China’s Foreign Policy towards Africa
Author: Chenchen Wu (the School of Government and International Affairs,
Durham University)
As global demand for energy increases, major players like the United States, the
European Union, and Japan are facing competition from a new source as China struggles
to meet its need for long-term energy supply. China-Africa cooperation has particularly
been put in the spotlight. Some international observers accuse Chinese foreign policy
towards African countries of undermining international efforts to increase transparency
and good governance. Others describe a policy of ‘an aid for oil strategy’ or even a ‘neocolonial policy’. On the African side, some blame on Chinese enterprises of underbidding
local firms, especially in the textile industry, or of failing to hire Africans. In Beijing, the
Chinese government insists on its ‘non-interference’ policy and refuses to link business
with the human rights issue. The Beijing Summit in 2006 accelerated the interaction
between China and Africa even further, as the two sides decided to accelerate
cooperation, especially in joint resources exploration and exploitation.
This research paper, divided in two parts, aims to provide insights into the status of the
Sino-Africa relationship and gives a relatively objective conclusion. Part one considers
the policy level, examining the past relationship from the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence’ in the Bandung Conference in 1955, to ‘Four Principles of Chinese
Cooperation with Africa’ in 1982, to ‘a New Strategic Partnership’ in 2006. This
concludes that China’s policy towards African has moved away from unconditional
assistance so that ‘mutual-benefits’ has become the priority. Part two examines the
motivation level. Here I argue that China’s policy to Africa is not only driven by oil and
other resource needs, but also the strategic importance of the African continent, which
lies in three considerations, with commercial factors and diplomatic issues standing
alongside the resource imperative. Some African countries like Nigeria, Angola, Sudan,
have gradually become critical oil-exporters for China as extreme instability of the MidEast supply has increased. In particular, since China and African countries are still
developing areas, political cooperation in international affairs is necessary as well as
important to secure their shared interests. Finally, I conclude that the cooperation
between China and African countries is on the basis of complementary trade, mutualrespect, and a concern for increased influence for the developing world in international
affairs, including the global political economy. Nevertheless, as a ‘responsible and rising
power’, which is what China claims to be, China should take more actions in certain
scenarios to stand with, and eventually contribute to the leadership of the international
community.


Part I the Policy level
This section debates the evolution of China’s African policy from the founding of New
China to the contemporary era, by means of three turning points: in 1955, 1982, and
2006.
i) ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’ in the Bandung Conference in 1955
China’s relation with Africa may be traced back to six centuries ago. In 1415, Chinese
explorers visited the East African coast and brought shiploads of Chinese commodities.
Kenya provided many local gifts as return. But the interaction in the modern time started
from the Bandung Conference held in the year 1955, which was widely regarded as a
seminal event in Sino-African history. The conference was expected to enhance
economic and cultural cooperation of the two continents and promoted the antiimperialist and anti-colonial struggle. Of the 29 states that participated in the conference,
six were African, such as Egypt, Libya and so on. The Former Premier, Zhou Enlai,
attended the conference and presented the Five Principles of ‘Peaceful Coexistence’,
which covered mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; mutual nonaggression; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit;
and peaceful coexistence (Looy, 2006:2). The achievement of great diplomatic success
followed the conference increased Chinese interests in the continent.1 In 1963, Premier
Zhou embarked on his first ten-nation tour of Africa to promote the second Asia-African
conference. Though few agreed on the necessity for the next meeting, Premier Zhou put
forwards a particular ‘Eight-Principles’ that were designed to guide China’s engagement
to African countries.2These principles clearly clarified the Chinese intention to assist
African countries by the policy of economic and technical aid. Moving into 1970s, China
significantly expanded aid projects in Africa, illustrated in the number of recipient
countries. (See table 1). Furthermore, the principles showed that Chinese government
provided the assistances to the African countries without asking for any return, at least
from an economic perspective. Some loans did not require repayment if the recipients
could not afford this. However, for China’s decision-makers, the aid diplomacy had both
political and ideological objectives. On the ideological level, China seemed to support
any revolutionary movement against imperialism, including African revolutions. On the
political level, the primary motivation was to compete with Taiwan and then get African
to support the PRC in international recognition, as well as to compete with the Soviet
Union in the African sphere.
1
Followed the conference, political interactions were built between China and some African countries,
including Egypt, Sudan, and Tunisia at the end of 1950s, Mali, Ghana, Somalia, Uganda, Kenya at the beginning of
1960s.
2
The eight are: 1. Chinese government have persistently been providing assistance to foreign countries
according to the principles of equality and mutual benefit, never regard the assistance as the grant by one sided…….
2. While providing foreign aid, Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty of recipient countries, no strings
attached and no privilege required. 3. in order to relief the burden of recipient countries, Chinese government
provides economic aids in the way of interest free or low interest loan, the time limit of repayment could be delayed
when it is needed. 4. The purpose of Chinese government providing foreign aid is not to make recipient countries
being dependent on China, but to help recipient countries gradually develop on the track of self reliance and
economic development independently. 5. For the projects constructed through China foreign aids, Chinese
government does its best to make quick effects through smack investment. Thus, the governments of recipient
countries could increase income and accumulate money. 6. Chinese government provides equipment and materials
made in China with the best quality, and negotiate the price in accordance with the price of international market….7.
While providing technical assistance, Chinese government assures to teach recipients to fully master this kind of
technology. 8. The experts who are dispatched by Chinese government to help recipient countries carrying out
construction, should be paid as same as their own experts of recipient countries. They are required to not have any
special requirement and enjoyment. (Gountin:11-12).

ii) Four Principles of Chinese Cooperation with Africa’ in 1982
After the most important political goal, the UN seat, was achieved in 1971, a mutual
diplomatic recognition between China and America was established in 1979. The less
intensive international environment was reflected in China’s foreign policy so that
economic growth and domestic reforms instead of revolutionary goals dominated the
policy agenda. The 12th Communist Party Committee National Assembly in 1982 sent
two messages that had implications for China’s African policy: China would concentrate
on domestic economic development; China would pursue its independent foreign policy
characterised with ‘mutual benefits’ in real meaning (Li, 2007:72). On the 1982 trip to
the African continent, in accordance with these changes, the Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang
offered a wholly new ‘Four Principles on Sino-African Economic and Technical
Cooperation’, which stressed equality and mutual benefits, practical result, diversity in
forms and common development.3 (Onderco, 2007: 5). If comparing the Four Principles
of the 1980s to the Eight Principles in the 1960s, a remarkable difference was that China
asked for mutual promotion of the two economies, as showed in principle 2 and 4.
Indeed, economic assistance between the poor countries could not be sustained in the
long term if it was only limited to a one-way flow. By that time, China was no longer
interested in sustaining its position as an influential player on the continent, but was eager
to develop own economic capability. In other words, Africa lost its importance in
Chinese eyes and was marginalized as China’s focus shifted to its own modernisation. In
3
The Four Principles include: 1. In carrying out economic and technological cooperation with African
countries, China abides by the principles of unity and friendship, equality and mutual benefit, respects their
sovereignty, does not interfere in their internal affairs, attaches no political conditions and asks for no privileges
whatsoever. 2. In China’s economic and technological cooperation with African countries, full play will be given to the
strong points and potentials of both sides on the basis of their actual needs and possibilities, and efforts will be made
to achieve good economic results with less investment, shorter construction cycle and quicker returns. 3. China’s
economic and technological cooperation with African countries takes a variety of forms suited to the specific
conditions, such as offering technical services, training technical and management personnel, engaging in scientific
and technological exchanges, undertaking construction projects, entering into cooperative production and joint
ventures. ……4. The purpose of China’s economic and technological cooperation with African countries is to contribute
to the enhancement of the self- reliant capabilities of both sides and promote the growth of the respective national
economies by complementing and helping each other.(Brautigam, 1998:49-50).
a period when China itself depended on foreign funds, there was little that China could do
for Africa.
iii) ‘A New Strategic Partnership’ in 2006
The lull in relations lasted until the Tiananmen turmoil in 1989. Though China intended
to focus its diplomacy with the developed countries, it was confronted with harsh
condemnation on human rights and punishment exemplified by political isolation and
economic sanctions. These made China aware of the insurmountable value divergence
between itself and the West. The only strategy seemed to be to look back, and to
strengthen ties with the developing world as a defensive mechanism. This meant a
reappraisal of the role of the third world countries, including the ASEAN countries and
African countries, which expressed their understanding towards Beijing’s action in
handling this internal problem. As part of an effort seeking political assistance, the
Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen visited 14 African countries during 1989 and 1992. The
tour highlighted Beijing’s intention in seeking potential political supports from the
African side. During his 1996 national visit, President Jiang Zemin proposed building a
long-term and stable Sino-African relationship of all-round cooperation and friendship
geared towards the 21st century (China-Africa Friendship and Cooperation in Five
Decades, 2000).
In 2006, Beijing government particularly released an important white paper, China’s
African Policy, to clarify Africa’s strategic importance to China. It was ‘the first of its
kind in China’s diplomatic history with Africa’, which embodied Chinese long-term plan
of enhancing all-rounds cooperation with Africa (Li, 2007: 69). Through it, Beijing
presents the world that the objective of China’s African policy is to ‘establish and
develop a new type of strategic partnership with Africa’ on the basis of advancing the
fundamental interests of both sides. The white paper captures the Beijing government’s
attempt to construct a strategic relationship with the continent. What Beijing addresses
repeatedly is mutual-benefit under the framework of the strategic partnership.
Apparently, the benefit here does not just purely refer to the political gains in 1955-1978,
or the economic interests during 1978-1989. Instead, it established strategic goals through
pragmatic pursuits, including political cooperation, economic interactions, and cultural
exchange and so on, as showed in the white paper.
Part II Motivation level
In the context of China’s foreign policy, there are three dominating objectives: national
unification, the promotion of world peace and an impartial world order, and the
sustainability of economic development (Payne & Veney, 1998:2). Others note that
China’s development strategy demands resource supplies and exports markets; that its
diplomacy requires support in the international organizations and through persuasion it
seeks allies to advance Chinese interests (Naidu & Davies, 2006: 70). In other words, the
People’s Republic of China is not interested in exporting communist ideology; it is
economic and political influences that occupy Chinese attention. China’s foreign policy
towards Africa is not exception to this.

i) Resources concerns
When many criticise ‘China’s colonial behaviour in Africa’, African countries
collectively have become an important trade partner, especially a reliable oil exporter for
China. Since the Asian Pacific area fails to provide abundant energy resources to fuel
Chinese economic growth, particularly after the accession of the World Trade
Organization, and the Iraqi War has further shaken the already instable supply from the
Middle-East region, China’s energy concern has switched to African continent. The
African countries figures on the agenda of Chinese oil diplomacy due to several factors.
Unlike the Middle East region, the external power influences are less evident in the
continent and African oil industries are open to foreign investment. Furthermore, African
oil has the characteristic of low-sulphur content, which is good for environmental
protection; and its location in West Africa makes for easy processing by Chinese
refineries (Naidu & Davies, 2006:73). Moreover, the historic links to liberation
movements, the identity of the developing countries, the shared understanding of human
rights question, along with the partnership based on non-interference policy have pushed
the bilateral cooperation forwards smoothly.
With the political supports of their governments, the three largest national oil companies
in China, China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), China National
Petroleum Cooperation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Cooperation (CNOOC)
have either operated new exploration deals with the oil exporting countries, or have taken
over the stakes in already-established African oil companies. (See table 2). Other oil
companies, like the Zhongyuan Oil Company, PetroChina also strive to invest in the
African oil sector. During the process, China’s commercial banks sometimes act as
credits-providers to ensure the commercial activity. For instance, in 2005, China’s Export
and Import bank granted a 1 billion USD oil-backed loan to Angola, which was increased
to 3 billion USD in 2006 for upgrading of local infrastructure. The increasing fund
enabled Sinopec to secure concessions for the oil exploration in the coming years (Naidu
& Davies, 2006:76). Nowadays, African countries have supplied approximately one third
of China’s oil imports, increased from 11 percent in the year 1995, competing with the
Middle East Region (See table 3). Angola, the second-largest oil-producing country in the
continent, has exceeded the Saudi Arabia to become the top oil supplier, providing 17.46
percent of China’s oil imports. (Zhao, 2007: 26, cited from U.S. Energy Administration;
Zhao Daojiong, 2006, China’s Oil Interests in Africa: International Political Problems).
It is apparent that China’s oil policy achieves a remarkable success in the continent.
Consequently, some scholars begin to purely link China’s African policy with oil or
energy, whereas others argue that China goes to Africa for grabbing raw materials to gear
its impressive economic growth. Although the two theories could not portray the full
picture of China’s African policy, the latter argument seems more pragmatic. Chinese
manufacturing sector has created massive demand for cooper, aluminium, nickel, iron
ore, oil and so on. Beside energy, China’s importing list in Africa is long. China not only
imports oil from Nigeria, Sudan, Angola, but also buys iron ore and platinum from South
Africa, timber from Cameroon, Congo and Gabon. China is in fact the world’s largest
leading importer of crude oil, iron ore, manganese, plastic materials, metal ores, oil seeds,
textile fibres, and pulp and paper; the second largest importer of cooper, which is needed
by China’s electricity industry; the importer of 40 percent of world soy bean, and the
consumer of 50 percent of world wood. Importantly, the demands for these commodities
will continue in the foreseeable future, according to Deutsche Bank Research Report.
(See table 4). As long as China continues to demand the resource inputs, the interest in
African continent will not wane as many African countries have become major resource
providers for China(Data from Deutsche Bank Research Report, 2006). Therefore, it is
reasonable to conclude that the African continent has become a major contributor to
China’s resource imports basement.
ii) Commercial considerations
Certainly, of the immediate importance to China are Africa’s abundant resources. China
needs every primary product, in many people’s eyes. However, it is insufficient to argue
that China treats Africa purely as a resource base. It can be argued that China’s
engagement with Africa in the new century is characterised not only by a need for
economic resources, but more critically, by the commercial deals and political muscles.
In the released white paper, economic interactions through preferential loans, financial
cooperation, agricultural communication, and investment in African infrastructure are
included and given high weight. In the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Beijing
Action Plan (2007-2009), beyond cooperation in resources, bilateral ties will involve not
only agriculture, trade, investment, but also infrastructure, science and technology. On
the national visit of President Hu Jintao to Africa, commercial deals include automotive
works in Namibia, opening fruit market to South Africa, expanding investments in
infrastructure, telecommunication, tourism in Seychelles, and increasing the number of
duty-free commodities in Mozambique (Africa-China: Hu’s Tour, 2007).
As a matter of fact, China has been one of the three largest trade partners with Africa,
following America and France. The bilateral trade is growing annually and rapidly, from
10 billion USD in 2000 to 733.11 billion USD in 2007. (See table 5). China has
acknowledged the export and investment potential in the continent. With 900 million
potential customers, the African continent is a rather suitable market for Chinese cheap
but good quality commodities, such as textiles and manufactured goods. The exports to
Africa went up from 2.3 percent of the total exports in the year 2001 to 3.1 percent in the
year 2007. (See table 6). The exports are mainly household utensils, mechanical and
electric products, textiles and clothes (Africa-China: Beijing Summit, 2006). Those
countries with large populations are the focusing markets, such as South Africa, Nigeria,
and Algeria. As Africa is not on the top 10 lists of China’s trade partner yet, and the trade
with Africa is only a tiny part of China’s foreign trade so that the potential for both is
massive.
In terms of investment, from 2003 to 2006, China’s outward investment to Africa had
risen from 74.81 billion USD to 519.86 billion USD. It only took 2.9 percent of total
Chinese overseas investment, although it covered 81 percent of African countries (2006
Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment). China has been
investing in textile industries in the form of joint venture with African enterprises in order
to take advantage of the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act and the
European Union’s Cotonou Agreement that is replaced by the Economic Partnership
Agreement, which may provide preferential clauses for textile and apparel goods of
eligible African countries into the American and European markets. In addition, Chinese
construction firms have been bidding for the construction deals in the continent. The
China Road and Bridge Corporation has set up the regional headquarter in the Capital of
Kenya and has been rebuilding the roads destroyed in Civil War in Angola (Meidan,
2006:79). Other commercial plans include that, a first group of overseas economic trade
and cooperation in which three countries of the group come from Africa: Nigeria,
Mauritius and Zambia, and a China-African Development Fund to provide start-up
capital to Chinese companied investing in Africa (World Investment Report 2007). Thus
resource import sector is only one part of an expanding trade and investment relationship
between China and Africa.

iii) Political and diplomatic considerations
Some analyses suggest that the China’s African policy has other intentions, such as
reforming the global order and advance resistance to hegemony, or to contain Taiwan.
(Taylor, 2006, 67-69). Though it is uncertain whether China’s intention is to change or
sustain the present global order, we can agree that beside commercial factors, China’s
African policy is also driven in a large part by political motivations, not least the Taiwan
issue and the pursuit of political backing in the international society to promote the
political environment for China’s strategic goals. Africa has been a reliable and
traditional ally to China, if ignoring the short-term antipathy to China’s revolutionary
ambitions in the 1960s. Without the supports of the African group, China would not be
able to take over Taiwan’s seat successfully in the United Nations, and be recognized by
the international community. Nowadays, in such an international system where
civilization and hegemony have coexistence, political cooperation in international
community is a key for those countries that have similar background and share similar
interests. So far China has more than once vetoed unfavourable resolutions to certain
African countries in the UN, while the African Union also defends China against the
human rights charge and Taiwan’s independence movement.
But in my theory, the core of the bilateral political exchange is not to regain Taiwan, but
a common agenda in seeking the justice of world order and resisting hegemony. Being a
historic event in the bilateral diplomacy, the 1955 Bandung Conference itself was
expected to enhance cooperation of the two continents to promote the anti-imperialist
struggle. The First China-Africa Forum in 2000 proposed the construction of an
international political and economic order. In the 2003 China-Africa Forum, Premier
Wen pointed out that ‘the hegemony is raising its ugly head’, so that the collective power
of the developing countries is beyond necessity to secure their own interests in
international affairs. The white paper of China’s African policy in 2006 indicates that
‘China will continue to strengthen solidarity and cooperation with African countries on
the international arena, conduct regular exchange of views, coordinate positions on the
major international and regional issues and stand for mutual support on major issues
concerning state sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity and human
right.’(China’s African policy, 2006). In the same year, at the opening ceremony of the
Beijing Summit and Third Ministerial Conference, President Hu Jintao noted that China
will cooperate with Africa to promote balanced and harmonious global development, to
strengthen cooperation in international affairs.(Hu’s speech at the opening ceremony of
the Beijing Summit, 2006). It is without any doubt that the regular forum meeting and
frequent high-level visits were intended not just to promote bilateral economic ties, but
more importantly, to build a steadfast political union between the two.
Part III Conclusion
China’s phenomenal economic growth is driving the impressive trade, diplomatic, and
aid relations with Africa, and the significant engagement causes mixed reactions in the
Western media and diplomacy, which wonder about the nature of the China’s interests in
the continent. If looking inside the story, we can see that, in the past, the bilateral
relationships were shaped by the China’s anti- hegemony strategy, combined with the
competition with Taiwan. Today, pragmatic motives based mainly on national interests
have replaced ideology to guide the Sino-African ties. From the economic perspective,
China and Africa have complementary economic and commercial needs. Africa is a
continent with rich-resources but poor manufacturing base and capital shortage. They rely
on imports, including in basic goods. In comparison, China has sufficient capital, a wellestablished manufacturing export base, but they depend on external resource suppliers.
The cooperation between the two is in accordance with the economic theory of
comparative advantages, and certainly both benefit from it. From the diplomatic
perspective, China perceives Africa as an important partner for coordination in the
process of international rules formulation. China’s claim of the identity of a developing
country means that it is viewed by the African countries as a reliable spokesman and
champion to ensure the shared interests in international organizations like the UN.
Moving to the strategies that China applies to the African case, there are three major
policies that help to win the favour of the majority of countries: the policy of mutual
respect without asking any political concessions of the counterparts; symbolic diplomacy,
frequent high-level visits shows the world how important the continent means to China,
which indirectly raises the political value of Africa; and impressively, economic
diplomacy. Chinese investments are always accompanied by related infrastructure
contracts, debt relief, assistance in public health and agriculture, offering zero-tariff
treatment for some African exports to China, and building schools. All these are warmly
welcomed by the governments and the ordinary people. ‘China has pledged to set up
three to five special economic zones, and institute a $5 billion development fund to
encourage Chinese investments in Africa. Moreover, 100 new schools will be built,
16,000 professionals will be trained.’(Meidan, 2006:70).
However, my reservation concerns the non-inference policy, which has almost become
the label of Chinese foreign policy. The core of the Five Principle of Coexistence, being
the foundation of China’s diplomacy, is mutual respect and non-interference in each
other’s internal affairs. Although to urge the counterpart to change would not be at the
cost of the commercial benefits and bilateral friendships. By offering alternative channel
of economic and diplomacy, China’s participation does weaken the leverage of others
trying to promote greater respect for human rights. Explanations, such that China itself
has human rights problems so that China has no right to accuse other countries, or that
every country has different understanding over human rights, could not satisfy the
Western public. Conversely, as China’s influence in the international community
increases, it is inappropriate to continue the non-interference policy, and more
importantly, this is not accordance to the image of ‘a responsible state’ that China wants
to shape. Therefore, Chinese authority may have to take some actions to win the
acceptance of the international community in some scenarios.
Table 1 only 13 African countries receiving Chinese aid in the 1960s
Country
Date of first aid agreement
Amount (US$ million)
Algeria
1958
100
Egypt
1958
193
Ghana
1961
81
Mali
1961
148
Somali
1963
220
Tanzania
1964
534
Kenya
1964
91
Burundi
1964
125
CAR
1964
56
Congo
1964
205
Uganda
1965
77
Mauritania
1967
239
Zambia
1967
372
30 countries receiving Chinese aid in the 1970s
Country
Date of first aid agreement
Amount (US$ million)
Sudan
1970
230
Equat.Guinea
1971
18.7
Ethiopia
1971
155
Guinea
1971
161
Sierra Leone
1971
94
Togo
1972
77
Tunisia
1972
97
Benin
1972
72
Mauritius
1972
48
Nigeria
1972
3
Rwanda
1972
56
Burkina Faso
1973
92
Cameroon
1973
124
Chad
1973
77
Senegal
1973
108
Niger
1974
64.7
Gabon
1975
26
The Gambia
1975
36
Guinea-Bissau
1975
18
Mozambique
1975
116
Sao Tme-Prcp
1975
12
Botswana
1976
19.4
Comoros
1976
10.3
Morocco
1976
32
Cape Verde
1977
17.6
Liberia
1977
37.4
Seychelles
1978
8.1
Djibouti
1979
12.9
(Sources from Brautigam Deborah, 1998, Chinese Aid and African Development, P45)
Table 2: some commercial deals of China’s three largest oil companies in Africa
Since 1996, CNPC has controlled a 40% stake in the Greater
Nile Petroleum Operating Company in Sudan; in 2003,
CNPC purchased oil refineries in Algeria for 350 million
USD and signed an exploration deal fro oil in two blocks; in
CNPC
2004, CNPC invested 1 million USD in an oil and gas
exploration project in Mauritania; in 2006, CNPC and
Sinopec teamed up to exploit newly discovered drilling
rights to an oilfield in Sudan in a deal worth about 600
million USD.
In 2002, Sinopec signed a contract for 525 million USD to
develop oil field in Algeria; in 2004, Sinopec signed a
technical evaluation deal for three onshore oilfields in
Gabon to supply China with crude oil; in 2005, Sinopec
Sinopec
purchased a 27% stake in an oil field off the coast in
Nigeria; in 2006, Sinopec entered into a joint venture
partnership with a local oil company to build an oil refinery
in Angola; in 2006, Sinopec has been constructing a
1,500km pipeline to Port Sudan.
In 2005, CNOOC paid 2.3 billion dollar for a stake in the
Akpo offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria; In 2006, CNOOC
signed a production-sharing contract in Equatorial Guinea;
CNOOC
and bought a 45% stake in a Nigeria oil and gas field for 2.3
billion USD; also in 2006, CNOOC was allowed to explore
in six blocks covering 44500 sq miles in Kenya;
(Sources: Naidu & Davies, ‘China Fuels its Future with Africa’s Riches’; Scott-Meuser,
‘Fuelling Development: China and Africa’; Meidan Michal, China’s Africa Policy:
Business Now, Politics Later)
Table 3 China’s imported crude oil by region 1995-2006(%)
Regions
1995
2000
2003
2006
Middle East
46
53.6
51.3
45
Africa
11
24.0
24.4
32
Asia-Pacific
41
15.0
15.3
8
Others
2
6.7
9.4
15
(Sources: Lai, 2007, ‘China’s Oil Diplomacy: Is It a Global Security Threat?’, P522,
cited from Yearbook of China’s Economic Foreign Relations and Trade, 2002, 2003;
Zhao, 2007, China-US Oil Rivalry in Africa.)
Table 4
Projections for China’s Commodity Import Demand
Commodity
Unit
Latest Demand
Predicted Demand
in 2020
Iron ore
m tons
148
710
Oil
m tons
91
1861
Soy
m tons
26
50
Coal
m tons
11
810
Copper
m tons
3
20
Manganese
m tons
3
13
Meat
m tons
0.3
4
Wood
m cubic
34
150
(Sources: Deutsche Bank Research Report)
Table 5 China’s trade volume with the world and with the Africa (billion USD)
Year
Total
trade Trade
with
Weight
volume
Africa
2007
21738.3
733.11
3.4%
2006
17606.9
554.64
3.2%
2005
14221.2
397.4
2.8%
2000
4743
10
0.2%
(Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China)
Table 6 China’s exports to the world and to the Africa (billion USD)
Year
2001
2004
2005
2006
2007
Exports volume 60.1
138.2
186.8
266.9
372.9
5933.7
7620
9690.7
12180.1
2.3
2.5
2.8
3.1
to Africa
Total Exports
2661.5
5
Percentage
2.2
(Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China,
2006 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment)
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