David Wilcox begins this essay with the troubling problem of a science student who, in spite of the best
intentions of her Christian instructors, feels that the apparatus of scientific explanations she has learned
removes God far, far away. He criticizes the apparent acceptance (in practice, if not in theory) by
Christian science teachers of the naturalistic assumptions of the scientific establishment, and explores
the question what it would be like to "teach science under the Covenant." Mr. Wilcox teaches biology at
Eastern College.
Reproduced by permission from Christian Scholar's Review
I walked into a senior seminar class a few years ago to find a student in tears, weeping because
she felt that God had drifted further and further away from her during the years of her study of science.
The building pressure of scientific explanations—enzymes and ecosystems, kidneys and operons—
seemed to leave little room for the God who had performed miracles on Sunday morning in her home
church. That class period was spent in talking about the God who is always there, always governing,
always manifesting himself, in pointing out that he is not a God who occasionally pops in to do a miracle,
but otherwise is absent.1
I was rather upset myself, for we are truly concerned to teach the concept of the active presence of God
in our department. How had our student missed it? Why was she thinking of God as a craftsman, a
watchmaker whose vast clockwork ran itself, rather than the Creator King, reigning as governor over all
his creation? "He makes the winds his messengers, flames of fire his servants."2 It is true that her
reaction reflected a religious background which emphasized God’s frequent intrusion into the natural
order, but it was still troubling that after four years at a Christian college, her instinctive reaction was to
see God as absent from the usual course of nature.
My student was probably suffering from the usual conventions of science teaching, even by Christians.
We may believe in Yahweh, the God who makes covenant both with his people and his world, but we
teach science as we were trained. We imply that the creation is to be viewed as an autonomous clock. A
product of an infinite, loving intellect, true enough, but still a product, a mechanism rather than a
dependent creature acting in obedience. We treat natural law as something which God implanted into
the universe, rather than His moment by moment free choice. We imply that the uniformity of nature is
innate to the creation, rather than a revelation of God’s faithfulness. Even our comments supporting
God’s position as Creator—"This is God’s plan for the world." "He made us work this way."—reinforce
the concept of the clockmaker God. We neglect the concept of the providential King of the creation, the
shepherd of Israel. One would think God blocked the flames from burning Shadrach, Meshach and
Abednigo, as if he were a suit of divine asbestos rather than the Lord of the flames who directed his
obedient servants not to burn the three ‘friends.3
Obscuring God Through Science
How and why has our teaching of science come to obscure our King? The question of the "nature of
nature" is both spiritual and scientific, a foundational part of the battle for the minds of men, a necessary
component of the struggle to shape the world-view of our age.4 Unfortunately, if not in the popular mind,
at least in the arena of scientific discourse (even among Christians), the idea of God’s involvement in
natural processes is no longer even considered as a viable hypothesis (or research program).5
I believe that our instinctive neglect of God’s presence is due to an inherited form of apologetics based
on the concept of God’s occasional presence.6 But to teach a doctrine of God’s occasional presence is
to teach a doctrine of his usual absence. Thus, an apologetic based on his occasional presence also
acts as an apologetic for his usual absence, that is, as an apologetic for the autonomy of nature. Worse,
such an argument is a far more powerful apologetic for his absence than for his presence, for when
concepts are asserted, we are alerted to question them, but when concepts are assumed, we frequently
do not even notice as we accept them without reflection. In this apologetic, we have assumed the usual
absence of God!
But, how have we assumed, how have we taught the absence of God? Take, for example, the specific
area upon which this apologetic is usually focused, biological origins. 7 When we treat natural selection
as an undirected process, we have assumed the autonomy of the natural order, and thus, the absence
of God. When we assume that mutation and genetic drift are random, directionless events, we have
assumed the autonomy of the natural order, and thus, the absence of God. When we argue that highly
improbably events are simply impossible, we have implied the autonomy of the natural order, and thus,
the absence of God. When we teach that there are natural limits to biological change, we have implied
the governing autonomy of the natural order, and thus, the absence of creation’s King. But the
Scriptures know nothing of such an autonomous nature, for nature is God’s obedient creature, acting in
obedience to his commands, directed according to His purposes.8
A Self-Defeating Apologetic
Not only is an apologetic based on God’s occasional presence and usual absence unscriptural, it is also
self-defeating. First, it is based on what science does not know. But obviously, science may learn more
in the future. Thus, our arguments are always vulnerable to scientific advance, and our opponents will
simply wait for us to be proved wrong. If we win an argument, our victory will be viewed as temporary,
but if we are proved wrong, they will think that God has been excluded from that part of the cosmos. 9
Second, no matter how good the argument, it will reinforce the assumption of nature’s autonomy in the
minds of both our opponents and our audience. Both we and our opponents will seem to accept the
same view of reality. Both of us will be viewing God’s actions only as alternatives to material causes.
Thus, every scientific explanation will become an exclusion of God and a powerful argument against the
Divine presence.10
Third, no matter how good the argument, it touches only on a single thread of the vast fabric of scientific
explanation. Thus, it allows one’s opponents to use a "bait and switch" tactic to avoid the thrust of the
argument. Like hydra, for every head chopped off, two more will grow. Every argument can be won, or
at least avoided, by bringing up yet another example.
Fourth, the better our argument, the more it will tempt believers to base their faith in God on what
science can prove rather than what the Scriptures say. A faith based on exceptions to scientific
explanations can be disastrous when such a "scientific" believer stands alone against an attack which
uses expert science.11
Fifth, such an argument can never take new ground, for new ground would be part of that autonomous
natural order which we deeded over to the materialist. All we can do is try to prevent the loss of ground
they have not yet taken. Thus, scientific advances will always be opposed by this apologetic, for
scientific explanations can only take away from religious explanations. 12
Sixth, the proposal of divine interventions as alternative causes for mate rial events strongly reinforces
David Hume’s argument against miracles. Any "miracle" proposed as an explanation is, by definition,
deemed infinitely less likely than the most far fetched material explanation. 13 Thus, such an argument
makes it more difficult to accept the very miraculous acts which it is proposing! First one must show that
the idea of a God who acts through the natural order is reasonable. Then the acceptance for His
manifest presence, for a "miracle", follows naturally.
The Heavy Hand of History
How did we get into this predicament? I suggest that our ideas are the product of three hundred years of
Christian apologetics. We Christians wanted an absolute, nailed down, logical, humanly reasoned,
obvious to all, proof of God’s existence! Therefore we moved away from Biblical revelation as the base
for our acceptance of Christian reality.
In the mind of many early scientists (Boyle, Newton, etc.), physical reality was assumed to exist in
momentary dependance, contingent on the free will of God, a view termed voluntarism. Thus, natural
order was based on God’s covenant faithfulness to the creature, on his providential rule by which he
moment by moment did as he chose throughout the creation, whether according to the regular order of
nature or not. Because God was the God of all truth, there were two true books, the book of the
Scripture and the book of nature. Because he is a faithful and covenanting God, we could expect order
and law. Because nature was contingent only on his absolutely free will, we must investigate his
words/works, not try to reason our way to truth. Because his people are called to build the kingdom, all
fruitful work is blessed, hands as well as head. Experimentation is honorable. Modern science was
nurtured by Christian faith.14
And, how did such early Christians in science know all that? By the eye of faith and the Word of God,
which did not consist of an absolute proof. Of course, without a faith commitment to nature’s autonomy,
there was (and is) no logical reason to exclude the theistic view. But we wanted proof! Thus our
ancestors looked for events which could not be explained through "natural causes", instead requiring the
immediate and evident hand of God. By default, this argument, originally proposed only for the sake of
the debate, relegated nature to the autonomous fixed laws of Descartes. The scientific apologists (like
Paley) who wrote works such as the Bridgewater treatises tended to assume this position. 15 However,
that which is ignored becomes that which is invisible. The assumption of autonomy became not only the
bedrock assumption of the logical positivists, it also became the working assumption of Christians, both
in and out of science.
In this atmosphere, Darwin’s hypotheses were a major and frightening challenge. It was a natural
mechanism which claimed to close the major source of gaps used for the apologetic argument, the
origin of new living species. As Darwin presented it, it was also an explicit statement of the undirected
autonomy of nature in that process.16 The response of the Christian apologists (natural theologians such
as Sedgewick) was to attack the mechanism in order to keep the gaps open.17
In contrast, the conservative theologians were less interested in the species problem. Theologians like
Charles Hodge of Princeton viewed the question of evolution as a matter of Biblical interpretation. As
such, the central issue was considered to be the singular origin of man, hence the meaning of such
concepts as the image of God in man, original sin and the need for atonement. Hodge considered
Darwin’s real problem to be his denial of design and direction in nature. Darwin would have none of
supernaturally directed selection, but Hodge insisted that there was no logical reason for that rejection.
Thus, when these theologians engaged Darwinism, their remarks attacked the unreasonable idea that
natural causes excluded divine direction, that is, they attacked Darwin’s view of the autonomy of
nature.18 (By way of contrast, liberal theologians accepted the concept of an autonomous metaphysical
progress principle as foundational to both biology and theology.) 19
The Best Defense—Regaining the Initiative
During the last hundred years, for some reason, the conservative church has refocused, centering its
attention on the world-view and concerns of the nineteenth century scientific apologists rather than
those of its theologians. The typical critique and perspective found on evangelical book shelves is based
on the concept of a incomplete universe which runs itself, except when God chooses to act intrusively.
Most could have been written (better) by Adam Sedgewick or J. W. Dawson, 20 but would have raised
grave concerns in the mind of B. B. Warfield.21 Undoubtedly there are numerous historical reasons for
this anomaly, but it has placed us in an untenable position. We have refused to argue except under
those circumstances which give our opponents the clear advantage. We have allowed them to set the
agenda. We have laid the sword of autonomous causation in the hand of materialism, and it has been
wielded with close to total enthusiasm. We have given material causal explanations the power to
gradually escort God out the back door of the universe as an unneeded hypothesis! What then shall we
do? How can we regain the initiative? We must get that sword back!
At the onset, we should understand that God’s people are called to proclaim Jesus as Lord, not to prove
God’s existence. This does not mean to preach sermons, but to show that all of reality can be coherently
regarded as governed by him. To do so in science, certainly one of the first things which we must
establish is that a fully biblical view of the world has the coherency and adequacy to act as a base for
the scientific quest. Given the popularity of the term "naturalism" as a necessary base for science,
perhaps we could speak of "Theistic Naturalism," as opposed to "Materialistic Naturalism." The reason
for using such a loaded term (or, as an alternative, "Providentialism") would be to place at the forefront
of our efforts the concept that the Word, Yahweh, the Lord of Hosts, is the present and active governor
of the natural world in every possible sense. That should be our central theme, not a Gnostic principle
whispered behind closed doors to the initiated brethren. 22 Unless we use a term which speaks directly to
the central assumption of materialistic science, the autonomy of nature, our readers (Christian or not)
will not get the point.
Obviously this will lead the materialists to scream foul. But have we not played by their rules long
enough? Let them win their arguments within the constraints of a fully theistic universe. They will claim
that we can do no science if all reality is contingent on the free will of God, for he could do anything. 23
But, Yahweh has made covenant with the universe to maintain order, and he is faithful. Thus, God’s will
is the boundary condition of the entire space-time continuum. The whole universe is a contingent reality,
not just the particles out of which it is made.24 The theist has every right to expect regularity and to state
observed laws. Indeed, theists from Isaac Newton to Lord Kelvin to the present have done so.
Materialists will accuse theists of fatally mixing science and religion, to the detriment of both. 25 We
should reply that on the contrary, this disentangles them, that the assumption either that natural order is
contingent on the Divine fiat or that it is contingent on undirected randomness is a religious axiom.
Either source of order could act through probability fluctuations in a "virtual vacuum" (a theory that the
universe arose from random changes in nothing whatsoever). The common statement that undirected
randomness is the more "scientific" axiom assumes the autonomy of the cosmos, and has thus
entangled religion and science to the detriment of both.
The theist will also be accused of ignoring the evidence of historical processes, that the shape of
present realities (like the Panda’s Thumb)26 indicate that they are contingent on the shape of the past
rather than design. But a faith which proclaims God as the Lord of History can hardly be accused of
ignoring historical contingency. History is the contingent expression of his total purpose, realized
moment by moment, but planned and called forth from eternity, from outside the entire space-time
continuum. As B. B. Warfield put it, "Some lack of general philosophical acumen must be suspected
when it is not fully understood that teleology is in no way inconsistent with—is rather necessarily
involved with—a complete system of natural causation. Every teleological system implies a complete
‘causo-mechanical’ explanation as its instrument."27 (Of course Warfield is referring to particular material
systems, not to systems such as Aristotle’s with metaphysical causality.)
Of course naturalists will suggest that this destroys the fruitful mechanical model which has guided
modern investigation. But, that is nonsense! Naturally, "mechanism" is a fruitful analogy. Machines are
designed systems. Why would a Christian not want to use it?28 But, we should be careful. Materialists
mean an autonomous machine, and theists should not concede that! Rather, natural "machines" (living
and non-living) are continuously held and directed through the structure of that covenant which we call
natural law.29 They are obedient creatures. Materialists need not bother to assume that we are vitalists,
for the theist does not need an immaterial life essence to consider a living creature as an obedient
servant.
The materialists may also call all of this an unneeded "God hypothesis," because "we know" that
diversity needs no guidance to be produced. For in stance, has not Richard Dawkins shown that (given
a few simple rules) random variation and environmental selection can produce anything? 30 Dawkins
points out that the genomes of all possible organisms are written in the same four base DNA language.
Thus, all genomes exist in the same universe of possibilities, a sort of multidimensional "Rubik’s cube"
which has been termed "genetic phase space" (GPS).31 It follows that any genome may be modified into
any other by the correct sequence of base changes (mutations). Thus evolutionary change of one type
of organism into another is the logical and necessary consequence of the natural selection of such
variants!
But, Dawkins’ argument is simply that since this "genetic universe" contains some useful sequences
(potential genomes), a random search can be conducted to find them. It certainly can be conducted, but
will it succeed? Dawkins not only assumes the existence of useful genomes (which we already knew
existed). He assumes the existence of viable trajectories connecting all genomes—which we do not
know. He assumes what his model is intended to prove.
Regaining the Initiative—A Good Offense
Is there any way of returning the attack, of discomforting the materialistic assumptions? Are there any
expected natural structures or useful apologetic arguments which are suggested by the assumption of a
covenanted cosmos? Let us consider three approaches; global coherence, probability structures, and
self-referenced systems.
An argument which explains everything but denies its own premise, must be invalid. The statement; "I
never tell the truth" is a simple example. For it to be true, it must be false. Such an argument from
coherence applies to the reality of reason, beauty, love, etc. Indeed, the scientist himself, the surprising
fact that human reason and natural law match, and the motivation for the scientific quest are part of the
system which must be explained.32
Science’s dependence on human rationality is particularly critical. We assume that human beings are
truly rational, that the concept of reason and our perceptions of truth can be valid insights. However,
materialism says that there is no rational source for our race, that the mental events which we call
"reason" are nothing but a complex survival mechanism. 33 Indeed, it is perfectly clear that what we think
ourselves to be (whether true or false) has drastic effects on our success, health, etc. It is thus clear that
thinking ourselves to be rational is good for our survival—but does that validate our opinion? How can
one trust a mind validated by mechanisms put together by undirected natural processes? As Darwin put
it, "But then, with me the horrid doubt always arises whether the convictions of man’s mind, which has
been developed from the mind of lower animals, are of any value or at all trustworthy." 34 Clearly, given
their own presuppositions, the sensible question to ask materialists is how they were conditioned (or
evolved?) to believe in "No God" and the autonomy of nature? Perhaps their expressed opinion is only a
Pavlovian response to the perception that such a view enhances survival in the modern university
science department.35
The second question, the matter of probability structures, examines the sort of facile assumptions made
by investigators such as Dawkins.36 As previously discussed, Dawkins’ model of evolutionary change
(Biomorph land) is far too simple to represent reality. He avoids the question of how much change is
necessary to turn one potential "viable genome" into another, of whether such genomes are close or
distant, clumped or randomly distributed in that "genetic phase space" that evolution explores. He
makes the neoDarwinian assumptions that the majority of viable genomes are "close" to each other
(require relatively few mutations for conversion), and also that they are connected by continuous paths
of viable sites (thus allowing a slow approach to the new position). Hence, Dawkins predicts gradual and
continuous morphological and genetic change.
But this assumption is far truer of Dawkins’ computerized model of genetic phase space (Biomorph land)
than it is of the real world. The probability characteristics of the space of all possible genomes can not
be investigated independently. A DNA strand the size of the human genome has an information capacity
of about 101,000,000,000 binary bits, a number beyond human understanding. Compare this with the
size of the entire physical universe, which has only 1080 particles, and with Dawkins’ Biomorph land
which has sites representing 1015 biomorph forms.
But the problem is greater than that. What percentage of the possible locations (genomes) in GPS
represent viable patterns? To what extent are such locations uniformly distributed, contiguous networks,
or isolated clumps? We cannot know. GPS structure leads to certain expectations about the pattern of
the fossil record. The speed and direction of a lineage’s changing morphology should be mapping GPS
(or, the adaptive landscape) within which it moves.37 But to state that a certain outcome (the pattern of
the fossil record) shows the structure of GPS is to assume the transition was made without divine
guidance.
Stasis and the sudden establishment of new morphologies implies a search process uniquely successful
in finding a new peak. If the pattern is sudden, it implies either that the new peak was very close,
essentially a variant on the old peak, or incredible luck, or a lineage with some sort of guidance system.
One might suggest that the sudden appearance of a sharply different morphology in a lineage might be
due to "luck." After all, any two sites on GPS are only "n" simultaneous mutational switches away. In four
billion years, a lot happens. However, if very long jumps happen frequently, or if the distribution of such
events is temporally clumped, it certainly suggests some sort of guidance mechanism, an intelligence
behind the trial and error process.38
Darwin assumed that sudden changes did not occur, that the sudden appearance of taxa was a function
of a poor geological record which would be resolved later. But Darwin’s expectations have not been
fulfilled. The fossil record indicates that suddenness is the mode of choice for new emergences. 39 One of
the great debates of late twentieth century paleontology is the reality and relevance of punctuated
change interrupting periods of morphological stasis.40 That suggests that viable genomes are distributed
in GPS in "islands" or clumps of patterns, and that those clumps are connected by narrow (unlikely)
pathways of lower viability.
But, what pattern of punctuation is reasonable? Should not such sudden events be random in
distribution? We presently believe that life appeared 3.8 billion years ago, when the earth was barely
cooled. One hundred phyla appeared in the Cambrian, all the major invertebrate classes appeared in
the Ordovician, the modern orders of mammals all appeared at the start of the Eocene, and a new level
of vertebrate structural innovation appeared about every 40 million years.41 This is not the expected
pattern of a random exploration of uniformly distributed clumps. It sounds more like the guided
exploration of a hierarchy of higher level clumps. 42
How can undirected variation explore such an array? What mechanism is reasonable? How likely is
such a random search process to find an isolated cluster? The problem which faces those committed to
the absence of God is not that movement in morphological space (GPS) is impossible, but rather that
the patterns of change which we see imply guidance as the simplest (or most "uniform") hypothesis of
causation. The materialist must explain that probability structure without invoking the appearance of the
product as proof that random change could have produced the product. One should not argue from
"gaps" in causality to the existence of God—but equally, one should not presume the causal absence of
God in order to demonstrate the absence of gaps.
The final argument is based on the self-referent pattern of organization characteristic of living things. A
self-referent system is one which turns back on itself in a closed causal loop, a system which is both
self-defining and self controlling. The biotic control loops of organisms include both the specifications
and commands of their inherited blueprints and the realization of those blueprints in their bodies. In such
a linguistic loop, a language is used to encode its own dictionary. For instance, the structure of the
aminoacyl synthetases is encoded in the amino acid code which their structure defines.
The same pattern exists in a hierarchy of self-defining genetic levels. The specifically encoded
"homeobox" control genes make recognition proteins. Each protein recognizes a specific DNA sequence
which can be arbitrarily assigned to the control of any other gene. The same homeobox gene can
control utterly different processes in different organisms. Such arbitrary assignments of meaning are the
essence of an encoded language. Thus, the hierarchical physical pattern of living systems can be
shown to be dictated by a hierarchical information pattern of genomic messages. Further, as such loops
have control functions, self referencing involves encoded standard values for conditions and correction
mechanisms which can be called forth by the control loop itself. Such a loop contains and sets its own
boundary conditions.43
It is extremely difficult to draw up a model for the beginning of such a system. Further, the array of
possible changes in a self defined loop must be a function of the dynamics of the loop, not of outside
forces. Therefore, selection and mutation are products of the genome itself, not imposed forces. 44 The
standard metaphors (models) for living entities—the machine, the epiphenomena of complex
happenstances—are not very useful for evaluating such a system. A far better metaphor is that of the
population as obedient creature, given a pattern and obediently realizing it, using its genetic heritage to
increase and fill the habitat, niche, or morphogenetic hyperspace which it has been given by God.
To speak of obedience is of course anthropomorphic, but no more so than to speak of biological
"machines" (manufactured, after all), natural "selection", "selfish" genes, r and K "strategists", or
"messenger" RNA. Modern genetics could not be discussed without such metaphor. Naturally the reader
must recognize the limitations of a metaphor and not identify it with the original, the iron horse with the
fleshy equine. The "obedient" response of the mushroom to its DNA blueprint does not involve moral
choice, but it does involve the directive will of God. To speak of it thus is both biologically and biblically
coherent.
This does not necessarily imply that "creaturely" populations are morphologically fixed. Since their
obedience (to genome and God) is a continuous circle of response to the commands of their shepherd
Creator, He can lead them else where in "GPS" if He sees fit. If God indeed rules natural processes,
such divine commands might be given through inheritance, through "happenstance" (mutation and drift),
or through "lot in life" (environment).45 To speak of "obedient populations" may sound rather mythical,
but one can put testable mathematical models to the concept. In fact, one must build the self referencing
and goal seeking suggested by this metaphor into mathematical models of living systems if they are to
be realistic.46
Conclusions: Teaching Under the Covenant
Richard Levins wrote a paper several years ago in which he stated that, as a Marxist, he considered the
problem of complexity critical for understanding and modeling biological systems.47 This I found
fascinating for many reasons, but most for his open admission that his world view generated his
research program. What might be the impact if Christians would openly say something similar? "As a
Christian, I find the self-referencing nature of living systems particularly interesting and important.
Therefore I suggest that the following mathematical models of such systems might lead to a
considerable advance in our understanding of them." If such models were really useful, they would
direct attention to the world view which framed them, and to the God who made all things.
How then shall we teach science under the covenant? Let me make a few tentative suggestions. First,
we must debrief our own assumptions—are they scriptural or cultural? This is especially true for the
assumptions which everyone knows are obvious truths! Particularly, this should include our assumptions
that we know what the Scriptures are saying.48
Second, we should explicitly state those assumptions about reality which we usually just imply. This
means that we should state them as assumptions, not as truths "obvious to all thinking entities." (For
instance, the methodological assumption of "invariant natural law" should be stated as a limit on the
completeness of scientific explanation.) Our students need to learn how to evaluate assumptions and
build world views, and to develop that skill they must know that such necessary assumptions always
exist and can be evaluated.49 This will avoid the "correlle plate" syndrome in which a brittle world view
package falls to shreds as soon as one minor "fact" is disproved. (Correlle plates never crack or chip,
they just explode into thousands of pieces.)
Third, we should build the central concepts of our science on what the nature of the obedient creature is
which we are studying, rather than how God made it. As John Calvin put it, "It is only when we
contemplate God in providence that we can form any true conception of him as Creator." 50 (For instance,
the teaching of physiology can be based on the functions and needs of the organism as a designed
whole, rather than basing it on the molecular mechanisms—which are after all simply used by the
organism to meet those needs.)
Fourth, if we are going to make some concession to a non-Christian world view for the sake of
argument, we must make it clear that we are doing so, and also give the Christian alternative view of
that sort of mechanism. Otherwise, we will really be teaching the assumptions of the view we are
attacking. For instance, the assumption of undirected natural cause is always an unbiblical simplification
of reality, even if used to argue for the necessity of miracle or special creation.
Last, but not least, we must never use untruths or sloppy scholarship to defend God’s truth. Thus
Archeopteryx should not be termed a typical bird when it has the skeleton of a small theropod dinosaur.
The holy God of truth will not be pleased, no matter how exalted our goal. 51
1 Sproul, R. C. "Clock-maker Myths: God in the Here and Now." Eternity 10.(1987):68.
2 Psalm 104:4.
3 Views of God further discussed in: Wilcox, D. L. "Three Models of Making: Prime Mover, Craftsman
and King." Perspectives in Faith and Science 39.4 (1987): 212-220.
4 See debate between Provine and Johnson in First Things, Fall, 1990.
5 For introduction to the idea of a research program, see: Mitchell, W. A. and T. J. Val one. "The
Optimization Research Program: Studying Adaptations by Their Function." The Quarterly Review of
Biology 65.1 (1990:43-52. Also, Sproul, 1987.
6 Emerton, N. "The Argument from Design in Early Modem Theology." Science and Christian Belief 1.2
(1989): 129-147. Topham, J. R. "Teleology and the Concept of Natural Law: An Historical Perspective.,’
Science and Christian Belief 1.2 (1989): 149-160.
7 The literature in this area is truly immense. One of the best of the genre is: Lester, L. P. and Bohlin, R.
G. The Natural Limits of Biological Change. Grand Rapids: Zondervan /Probe, 1984.
8 Psalm 104, indeed all of the Scriptures.
9 See, for instance, Van Till, H. J. The Fourth Day: What the Bible and the Heavens are Telling Us
About the Creation. Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1986.
10 For example, see Simpson, G. G. The Meaning of Evolution. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1967.
11 Topham, 1989.
12 Ratzsch, D. Philosophy of Science Intervarsity Press, Downers Grove, Illinois, (1986).
13 Ruse, M. Taking Darwin Seriously Basil Blackwell, Oxford (1986).
14 This view has been supported by a variety of writers such as: Hooykaas, R. Religion and the Rise of
Modern Science. Grand Rapids: W. B. Eerdmans, 1972.; Hummel, C. The Galileo Connection. Downers
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986.; Klaaren, E. M. Religious Origins of Modern Science. Grand Rapids: W.
B. Eerdmans, 1977.
15 Gillespie, N. C. "Divine Design and the Industrial Revolution." Isis 81 (1990): 214-229. Also; Emerton,
1989; and Topham, 1989.
16 As an example of the effect of Darwin’s views, see; Laporte, L. F. "The World into Which Darwin Led
Simpson" Journal of the History of Biology 23.3 (1990): 499-516.
17 Emerton, 1989.
18 Hodge, C. What is Darwinism? New York: Scribners, Armstrong and Co., 1874. Warfield, B. B. "A
Review of Darwinianism Today, by Vernon L. Kellogg." Princeton Theological Review (1908): 640-650.
19 For instance, see: Abbott, L. The Theology of an Evolutionist. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Co.,
1897.
20 Dawson, J. W. The Story of the Earth and Man. New York: John B. Alden, Publisher, 1890.
21 Warfield wrote extensively on this. For example; Warfield, B. B. "Calvin’s Doctrine of Creation."
Princeton Theological Review 13.(1915): 190-255. For a broader view, also see; Livingstone, D. N.
Darwin’s Forgotten Defenders. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1987.
22 Sproul, 1987.
23 Wallace, B. Chromosomes, Giant Molecules and Evolution. New York: Norton, 1966.
24 Historical contingency is one of Stephen Gould’s favorite topics, for instance; Gould, S. J. "Eight (or
Fewer) Little Piggies." Natural History 1/91 (1990): 22-29.
25 Compare statements concerning the direction of mechanism in: Warfield, 1908; and Simpson, 1967.
26 Gould, S. J. The Panda’s Thumb. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1980.
27 Warfield, 1908.
28 Indeed, that was Paley’s major concept. Gillespie, 1990.
29 Murray, J. "A Biblical Theological Study." The Sovereignty of God. Editor, J. T. Hoogstra. Grand
Rapids: Zondervan, 1940.
30 Dawkins, R. The Blind Watchmaker. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1986, and; Frazzetta, T. H.
Complex Adaptations in Evolving Populations. Sunderland, Mass.: Sinauer Associates, Inc., 1975.
31 Brooks, D. R., J. Collier, B. A. Maurer, J. D. H. Smith, and E. 0. Wiley. "Entropy and Information in
Evolving Biological Systems." Biology and Philosophy 4. (1989); 407-432.
32 See discussion in Ratzsch, 1986.
33 Following the logic of: Wilson, E. 0. On Human Nature. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1978.
34 Darwin, C. "A letter to W. Graham, 1881" in Life and Letters of Charles Darwin. editor, F. Darwin,
New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1896.
35 In the same way that Wilson (1978) suggests we evolved "religious" ideas. Also, for one scholar’s
assessment of academic "peer" pressure, see: Wuthnow, R. "Living the Question Evangelical
Christianity and Critical Thought." Cross Currents (Summer 1990): 160-175.
36 Dawkins, 1986.
37 Logic used extensively by Stephen Gould, for instance in: Wonderful Life. New York: W. W. Norton
and Co., 1989.
38 Logic suggested by Charles Thaxton. See: Thaxton, C. B., W. L. Bradley, and R. L. Olsen. The
Mystery of Life’s Origin: Reassessing Current Theories. New York: Philosophical Library, 1984.
39 For evidence of clumping on different scales see; Erwin, D., J. W. Valentine, and J. J. Sepkoski, Jr.
"A Comparative Study of Diversification Events: The Early Paleozoic versus the Mesozoic." Evolution
41.6 (1987): 1177-1186. MacFadden, B. J. and R. C. Hulbert. "Explosive Speciation at the Base of the
Adaptive Radiation of Miocene Grazing Horses." Nature 336. (1988): 466-468.
40 Interpretation of fossil record by Gould and Eldredge. See; Gould, S. J. "Darwinism and the
Expansion of Evolutionary Theory." Science 216. (1982): 380-386. Vrba, E. S., and S. J. Gould. "The
Hierarchical Expansion of Sorting and Selection: Sorting and Selection Cannot be Equated."
Paleobiology 12.2 (1986): 217-228. Vrba, E. and N. Eldredge. "Individuals, Hierarchies and Processes:
Toward a More Complete Evolutionary Theory." Paleobiology 10.2 (1984): 146-171,.
41 0ne of the most comprehensive surveys of this data is; Carroll, R. L. Vertebrate Paleontology and
Evolution. New York. W. H. Freeman and Company, 1988.
42 Materially based ideas have certainly been proposed, but the consensus is that they are not
adequate—Erwin, 1987.
43 The idea of such patterns is part of an huge literature in developmental biology, for instance; Raff, R.
A., and J. C. Kaufmann. Embryos, Genes and Evolution: The Developmental Genetic Basis of
Evolutionary Change. New York: Macmillan, 1983. Rieppel, 0. "Structuralism, Functionalism, and the
Four Aristotelian Causes." Journal of the History of Biology 23.2 (1990): 291-320. Wagner, G. P. "The
Biological Homology Concept." Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 20. (1989): 51-69.
44 For introduction to literature on mutation and selection, see; Barton, N. H. and M. Turelli.
"Evolutionary Quantitative Genetics: How Little Do We Know?" Annual Review of Genetics 23. (1989):
337-370.778. Borstnik, B., D. Pumpernik, and G. L. Hofacker. "Point Mutations as an Optimal Search
Process in Biological Evolution." Journal of Theoretical Biology 125. (1987): 249-268. Pakula, A. A., and
R. T. Saner. "Genetic Analysis of Protein Stability and Function." Annual Review of Genetics 23. (1989):
289-310. Parsons, P. A. "Evolutionary Rates under Environmental Stress." Evolutionary Biology 21.
(1987): 311-347.
45 Proverbs 16:33; Wilcox, 1987.
46 Mesarovic’, M. D. "Systems Theory and Biology—View of a Theoretician" in System Theory and
Biology: Proceeding, Systems Symposium 3, Case Western Reserve University (New York: SpringerVerlag, (1968): 59-87.
47 Levins, R. "The Qualitative Analysis of Partially Specified Systems." Annals of the New York
Academy of Sciences. 231 (1974); 123-138.
48 See statements by: Blocher, H. In the Beginning: The Opening Chapters of Genesis. Leicester, G.B.:
InterVarsity Press, 1984.
49 See discussion in Ratzsch, 1986.
50 Calvin, J. Institutes of the Christian Religion. translator; H. Beveridge. Grand Rapids: W. B.
Eerdmans, 1962.
51 I Samuel 15:13-23.
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Wicox, David
Covenantal Science: Impossible or Required?. Christian Scholar's Review
Christian Scholar's Review
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