Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 04.07.2009
Florian Häubi 0844675
„Nietzsches Entwicklungstheorie
und das ‚souveraine Individuum‘ in GM II:2“
Florian Häubi
Introduction
The paper I presented in the Nietzsche-Seminar tries to situate the “sovereign individual” in
GM II:2 within Nietzsche’s evolutionary thinking. It has recently been a matter of discussion
if the “sovereign individual” as it appears in GM II:2 can be considered as a Nietzschean ideal
or if it has to be interpreted as the fulfillment of a process which is negatively valuated. By
taking into consideration Nietzsche’s view on evolution and especially his attacks against the
social-Darwinist Herbert Spencer, both interpretations of the “sovereign individual” appear to
be only partially right. The claim of my paper is that the “sovereign individual” cannot be
considered as Nietzsche’s ideal, but that – nevertheless – it provides us with a positive moral
account. This is worked out in the third part of my paper (“The individual from the viewpoint
of evolutionary theory”) on which I will focus here.
In this report, I will first (1.) give a short summary of my paper. The second part (2.) will
present the most important points made during the discussion and in the third part (3.) I will
formulate some critical remarks. The fourth part (4.) will give a conclusion.
1. Summary
In the first part of my paper I give a short introduction of the topic, relating it to a broader
discussion within the Nietzsche research, and giving a justification for my methodological
approach. In the second part, I present the evolutionary theory how it is brought forward by
Darwin and I draw some main lines regarding its reception. The second section of the second
part gives a more detailed account of Herbert Spencer since he is at the centre of most of
Nietzsche’s attacks against evolutionary theory. Moreover, it is by reading Herbert Spencer in
the early 1880’s that Nietzsche is getting involved in the discussions on the topic of evolution
and starts to develop his own account of evolutionary processes.
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Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 04.07.2009
Florian Häubi 0844675
In the third part of my paper (3.) I show that Nietzsche’s concept of “Individuum” is the core
of his “Entwicklungstheorie” and that it entails a direct critique on Spencer’s conception of
the “ideally moral man”. Nietzsche thinks of “Entwicklung” as a tendency towards the
breeding of an “Individuum”1 and, consequently, sees at the beginning of the human
“Entwicklung” not a solitary, but a social organism. That is, the individual does not appear
(already) at the very beginning, but rather is a late achievement within the “menschliche
Entwicklung”. This entails a twofold critique on Spencer, whose evolutionary theory suggests
a development of increasing social adaption of the solitary organism, which ultimately leads
to a reconciliation of altruistic and egoistic impulses found in the “ideally moral man”.2
In 3.1. I suggest that Nietzsche’s conception of an “Entwicklung” towards the “Individuum”
is supported by the primacy he gives to egoism. In relation to the individual that comes late in
the “Entwicklung” of human beings, Nietzsche writes: “Der Egoismus ist etwas Spätes und
immer noch Seltenes: die Heerden-Gefühle sind mächtiger und älter”3. According to
Nietzsche, our instincts and drives have been bred through ages in a social environment.
Therefore, the organization of drives and instincts is adjusted to the requirements of society.
These social drives are still stronger than the individual drives. On the basis of this distinction
between social drives and individual drives, I make a distinction between a “nichtindividuellen Egoismus”4 and a “höherer Egoismus” which comes late in the “menschlichen
Entwicklung”.5 The “nicht-individuelle Egoismus” seeks to gain pleasure by satisfying one’s
own drives (hence it is an egoism), but these drives are social and shared by many other
members of the society (hence it is a non-individual egoism). On the other hand, the higher
egoism seems to refer to an individual organism, whose drives are no more socially bound.
This egoism seems to ask for a re-organization of one’s drives. Moreover, the “Entwicklung”
of this egoism proceeds parallel to the above-mentioned “Entwicklung” of the “Individuum”.
In order to make this point clearer, the next part will work out in more detail Nietzsche’s
conception of the “Individuum” and the “Wille zur Macht”.
Cf.: KSA 9, 238: „[…] die Entwicklung zum Individuellen […]“ und „Ich sehe dagegen das Individuum
wachsen, […]“. Also in KSA 12, 294: „Grundirrthümer der bisherigen Biologen: es handelt sich nicht um die
Gattung, sondern um stärker auszuwirkende Individuen (die Vielen sind nur Mittel).“
2
Against this Nietzsche writes: KSA 9, 515 „Die Amöbe-Einheit des Individuums kommt zuletzt! Und die
Philosophen giengen von ihr aus, als ob sie bei Jedem da sei!“ Furthermore, in KSA 9, 458 Nietzsche designates
Spencer’s „ideally moral man“ as a „Dauermensch“ and compares him to a „Chinesethum“
3
KSA 9, 513.
4
KSA 9, 488.
5
Note that this is not meant to exclude other kinds of egoism.
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Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 04.07.2009
Florian Häubi 0844675
In 3.2. I stress that Nietzsche does not think of the individual as a stable entity, but rather as a
plurality of instincts and drives. According to Nietzsche, all single parts strive for
“Herrwerden”, “Siegen”, “Vorherrschen” and ultimately for power. These conflicting drives
lead to a “Kampf der Theile” and to an “Aristokratie im Leibe”. The process of
individualization within a single organism is described as a “Zerfallen von Eins in Zwei” and
the “beständige Vergehen der Individuen auf den Gewinn von wenig Individuen.”6 It is
important to note that Nietzsche observes the same process on the level of societies, so that
“Völker und Rassen” are the basis for the “Erzeugung von einzelnen werthvollen Individuen.”
Since Nietzsche seems to imply a certain order of rank within the “Entwicklung”, it is
necessary to consider Nietzsche’s conception of “Vervollkommnung”.
In 3.3. I try to describe Nietzsche’s conception of progress and “Vervollkommnung”, which
does not imply any kind of teleology,7 especially not a teleology in the sense of a linear
progression towards an ultimate fixed end-goal. According to a quote from Nietzsche8,
“Vervollkommnung” consists of two elements: increasing complexity and more power.
Higher Complexity means first a higher amount of single parts within an organism and
second, a more sophisticated interaction, division of labor and distinction between these parts.
This definition of “Vervollkommnung” on the level of a single organism is applied to
humanity as such by Nietzsche. He writes: “Schluss auf die Entwicklung der Menschheit: die
Vervollkommnung besteht in der Hervorbringung der mächtigsten Individuen, zu deren
Werkzeug die grösste Menge gemacht wird.“9
In 3.4. I first take up the notion of the higher egoism and link it to the notion of sovereignty.
Both have in common a “Loslösung” from socially generated drives and instincts and require
a higher form of individuality. According to Nietzsche, human beings first appear to be
organs of the social organism. However, the “Individuum” as it appears within Nietzsche’s
“Entwicklungstheorie” has acquired the “Empfindungen des Organismus”. In KSA 11, 509
Nietzsche lists six physiological processes in order to describe what it means to feel like an
organism and to achieve a re-organization of the drives and instincts.
The conclusions can be summarized as follows. I think that the figure of the “sovereign
individual” in GM II:2 is the result of Nietzsche’s thinking about “Entwicklung” and is
6
KSA 12, 296.
Nietzsche denies explicitly a teleology within the „Entwicklung“: KSA 9, 208 „Die Menschheit hat kein Ziel,
ebenso wenig wie die Saurier eins hatten, aber sie hat eine Entwicklung, d.h. ihr Ende ist nicht mehr bedeutend
als irgend ein Punkt ihres Weges!“
8
KSA 12, 96: „Begriff der ‚Vervollkommnung‘: nicht nur grössere Compliciertheit, sondern grössere Macht.“
9
KSA 12, 96.
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Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 04.07.2009
Florian Häubi 0844675
therefore linked to his conception of the “Individuum” as I tried to describe above. What
would be the consequence if one takes the “sovereign individual” to be an ideal? From the
viewpoint of Nietzsche’s “Entwicklungstheorie” it would mean to introduce a teleological
thinking. It would mean to see the “sovereign individual” as the climax and end-goal of a
linear and necessarily evolutionary process. However, I see this in some contradiction to
Nietzsche’s attacks against exactly this kind of teleological thinking provided by socialDarwinists like Spencer.10
Another interpretation of the “sovereign individual” seems to suggest that it is the culmination
of a negative process described by Nietzsche in GM II:1. It embodies the contemporary
values, such as “Verantwortlichkeit” and “freier Wille”, which in many passages are
explicitly criticized by Nietzsche. Therefore, the “sovereign individual” has a rather negative
status. However, this interpretation does not seem to me compatible with Nietzsche’s
“Entwicklungstheorie” either. If it is indeed the case that the “sovereign individual” in GM
II:2 can be linked to the “Individuum” as it appears in Nietzsche’s “Entwicklungstheorie”, it
does not seem plausible to me to dismiss the “sovereign individual” as a mere representative
of negatively judged values. In other words: since the “Individuum” as it is described in
Nietzsche’s “Entwicklungstheorie” has a strong positive connotation and since it can be
linked to the “sovereign individual”, it is hard to see how then the “sovereign individual”
should be considered as ultimately negative. Therefore, I think that the “sovereign individual”
in GM II:2 can provide us with a more positive account of Nietzsche’s moral views.
2. Discussion
2.1. The distinction between descriptive and normative
One main point of the discussion dealt with the normative status of the individual as it appears
in Nietzsche’s evolutionary thinking. It does not seem clear if Nietzsche’s description of an
evolutionary process entails some possible guidelines for our actions, i.e. if one should strive
for a development towards the individual.
In my paper, I did not address this question explicitly. The reason is that it was not the aim of
my paper to work out Nietzsche’s positive moral account, but only to show that Nietzsche
evaluates the individual within his evolutionary thinking – and ultimately also the “sovereign
individual” in GM II:2 – positively. I think this can be shown by pointing to Nietzsche’s
This is just one further reason against reading the „sovereign individual“ in GM II:2 as an ideal. Even if one
did not agree on this point, one would have to face the arguments brought forward by Acampora.
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Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 04.07.2009
Florian Häubi 0844675
manifold critique on Herbert Spencer and his preference of the individual at the expense of
the herd. However, I think that my paper also provides a possible starting point in order to
answer the question regarding the normative status of Nietzsche’s descriptions of an
evolutionary process.
There are mainly three points I consider to be important. First, the normative implications of
the evolutionary process described by Nietzsche can be found in one particular feature of this
evolutionary thinking. Nietzsche does not present a fully worked out evolutionary theory, nor
does he develop a coherent criticism on what he perceives as Darwinism. His evolutionary
thinking is guided by his general attacks against “herd-morality” or the “democratic
idiosyncrasies”. Therefore, I think that Nietzsche’s remarks on the evolutionary process can
be considered as a means in order to sustain scientifically what he perceives to be valuable. In
other words, his evolutionary thinking is strongly guided by a more general, philosophical
world-view (I think this is not only true for Nietzsche, but also for Darwin, as well as for
Spencer and Huxley). Second, in a text from the Nachlass (KSA 11, 509) Nietzsche gives an
account of what it would mean to feel like a solitary organism and how it can be achieved.
Therefore, I think it is plausible to suggest that Nietzsche was concerned with the normative
implications of his description of the evolutionary process. Third, normative considerations
come into play when one perceives the individuation-process as going together with a
“höherer Egoismus”, which is opposed to the “Heerden-Egoismus”.
2.2. The topics of „promising“, „forgetting“/„remembering“ and “responsibility”
Another objection made during the discussion was that the paper deals with the “sovereign
individual” in GM II:2, but the decisive features of this figure, such as “promising” or master
of “free will” as well as “forgetting” and “remembering” as the decisive forces within the
“Geschichte der Verantwortlichkeit”, are not mentioned at all. But how can one understand
what the “sovereign individual” is and how it is evaluated by Nietzsche, if one does not pay
attention to these decisive elements?
I think that this omission can somehow be explained by stating that my paper had in this
respect a rather preparatory purpose in the sense that it gives an account for the physiological
processes going on within the “sovereign individual. I intentionally focused on four main
aspects of the “sovereign individual” and tried to read them in line with Nietzsche’s
evolutionary thinking. These four aspects can be summarized according to four questions:

What is the “individual”?
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Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 04.07.2009
Florian Häubi 0844675

What does it mean that the “individual” appears at the end of a development?

What does it mean that the “sovereign individual” is described as the “reifste Frucht”?

What does it mean to be “souverain” and “übersittlich?
These are the four elements of GM II:2 which I tried to clarify. Regarding the above
mentioned criticism, I can answer as follows. The importance of “promising”,
“forgetting”/”remembering” and “responsibility” are decisive features of the “sovereign
individual” and I do not neglect their importance for an adequate interpretation of this figure.
However, I think it is helpful first to clarify the general biological and physiological processes
in which evolution takes place for Nietzsche. Then it is possible to read and interpret the
above mentioned concepts in line with these processes. My suggestion is that one might get
another understanding of what Nietzsche could have meant by designating the “sovereign
individual” as the “Mensch, der versprechen darf” and as the “Herr über den freien Willen”. It
is in this respect that my paper can be understood as preparatory since it aims to give an
account for the physiological processes which build the basis for an interpretation of the
concepts such as “freier Wille” and “versprechen dürfen”.
2.3. The concept of teleology
Another problem of the paper is the way of using the concept of teleology. It seems clear that
Nietzsche does not think of the evolutionary process as teleological in the sense Herbert
Spencer does. Nevertheless, the fact that he writes about an evolution towards the individual
and that he uses the expression “es handelt sich um” seems to imply a certain kind of
teleology.
Here, I tend to agree that Nietzsche did not seem to succeed in avoiding a certain teleological
conception. However, I think that it makes sense – at least regarding evolutionary theories –
to deal with a restricted conception of teleology and to claim that Nietzsche did not think of
evolution as having a certain telos. In this restricted sense, a teleological conception means to
think of evolution as a linear process towards a fixed end-goal. This definition has two
advantages. First, it makes possible to distinguish Nietzsche’s conception of the evolutionary
process from Spencer’s evolutionary theory as an intrinsic and moral force leading directly to
a certain end state of evolution. Second, it becomes possible to think of some form of progress
and perfection within evolution which does not imply a teleological conception in a strict
sense. Therefore, Nietzsche’s criticism on any teleological conceptions does not need to be
read as self-contradictory.
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Nietzsche-Seminar
Reflective Report, 04.07.2009
Florian Häubi 0844675
3. Critical remarks
3.1. Structure and the table of contents
I am not convinced by the structure of the paper since the single subchapters in the third
chapter do not represent the particular elements of the “sovereign individual” which are linked
to Nietzsche’s evolutionary thinking. Therefore, I propose the following structure for the third
chapter which allows better to capture the single argumentative steps.
The beginning of chapter 3 gives a general overview and introduction to the relation between
Nietzsche and evolutionary theory, especially how the theory is brought forward by Herbert
Spencer. Chapter 3.1. deals with Nietzsche’s conception of the “Individuum” and the will to
power. This allows to answer the question of how one has to think of the “individual” in GM
II:2, namely not as a stable subject or as a person, but as an organism constituted by a
plurality of drives. Chapter 3.2. has the title “Die Stellung des Individuums innerhalb des
Entwicklungsprozesses”. This chapter deals with Nietzsche’s assumption that evolution is a
process of increasing individuation. This allows to answer the question of what it means that
the “sovereign individual” comes at the end of the process described by Nietzsche in GM II:1.
Furthermore, the evolution towards an individual is linked to Nietzsche’s conception of
progress and perfection. This allows to answer the question of what it means that Nietzsche
designates the “sovereign individual” as “die reifste Frucht”. Finally, in Chapter 3.3. I discuss
Nietzsche’s view on egoism and altruism, especially how it is opposed to Herbert Spencer’s
account. Moreover, I show that the process of increasing individuality is somehow linked with
what Nietzsche calls “höherer Egoismus”. This “höherer Egoismus” is described in terms of a
“Loslösung” from the socially bred instincts and drives which describes one aspect of the
relationship between the individual organism and the herd. This allows to answer the question
of what Nietzsche could mean with “souverain”, “autonom” and “übersittlich”. I think this
structure is more adequate in order to show the single steps of what I am trying to bring
forward in the paper.
4. Conclusions
Nietzsche’s conception of evolution entails a manifold critique on debates and discussions at
his time and gives a more detailed picture of his physiology. It provides us with what he
considered to be the underlying processes of the human organism. These quasi-scientific
descriptions and explanations of values and convictions as well as human behavior make it
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Florian Häubi 0844675
difficult to find a more positive Nietzschean moral account. I think that in GM II:2 Nietzsche
gives, at least to some extent, such a positive account. However, I am still not sure about the
single features of the “sovereign individual” such as “promising” and “master of free will”,
but I think that already Nietzsche’s description of physiological processes (such as selfregulation, feeling like an organism and “Loslösung” from socially bred drives and instincts)
expresses a certain value judgment and entails a normative statement.
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