Islamic State of Iraq and Syria -The Bonds of Jihad and its Network’s in Southeast Asia
10th September
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have declared a “caliphate” in Iraq and are forwarding its empire
to Syria and the Middle East. ISIS has also now penetrated Southeast Asia where ISIS linked Jemaah
Islamiyah group has declared a “caliphate” in Indonesia recently. Many Southeast Asian Muslim youths
are joining ISIS and retuning back unknown to the authorities. The most alarming of it, is the linkages of
these networks operating together under ISIS.
Authorities in Southeast Asia are challenged into indentifying the operating networks and how they are
able to link with ease. The use of violence adopted by ISIS are based on the Salafi objectives such
practiced by Al Qaeda (AQ), Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF).
ISIS is adopting the Global Salafi Network which consist of the Central Staff, Shura and four committees
which link to the Maghreb Arabs, Core Arabs and Southeast Asians. The Indonesian core is the most
important core within Southeast Asia. This amounts to 57% of the original core under the Global Salafi
Network. The average age of the recruits are anywhere from the years of birth of 1975 to 1985. The vast
majority of these youths have no prior criminal record.
Malaysia is not left out of the equilibrium as the average age is similar to Indonesia. Overall these youths
are generally “good kids”. Malaysian Muslim Youths are recruited by “Friendship”, cliques of friends
joining together. This amounts to at least 70% of the recruitment process followed by “Kinship” to foster
bonds between families’ of Mujahedin kinship and 10% within the “Discipleship”.
According to foreign sources and press statements by the Malaysian authorities, the threat for an attack
has been indentified at selected targets within the city. Although the authorities claim that the
capabilities are far within the reach, one should always remember the famous quote; “Terrorist need to
be lucky once, we need to be lucky always”.
Salafi gatherings in worship places are potential recruitment places to meet new friends and to link with
global jihadist organizations. This amounts to 50% of the recruitment process. Most often these youths
are from religious, caring and middle class background, which became separated from traditional bonds
and culture.
These youths are international people, knowing a few languages and well versed in computer
technology. To escape their lonely, marginalized life, they sought new friends, through places of
worship. They did not start religious, but gravitated to religious social life for emotional needs. They
formed cliques, which transformed them into fanatics based on strong friendship bonds. Social bonds
came before ideological commitment, which, along with group dynamics, made the recruitment for
terrorism possible.
The traits are very similar to the ongoing recruitment process by ISIS within the global jihadist
recruitment. The Southeast Asia recruitment process is still hierarchical “top down” structure and it’s
vulnerable to decapitation, the possibility of splinter groups supporting ISIS. ISIS is using the JI network
in order to strengthen the original “Pan Islamic” state caliphate adopted by JI in the early 90’s.
Authorities within the region need to indentify these traits in order to address and curtail the threat of
ISIS further. The network characteristics are based on distribution of the jihad according to the
presences of “weak ties”; places of worship, the lack of embeddedness eliminating any restraints from
operations and through transformational quality of dence networks.
The impact of information technology on global jihad has made this possible for the recruitment and
radicalization process. This also allowed for the diffusion of Salafi messages, bypassing traditional
Imams, which encourages rejections of traditions and special interpretations of the Quran. This in many
ways creates a virtual “Umma”.
The authorities need to penetrate the jihad through weak links and simultaneously attack against
popular hubs which will degrade the networks into smaller less effective groups. The authorities need to
also eliminate the bridges linking potential Mujahedin with the Jihad, especially in places of worship and
schools. Governments in Southeast Asia need to diminish the pool of potential terrorist by strengthening
non-violent Salafi alternatives.
Complacency within Southeast Asian governments will only lead to ISIS becoming a major threat within
the region. Foreign terrorist groups already operating in the region such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and
Hamas will take advantage of the evolving opportunities to further strengthen their operations in the
region. This will lead to further unrest already taking place with the South China Sea disputes by some
ASEAN states.
Andrin Raj (andrin.raj@stratad.net) is the SEA Regional Director for the International Association for
Counterterrorism and Security Professionals-Centre for Security Studies, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. His
views do not reflect the IACSP.