Hansen Breitling
Philosophy of Language: Wittgenstein
1/26/14
First Two Analytic Response Papers
Prompt #1: General names might not appear to the average person to present much
difficulty with regards to being defined. However as Locke and Berkeley show through their
interactions, it is no simple task to clearly define and give meaning to “general names”. This
paper will go through Locke’s account of general names, continue with Berkeley’s critique of
Locke, and then reveal Berkeley’s alternative definition. I will end with my own assessment of
Berkeley and both his criticism and alternative definition. I will begin then with Locke and his
attitude toward general names.
For Locke, general names are words that are made to mark a multitude of particular
names. These general names are necessary because it is impossible for every object to possess its
own unique and distinct particular name, as no person could possibly remember the near infinite
number of particular names he/she would have to if every object one encountered needed a new
name (Chapter 3, section 2, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding). In Locke’s mind, one
comes to a general name as use of a sign of a general idea. Ideas then become general by
removing from them all the things that made them particular (time, place, etc.) and leaving only
something of a sort (Section 6). The part where Locke gets into trouble is when he says that these
general names are abstractions and actually represent all and none of the particular features of a
general thing. This means the general name triangle, should conjure in one’s thoughts both all
the particular features of a triangle (equilateral, acute, obtuse) and at the same time none of these.
Through the process of abstraction, Locke says that one can go from particulars to generals,
which are then to be thought of as all and none of the particulars of whatever sort of thing the
general name stands for. Now I will move on to Berkeley’s criticism of Locke’s work on general
names.
Berkeley, in one single quip, is able to do irreversible damage to Locke’s theory on general
names. He simply asks, regarding a quote from Locke, if it is possible for the reader to conjure in
their minds a general idea of a triangle as defined by Locke, thus simultaneously envisioning all
and none of the particulars of that thing (Section 13, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledg). Since no one can do so, Locke’s theory of generality through abstraction is
essentially felled. Now I can move on the replacement Berkeley gives for Locke’s theory and my
opinion of it.
Knowing that Berkeley disagrees that through considering all and none of the particulars
to comprehend a general idea, what does he say can compose these general names? According to
him, one can show the commonality of all particular triangles without demonstrating a proof on
all of them or an abstract of a triangle. For example, a triangle can be known by its relational
aspects that are completely non-reliant on the particular angles or shape of that triangle. This is
Berkeley’s solution to the problem Locke faced of saying that one must imagine all and none of
the particulars to gain access to a general idea. Now I will do my own review of Berkeley’s
criticism and alternative.
While I find Berkeley’s critique of Locke’s theory to be spot on, I see several problems in
the alternative offered by him. First, to say that general ideas will be based on similar relational
properties makes one wonder what exactly is similar and what is dissimilar. With a bit of
imagination, all things can be found to be both similar and dissimilar. That makes his definition
very vague. The second problem I see is that if one tries to whittle down the definition of a
general triangle to something that is similar relation properties with regards to being three sided,
and existing in two dimensions, etc., then one has simply said that a triangle is similar with
regards to being a triangle. This is a circular definition and stops one from solving Berkeley’s
first issue by simply being more specific.
This paper has now shown Locke’s theory on general names, Berkeley’s critique of
Locke as well as his own alternative theory. Then I gave my own view on the strength of
Berkeley’s criticism and theory. This has all been in a hope that general names and ideas can
now be found to be better understood as complicated philosophical issues facing the philosophy
of language.
Prompt #2: In the section of Russell’s The Problems of Philosophy that I am examining,
he makes a unique argument for the meaning of universals or property words. I will then critique
Russell’s theory. He begins by acknowledging the arguments made by Berkeley and Hume and
other empiricists who say that there is no such thing as abstract ideas (ex: universal whiteness).
Russell even agrees with them to the extent that when we think of whiteness, one conjures a
specific particular in mind not an abstract idea. Russell also consents that if one wanted to prove
something about triangles, he/she would construct a proof about a particular triangle in which the
proof simply didn’t rely on any of the particulars of that triangle and thus applies to all particular
triangles. However Russell now creates his own theory by asking the reader to think how one
knows if something is a triangle. One would have to say that something is a triangle if it
possesses the correct similarity to the particular triangle one is viewing. Here, departing from
Berkeley and Hume’s views, Russell says that the resemblance one finds would have to be a
universal. This is because there are many particular triangles, and the “resemblance” (similarity)
between any two triangles would have to be consistent for any two triangles. This, then, is an
aspect of being a universal, being consistent throughout all particular cases. The above is
Russell’s reasoning for the existence of universals or property words. Now I will examine
whether or not I find his theory plausible, or if I see any major faults.
While Russell’s reasoning seems sound, a careful examination of it will reveal that in his
refutation of Berkeley, he actually falls into the same trap. That is, Russell talks about a
“resemblance” or what could be called a similarity. Well as I discussed in the above paper,
anything can be construed as resembling or not resembling another thing to a certain extent, and
if one attempts to more narrowly define that resemblance then one is led into the trap of
providing a circular definition. Thus I do not find Russell’s theory plausible, as it does not even
solve the problem of the person he is supposedly refuting.
This paper has shown that while Russell does give a unique account for how to show
there are abstract ideas or universals, he has in fact made a grievous error in the process of his
reasoning, making his theory as a whole weak.