1
Bibliography
Alston, William, "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification",
Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology, ed. James Toberlin (Atascadero,
CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co.), 1988, pp. 257-299.
Alston, William, Perceiving God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1991.
Atkinson, R.F., “‘Good’ and ‘Right’ and ‘Probable’ in Language, Truth and Logic,” Mind
64:254, 1955, pp. 242-246.
Ayer, A. J., The Central Questions of Philosophy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson)
1973.
Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic, 2nd Ed. (New York: Dover Publications) 1952.
Ayer, A. J., “Editor’s Introduction”, Logical Positivism, ed. A.J. Ayer (New York:
Macmillan), 1959.
Ayer, A. J., The Problem of Knowledge (Edinburgh: Penguin Books) 1956.
Bergmann, Michael, “Deontology and Defeat,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research 60:4, 2000, pp. 87-102.
Blackburn, Simon, Spreading the Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1984.
Blackburn, Simon, Essays in Quasi-Realism Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1993.
Blackburn, Simon, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1998.
Bonjour, Laurence, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge,” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy: Volume V: Studies in Epistemology, Ed. Peter French (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press), 1980, pp. 53-73.
Brink, David, “Externalist Moral Realism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, 1986, pp.
23-42.
Brueckner, Anthony, “Deontologism and Internalism in Epistemology,” Nous 30:3, 1996,
pp. 527-536.
Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard, "Internalism Defended", in Epistemology:
Internalism and Externalism, Ed. Hilary Kornblith (Malden, MA: Blackwell)
2001, pp. 231-260.
Cuneo, Terence, The Normative Web (book manuscript, unpublished).
2
Feldman, Fred, Introductory Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall) 1978.
Feldman, Richard, “Epistemic Obligations”, Philosophical Perspectives 2:
Epistemology, ed. James Toberlin (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview) 1988, pp. 236256.
Feldman, Richard, Epistemology (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall) 2003.
Feldman, Richard, “The Ethics of Belief”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
LX:3, 2000, pp. 667-695.
Feldman, Richard, “Voluntary Belief and Epistemic Evaluation”, Knowledge, Truth, and
Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue, Ed. Matthias
Steup (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2001, pp. 77-92.
Field, Hartry, “Apriority as an Evaluative Notion”, Truth and the Absence of Fact
(Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001), pp. 361-387.
Field, Hartry, “Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse”, Truth and the
Absence of Fact (Oxford: Oxford University Press (2001), pp. 222-258.
Geach, Peter, “Ascriptivism”, Philosophical Review 69, 1960, pp. 221-225.
Geach, Peter, “Assertion”, Philosophical Review 74, 1965, pp. 449-465.
Gibbard, Allan, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP) 1990.
Gibbard, Allan, Thinking How To Live (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP) 2003.
Ginet, Carl, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory (Dordrecht: D. Reidel) 1985.
Goldman, Alvin, “Reliablism: What is Justified Belief?” The Theory of Knowledge:
Classical and Contemporary Readings, 2nd ed., ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth) 2001, pp. 306-319.
Goldman, Alvin, “Internalism Exposed,” Journal of Philosophy, 96, 1999, pp. 271-293.
Greco, John, “Virtues and Rules in Epistemology”, Virtue Epistemology: Essays on
Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, eds. Abrol Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski
(New York: Oxford University Press) 2001, pp. 117-141.
Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1952.
Hare, R. M., Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1963.
Hare, R. M., Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1981.
3
Hare, R. M., “Universal Prescriptivism”, A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer
(Oxford: Blackwell) 1991, pp. 451-463.
Hare, R. M., “Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics”, Moral Knowledge? New
Readings in Moral Epistemology, eds. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark
Timmons (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1996, pp. 190-199.
Hare, R. M., Sorting Out Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1997.
Harman, Gilbert, “Moral Diversity as an Argument for Moral Relativism”, Perspectives
on Moral Relativism, eds. Douglas Odegard and Carol Stewart (Milliken, Ontario:
Agathon Books Limited), pp. 13-32.
Harman, Gilbert, The Nature of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1977.
Harman, Gilbert, “Moral Explanations of Natural Facts—Can Moral Claims be Tested
Against Moral Reality?” Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, 1986, pp. 57-68.
Harman, Gilbert and Thomson, Judith, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Malden,
MA: Blackwell) 1996.
Harman, Gilbert, Explaining Value and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press) 2000.
Heller, Mark, “Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conception of
Epistemic Justification”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81, 2000, pp. 130-141.
Horgan, Terry and Timmons, Mark, “Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness
Revived”, Synthese 92, 1992, pp. 221-60.
Horwich, Paul, “Gibbard’s Theory of Norms”, Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, 1993,
pp. 67-78.
Hume, David, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 2nd ed., Ed. L.A. SelbyBigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1962.
Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford
University Press) 1888.
Jackson, Frank, “Non-Cognitivism, Normativity, Belief”, Normativity, ed. Jonathan
Dancy (Malden, MA: Blackwell) 2000, pp. 100-115.
Kim, Jaegwon, “What is Naturalized Epistemology? Supervenience and Mind
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1993, pp. 216-236.
4
Kornblith, Hilary, “Epistemic Obligation and the Possibility of Internalism”, Virtue
Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, eds. Abrol
Fairweather and Linda Zagzebski (New York: Oxford University Press) 2001, pp.
231-248.
Kvanvig, Jonathan, The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 2003.
Lycan, William, “Epistemic Value”, Synthese 64, 1985, pp. 137-164.
Mackie, J.L., Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin) 1977.
Millar, Alan and Bermudez, Jose Luis, eds. Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of
Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 2002.
Moore, G.E., Philosophical Papers (London: Allen and Unwin) 1959.
Nobis, Nathan, “Ayer and Stevenson’s Epistemological Emotivism,” Croatian Journal of
Philosophy, Vol. IV, No. 10, April, 2004, pp. 61-81.
Plantinga, Alvin, Warrant: The Current Debate (New York: Oxford University Press)
1993.
Pollock, John, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and
Littlefield) 1987.
Pryor, James, “Highlights of Recent Epistemology”, British Journal of Philosophy of
Science 52, 2001, pp. 95-124.
Pust, Joel, Intuitions as Evidence (New York: Garland Publishing) 2000.
Railton, Peter, “Moral Realism”, Philosophical Review 95, 1986, pp. 163-207.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, “Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms”, Essays on Moral
Realism, Ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)
1988, pp. 1-26.
Sayre-McCord, Geoffrey, “Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence”, Essays on Moral
Realism, Ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press)
1988, pp. 256-281.
Shafer Landau, Russ, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 2003.
Smith, Michael, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell) 1994.
5
Smith, Michael, “Realism”, A Companion to Ethics, Ed. Peter Singer (Oxford:
Blackwell) 1991, pp. 399-410.
Steup, Matthias, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice Hall) 1996.
Steup, Matthias, “Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology”, Acta Analytica 15,
2000, pp. 25-56.
Steup, Mattias, “Epistemic Deontologism,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed.
Robert Audi (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1995, pp. 231-232.
Steup, Mattias, “The Deontic Conception of Epistemic Justification”, Philosophical
Studies 53, 1988, pp. 65-84.
Stevenson, C.L., Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1944.
Stevenson, C.L., “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,” Fact and Values (New
Haven: Yale University Press) 1963, pp. 10-31.
Stevenson, C.L., “Retrospective Comments,” Fact and Values (New Haven: Yale
University Press) 1963, pp. 186-232.
Stevenson, C.L., “Ethical Fallibility”, Ethics and Society: Original Essays on
Contemporary Moral Problems, Ed. Richard T. De George (Garden City, NY:
Anchor Books), 1966, pp. 197-217.
Sturgeon, Nicholas, “What Difference Does it Make Whether Moral Realism is True?”
Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, 1986, pp. 116-117.
Sturgeon, Nicholas, “Moral Explanations”, Essays on Moral Realism, Ed. Geoffrey
Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) 1988, 229-255.
Sturgeon, Nicholas, “Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts”, Southern Journal
of Philosophy 24, 1986, pp. 69-78
Sturgeon, Nicholas, 1995. “Critical Study of Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.”
Nous 29: 402-424.
Sturgeon, Nick, “Harman on Objectivity and Moral Relativism,” unpublished paper.
Thomson, Judith and Harman, Gilbert, Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (Malden,
MA: Blackwell) 1996.
Timmons, Mark, Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Ethical Contextualism
(New York: Oxford University Press) 1999.
6
van Inwagen, Peter, “Quam Dilecta”, God and the Philosophers, Ed. Tom Morris
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1994, 31-60.
Wright, Crispin, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press)
1992.
Weinberg, Jonathan, Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen, “Normativity and Epistemic
Intuitions,” Philosophical Topics (forthcoming).
Weinberg, Jonathan, Nichols, Shaun and Stich, Stephen, “Meta-Skepticism: Meditations
on Ethno-Epistemology," to appear in S. Luper, ed., The Skeptics (forthcoming).
Zagzebski, Linda, Virtues of the Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1996.