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Chapter 8: Matter and Body
In these chapters we started with the general design of the cosmos, with its finite
extension between the centre of the earth and the periphery at the sphere of the
fixed stars. We have talked about causality in general and we have considered
divine causality in particular. We have further considered theological problems
related to theories of the eternity of the world and its recent creation. Now we
enter into the material nature of the created cosmos. What is matter? What is the
nature of matter?
The concept of matter is elusive. We soon fall into a lot of confusion when
we try to clarify even a common notion of matter. A naïve view of matter will
probably appeal to sensible qualities like hardness and resistance: matter is
something hard and resistant to touch. In human experience these are, however,
relative qualities. Rock is hard and has a high degree of resistance, but what
about water and air? Commonsense notions run into difficulties, but turning to
more philosophical considerations will not necessarily free us from confusion.
There is, I think, at least one common notion that will assist our intuitions when
we try to enter the topic in a more strict way, viz. the notion that matter is what
is fundamental to all sorts of bodily being. Matter is the subject of bodies. In
order to get a hold of ancient theories it is necessary to have some slight
knowledge of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, so that we shall continue with a
short elucidation of that doctrine before we enter the field itself.
We are not going to enter into the depths of the Aristotelian doctrine of
categories, since that doctrine in itself involves one in a lot of intricate problems.
We shall just note that in his writing the Categories, as well as in some other
places in his works, Aristotle divides being into ten categories (chapter 4):
substance (ousia), quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, having, acting,
and being acted upon (suffering). Perhaps we make things clearer if we put them
in a figure with some of Aristotle’s own examples and some in addition:
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Substance
Man, horse
Quantity
A line two cubits long
Quality
The white, the grammatical, the good
Relation
A double, a half, the greater, the father
Place
In the Lyceum, in the marketplace
Time
Yesterday, last year
Position
Lies down, sits
Having
Is shod, is armed
Acting
Cuts, burns
Being acted upon
Is cut, is burned
One may think of the system of the categories ac a classification of predicates that
may be said of subjects. We may for instance say that ‘Socrates is a man’, and
then we pronounce a substantial predicate of him. We may further say that
‘Socrates is of a definite height (quantity), is good (quality), is a father (relation),
is killed (being acted upon), etc.’ It is important to note that when such
predicates are given, what we talk of is not only a semantic term, but a thing: We
say, for instance, that a concrete individual person in the world is the possessor
of a definite quality that exists, like goodness. — We leave the subject of the
categories as such at this stage, because we now come close to the verge of diving
into all sorts of problems.
With this piece of rather simple knowledge of the topic of the categories,
we may turn to an important Aristotelian text that immediately brings us into the
problematic of matter as such. In the Metaphysics book 7 (Zeta), Aristotle
investigates the nature of being, and directs his attention to the nature of ousia,
i.e. substance or essence. The meaning of being is to be sought as the meaning of
ousia. The relevant text is from chapter 3. We shall now bear in mind that all
predicates from the Categories should be considered as different kinds of forms
that have their fundament of being or existence in a basic subject. Aristotle
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considers if the ousia of something is this basic subject, i.e. that which is at the
bottom of something as carrying all its formal properties. He says that the subject
(hypokeimenon) is ‘that of which everything else is predicated while it itself is not
predicated of anything else’. We may remove or abstract all these predicates or
forms and ask what is left. A quotation brings us to the heart of the matter:
By matter I mean that which is not in itself said to be a given anything, nor a given quantity, nor
characterised by any of the other categories which define being. For there is something of which
each of these is predicated, and it’s being is different from that of each of the predicates. For the
rest are predicated of substance, and substance of matter, so that the last thing is in itself neither a
given anything, nor of a given quantity, nor anything else.
Maybe an example will serve us better to understand the way Aristotle thinks in
this regard. Let us say we have a box that is white, its surface is warm, with a
volume of length, breadth, and height of one cubit each. We may search for the
subject of these forms by removing or abstracting in thought all the forms that
are predicated on the box. First we abstract the predicate ‘box’ which belongs to
the category of substance. Then we remove in thought the whiteness, the
warmth, and finally the volume or bulk. What is left? There is nothing left that
we may observe, no predicate, no property may be seen. That which is left,
according to the Aristotelian point of view, is the unknown or even unknowable
subject that carries the different kinds of forms. This is what has entered into
philosophical tradition as Aristotle’s first of prime matter. Some modern
commentators on Aristotle have denied a doctrine of prime matter in him.1 His
ancient commentators have not, however, doubted that he has such a doctrine.2
Before we follow some of the main lines of Aristotle’s ancient commentators, we
shall pause for a moment and ask what may be gained from the results of
Aristotle’s analysis.
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2
Cf. Sorabji (2004) 268.
Sorabji (2004) 253.
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We started from a naïve view of matter that a lot of people probably
would have brought into the picture: matter is something hard and resistant to
touch. From an Aristotelian point of view, properties like these are qualitative
forms that should be abstracted in order to reach the thing itself. The analysis has
shown, however, that the thing itself is nothing positive, only a ‘something’ with
the bare property of being able to carry all sorts of forms. On this view, matter is
obviously an incorporeal potentiality for form. It cannot be known in itself, but
even so it has to exist as a basic condition of all other kinds of being. However, if
we have a theoretical starting point like the Aristotelian one, we may ask how
matter can exist at all. All kinds of being are classified into the system of
categories, and since matter obviously is not something of that kind, how can it
have being? The analysis of the concept of the matter of corporeal being not only
brings us to the dimension of an incorporeal ‘something’ but even to the limit
between being and non-being. I suppose the only positive thing that can be said
about it is that matter is a bare potentiality with no positive properties in itself.
How was this concept received in late antiquity?
It seems that we may classify conceptions of matter in late antiquity into
two main and quite different kinds. On the one hand we have conceptions that
may be seen as adhering to or developing the basic Aristotelian idea. On the
other hand we have conceptions that rather radically quits philosophy of the
notion of a basic subject. The first line of thought develops ideas of matter
alternatively as (i) a first subject incorporeal and without quality, (ii) as a mere
shadow of reality, (iii) and as a three-dimensional extension (diastema, diastasis).
The last view might immediately strike one as rather strange, since the notion of
three dimensions looks like a form belonging to the category of quantity. This
could seem to indicate a rearrangement of the whole system of categories, in
such a way that the category of quantity is moved into a primary position. This
is, however, not the case. Even if extension in three dimensions in a certain sense
belongs to the category of quantity, three-dimensionality as such does not
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necessarily do so. We shall shortly return to this topic. I shall return to the second
line of thought, which seem to rid itself of the basic subject altogether, below.
The Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias thinks that there
is a kind of matter that underlies bodies, and which, since it cannot be a
compound of matter and form, cannot itself be a body.3 The basic matter is, then,
incorporeal and without quality. According to Simplicius, Porphyry has a
doctrine of primary matter as without any qualities and probably without being
of bodily form.4 He calls it ‘body in potency’. Plotinus thinks that matter is
created by the soul.5 The soul may turn its attention towards what is higher than
itself, i.e. towards the Intellect or Being. It may also turn towards what comes
after itself, and then it turns to non-Being. What comes after the Soul is beyond
the sphere of what is intelligible or the Real. Matter is a result of the internal
activity of the Soul. When the Soul directs its will towards itself, which will be its
internal activity, there occurs an external activity in which something posterior to
itself is created, viz. matter that is an image of the Soul. This image is non-being,
in the void, and in darkness. It is this weak kind of existence that is called a
shadow, a picture, and an appearance. To say that it has existence is, of course, to
say too much, because it disappear as a shadowy something into the realm of
non-being. Even so, it makes a contribution to the constitution of material beings.
But at this level the activity that starts form the One reaches its limit in
something that lacks power to create beyond itself. We have reached the limit of
being in the realm of impotency.
In Plotinus the radical notion of matter as what underlies bodily extension
and dimension, and qualities, brings us face to face with a notion of something
that cannot be grasped. Matter as such is beyond all volume and magnitude and
extension. It is, in short, something the nature of which we cannot grasp at all.
Even so, Plotinus thinks matter enters the picture of material generation and the
3
Alexander in Sorabji (2004) 254.
Porphyry quoted in Simplicius in Sorabji (2004) 256.
5
Plotinus in Sorabji (2004) 254-6.
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establishment of quantities and qualities. I suppose he thinks that for the nature
of bodily being to exist, there has to be a foundation to account for bodies not
being just modes of intelligible realities. Matter is the principle — even if it is too
weak to be a proper principle — of bodily being as something principally
different from intelligible being. The limits of the Plotinian cosmos are, therefore,
the One beyond being and thought and positive predication, and, at the other
end, matter as beyond being and thought and positive predication. The One is,
however, a creative source, while matter is without any power at all.
Simplicius, though a faithful Neoplatonist, deviates from Plotinus in his
conception of matter. Prime matter is, according to his view, indefinite extension
(diastema aoriston).6 He builds this idea on a text from Aristotle, viz. from Physics
209b6-11:
…in so far as a place is regarded as the extension (diastema) of the magnitude, it would be the
matter of a body (for this is distinct from the magnitude), and this is what is contained and is
limited by the form, as by a surface or a boundary. Now such are matter and the indefinite (to
aoriston); for when the limit and the affections of the sphere are removed, what remains is none
other than matter.
The question is now what we shall understand by ‘indefinite extension’. Every
body has a certain magnitude or bulk. Therefore every body has a definite
extension. We have indefinite extension when particular boundaries are
removed. Somehow the place that contained a thing of a definite bulk will, when
the limits of the bulk are removed, extend indefinitely. That which limited this
place as the place of this body, i.e. certain surfaces or limits, is abstracted. In that
case, this particular place is no longer a particular place, but rather place in
general. It becomes the unlimited extension that gives the potentiality for the
emergence of any body whatsoever. We may borrow a modern term and say that
6
Simplicius in Sorabji (2004) 256-8.
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matter is a field manifesting properties,7 or, even better: that matter is a field
holding the potentiality for manifesting properties.
I suppose it is possible to understand the difference between the definite
extension of a particular body that is limited by the possession of forms, and the
indefinite extension that emerges when limits are removed. Simplicius tries to
make his position clear in the following quotation:
So perhaps two notions of body should be postulated, the first existing in terms of form (eidos)
and formative principle (logos), and made definite (horismenon), by three dimensions (diastaseis),
the second in terms of a slackening, a spreading and a lack of definiteness from the incorporeal,
indivisible, intelligible reality. The second is not given a definite form by three dimensions, but is
everywhere slackened, and split, and flows from all sides away form being into non-being. And
perhaps we should postulate that matter is dimension (diastasis) of this sort.8
Once more we should notice the distinction between intelligible reality and the
mode of existence of matter. The intelligible is qualified with terms like
incorporeal and indivisible. This is interesting, since according to the alternative
conception of matter prime matter itself is incorporeal. As a matter of fact, if
Simplicius thinks that bodies originate with the introduction of limits, then prime
matter, despite being indefinitely extended, is obviously incorporeal in his theory
as well. What is rather obvious in Simplicius’ idea of matter is, further, that
matter is potentially divisible. On the one hand it slackens and flows out into
indefiniteness, but on the other hand there is a potentiality for the introduction of
limits that will give rise to body that further, for different reasons, attracts to
itself all kinds of additional predicates or forms.
One of the things that is rather fascinating in the above picture is the idea
that bodies are in need of some indefinite substrate verging on the edge of nonexistence in order to be constituted as bodies, and in order to be that kind of
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8
Cf. Sorabji (2004) 253.
Simplicius in Sorabji (2004) 258.
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things that carry forms belonging to other categories of being. The second main
view of matter in late antiquity sets aside the idea of such a substrate or subject.
The main sources for this alternative view is found in two important theologians
of the 4th century, viz. in the brothers St Basil the Great and St Gregory of Nyssa.
In his In hexaemeron, Basil says:
These same thoughts, let us also recommend to ourselves concerning the earth, not to be curious
about what its substance is; nor to wear ourselves out by reasoning, seeking its very foundation;
nor to search for some nature destitute of qualities, existing without quality in itself; but to realize
well that all that is seen around it is related to the reason of its existence, forming an essential part
of its essence. You will end with nothing if you attempt to eliminate by reason each of the
qualities that exist in it. In fact, if you remove the black, the cold, the weight, the density, the
qualities pertaining to taste, or any others which are perceptible, there will be no basic
substance.9
The text and its context are rather interesting. On the one hand the purpose of
writing these words are to warn the listeners against committing themselves to
speculative thinking about the foundations of the world, since one risks being
confused. On the other hand, Basil seems to present ideas he himself believes in.
In this text Basil goes further than any philosophical predecessor has done, and
his brother Gregory becomes even more explicit.
Gregory of Nyssa starts with a problem, and the view of matter that he
presents is put forward in order to solve this problem. — We come to this below.
— There are three passages in his works on the nature of matter. In two of them
there is definitely no mention of any material subject, but in the third a subject is
taken into the picture. However, it is no coincidence that a subject is lacking in
two of the passages, rather it is more surprising that the third passage mentions
such a thing.
9
In hexaemeron 1.8
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Now, what is Gregory’s problem? He says:10 ‘You can hear people saying
things like this: if God is matterless, where does matter come from? How can
quantity come from non-quantity, the visible from the invisible, something with
limited bulk and size from what lacks magnitude and limits?’ — One might
wonder at the problem. Why does he think it should be difficult to imagine that
God could create something of a nature different from Himself? Whether or not
he thinks there is a real problem here, he presents the following theory: God
established all the things through which matter is constituted, such as light,
heavy, dense, rare, soft, resistant, fluid, dry, cold, hot, colour, shape, outline,
extension. These properties and properties like them are, basically and in
themselves, thoughts (ennoiai) and concepts (noemata). He concludes: ‘But when
they run together (sundramein), they turn into matter (hule ginetai).’ Matter is
constituted, that is, as a collection of ideas.
If Gregory thinks this solves his problem, I suppose he thinks these
thoughts and concepts first and foremost are in the mind of God. Even though
Gregory thinks the divine being circumscribes the cosmos, he is no pantheist.
There is a definite distinction between the uncreated being of God and created
otherness. The divine concepts must somehow be extrapolated from the being of
God into the constitution of the created world. A probable interpretation is that
in themselves these properties are thoughts of the divine mind, but in the act of
creation God established them for the creation all material things. Transported
into the created realm, therefore, the divine thoughts become, according to my
interpretation, forms that come together in accordance with the divine purpose,
and constitute what we call bodies.
Sorabji thinks this is a kind of Berkeleian idealism.11 To discuss this claim
in the present context would bring us far off our track, but the idea is for sure
10
For this and the following, see his In hexaemeron PG 44: 69b-c. The three passages, from In
hexaemeron, De anima et resurrectione, and De hominis opificio, are conveniently collected and translated
in Sorabji (2004) 159-61.
11
Sorabji (2004) 158.
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interesting. We should note that according to Gregory bodies built up by such
intelligible or formal structures, are grasped by the mind and not by sense
perception. As a matter of fact, Gregory does not deny the power of sense
perception, but he says in De hominis opicicio that it is the mind (nous) that sees
and hears through eyes and hears.12 One could consider this to be a theory
similar to Aristotle’s doctrine that what is gained in sense perception is a form.
One might wonder why Gregory in the third text speaks as if there was a
subject for these properties.13 The main line of thought is the same; it is the
properties coming together that produce material reality. The substratum does
not, it seems, play any important role. One might ask the question if there should
be any decisive reasons, theological or philosophical, to prefer one of the main
doctrines before the other. I cannot see that there are. The only thing to take
notice of from a theological point of view should be that one should not
understand Gregory to mean that the cosmos as such is divine by nature. There
has to be a distinction between what is in God’s mind and what is made for the
constitution of the world. Even so, it is quite interesting to see that in a
philosophical analysis, the nature of matter and body is quite different from
what one considers them to be in a common sense view.
12
13
De hominis opificio 6.1.
Sorabji (2004) 160-1.