
-1.116**
(.129)
-.959**
(.082)
-.957**
(.051)
-.826**
(.280)
.010
(.026)
-.002
(.002)
-.006*
(.004)
-.002
(.002)
.036**
(.009)
.495++
(.115)
.89
120
-.044
(.159)
-.808**
(.181)
-.716**
(.164)
-.228*
(.132)
-.363**
(.088)
N/A
.186
(.087)
-.932**
(.145)
-.791**
(.129)
-.849**
(.071)
-.811**
(.060)
N/A
-.021
(.031)
-1.660**
(.067)
-1.590**
(.056)
-1.599**
(.039)
-1.470**
(.025)
N/A
-.071
(.063)
N/A
-.047*
(.027)
-.003*
(.001)
-.024**
(.008)
-.003
(.002)
-.025
(.014)
.590++
(.107)
.79
134
-.008
(.011)
.001
(.001)
.003
(.004)
.001
(.001)
.011*
(.006)
.790++
(.057)
.99
105
-.088**
(.026)
.002
(.031)
-.007
(.019)
<.001
(.004)
.005**
(.002)
.484++
(.129)
.89
101
.005
(.084)
-1.046**
(.125)
-1.094**
(.085)
-.666**
(.130)
-.632**
(.057)
-.052
(.207)
-.035
(.030)
-.006**
(.002)
-.017
(.029)
-.004
(.004)
-.038b
(.013)
1.049**
(.155)
.88
124
-.040
(.075)
N/A
-.068
(.042)
-.007**
(.003)
-.014
(.017)
.004
(.006)
.001
(.008)
.472+
(.245)
.66
103
-.056
(.085)
-.980**
(.201)
-1.106**
(.149)
-1.056**
(.108)
-.819**
(.074)
-.197
(.265)
-.059*
(.032)
.003
(.003)
.016
(.025)
-.005
(.004)
-.010
(.015)
.644++
(.191)
.74
117
.100
(.063)
-1.096**
(.124)
-1.022**
(.140)
-.915**
(.099)
-.742**
(.052)
-.896**
(.070)
-.063**
(.026)
.001
(.003)
-.002*
(.001)
.006**
(.002)
.005
(.004)
.487++
(.108)
.87
149
-.851**
(.294)
-1.330**
(.116)
-1.350**
(.102)
-.721**
(.122)
-.054
(.040)
-.009
(.007)
-.012**
(.003)
-.004
(.004)
-.003
(.008)
1.228++
(.251)
.82
80
N/A
-1.181**
(.064)
-.983**
(.051)
N/A
Comparison category is Republican white male
Estimate is in opposite direction than expected, and would be significant in a two-tailed test at the .05 level.
N/A
-1.185**
(.089)
-1.259**
(.053)
N/A
-.005
(.024)
.064
(.038)
-.040
(.029)
.003
(.005)
-.007b
(.002)
.624++
(172)
.94
70
Table 4. Influences on Legislator Ideology, Comparison to Democratic White Men
Republican White
MaleA
Republican White
FemaleA
Democratic Black
FemaleA
Democratic Black
MaleA
Democratic White
FemaleA
Latino
Policy Index
Percentage Black
in District
Percentage Latino
in District
Average Income in
District
% Farming in
District
Intercept
Adjusted R2
Number of
Legislators
A
b
CA
FL
IL
LA
MD
MI
MT
NC
SC
SD
TX
1.311**
(.191)
1.350**
(.102)
N/A
1.506**
(.091)
1.511**
(.071)
-.083
(.170)
-.007
(.155)
-.144
(.101)
.464
(.131)
-.010
(.030)
-.002
(.003)
-.013**
(.002)
-.002
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.549**
(.158)
.90
120
.942**
(.073)
.957**
(.051)
-.239*
(.130)
-.158
(.119)
-.001
(.080)
.132
(.273)
.010
(.026)
-.002
(.002)
-.006*
(.004)
-.002
(.002)
.036**
(.009)
-.462**
(.114)
.89
120
.319*
(.166)
.353**
(.087)
-.445**
(.157)
-.352**
(.136)
.135
(.118)
N/A
.996**
(.086)
.811**
(.060)
-.121
(.128)
.019
(.112)
-.038
(.054)
N/A
1.449**
(.035)
1.470**
(.025)
-.190**
(.056)
-.119*
(.055)
-.129**
(.039)
N/A
.912**
(069)
.983**
(.051)
N/A
-.047*
(.027)
-.003*
(.002)
-.024**
(.008)
-.003
(.002)
-.025
(.014)
-.221*
(.098)
.79
134
-.008
(.010)
.001
(.001)
.003
(.004)
.001
(.001)
.011*
(.006)
-.580**
(..051)
.99
105
-.088**
(.026)
.002
(.031)
-.007
(.019)
.001
(.004)
.005**
(.002)
-.499**
(.116)
.637**
(.096)
.632**
(.057)
-.414**
(.117)
-.462**
(.073)
-.034
(.129)
.580**
(.214)
-.035
(.030)
-.006**
(.002)
-.017
(.029)
-.004
(.004)
-.038b
(.013)
.416**
(.166)
.87
124
1.219**
(.083)
1.259**
(.053)
N/A
-.068
(.042)
-.007**
(.003)
-.014
(.017)
.004
(.006)
.001
(.008)
.109
(.237)
.66
103
.763**
(.095)
.819**
(.074)
-.161
(.180)
-.287*
(.121)
-.236*
(.102)
.622b
(.272)
-.059*
(.032)
.003
(.003)
.016
(.024)
-.005
(.004)
-.010
(.015)
-.175
(.194)
.74
117
.842**
(.072)
.742**
(.052)
-.353**
(.121)
-.279*
(.135)
-.173*
(.100)
-.154*
(.067)
-.063**
(.026)
.001
(.003)
-.002*
(.001)
.006**
(.002)
.005
(.004)
-.255**
(.097)
.87
149
.499
(.283)
.020
(.116)
.528**
(.127)
-.054
(.040)
-.009
(.007)
-.012**
(.003)
-.004
(.004)
-.003
(.008)
-.122
(.258)
.82
80
N/A
-.198**
(.063)
N/A
101
Comparison category is Democratic white male
Estimate is in opposite direction than expected, and would be significant in a two-tailed test at the .05 level.
N/A
.074
(.091)
N/A
-.005
(.024)
.064
(.038)
-.040
(.029)
.003
(.005)
-.007b
(.002)
-.635**
(.157)
.93
70
Table 5. Influences on Legislator Ideology, Comparison to Democratic African-American Women
Republican White
FemaleA
Republican White
MaleA
Democratic Black
MaleA
Democratic White
FemaleA
Democratic White
MaleA
Latino
Policy Index
Percentage Black
in District
Percentage Latino
in District
Average Income in
District
% Farming in
District
Intercept
Adjusted R2
Number of
Legislators
A
b
FL
IL
LA
MD
MI
NC
SC
TX
1.588**
(.169)
1.594**
(.170)
.076
(.128)
-.061
(.179)
.083
(.170)
.547**
(.196)
-.010
(.030)
-.002
(.003)
.013**
(.002)
-.002
(.003)
-.004
(.008)
-.731**
(.236)
.90
120
1.182**
(.147)
1.197**
(.140)
.081
(.104)
.238*
(.130)
.239*
(.130)
.371
(.300)
.010
(.026)
-.002
(.002)
-.006*
(.004)
-.002
(.002)
.036**
(.009)
-.701**
(.179)
.89
120
.763**
(.228)
.808**
(.181)
.092
(.135)
.580**
(.171)
.445**
(.157)
N/A
1.117**
(.157)
.932**
(.145)
.140
(.090)
.082
(.132)
.121
(.128)
N/A
1.639**
(.072)
1.660**
(.067)
.070
(.047)
.060
(.068)
.190**
(.067)
N/A
-.068
(.042)
-.007**
(.003)
-.014
(.017)
.004
(.006)
.001
(.008)
-.335
(.284)
.66
103
-047
(.027)
-.003*
(.002)
-.024**
(.008)
-.003
(.002)
-.025
(.014)
-.342*
(.171)
.79
134
-.008
(.011)
<.001
(.001)
.003
(.004)
<.001
(.001)
.011*
(.006)
-.870**
(.085)
.99
105
.924**
(.207)
.980**
(.201)
-.126
(.155)
-.075
(.183)
.161
(.180)
.783b
(.334)
-.059*
(.032)
.003
(.0030
.016
(.025)
-.005
(.004)
-.010
(.015)
-.336
(.265)
.74
117
1.051**
(.148)
1.046**
(.125)
-.048
(.115)
.380*
(.166)
.414**
(.117)
.995**
(.243)
-.035
(.030)
-.006**
(.002)
-.017
(.029)
-.004
(.004)
-.038**
(.013)
.002
(.205)
.88
124
1.196**
(.134)
1.096**
(.124)
.074
(.114)
.180
(.148)
.353**
(.121)
.200
(.131)
-.063**
(.026)
.001
(.003)
-.002*
(.001)
.006**
(.002)
.005
(.004)
-.608**
(.157)
.87
149
Comparison category is Democratic African-American female
Estimate is in opposite direction than expected, and would be significant in a two-tailed test at the .05 level.