Regionalism and African Foreign Policies
BY OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
05-17-01
BY PROF. WALTER CROSS
SUMMITED TO: DR. LUIS B. SERAPIAO
AFRICAN STUDIES Ph.D. HOWARD UNIVERSITY
BLACOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, culturalscience@cs.com , FT. WASHINGTON, MD 20744
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
TABLE OF CONTENT
Page
I.
INTRODUCTION
A. Objective
3
3
II.
REGIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICES
4
III.
REGIONAL GRUOPINGS IN AFRICA
A. Subcontinental Arrangements
B. West Africa
C. East/Southern Africa
D. Central Africa
E. Northern Africa
F. Constraints of Regionalism
G. Pan-African Arrangements
7
9
9
10
11
11
11
13
IV.
REGIONAL GROUPING AND THE PURSUIT
OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY
15
V.
ASSESSING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN
REGIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY
20
VI.
AFRICAN REGIONAL GROUPINGS
AND THE LOME CONVENTION
25
VII.
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE CONCLUDES
30
VIII. CONCLUSION
32
IX.
33
REFERENCES
"In any case, regional integration and cooperation have become the buzzwords of the
1990s. A prevailing view is that in order for Africa to avoid further marginalization, regional
cooperation and integration are needed. The emergence of regional trading blocs in different
parts of the world provides another rationale for Africa to embrace regionalism more seriously
as a strategy to meet development aspirations. Africa has no choice but to be fully integrated in
order to enhance its leverage as a viable economic power in the international arena and to
enable the continent to adapt better to external shocks."
By Olufemi A. Babarinde
1999
Regionalism and African Foreign Policy
2
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
I.
INTRODUCTION
This is a research from the book, African Foreign Policies edited by Stephen Wright.
This assignment was given in the class, "Africa in World Affairs". This was given by Dr.
Luis B. Serapiao in the Spring of 2001. These are the writings and statements of the author,
" Olufemi A. Babarinde on Regionalism and African Foreign Policy, a Black/African
Professor who have conducted the research and study on the above topic. This is the final
assignment of four. I chose these topic because I am interested in Regionalism and African
Foreign Policy from the minds of the Black/Africans. As a Blacological Scholar I am also
interested in what Black/African leaders have to say about the movement for independence
and self-reliance.
It is also important to know their story about the OAU and those
countries that have experienced sustainable governmental success after colonialism. This is
a general Black/African perspective on Regionalism and African Foreign Policy.
A.
Objective:
Objective of the research is to establish that Black/Africans can think for themselves and
can create ideas, theories, concepts, and philosophies of their own to redevelop Black/Africa
as a contributor in Globalisation. Since the destruction of the Black Civilization
Black/Africa has continued to evolve into it own manifestation.
The journey of
redevelopment has fashioned Black/African people into scholastic and scientific geniuses
that are capable to meet the task. It is my intention to show that Black/African scholarship
is more than adequate to define what needs to be done for Africa. There is no need to look
else where for the solution to he problem facing Black/Africa. It is best to let Olufemi A.
Babarinde tell you in his own words what research, study and experience has reveal to him.
The topics include, Regional Groupings in Africa, Subcontinental Arrangements,
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
East/Southern Africa, Central Africa, Northern Africa, Constraints of Regionalism, PanAfrican Arrangements, Regional Groupings and the Pursuit of Independent Foreign Policy,
Assessing the Linkage Between Regionalism and Foreign Policy, and African regional
Groupings and the Lome' Convention.
II.
REGIONALISM AND AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
Much has been written. on regionalism in Africa,1 just as there is a growing body of work
on African foreign policies.2 Unfortunately, little existing scholarship has explicitly examined
the connection between regional integration and foreign policy in Africa. If these two issues are
linked and/or studied at all, the attention is relatively peripheral and terse at best.3
The scholarly discourse on African foreign policy has primarily been at the state level,
analyzing the policy of a particular government. Occasionally, scholars modify this conventional
approach by comparing and contrasting the foreign policies of two countries or, at times, a
handful of countries.4 Comparative studies of the foreign policies of African states, according to
Timothy Shaw, remain essentially "embryonic."5 In short, most existing studies have not
approached foreign policy from the supranational or regional level of analysis, perhaps because
doing so is rather challenging. A handful of plausible explanations for this are advanced here.
First, it is argued that whereas Africa is not devoid of regional groupings, especially in
the postcolonial era, the life span of some of these entities is often too short to allow for any
discernible foreign policy, let alone any meaningful study of the policies. Admittedly, some
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
organizations have existed for a decade or more, but they have been somnolent during much of
their existence or have drifted to the brink of disintegration.
Second, to the extent that African states have been preoccupied, inter alia, with nationbuilding, improving their tenuous legitimacy at home, enhancing their relative autonomy in the
global capitalist system, and establishing their own visibility in the international arena since
attaining independence, it is conceivable that the pursuit of foreign policy at the regional level
was a low priority Besides, the formulation and implementation of foreign policies are
traditionally jealously guarded by national foreign ministries as sacred areas of their
sovereignty. In other words, governments have been less inclined to preoccupy themselves with
a subcontinental foreign policy, given their predisposition to savor their autonomy.
Third, if the OAU-an august body in which all but one of the continent's states are
members-already pursues a continental foreign policy an issue that will be revisited later why
duplicate the effort at the subcontinental level? Further, is it not enough that the OAU is a panAfrican manifestation of national foreign policies? It is thus arguable that African governments
are wary of a parallel undertaking at the subregional level, especially given the likelihood that
duplication could amount to wasting scarce resources. Besides, it might be equally difficult to
establish whether the thrusts for a particular country's foreign policy are essentially panAfrican
or subregional.
Fourth, to the degree that most of these regional arrangements have an economic
underpinning, it may be difficult to discern their foreign policy initiatives, particularly if foreign
policy is not one of their explicit mandates, as is the case with many regional groupings. To the
extent that a bureaucracy is typically charged with the task of developing and implementing a
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
foreign policy there may be no comparable agencies at the subcontinental level, especially if
member states jealously guard foreign policy as their exclusive domain.
Fifth, given the perennially anemic state of African economies, resource constraints, and
the nagging challenges of development, to distinctly pursue an independent foreign policy at the
subcontinental level could be overstretching an already overtasked national ministry of external
affairs. To be sure, the argument here is not that this is an impossible task for African civil
services but that they would have to assume these additional responsibilities with the same or
dwindling resources. In fact, most African countries do not even maintain embassies in all the
other states of their subregion, largely because of budgetary constraints. All told, the range of
foreign policy choices of regional groupings may, after all, be limited.
These reasons notwithstanding, this chapter will delve into how regional integration
impacts African foreign policies. The analysis will illuminate the extent to which regional
organizations are, if at all, independently developing their own distinct foreign policy initiatives.
It will probe the importance of regional policies to participating states. It will also speculate on
how the proposed African Economic Community, a pan-African supranational scheme, will
impact foreign policy Of related interest is how foreign policies need to be coordinated in order
to realize the AEC.
I will first review regionalism in Africa, considering only the principal and most enduring
groupings. In the subsequent section, I will examine evidence of subregional African groups
pursuing seemingly autonomous foreign policies. Then I will assess the strength of the linkages
between regionalism and foreign policy initiatives and address whether the pursuit of an
ostensibly independent foreign policy by regional organizations is desirable and/or advisable,
given the balkanization of the continent and the severe constraints on its meager resources.
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
Similarly, I will address the issue of whether subcontinental foreign policy initiatives, where they
exist, have been beneficial to the region, its member states, and Africa as a whole. In the
succeeding section, I will discuss the Lome Convention as a case study to illustrate how a group
of primarily African countries have attempted a collective foreign economic policy with Europe.
The final section concludes with some observations and suggestions with a view to the future.
III.
REGIONAL GROUPINGS IN AFRICA
Regionalism is employed in this chapter to encompass transnational cooperation and
integration by sovereign states. Both regional integration and regional cooperation are employed
interchangeably. To demonstrate the similarities between the two--cooperation and integrationand thus to justify using them synonymously, a brief theoretical explanation is offered.
Regional cooperation typically implies collective state action within defined confines
controlled by participating governments. Collective state action in this respect is not meant to
usurp national authority or to displace sovereignty. Functional cooperation by member states
entails minimal regional bureaucracy at best, and national governments are the gatekeepers
between the national and regional levels and, thus, can slow down or completely halt the
construction of a regional political order.6
By contrast, regional integration connotes a process of creating a larger political entity,
whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over preexisting national ones.7 Regional
integration can be intentional by governmental agents to forge the "rules of the game" and the
modus operandi, thus implying the eradication of, usually, economic barriers. This construct of
regionalism can also emanate from interaction between socioeconomic actors across national
boundaries.
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
In either manifestation of regionalism, however, states potentially cede some of their
sovereignty. However, the levers of power reside with the state, and it may decide not to
participate in a joint exercise to maintain sovereignty. Theoretically, no sovereign state could be
coerced into collective joint action without, at the very minimum, its acquiescence or its interests
being overtly or otherwise served. In any case, this broad interpretation of regional collective
action will be applied to the ensuing discussion of regionalism. Regionalism will be used to
imply integration and cooperation, especially since existing regional schemes in Africa, such as
the AEC, generously employ both concepts synonymously.
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
page218
Regional cooperation and integration initiatives are not postcolonial phenomena in
Africa.8 They appealed to many leaders of the independence movements and were viewed as a
mechanism for countervailing the balkanization of the continent. Notable among those who
espoused pan-African cooperation were Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor, Julius Nyerere,
Kenneth Kaunda, and Modibo Keita.9 They held the view that regional cooperation/integration
was necessary to stimulate economic growth and development via industrialization factor
mobility and economic independence. In response to their campaign for regionalism during the
early ! 1960s, groupings were established, some of which were stillborn (the 1965 nine-member
Maghreb Permanent Consultative Committee) and short lived (the 1959 Union Douaniere de
1'Afrique de 1'Ouest).10
These initial attempts failed for the same reasons that current schemes are struggling,
namely, that the initiatives were misconceived with regard to their raison d'etre. Decisionmaking
was often paralyzed because of vendettas between leaders of participating states.11 Efforts also
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
failed because of nationalism. It was extremely difficult to convince a people just liberated from
colonialism, plagued by ethnic-based allegiances, and in search of a national identity of the
virtues of supranational collective action. Besides, many postcolonial economic orders were
continuations of colonial systems, profoundly influencing consumption patterns and external
orientation. Almost four decades after independence, an analysis of trade, direct foreign
investment, and economic assistance reveals a linge2ing colonial legacy and Africa's
subordination within the global economy.12
A. Subcontinental Arrangements
Between the 1960s-the decade of African independence-and 1991when the Treaty of Abuja was
signed to create the AEC-there was a proliferation of subcontinental regional arrangements in
Africa. Since 1991, in a developing post-Cold War environment, two noteworthy efforts have
emerged: first, the 1994 attempt to revive the defunct East African Community and, second, the
renaming and reorganizing of the Preferential Trade Area and the Southern African Development
Coordination Conference. Despite problems, the spirit of regional cooperation/integration in
Africa remains upbeat. All told, it is estimated that there are in excess of 200 regional
arrangements in Africa, and about 40 such groupings are located in West Africa alone.13
Inevitably, countries participate in several regional groupings, and tasks overlap.
B. West Africa.
The Economic Community of West African States was founded in May 1975 to promote
cooperation and development in economic, social, and cultural activity. The Treaty of Lagos also
set out to raise the standard of living of its citizens, increase and maintain economic stability in
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
the region, coordinate external tariff and macroeconomic policies, improve relations among
member states, and contribute to the development of the continent.
Page 219
The community was also charged with the task of creating a common market by 1990, thus
enabling trade liberalization and factor mobility, though this did not occur. To assure an
equitable distribution of the benefits that accrue from the undertaking, the Fund for Cooperation,
Compensation, and Development was set up, to which Nigeria contributes the lion's share of 32
percent and both Cote d'Ivoire and Ghana contribute 13 percent each. Currently there are sixteen
participating countries, with a combined population of about 198 million and an estimated GDP
of $71 billion.14
C. East/Southern Africa.
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa was established in November 1993
to replace the PTA, which had been created in 1981 at the behest of the UN's Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA), and entered into force in July 1984. COMESA exemplifies
the UNECA's urging for an introverted free-trade area, which currently traverses twenty-three
Eastern and Southern African states. Presently it boasts a total population of roughly 300 million
and about $120 billion in GDP Its stated goal is the improvement of commercial and economic
cooperation in the region, as well as the transformation of the production structure of participating countries. It is designed to transcend both the economic dominance of the Republic of South
Africa and Western capitalism. The Southern Africa Development Community, by contrast, was
created by ten Southern African states to defuse the economic threat from a powerful
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postapartheid South Africa, though South Africa (and Mauritius) joined in 1994 and Seychelles
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo joined in 1997.15 SADC has an estimated combined
population of 170 million and a GDP of over $200 billion. Finally, the on-off EAC is on again,16
as it was revived in late 1994.17 Although some issues have yet to be resolved by the groupKenya, Tanzania, and Uganda-the countries recently took a major step toward closer regional integration by agreeing to make their currencies fully convertible.18
D.
Central Africa.
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was set up in October
1983. It is an arrangement between eleven countries that aspire to promote financial and
commercial cooperation, by eliminating internal trade barriers and adopting a common external
tariff, and eventually create a common market. Its total population is roughly 80 million, and its
GDP is about $30 billion.
E.
Northern Africa.
A major regional grouping north of the Sahara is the Arab Maghreb hed in 1989 to foster
cooperation and integration between Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, as well
as better regional linkages with the European Union. The AMU has an estimated total population
of 68 million and about $120 billion in GDP.
F.
Constraints of Regionalism
A relevant issue is how these myriad regional arrangements have fared vis-a-vis their stated
objectives. At the risk of overgeneralizing, arrangements have either not lived up to potential or
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have been outright disappointing. One problem is overlapping membership and divided allegiance, for example between COMESA and SADC. Multiple membership also means additional
strains on the limited resources of member states. In the same vein, there are linguistic and
bureaucratic hurdles to surmount, especially by ECOWAS and COMESA because of the sheer
size of their membership and their colonial linguistic inheritance.
Some arrangements, ironically, are still dependent on the largesse of extra-African
benefactors. Such was the case with SADCC, which depended on the generosity of the EU.
Similarly, all African states are in one North-South dialogue or another with the EU, the most
renowned of which is the Lome Convention. Whereas these North-South arrangements are meant
to provide concessions to and facilitate the development of African countries, there is always the
possibility that these accords could be competing with Africa's regional groupings for loyalty.
Indeed, there is evidence that North-South arrangements such as Lome or extra-African aid
linkages have hindered South-South trade and cooperation and also undermined the goals and
cohesion of Africa's regional groups.19 There were other significant developments, such as the
prolonged drought in Southern Africa during the early 1990s; continuing civil wars in Angola,
Liberia, Mozambique, and Sudan; the implementation of structural adjustment programs;
currency devaluation/depreciation; and other externally prescribed conditionalities, notably by
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international creditors. Undoubtedly
these factors have constrained viable and credible (sub)continental African foreign policies.
Efforts must be commended at least for some intangible results. ECOWAS, for example,
has proven its resiliency, despite coming close to disintegration several times. Moreover, the
community recently called for the creation of a single currency. Admittedly, the group may not
be close to adopting a single currency any time soon, but the mere fact that its members agreed
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
to do so at this time, calculated posturing or not, must not be easily dismissed. In addition, with
the end of the civil wars in Southern Africa, the fall of apartheid, and the end of the Cold War,
SADC may be poised for "takeoff."
Page221
There is a steadily growing literature on the efficacy of Africa's regional groupings, and
the various analyses will not be repeated here. Most analysts seem to believe that these
arrangements are more symbolic than real, with respect to bona fide regional cooperation and
integration. The profound economic crises of the continent tell the sad story of how ineffective
these regional arrangements have been in alleviating underdevelopment burdens of African
societies.
G.
Pan-African Arrangements
The OAU is the premier continental postcolonial grouping. Established in 1963, its raison d'etre,
according to its charter, is to foster peace, security, unity, and development throughout the
continent. Article III of the charter comes closest to spelling out a foreign policy mandate,
calling on members to respect the territorial integrity of member states, peacefully settle disputes, complete the political emancipation of the continent, and espouse nonalignment. The
consensus is that although the OAU has performed admirably in some areas, such as
coordinating policies toward extra-African actors and collectively fighting colonial and race
domination, it has fallen short of many of its stated goals, especially in moving beyond
symbolism to reality and implementation.21 More than three decades after its inauguration,
Africa still has the unenviable distinction of being the least developed continent, which means
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
that the OAU has to work toward improving the socioeconomic development of the continent
and its people.
Thus, at its annual meeting in Abuja in June 1991, the OAU formally established the panAfrican Economic Community. The event was preceded, a decade earlier, by the OAU's adoption
of the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos.22 The endorsement of the LPA in April
1980 acknowledged that development would entail some sort of pan-African strategy, which
would address the continent's incorporation into the global economy. In order to transform the
status quo, African countries would have to reduce their dependence on the North and their susceptibility to external shocks over which they have very little, if any, control. To that end, the
UNECA prescribed self-reliance via subregional cooperation as the pathway to development,
albeit with some external assistance.23 Accordingly the LPA was "the first comprehensive,
continentwide effort to formulate an African-led policy strategy for the economic development
of the continent,"24 and its overall purpose was "not only to promote the development of nations
and peoples of Africa, but also their progressive integration over great regional areas; and its
ultimate goal is to set up an African Economic Community by the end of the century."25
The signing of the AEC treaty in June 1991 must, therefore, be seen as an attempt by the
OAU to resuscitate the LPA and as a reaffirmation that regional cooperation and integration are
essential to the continent's development strategies. A perusal of the articles of the treaty strongly
suggests that its architects patterned the AEC after the EU. Article 4, Chapter 2 of the Treaty of
Abuja outlined four main objectives: to promote economic, social, and cultural development and
the integration of African economies; to establish a framework for the development,
mobilization, and utilization of Africa's human and nonhuman resources; to promote cooperation
in all fields of human endeavor so as to raise the continent's living standards; and to coordinate
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
and harmonize policies among existing and future economic communities. Another notable
element of the treaty is contained in Article 6, Chapter 2, where signatories committed to a 34- to
40-year timetable for the completion of the AEC. The pan-African integration process was
intended to be implemented in six phases, culminating in the functioning of, among other
entities, a pan-African economic and monetary union, an African central bank, a single African
currency, and a pan-African parliament. To say the least, these were rather ambitious goals for a
continent with very discouraging national records when it comes to respect for government
accountability and transparency, majority rule and minority rights, and so forth.26
In any case, regional integration and cooperation have become the buzzwords of the
1990s. A prevailing view is that in order for Africa to avoid further marginalization, regional
cooperation and integration are needed. The emergence of regional trading blocs in different
parts of the world provides another rationale for Africa to embrace regionalism more seriously
as a strategy to meet development aspirations. Africa has no choice but to be fully integrated in
order to enhance its leverage as a viable economic power in the international arena and to
enable the continent to adapt better to external shocks.
IV.
REGIONAL GROUPINGS AND THE PURSUIT
OF INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY
There are several fitting questions to ask in regard to the foreign policies of regional groupings.
Do such autonomously developed policies exist? How are they developed and implemented?
And how successful are they?
Africa's regional organizations generally exist for the primary purpose of collectively
advancing their level of development, irrespective of whether, as insinuated in some quarters,
African countries join the integration bandwagon because it is fashionable to do so. A perusal of
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
the treaties and charter of integration schemes would reveal an economic leitmotiv and raison
d'etre. Arguably, these countries, as is typical of regional integration in general, come together in
their subcontinental and continental frameworks with the hopes of using them to forge a better
economic environment for their respective societies. The texts of the agreements are often replete
with references to such issues as the free movement of people, capital, services, and goods; the
coordination of macroeconomic policies; the coordination or joint ownership of production and
distribution facilities; and the need for collective security.
The very implementation of "common market" agendas by these groups inevitably
connotes the existence of a foreign policy.27 One reason is that these organizations are still often
dependent on extra-African sources for financial, technical, and other assistance. Ironically,
therefore, before the groups can achieve relative economic interdependence with the outside
world, they must first accommodate those extraneous interests. To that end, the behavior of
Africa's regional organizations has to be cognizant of external forces and entities and their
policies. For example, the EU and its member states have been instrumental in the creation of
many regional cooperation or integration arrangements on the continent, such as the defunct
ADCC, or have provided moral and other kinds of support to ECOWAS and others. Given this
situation, it would be very difficult for these regional entities to ignore the preferences of external
forces or to assume positions that are profoundly confrontational.
This begs the question of what unique types of foreign policy behavior have been exhibited by
regional groupings. To the extent that subcontinental challenges are also typically pan-African, it
may be difficult to ascertain which foreign policy behavior is unique to subregional entities.
Nonetheless, some examples exist.
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
Perhaps a beginning point is the foreign policy behavior of the Front Line States,
embodied in the policy of SADCC toward SA during the apartheid era: It is well-known that the
FLS/SADCC group's subcontinental strategy was to mitigate the effects of the apartheid structure
on their members' economies and to transcend the hegemonic status of SA. Several points come
to mind here. First, SADCC was constrained by its limited economic capabilities with respect to
what policies it could pursue independent of SA. Second, despite ideological differences between
SADCC countries and SA, the former managed to accommodate the latter, with respect to trade,
shipment of goods across SA, and so forth. Third, although a primary goal of the FLS was the
liberation of Rhodesia Zimbabwe from Ian Smith and his cohorts and, subsequently with SADCC,
the ending of the apartheid system in SA, this policy was not peculiarly the FLS's or SADCC's. It
was also an OAU policy and, for that matter, the tacit policy of other regional structures in Africa.
Nevertheless, SADCC was concerned with counteracting the SA juggernaut, which was a primary
reason for its creation in the first place. In the same vein, COMESA was set up primarily to serve
an economic purpose.
Page 224
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
Were these examples of foreign policy by SADC and COMESA peculiar to the region and
independent of policies elsewhere on the continent? To the extent that geographical proximity to
SA is a factor, the concerns and the calculated responses were essentially subcontinental.
However, because the other regional groupings in the continent could afford to react to SA
dominance differently, they were nonetheless engaged on the issue, and this was reflected in the
collective actions of their member states, save one or two.28 The final point here is that neither
SADC nor COMESA has an elaborate bureaucracy with which to conduct foreign policy The
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
staff for both regional frameworks was and is deliberately kept small,29 which means that
whatever independent foreign policy existed for the two almost had to have been an
amalgamation of the foreign policies of member states.
ECOWAS, conversely, has a relatively large bureaucracy with which it potentially could
develop and implement a foreign policy if it chose to do so. However the 1975 treaty does not
include the pursuit of a foreign policy as an explicit goal. Still, many seemingly economic
activities of ECOWAS have external implications or foreign policy connotations. Take, for
instance, the recent call to adopt a single currency, which ineluctably affects the CFA franc zone
and the age-old privileged relationship between the zone countries of ECOWAS and France. Even
though the decision to adopt a single currency, although it may never happen, is intended to facilitate the common market agenda of the group and ultimately facilitate the development of its
member states, it poignantly has ramifications that transcend the West African region. France is
not the only external entity that would be affected by the realization of this policy; the rest of the
EU and other African countries would be affected as well.
Another important ECOWAS policy that contained foreign policy implications was the
group's decision to intervene in the mayhem in one of its member states-Liberia-in 1992, two
years after the crisis commenced, even though the establishing treaty says nothing about intervening in the "internal affairs" of members. Indeed, it eschews such involvement. There is, however,
a quasi-collective security provision that calls for members to come to the rescue of another
member in the event of an external threat. Reluctantly and due to pressure from within Africa and
from outside (primarily the UN),30 ECOWAS established a peace enforcement monitoring group,
popularly known as ECOMOG.31 ECOWAS found itself thrust into this role largely because the
Cold War was over and because Liberia, like the entire continent of Africa according to the
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
calculus of the major actors, was of practically no geostrategic value (this was a logic behind the
later involvement in Sierra Leone as well). The United States was unwilling to directly intervene,
especially given its commitment elsewhere in the world at the time (the 1991 Gulf War), and the
UN was over stretched. In any case, ECOMOG under Nigerian stewardship (see Chapter 7)
stepped in, and the war was brought to a precarious truce. The decision to form ECOMOG had
foreign policy implications for ECOWAS because the symptoms of the war spilled over into
neighboring countries and because the selfish interests of ECOWAS were involved, not the least
of which was how to conduct itself on the world stage. ECOWAS either had to rise to the
occasion or risk sanctioning an already battered image of the continent and the OAU as a
collective of incompetents.
In 1994, the British government floated a proposal to create a regional peacekeeping
organization for Africa in the fashion of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE).32 Several factors accounted for the timing of the proposal, notably the Liberian crisis,
the mayhem in Rwanda, the tenuous order in neighboring Burundi, the cessation of hostility in
Mozambique, and the fragile cease-fire in Angola. In all these places, blue helmet peacekeeping
and/or peace-enforcement missions have been needed. In other parts of the world, such as Bosnia,
Haiti, and so forth, the services of UN troops have been required, thereby stretching the capacity
of the UN. (Unfortunately, the UN has had to cut back because of dwindling financial support
from the richest member states.) In addition, Africa's marginalization has become more apparent
in the post-Cold War era, and it is believed that the continent must bear more of the burden, especially given the seeming apathy of the OAU during the Rwandan crisis. It is also believed that
SA has the moral, financial, and human capacities to provide leadership and support as a
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Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
peacekeeper in Africa, although Nelson Mandela has attempted to deflate such expectations (see
Chapter 9). So far, little action has occurred on the British proposal.
Briefly, both ECCAS and AMU have also pursued internal policies that have foreign
policy connotations. ECCAS, for example, in pursuing its aspiration for a common market, has
been trying to coordinate fiscal and tariff policies, with the hope of ultimately eradicating them.
These activities not only affect other states, particularly their neighbors, but are also aimed at
attracting foreign investment into the region. As in other African countries and subregional
groupings, such undertakings are meant to enhance the economic capacity of member states
through collective action, thereby stimulating their development. Once again, internal as these
endeavors may appear, they elicit some reaction in the international domain. Furthermore,
ECCAS has attempted to respond to the internal crises of some of its members, most notably
Burundi, Rwanda, and Congo-Zaire.
Because of its geography AMU is largely preoccupied with Europe and the Middle East in
its foreign policy, although it is also concerned with development issues. It should come as no
surprise that the group is interested in such things as the EU's Mediterranean policy, the behavior
of European Mediterranean states, and the Arab League (to which its members belong). These
AMU interests are arguably unique to the area.33
Page226
V.
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
ASSESSING THE LINKAGE BETWEEN REGIONALISM
AND FOREIGN POLICY
The task in this section is to address two sets of germane questions. First, when is foreign policy
likely to be pursued at the subcontinental level, which countries are likely to push for such a
20
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
policy, and why? Second, has the pursuit of an autonomous foreign policy by Africa's regional
schemes been beneficial to members states, to the group, and to the continent?
If we accept the premise that foreign policy is inextricably linked with domestic policy,
then there is ample evidence that African countries have either initiated or supported foreign
policy enterprises at the subcontinental regional level. The rule of thumb is that states participate
in a collective exercise because their interests are somehow served, not for altruism. Thus, when
they
participate
in
foreign
policy
enterprises
within
the
framework
of
regional
integration/cooperation, they do so because their interests are directly or otherwise involved.
Furthermore, if foreign policy is a function of, among other things, domestic economic capacity
and population and to the degree that regional integration typically encompasses unequally
endowed participating states, it would be in the interest of some states to pursue foreign policy
initiatives at the subregional level. To that end, we can conceive of three categories of states and
their preference for using the regional integration stage to pursue some of their foreign policies.
At one end of the spectrum are the weak/weakest member states. For them; since they do
not have the economic wherewithal and/or the population size to independently pursue a credible
foreign policy, they may find it in their interest to pursue some or all of their foreign policy
through regionalism.34
At the polar opposite are countries that would prefer to autonomously develop and
implement their foreign policy at the state level, largely because of their relative dominance and
because the state level is where they expect optimum impact or results. However, because of their
sheer population size or regional hegemonic status, they may find it prudent to selectively use the
subregional stage to pursue their foreign policy agendas.35
21
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
The third group of states is composed of the medium-sized countries. They belong
somewhere along the continuum with regard to their preference for the optimal location for
conducting foreign policy.36
Each of these categories of countries would have to find its best location in terms of a
predisposition for either a more unilateral national approach or a more multilateral regional
emphasis, a decision that would primarily depend on the country and the issue in question. In
these scenarios, all members of a regional structure are likely to use the framework for their
foreign policy when it serves their interests. In all three instances, members would be availing
themselves of the leverage that usually accompanies true regionalism and collective action.
Page227
Now, I will attempt to apply that general theoretical framework. Given the economic and
military profile of Africa, there are no economic superpowers on the continent; South Africa
could possibly be regarded as a subregional power. In any case, countries range from the poorest
and weakest to a few medium-sized countries. Against this background, Africa's weak states,
which constitute the vast majority, are likely to conduct their foreign policy at the subregional
level; the remaining countries are likely to utilize an optimal mix of national and regional
approaches. Some examples are illustrative.
First, it is doubtful that countries such as Lesotho or Swaziland, both weak in economic
and military capabilities, could have pursued a foreign policy that significantly influenced
apartheid SA to change its policies. However, their membership in PTA, SADCC, and the OAU
(and UN) gave them some leverage. It would be easier for them to hide behind the cloak of
collective action than to unilaterally conduct a foreign policy toward South Africa, especially a
22
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
confrontational one. Hence, even though PTA and SADCC were relatively loose regional
arrangements designed to reduce the dependence of participating states on SA (which might
coincidentally have been in the interests of Lesotho and Swaziland), both countries enjoyed not
only moral support but also the fortitude and leverage to conduct such a policy. Medium-sized
countries, such as Botswana, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and so forth, also benefited, as can be seen in
the respective chapters of this volume.
In ECOWAS, where most members are essentially militarily and economically weak, the
countries directly or indirectly benefited from the ECOMOG peace enforcement operation in
Liberia, for no one member was strong enough to unilaterally shoulder the burden. Initially,
member states, while their leaders traded accusations, seemed to have ignored the problem until
pressure to do something mounted, especially from outside the continent. The cessation of
hostilities was trumpeted as a foreign policy triumph by the medium-sized participating states,
especially Nigeria, although they used the ECOWAS stage to conduct that policy.
As argued earlier, when it suits the interests of medium-sized states, they can avail
themselves of the leverage associated with regional integration/cooperation. The propensity for
this to happen is perhaps greater when those states either are regional hegemons or have powerful
leaderships. In West Africa, for instance, where Nigeria is somewhat of a hegemony largely
because of sheer population size, Nigeria's relative prowess may be deemed intimidating or
viewed with serious concern by other members.
Page 228
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
Consequently a country in, say, Nigeria's position or SA's position may find it prudent,
when convenient, to join forces with other member states within the subregional framework, if
23
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
doing so would assuage skeptical neighbors about its true intentions for the region. Nigeria or SA
may not want to be deemed a subregional bully but would prefer to be seen as providing
subregional leadership. Thus, a regional group such as ECOWAS or SADC may provide a
convenient avenue to flaunt its "teamplayer," cooperative credentials.3~ Conversely, when a
country or a regional group has a charismatic and powerful leader, it is likely that the individual
will use the regional cooperation stage to pursue certain foreign policy initiatives. This was the
case, as lucidly argued by Daniel Bach, with Cote d'Ivoire's Houphouet-Boigny and his frequent
attempts to use francophone regional organizations to conduct his country's foreign policy in
West Africa.38
Next, I will attempt to answer the question of whether the conduct of an autonomously
developed and implemented foreign policy at the subregional level has been beneficial to
member states, the regional group, ° and Africa. Although one could cite an array of regional
policies with foreign policy connotations or implications, only a few cases will be mentioned
here. Based on these cases, it is obvious that, at least for the poorest and weakest member states,
collective action has brought some visibility and the satisfaction of knowing that they mattered.
In terms of SADCC policies toward SA, countries such as Lesotho and Swaziland feel reassured
that they contributed toward an effective policy by virtue of their membership and participation.
Likewise, in the ECOMOG operation in Liberia, the poorer countries could also find some
vicarious satisfaction in the dubious success of ECOWAS. In essence, therefore, member
countries are likely to benefit from a regional foreign policy success, even if they themselves
abstained. It is unlikely that states would endorse or acquiesce to a regional policy incompatible
with their interests.
24
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
On the question of whether regional organizations benefit when foreign policies are
conducted at that level, the answer is a qualified yes. On I the one hand, conducting policy for
the collective at this level may enhance solidarity; on the other, it potentially may exacerbate
friction among them, which could paralyze morale and decisionmaking and possibly lead to
disintegration. If a foreign policy succeeds at this level, it bodes well for the organization, but if
the reverse is the case, it may cause or aggravate friction, especially if some members had
opposed the policy or its conduct in the first place. Finally, on the question of whether Africa ,
benefits when foreign policies are developed and implemented at the regional level, the answer is
yes if the policy succeeds and promotes solidarity. If, however, the policy fails, then the
continent, which is used to being viewed in a negative light to begin with, provides more
ammunition to skeptics and critics, internal and external alike.
Page229
VI.
AFRICAN REGIONAL GROUPINGS
AND THE LOME CONVENTION
The purpose of this section is to examine an age-old and encompassing North-South
arrangement, the Lome Convention, as a case study of regionalism and African foreign policies.
Although, as mentioned earlier, the EU also maintains relationships with North African countries
under the auspices of the Maghreb and Mashreq agreements, the Lome Convention is selected
here for the following reasons. First, it is widely regarded as the most elaborate of EU relations
with the South and as a model for North-South relations. Second, of the EU's existing
arrangements with Africa, not only is it the one to which most of the African countries belong, it
is also the one with the longest history.39 Third, the convention presently links the 15 members of
25
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
the EU to 71 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, roughly two-thirds of which are subSaharan African.
By the early 1970s, the environment within which the EU was conducting its policies had
changed profoundly. Most notable was the first enlargement of the EU, which took place in 1973
with the addition of Denmark, Ireland, and the UK. With the arrival of the UK, the EU extended
an open invitation (Protocol 22), primarily to African, Caribbean, and Pacific Commonwealth
countries, to consider three possible agreements with the EU.40 The first official response from
the Commonwealth group soon followed, and it was unified and critical. Led by the African
countries, the group unequivocally rejected all three alternative arrangements contained in the
invitation, contending that several aspects of them smacked of neoimperialism and that they
were, thus, incompatible with the group's development aspirations. For example, the group found
the "reverse preference" clause in one of the three alternative arrangements objectionable.
Meanwhile, the eighteen-member francophone African Associate States and Malagasy
(AASM) of the Yaounde Convention were concerned that the invitation to the Commonwealth
group would chip away at the group's privileges with the EU. The group soon issued a
communique in which it expressed its desire to maintain its long-standing relations with the EU.
That meant retaining the "associate" status of its members and maintaining the reciprocal trade
arrangements.
In light of the diametrically opposed positions held by the francophone and anglophone
African countries, the OAU and the UNECA soon intervened to bridge the lacuna. In essence,
the OAU and UNECA tried to impress upon both groups, particularly the AASM, that they stood
a better chance of getting a very good deal from the EU if they collaborated and presented the
European Commission with a united front. Following a series of political maneuverings, the
26
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
AASM group subsequently abandoned its previous position and joined its anglophone
counterpart to negotiate an entirely new agreement with the European countries.
Page230
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
It was a rare form of "unity" among the mostly SSA countries. Led by Nigeria in July 1974, trade
ministers from forty-six ACP countries commenced bloc-to-bloc negotiations with the European
Commission on a new convention to replace Yaounde.41 The negotiations coincided with the call
by the Group of 77 for a New International Economic Order, and they took place in the aftermath
of the first energy crisis of the 1970s. Thus, the ACP group presented the European Commission
with a laundry list of requests and concessions. For example, the primarily African group
requested an automatic mechanism to both stabilize their export earnings against adverse
fluctuations and assure specific prices for their commodities.
The eighteen-month negotiation and conclusion of the Lome Convention was both a
victory for and a manifestation of African regional foreign economic policies by Africans on the
continent and in the Diaspora. The product of the negotiation was a convention that contained an
array of economic concessions for the ACP group, which, more than two decades later, still
characterize it. The Lome Convention, named after the capital of Togo where the first and
subsequent conventions were signed, has basically included the following concessions, among
others: a nonreciprocal trade preference; an economic assistance program; an industrial and technical cooperation program; two insurance schemes for commodities; and separate (sugar,
bananas, rum, veal, and so on) protocols. The main rationale of the Lome Convention is to
enable the ACP states to avail themselves of the concessions to facilitate their own development.
27
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
Since its inception, however, the Lome Convention has been criticized by observers for
failing to advance the development of the ACP countries as a group. Although some member
countries have experienced a degree of economic improvement, the same cannot be said for the
majority. The disparity in economic development has created a chasm between members of the
ACP group over the years with regard to the renegotiations of Lome. Although the renegotiations
process of the convention has become ritualized and the concomitant outcomes have become
predictable, the cohesion. of the ACP group has weakened. In the negotiation of the second and
subsequent Lome agreements, the African-dominated group has been less cohesive in presenting
the European Commission with a "common agenda."
Apart from the growing economic disparity, other factors account for the disintegrating
unity. Foremost among these is the fact that the size of the ACP group has swollen from forty-six
in 1975 to seventy-one at present. In addition, there is an absence of leadership. Nowadays,
unlike the mid-1970s, Nigeria no longer enjoys an almost unrivaled economic affluence and
hegemony.42
Page231
The only other country in SSA that has both the capacity and the willingness to play the role of a
leader in negotiations with the EU, the Republic of South Africa, has battled with the EU to let it
into the ACP fold. Simultaneously, both the international political economy (IPE) and the EU
have undergone profound changes since 1975, prompting many to wonder about the importance
of the convention in the EU's foreign policy enterprise. On the one hand, the current membership
of the EU has almost doubled since 1975 and is composed of countries such as Finland and
Austria, which historically did not enjoy any ties with Africa in particular and hence are unlikely
28
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
to be as sympathetic as, say, France or Belgium. On the other hand, new economic opportunities
and challenges have sprung up elsewhere in the IPE and have captured the imagination of the EU
and its members. For example, the 1989-1990 revolution in Eastern Europe was too close to
home for the EU to simply dismiss; it must address the urgent needs of its neighbors.
In short, given the absence of leadership, the poor economic performance within the ACP
group, and the profoundly altered IPE, it is arguable that the ACP countries have lost their
leverage and are thus no longer in a position to dictate the terms of their foreign economic
policies to the EU. Today, the ACP group finds itself in a take-it-or-leave-it dependent
relationship with the EU. That is, the EU-ACP relationship of the late 1990s is diametrically
opposed to the situation in the mid-1970s. The EU is more confident, more affluent, larger in
population and economic size, and confronted by more global challenges (among which Africa is
only one). Conversely the African group is less assured today and less cohesive after almost four
decades of postcolonial economic mismanagement, soaring debt, and misfortunes.
Against this backdrop, the African group's foreign policy vis-a-vis the EU seems to be
characterized by a more unequal exchange and a more dependent relationship than the "equal
partnership" relationship of the 1970s. Some analysts have even argued that the only reason why
the EU still maintains its relationship with the ACP countries is because of the latter's "collective
weakness."`43 In any case, by the time the fourth Lome Convention was negotiated and put into
force and by the time of its midterm review (1994-1995), it had become evident that though the
group was no longer as united as in 1974, it still preferred to negotiate a collective agreement
with the EU. Indeed, as the expiration of Lome IV approaches, talks about the future of the
convention have abounded. One school of thought says there will be no Lome Convention
29
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
beyond 2000, when the fourth convention expires. Another school of thought states that if there
is a Lome Convention in the next millennium, it will be radically different in structure.
Page 232
OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE
In either case, many ACP countries, especially the African ones, have expressed their preference
to preserve their privileged collective relationship with the EU.
This decision by the ACP countries might have been inspired by several factors. First, it
is plausible that in the calculus of the ACP countries, alternative arrangements with the North did
not exist or, if they did, they were not as alluring, especially in light of Africa's weakening
position in the IPE. Second, the ACP countries might have also come to the realization that to
maximize the benefits of their relationship with the EU, their most valuable asset was perhaps
their large size, particularly if they were to effectively counteract a new international division of
labor and power. Third, it is also quite possible that the ACP group's decision to stay together in
the Euro-African relations could be attributed to the spirit of African solidarity, that is, the need
to join forces and heighten the visibility of the continent against the background of the
globalization of international capital. In any case, it is ironic that the prospect of losing the privileged arrangement with the EU has reinvigorated the "unity" of the African-dominated group,
despite all their differences.44
VII. OLUFEMI A. BABARINDE CONCLUDED THE FOLLOWING:
All told, preparing the analysis presented in this chapter has been rather ' challenging in light of
limited amount of previous scholarship specifically on the subject. This undertaking has been
approached with an exploratory mind-set, and other portentous areas have been omitted due to
30
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
space constraints. Future research should address more closely, for example, whether the types of
political regimes represented in a regional organization make a difference in terms of the group's
decisionmaking on developing and/or implementing foreign policy at that level. For instance,
does it matter if some of the members operate under a military dictatorship, such as in
ECOWAS, or if the vast majority of participating countries subscribe to a pluralist model, such
as SADC? Future research should also probe deeper into the potential effects of the AEC on the
foreign policies of states and regions. It would also be interesting to study how, if at all, the
continent's regional organizations are using their collective leverage to pursue economic policies
in the global system.
Some suggestions are in order. Regional entities in Africa should be utilizing frameworks
simultaneously at the subcontinental and continental levels to present their cases to the
international financial community on issues such as debt rescheduling. Furthermore, they should
be using their collective strength to explore and exploit opportunities in the New International
Division of Labor in order to promote their own development. They should also be more
aggressive in using the regional stage to win concessions, as in their negotiations with the EU
over Lome and the proposed EU-Maghreb free trade area, in the World Trade Organization, and
in other global forums.
Page 233
Frankly, given the economic weakness of these countries, they had better join forces and harness
scarce resources if they hope to stem or reverse their marginalization in the global economy.
Admittedly, this is easier said than done. After all, despite its fortyplus years of history, the EU
still has a long way to go in coordinating foreign policy and presenting a unified front to the
31
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
outside world. However, that does not preclude Africa from achieving such a feat on a consistent
basis.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In essence, I wish to agree with Dr. Olufemi A. Babarinde in concluding this research ,
that regional entities in Africa, specifically Sub-Saharan Africa should be utilizing frameworks
simultaneously at the subcontinental
and continental levels to present their cases to the
international financial community on issues such as conflict management, dispute resolution, and
economic and political development. As a Black/African scholar, it is imperative to point out
that this is an example of what Black/African Scholar can do given the opportunity to do. The
Black/African interdisciplinary scientist is faced with the same dilemma as the Black/African
artist of movie and film. These scientists are fighting for the right to utilize their creative genius
and talents to define who they are and what their story is. This is an excellent portrait of the
ability of Black/Africans to think for them selves and devise solutions to the problems facing
Black/Africa. The time has come for Black/Africa to be self-sustainable, self-sufficient, and
practice self-determination. The best resource is human resource. It is time for Black/African to
utilize its own recourses. It is time for Black/Africans to proclaim, affirm and acclaim their own
Blacological Thought.
According to my philosophy it is time for the development of the
Cultural Science of Blacology. In order for Africa to eliminate marginalization Black/Africa
must acknowledge and utilize it own brainpower to solve its problems.
32
Regionalism & African Foreign Policies
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Africa Policy Information Center, 110 Maryland Ave. NE #509,Washington, DC 20002,
USA Tel: (202) 546-7961, Fax: (202) 546-1545E-mail: apic@igc.org
Africa Action (www.africapolicy.org) Washington: 110 Maryland Ave. NE, #508
Washington, DC 20002 USA. apic@igc.org, New York: 50 Broad Street, #1701
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Serapiao, Luis B. Ph.D. AFST- 304-Africa in World Affairs,
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Howard University, Washington, DC lserapiao@fac.howard.edu
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African Foreign Policies edited by Stephen Wright ISNB 0-8133-2406-8 (INC) Northern
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African Foreign Policies edited by Stephen Wright ISNB 0-8133-2406-8 (INC) Northern
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African Foreign Policies edited by Stephen Wright ISNB 0-8133-2406-8 (INC) Northern
Arizona University, Westview Press, Published in 1999in the United States of America, A
member of the Perseus Books Group Copyright © 1999 (See Notes 23-39 page 235).
African Foreign Policies edited by Stephen Wright ISNB 0-8133-2406-8 (INC) Northern
Arizona University, Westview Press, Published in 1999in the United States of America, A
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8300 Gibbons Drive, Ft. Washington , Md. 20744 CulturalScience@cs.com
33