1.
Discussion Questions: A Theory of Justice, sections 69-77
69. The Concept of a Well-Ordered Society
(1) what is a well-ordered society? what does it mean to say that “a well-ordered society is … regulated by
its public conception of justice” (397)?
(2) what does it mean to say that a conception of justice is stable? on what does Rawls say stability
depends? what is the difference between saying, as Rawls does, that a conception of justice is stable and
saying that a society is stable (cf. 400-01)? why does Rawls fix on the former and not the latter?
(3) explain the view ascribed to Jeremy Bentham on p. 399. what does Rawls mean by suggesting that this
view “flouts” the criterion of stability?
(4) under what circumstances is a theory “congruent” (399)?
(5) why does Rawls need to discuss principles of human psychology and moral learning?
(6) under what circumstances is a system in equilibrium? under what circumstances is it stable?
(7) what are the two traditions of thought on the development of the moral sentiments? who are the most
important thinkers associated with each? which tradition, if either, fits more comfortably with the Christian
doctrine of original sin?
(8) why does Rawls try to combine insights of these two traditions of thought “in a natural way” (404)?
(9) On p. 405 Rawls says “The crucial point is how the general facts of moral psychology affect the choice
of principles in the original position.” Does this imply that the account of moral learning Rawls sketches is
available to parties in the original position? If so, does this imply that the stability argument of this chapter
is addressed primarily to parties in the original position, primarily to us Rawls’s readers, or to both
audiences?
70. The Morality of Authority
(1) what is the first psychological law Rawls postulates? explain in what way it is a law of reciprocity.
(2) Rawls says “although the child has the potentiality for love, his love of the parents is a new desire
brought about by his recognizing their evident love for him” (406). in which of the two traditions of
thought about the development of the moral sentiments does this remark locate Rawls? what about the
remark that the child “has no original tendency to do the things he is told to do” (407)?
(3) how is the development of love connected with parental affirmation of self-worth and with a child’s
growing sense of her own self-worth?
(4) what are the conditions under which the morality of authority develops?
71. The Morality of Association
(1) explain the remark “Whereas the child’s morality of authority consists largely of a collection of
precepts, the content of the morality of association is given by the individual’s role in the various
associations to which he belongs. These standards include the common sense rules of morality, along with
the adjustments required to fit them to a person’s peculiar position; they are impressed upon him by the
approval and disapproval of those in authority, or by the other members of the group.” (409)
(2) what does Rawls mean by “ideal” on p. 409-10?
2.
(3) what does Rawls mean by saying “It seems plausible, then, that acquiring a morality of association
(represented by some structure of ideals) rests upon the development of the intellectual skills required to
regard things from a variety of points of view and to think of these together as aspects of one system of
cooperation.” (410)?
(4) what is the second psychological law Rawls postulates? explain how it is a law of reciprocity.
(5) explain how the second psychological law presupposes the operation of the first. explain why the
“evident intention” of others to do their part is important. (cf. “Here the evident intention to honor one’s
obligations and duties is seen as a form of good will, and this recognition arouses feelings of friendship and
trust in return.” (412))
(6) why does Rawls talk about the genesis of associational guilt, indignation and other of the moral
sentiments? what role will these sentiments play in keeping justice as fairness stable, in returning it to
equilibrium?
72. The Morality of Principles
(1) what is the third psychological law Rawls postulates? explain in what way it is a law of reciprocity?
(2) how is the operation of third law triggered by someone’s acquisition of and conformity with the
morality of association?
(3) in what two ways does a sense of justice show itself? how will these manifestations of a sense of
justice tend to stabilize justice as fairness?
(4) explain why, once we have acquired the morality of principles, “our moral sentiments display an
independence from the accidental circumstances of our world, the meaning of this independence being
given by the description of the original position and its Kantian interpretation” (416).
(5) explain how moral principles can engage our affections.
(6) what does Rawls mean by saying that a sense of justice is “continuous with the love of mankind” (417)?
(7) Rawls remarks “a perfectly just society should be part of an ideal that rational human beings could
desire more than anything else once they had full knowledge and experience of what it was.” (418) is this
too strong a claim?
(8) what is the doctrine of the purely conscientious act? is utilitarianism committed to this doctrine? what
are the problems with it?
(9) what are the two forms the morality of principles assumes? what are the aspects of the morality of
supererogation? why is it important to Rawls to show that his view can accommodate the morality of
supererogation?
73. Features of the Moral Sentiments
(1) what are the differences among sentiments, attitudes and “moral feelings” or “moral emotions”?
(2) explain in what way Rawls’s inquiry into the moral sentiments is Wittgensteinian (see page 420, note
17).
(3) why is Rawls at pains to argue that “the moral attitudes are not to be identified with characteristic
sensations and behavioral manifestations” (425)? what view of the emotions might hold this contrary
view? does it tell in favor of a theory that it can explain or rationalize the moral emotions? why?
3.
(3) some of the questions to which Rawls’s inquiry leads him – for example, questions about the
physiological concommitants of certain emotions – are also pursued in other inquiries into the emotions,
like that of Thomas Aquinas. what are the salient differences between their approaches? (cf. “What
distinguishes the moral feelings from one another are the principles and faults which their explanations
typically invoke.” (422))
74. Connection Between Moral and Natural Attitudes
(1) what are the two questions raised when we ask whether the moral sentiments are connected to any
natural attitudes?
(2) On p. 428, Rawls remarks
Now the fact that one who lacks a sense of justice, and thereby a liability to guilt, lacks
certain fundamental attitudes and capacities is not to be taken as a reason for acting as
justice dictates. But it has this significance: by understanding what it would be like not
to have a sense of justice – that it would be to lack part of our humanity too – we are led
to accept our having this sentiment.
One natural way to take this is as an argument (or the conclusion of an argument) that it is good to have a
sense of justice. Now recall that on p. 350, Rawls remarked “However when we ask whether the sense of
justice is a good, the important question is clearly that defined by the thin theory.” Has Rawls remained
within the thin theory in giving the argument on p. 428? is your initial reaction to this question qualified by
the remark on pp. 428-29: “when I say that moral attitudes are part of our humanity, I mean those attitudes
that appeal to sound principles of right and justice in their explanation”? explain your answer.
(3) how might the account of the moral sentiments that Rawls offers be deployed to argue against the
emotivism and prescriptivism that were in the air when Rawls conceived and wrote TJ.
75. Principles of Moral Psychology
(1) on what grounds does Rawls assert that a tendency to reciprocity would have been selected for
evolutionarily (433; see also 440)?
(2) Rawls is often credited with reminding moral philosophers of the centrality of reciprocity to human
moral experience. what other motives than reciprocity might a moral view rely upon? how central is
reciprocity to Christian ethics? to Aristotle’s ethics?
76. The Problem of Relative Stability
(1) why is “a society regulated by a public sense of justice … inherently stable” (436)?
(2) what does Rawls mean by saying “the most stable conception of justice, therefore, is presumably one
that is perspicuous to our reason, congruent with our good, and rooted not in abnegation but in affirmation
of self” (436)?
(3) how does the reciprocal character of justice as fairness contribute to its relatively greater stability
(relative, that is, to the stability of a society regulated by the principle of utility)?
(4) how would the three psychological laws have to be altered so they imply that citizens in a utilitarian
society would acquire the corresponding sense of justice? are the amended laws less plausible than those
Rawls asserts on his own behalf? why or why not?
(5) why does Mill think that human beings “desire for [themselves] only those things in the benefits of
which others are included” (439)?
(6) explain how, in Mill’s view, justice strikes a balance between altruism and self-interest. why is the
balance point reciprocity? how does justice as fairness arrive at that point?
4.
(7) what does Rawls mean by saying that the argument from relative stability is “not intended as [a]
justifying reason for the contract view” (441)? why, then, does he present it?
77. The Basis of Equality
(1) at what three levels does the question of equality arise?
(2) what two features are definitive or characteristic of moral personality?
(3) explain the procedural interpretation of equality. what are the problems with this view of equality?
what are its advantages? (HINT: explain why it is sometimes thought that “founding equality on natural
attributes undermines equal justice”)
(4) what is a range property?
(5) if moral personality is the basis of equality, what are we to say about those who lack it: children, the
insane, the permanently handicapped? are these different cases, or are all to be treated in the same way
philosophically?
(6) explain the remark “By giving justice to those who can give justice in return, the principle of reciprocity
is fulfilled at the highest level.” (447)
(7) why is the discussion of the basis of equality included at the end of a chapter on moral psychology? is
the idea that we need some concluding account of those toward whom we develop the natural and moral
sentiments discussed in preceding sections, or is there some other explanation?