P HILOSOPHY OPTION : 2015–16, B IRKBECK B.A.
AND MA p.1
P HILOSOPHY OF A CTION
The course will treat the philosophy of action as a part of the philosophy of mind, in which questions both in metaphysics and epistemology crop up. What light can be cast on thinking about the mind’s place in nature by taking account of the fact that human beings do things for reasons? What idea of causality is needed for human agency to be understood? Is there a kind of explanation which has application specifically where there is human agency? Must one know that one is doing something if one is doing it intentionally?
Much recent debate in philosophy of action has been focused on the causal theory of action which took root in the late twentieth century. We’ll consider whether or not the account of human agency given in that theory should supplant a different account, which has recently gained adherents and which has its roots in Aristotle.
And we’ll see how answers to these questions bear on questions about free agency and responsibility.
Times and Places:
Lectures: Lectures for this module will be held in the autumn term only on Tuesdays at 6pm, in XXXXXX.
Seminars: There will be separate seminars for BA students and MA students—7p.m. Tuesdays.
BA seminars will be in YYYYYY.
MA seminars will be in XXXXX.
Convener and Lecturer:
Prof. Jennifer Hornsby. If you have any queries or comments about the organization of the module as a whole, contact her at
She can also advise on additional reading in connection with an essay you are writing.
Set Readings and Essays:
Required Reading: For each lecture there is assigned reading (listed below as ‘required ’). This is reading that you must do in advance of the lecture, in preparation for it.
Additional Reading: Each week there is also further, reading which you should do wherever the topic is of interest to you, and must do some of in connection with essays you write.
Essays: You will be required to write two essays per term in preparation for your seminars.
At the end of this schedule, there are two lists of essay questions.
One—week-by-week—has an essay question for each lecture/set reading. You should use this question if you are writing an essay for the seminar. And you might like to think about the question in preparation for the seminar even if you are not writing an essay.
The other list—further essay questions—is a list of questions whose answers would be likely to be based on material from more than one week’s lecture and would require some ‘Additional
Reading’.
At least one—i.e. one or both—of your pre-submitted essays should use a question from the further essay questions list.
Assessment:
B.A.: 2 presubmitted essays to a combined total of c.3,000 (and max. 3,300) words.
M.A.: 2 presubmitted essays to a combined total of c.3,500 (and max. 3,900) words.
Essay questions to be taken from lists – at least one of them from the list “for assessment”.
Moodle:
Electronic copies of all the required reading and some other course materials are available through
Moodle, at
. You will need your ITS login name and password to enter.

P HILOSOPHY OF ACTION: 2015–16, B IRKBECK B.A.
AND MA OPTION, p.2
LECTURE SCHEDULE
READINGS MARKED
CAN BE FOUND ON
READINGS MARKED ** ARE REPRINTED IN THE ANTHOLOGY P HILOSOPHY OF A CTION , EDS .
ONATHAN
ANCY
AND
ONS TANTINE S ANDIS , W ILEY B LACKWELL , 2015.
READINGS MARKED
ARE IN A C OMPANION TO P HILOSOPHY OF A CTION , EDS .
C.
S ANDIS AND T.
O’C ONNOR .
T HIS CAN BE GOT ONLINE AT : https://bibliotecamathom.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/a-companion-to-the
-philosophy-of-action.pdf
1
th
Required Reading: E. J. Lowe (2012). ‘Action Theory and Ontology’. In A Companion to Philosophy
of Action, eds. C. Sandis and T. O’Connor, Blackwell. ‖
Additional Reading:
Mourelatos, A.P.D. (1978), “Events, States and Processes”, Linguistics & Philosophy 2: 415–34.
2
th
Required Reading: Patterson, Sarah (2005). ‘Epiphenomenalism and Occasionalism: Problems of
Mental Causation, Old and New’. History of Philosophy Quarterly 22, 239–257
Additional Reading:
Strawson, P.F. (1974). ‘Self, Mind and Body’, in Freedom and Resentment (Methuen), Chapter 8,
Reprinted in David Rosenthal (ed.) The Nature of Mind (OUP 1991, Chapter 5, pp.58–62.
Hornsby, Jennifer (1986). “Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour”. In Subject, Thought
and Context, eds. P. Pettit and J. McDowell (Oxford University Press).
3
th
Required Reading: Ryle, Gilbert (1949). The Concept of Mind, Ch 3: The Will.
Additional Reading:
O’Shaughnessy, Brian (1973). ‘Trying (as the mental “pineal gland”)’, Journal of Philosophy 70:
365–38. †
Hornsby Jennifer (2012). ‘Trying to Act’, In A Companion to Philosophy of Action, eds. C. Sandis and
T. O’Connor, Blackwell.
‖
Kenny A.J.P. The Metaphysics of Mind, Ch.3: The Will.
4
th
Required Reading: Davidson, Donald (1963). Actions, Reasons and Causes. The Journal of Phil-
osophy, 60: 685–700. † and **
Additional Reading:
Aguilar, J. H. and Buckareff, A. A. (2010). ‘The causal theory of action: origins and issues’. In Aguilar and. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New perspectives on the causal theory of action
(The MIT Press.).
Julia Tanney (1995). ‘Why Reasons May Not Be Causes’, Mind and Language 10: 103–126.) † and also online at http://www.kent.ac.uk/secl/philosophy/articles/tanney/whyreasons.pdf
Don Marquis, ‘Verstehen and Explanation’ (1968) Kansas Journal of Sociology 4: 79–87.
†
and also online at http:///kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/bitstream/1808/4690/1/KJV4N2A4.pdf
[Note: Verstehen (German) means understanding. It is sometimes contrasted with Erklärung which means explanation.
The contrast is made by those who wish to distinguish the explanation of human behaviour from explanation in science.]
Ruben, D.-H. (2003). Action and Its Explanation (Oxford University Press), pp. 77-98.

P HILOSOPHY OPTION : 2015–16, B IRKBECK B.A.
AND MA p.3
5
th
Required Reading: Frankfurt, Harry (1978). ‘The Problem of Action’, American Philosophical
Quarterly 15: 157–162. † and **
Additional Reading:
Hornsby, Jennifer (2004). ‘Agency and Actions’. In Agency and Action, eds. Helen Steward and John
Hyman (Cambridge University Press) 1–23. **
Velleman, J. D. (1992). ‘What happens when someone acts?’. Mind 101. †
R EADING W EEK
6
th
Required Reading: Alvarez, Maria and Hyman, John (1998). ‘Agents and their Actions’. Philosophy
73: 219–45. † and **
Additional Reading:
Thalberg, Irving (1967). ‘Do we cause our own actions?’ Analysis 27: 196–201. †
Stout, Rowland (2005). Action (Central Problems of Philosophy, Acumen). Chs. 4–6.
Hornsby, Jennifer (1993).
‘Agency and Causal Explanation’. In Mental Causation, eds. J.Heil and
A.Mele (Oxford University Press). R EPRINTED in Philosophy of Action, ed. A. Mele (Oxford
Readings in Philosophy1997) and **
Hursthouse, Rosalind (1981). ‘Arational Actions’. Journal of Philosophy 88: 57-68. † and **
7
th
Required Reading: Bratman, Michael (1984). ‘Two Faces of Intention’. Philosophical Review 93:
375-405. † and **
Additional Reading:
Moran, R. and Stone, M. (2009). ‘Anscombe on Expression of Intention’. In New Essays on the
Explanation of Action, ed. C. Sandis (Palgrave Macmillan) 132–168. And reprinted in Essays on
Anscombe’s Intention , eds. A. Ford, J. Hornsby and F. Stoutland (Harvard Uni Press 2011).
Setiya, Kieran, ‘Intention’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), ed.
Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/intention/>.
Langton, Rae (2004). ‘Intention as Faith’. In Agency and Action, eds. J. Hyman and H. Steward
(Cambridge University Press) 243–258.
8
th
Required Reading: G.E.M. Anscombe (1957). Intention (Basil Blackwell). Extracts in Ch.11 of **
§1 and §§3–9 ( omitting part of §8: cutting from ‘traffic lights in crossing the road.’ to the end of the §
).
Additional Reading:
Hornsby, Jennifer (2011): “Actions in Their Circumstances”. In Essays on Anscombe’s Intention, eds.
A. Ford, J.Hornsby and F. Stoutland (Harvard University Press).
McDowell, John (2011). ‘Some Remarks on Intention in Action.’ The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy
6: 1–18. <http://www.amherstlecture.org/mcdowell2011/>.
9
st
Required Reading: Falvey, Kevin (2000). ‘Knowledge in Intention’, Philosophical Studies 99: 21–44.
Additional Reading:
Donnellan, K.S. (1963). ‘Knowing What I am Doing’. Journal of Philosophy 60: 401–409.
Johannes Roessler (2012). ‘Agents’ Knowledge’. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, eds. T.
O'Connor and C. Sandis (Blackwell)
‖

P HILOSOPHY OF ACTION: 2015–16, B IRKBECK B.A.
AND MA OPTION, p.4
LECTURE 9 (1 st Dec.): Knowledge of Intention and Action Additional Reading contd.
Ryle, Gilbert (1971) ‘A Rational Animal’. In Collected Papers Volume 2: 32. (Routledge 2009)
10
th
Required Reading: Steward, Helen (2011). ‘Moral Responsibility and the Concept of Agency’, in
Free Will and Modern Science, ed. R.Swinburne (Oxford U.P.) 141–157.
Additional Reading:
Davidson, Donald (1973). ‘Freedom to Act’. Reprinted in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford
U.P., 1980) 63–82.
E
Q
W
B
W
1 (29 th Sept.): Philosophy of Mind: Ontological Questions
No essay question this week. Please see the guide to reading, included in the moodle version of the reading.
2 (6 th Oct.): Problems of “mental causation”, old and new
‘The substance dualism of the heterogeneity argument introduces heterogeneity, while the property dualism of the exclusion argument introduces non-identity’. (Patterson).
Explain this claim.
3 (13 th Oct.): Volitionism, old and new
‘The connection between volitions and movements is mysterious.’ (Ryle).
What are Ryle’s grounds for saying this? Does Ryle demonstrate that it’s wrong to think that there are volitions?
4 (20 th Oct.): Davidson on Action and its Explanation
‘The signalling driver can answer the question, “Why did you raise your arm when you did?”, and from the answer we learn the event that caused the action.’ (Davidson).
What assumptions are in play when Davidson says this?
5 (27 th Oct.): Agency
‘[W]hat makes causal theories implausible is that they direct attention exclusively away from the events whose natures are at issue, and away from the times at which they occur.’ (Frankfurt).
What does Frankfurt mean by this? Is he right?
6 (10 th Nov.): Agency and Causation
‘ We shall argue that the concept of agency involves the notion of an agent’s causing an event.’ (Alvarez
and Hyman).
What is their argument? Is it successful?
7 ( 17 th Nov .): Intention
‘Intention is Janus faced, tied to both intentional action and coordinating plans.’ (Bratman).
Does Bratman make a good case for this claim?
8 (24 th Nov): Intention and Action
‘Intentional actions are ones to which a certain sense of the question “why?” has application.’ (Anscombe).
How does Anscombe explain this? What is the “certain” sense of the question “why?”? Does
Anscombe mean by ‘intentional action’ what Davidson meant?

P HILOSOPHY OPTION : 2015–16, B IRKBECK B.A.
AND MA p.5
9 (1 st Dec.): Knowledge of Intention and Action
‘[W]hile one’s ability to say straight off what one is doing is grounded in knowledge of one’s intentions, such knowledge is also, in favourable cases, knowledge of what one is doing.’ (Falvey).
Do you agree with this claim? If so, what it is its significance? If not, what is wrong with it?
10 (8 th Dec.): Free Agency
‘Even if actions are physical events … their categorization as actions on the part of a certain agent depends
…on the relation borne by the agent to the event in question.’ (Steward).
Explain and assess this claim.
F
E
Q
Y OU MUST SUBMIT TWO ESSAYS FOR ASSESSMENT .
Y OU SHOULD AVOID OVERLAP IN THE TWO ESSAYS .
Y OU CAN TAKE BOTH YOUR QUESTIONS FROM THIS LIST , OR YOU CAN TAKE ONE FROM THIS LIST AND ONE FROM THE
WEEK BY WEEK ESSAY QUESTIONS .
I T IS FINE TO USE MATERIAL FROM AN ANSWER TO A WEEK BY WEEK ESSAY QUESTION IN ANSWERING A FURTHER
ESSAY QUESTION .
F OR BA S TUDENTS : THE COMBINED TOTAL OF THE TWO ESSAYS SHOULD BE AROUND 3,000 WORDS AND NOT MORE
THAN 3,300 WORDS .
F OR MA S TUDENTS : THE COMBINED TOTAL OF THE TWO ESSAYS SHOULD BE AROUND 3,500 WORDS AND NOT MORE
THAN 3,900 WORDS .