Social dialogue and the public
services in the aftermath of the
economic crisis: strengthening
partnership in an era of austerity
in the Netherlands
National report
Peter Leisink, Ulrike Weske, Eva Knies
Utrecht University School of Governance, The Netherlands,
November 2012
European Commission project
Coordinated by Professor Stephen Bach, King’s College, London
‘Industrial Relations and Social Dialogue’
VP/2011/001
Table of Contents
Summary .................................................................................................................................... 1
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 2
Public Services and public sector social dialogue .................................................................... 2
Overview of public services and employment per sector ................................................... 2
Institutions of social dialogue in the public sector .............................................................. 3
2. National austerity: drivers and measures ............................................................................ 5
Central government ................................................................................................................ 7
Drivers of change ................................................................................................................. 7
Main proposals and union demands ................................................................................... 7
Outcomes............................................................................................................................. 7
Role of social dialogue ......................................................................................................... 7
Impact on social dialogue .................................................................................................... 8
Primary education ................................................................................................................... 8
Drivers of change ................................................................................................................. 8
Main proposals and union demands ................................................................................... 8
Outcomes............................................................................................................................. 8
Role of social dialogue ......................................................................................................... 9
Impact on social dialogue .................................................................................................... 9
Hospitals .................................................................................................................................. 9
Drivers of change ................................................................................................................. 9
Main proposals and union demands ................................................................................. 10
Outcomes........................................................................................................................... 10
Role of social dialogue ....................................................................................................... 10
Impact on social dialogue .................................................................................................. 10
3. a Local government ............................................................................................................. 11
The sectoral level................................................................................................................... 11
Background: the municipal budget ................................................................................... 11
Drivers of change ............................................................................................................... 12
Main proposals and union demands ................................................................................. 12
Outcomes........................................................................................................................... 13
Role of social dialogue ....................................................................................................... 14
Impact on social dialogue .................................................................................................. 14
3. b Case studies in two municipalities ................................................................................... 15
Selection of case studies.................................................................................................... 15
Findings .............................................................................................................................. 15
Leeuwarden ............................................................................................................................. 16
Drivers of change ............................................................................................................... 16
Main proposals .................................................................................................................. 16
Outcomes........................................................................................................................... 17
Role of the social dialogue................................................................................................. 17
Impact on social dialogue .................................................................................................. 17
Zwolle ....................................................................................................................................... 17
Drivers of change ............................................................................................................... 17
Main proposals .................................................................................................................. 18
Outcomes........................................................................................................................... 18
Role of social dialogue ....................................................................................................... 19
Impact on social dialogue .................................................................................................. 19
Comparison of the two municipalities .................................................................................. 19
Relation between the sectoral and local level social dialogue institutions .......................... 20
4. Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 21
The drivers of change in public sector employment relations .............................................. 21
The impact of demographic changes ................................................................................ 22
The consequences of austerity measures and other changes .............................................. 23
The influence of the social dialogue on shaping the consequences of change ................ 24
Reflections on the institutional characteristics of the Dutch case ........................................ 26
References ............................................................................................................................... 27
Appendices............................................................................................................................... 29
List of Tables
Table 1: Employment levels 2008 - 2011
Table 2: Local government budget in billion Euros
Table 3: Comparison of the two cases
Summary
Public management reform programmes aimed at creating a smaller government that
provides better public services for citizens date back to the 1990s. The economic and fiscal
crisis has added an extra impulse to these reform programmes. This impact manifests itself
first in quantitative measures aimed at cuts in public sector employment and wages, and
second in structural reforms such as the decentralization of public services to local
government.
In the Netherlands, successive governments have implemented austerity measures. First the
Balkenende IV government in 2010 (3.2 billion Euros), and then the Rutte I government that
decided on 105 austerity measures which would save 18 billion till 2015 in order to comply
with the requirements of the European Stability and Growth pact by 2013. It is estimated
that as a consequence about 10 per cent of total government jobs will disappear. Because
the economic crisis affected government finances more than foreseen extra austerity
measures were required by the European Commission before 30 April 2012. An ad-hoc
parliamentary majority agreed upon a new package of austerity measures amounting to 12
billion Euros. These cutback decisions included a wage freeze for public sector employees for
2 years and a rise of the pension age. A new coalition cabinet took office in November 2012,
which announced new austerity measures topping earlier measures with an extra 16 billion
Euros. Measures include efficiency cuts, legislation concerning harmonization of dismissal of
public sector employees with regulations for private sector employees, caps on dismissal
compensation, and raising the pension age more quickly.
The economic and fiscal crisis has prompted central government to introduce austerity
measures that affect local government in two ways. First, the general financial contribution
from central to local government has been reduced. Second, central government has
decided to decentralize the provision of specific welfare arrangements, such as providing
sheltered workplaces, to local government with a simultaneous ‘efficiency saving’ on the
budget for providing these arrangements. Apart from central government decisions, local
government has suffered financially because of losses on ground exploitation and social
assistance payments. Due to these developments, local government employers feel the need
to cut back on employment conditions.
With regard to the social dialogue in the local government sector, union representatives
have had a role not so much in the decision-making over the austerity measures but rather
in their implementation and consequences. Wage negotiations at sectoral level were more
difficult than before. When employers and unions continued to disagree, unions organized
protest demonstrations and strikes, which eventually resulted in a collective agreement. The
agreement that was concluded in April 2012 provides a fairly normal wage rise, flexibilisation
of working hours, and an arrangement replacing job security by two year work-to-work
support for employees made redundant.
The dominant driver of change in the case studies in Leeuwarden and Zwolle is the existing
trend towards a smaller and service-oriented government. Austerity measures have
contributed to this process by putting extra pressure on this trend. In both municipalities,
the works council demanded strategic personnel planning which would enable the
1
organization to react better to social changes. In Leeuwarden the works council controlled
that staff reduction was effectuated according to the rules but offered no active support in
finding alternative employment opportunities whereas in Zwolle the works council
collaborated with the employer in arranging job opportunities in the private sector and in
other public organizations. Because the Leeuwarden municipal employer decided at a later
moment to cut more jobs than initially foreseen and expected forced redundancies, a
conflict between employer and works council arose and the works council attempted to
defend its refusal of forced redundancies by submitting the conflict to court. In both cases,
the role of the social dialogue involves the works council monitoring the process of change.
In both cases the works councils and HR directors also acknowledge the need to collaborate
in the current situation which requires change towards a more flexible organization.
The social dialogue is a stable institution as such in the Netherlands. The economic crisis
does not impact the central institutions of the collective agreement, the consultation and
negotiation mechanisms at sectoral level, and the works council at organizational level. It
also appears that the Dutch culture of cooperation is quite resilient and supports the
continued functioning of the social dialogue. However, it appears that the effectiveness of
the social dialogue varies by sector, partly reflecting the differential impact of economic and
demographic circumstances. The social dialogue at sectoral and organizational level is able
to generate innovative arrangements. So it appears that social dialogue institutions in the
Netherlands facilitate producing balanced outcomes that take into account the interests of
various stakeholders.
1. Introduction
This report deals with the question of how austerity measures and other drivers of change
have impacted on public sector employment relations in the Netherlands, and how
government, employers and trade unions have attempted to shape those policies and to
deal with their consequences. We present a general description of recent changes in public
sector employment relations, illustrating the degree of diversity by including central
government, primary education and hospitals. An in-depth description is provided for local
government, which is covered both at the sectoral level and at the local level. We analyse
developments from 2009 onwards, recognizing that the economic crisis, which followed the
global financial crisis in 2008, went along with a fiscal crisis causing governments to take cutback measures (Kickert 2012). However, we recognize that some changes that impact on
public sector employment relationships date back to well before the outbreak of the
economic crisis. For instance, public management reform programmes aimed at creating a
government that would perform better and cost less go back to the 1990s in the
Netherlands (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). Such public management reform programmes
included programmes to modernize public sector employment relations.
Public Services and public sector social dialogue
Overview of public services and employment per sector
The concept of ‘public sector’ is understood in a broad way in the Netherlands. This involves
government, semi-public and nonprofit sectors. We list the various sectors and their
respective number of employees in the period 2008 - 2011, drawing on recent national data.
2
Table 1: Employment levels 2008 - 2011
Sector
2008
Public administration*
Central government
123.335
Local government
171.189
Provincial government
13.003
Public safety*
Police
62.246
Defence
67.527
Education*
Primary education
187.072
Secondary education
105.051
Intermediate vocational education
55.869
Higher professional education
40.027
Universities
51.226
Healthcare (cure and care)**
Care, elderly care, home care
390.940
Hospitals
183.920
Academic hospitals
68.220
* Kerngegevens Arbeid en Overheid (2012)
** Kerngegevens zorginstellingen CBS (2012)
2009
2010
2011
123.599
177.133
13.285
122.537
175.176
13.217
119.064
168.051
12.625
65.598
69.377
64.531
68.956
64.709
65.027
189.586
108.324
56.547
42.020
54.461
186.587
106.093
57.162
41.732
52.851
182.793
106.002
55.787
42.443
54.185
399.720
190.640
70.790
418.330
193.420
72.250
-
Institutions of social dialogue in the public sector
Until 1993 terms of employment for all public sector workers were centrally determined by
the Minister of the Interior, who formally represented the government as employer. With a
view to creating employment conditions that more adequately addressed the differentiated
labour market situations, the government decided to introduce the so-called sector model,
meaning that the former single collective agreement was replaced by currently 14 collective
agreements, each of which covers the employees in one specific sector, such as central
government and police. The unions initially opposed this on the grounds of public sector
workers’ solidarity but in 1993 struck a deal. This deal included that the government realized
its objective of decentralization: employer and employee organizations in each sector
negotiate about the conditions of employment in that sector. The unions obtained the socalled ‘agreement requisite’, which means that changes in existing terms of employment can
only be made if half of the unions represented in the negotiation process agree with these.
From the point of view of public law, some of the collective agreements that replace the
former single agreement are still unilaterally decided by government but in practice central
government can no longer unilaterally change existing conditions of employment but require
union consent (Steijn & Leisink, 2007). Currently, all collective agreements are concluded at
sectoral level. They are generally binding and cover all employees. Their scope is very broad:
apart from pay and working conditions, issues such as career support and work-life balance
are also covered. In practice, all collective agreements are joint agreements although in
some sectors the collective agreement has legally the form of a unilateral decision by
government.
The introduction of consultation and negotiation mechanisms in the public sector was
considered as ‘normalization’, that is creating employment relations that are similar to those
in the private sector which was regarded as the ‘norm’. This process of normalization
involved another institution of social dialogue as well. In 1995 the Works Council Act was
extended to cover public sector organizations, which implied more opportunities for public
3
sector workers to participate in organizational decision-making. The works council is a body
that represents employees at the organizational level. All employees have a right to elect
representatives; in practice the majority of works council members are trade union
members. The works council has legal rights regarding employer policies. This includes the
right of approval in the field of personnel and social policies, which means that the employer
can decide on policies in an area such as health and safety only if the works council approves
of such policies; if the works council disapproves of employer plans the employer is forced to
revise his plans. The works council also has the right of advice in the field of economic and
financial issues, including issues such as outsourcing. If the employer wants to go ahead with
his plans despite a negative advice of the works council, the works council has the right to
submit the issue to a court. About half of works council members report, in a recent survey
(A+O fonds Rijk, 2011) that they attempt to influence organizational policymaking
proactively, about a third report that they participate in policymaking, and about one in five
works council members describe their role as controlling policy proposals made by their
employer. As a rule the works council and the executive director of an organization meet
about ten times per year for consultation.
According to the Works Council Act it is the aim of the works council to contribute to the
well-functioning of the organization in all its goals. The government felt that it was necessary
to restrict this brief in government organizations because this might infringe upon the rights
and responsibilities of politicians to decide the tasks of public bodies and their
implementation. This so-called ‘primacy of politics’ excludes political decisions about tasks,
policies and their implementation from the right of approval and advice by the works council
in government organizations. Austerity measures are a case in point. However, when
political decisions have consequences for employees’ activities, including their job and terms
of employment, the works council must be consulted with on these personnel
consequences. This governmental exception has created occasional conflicts over time. A
survey showed that 15 per cent of government works council members have the experience
that the works council is occasionally/frequently not consulted with on issues because of the
‘primacy of politics’, but only 3 per cent of government employer representatives claim that
this is the case (A+O fonds Rijk, 2011).
To summarize, the institutions of social dialogue involve:
- at sectoral level: negotiations between employer and trade union representatives
over the collective agreement covering all employees in that sector
- at organizational level: negotiations between employer and trade union
representatives about organizational issues such as reorganizations/collective
redundancies, and other issues that have been decentralized by the sectoral
agreement
- at organizational level: consultation and negotiation between the works council and
the employer/top management of the organization dealing with issues according to
the Works Council Act.
Negotiations between employer and trade union representatives at organizational level are
limited to specific issues only. The major institution of social dialogue at organizational level
is the works council. For the sectors in our study Appendix 3 lists the organizations that are
involved in the negotiations at sectoral level over the collective agreement.
4
2. National austerity: drivers and measures
It was only in 2010 when austerity measures were presented for the first time in connection
with the economic and fiscal crisis. At the time the Balkenende IV government, which
consisted of christian democrats (CDA), social democrats (PvdA) and Christenunie (CU), and
which was in office from February 2007 till February 2010, decided on austerity measures
amounting to 3.2 billion Euros. There were cut back decisions before 2010, however. For
instance, in April 2009 the Balkenende IV government decided to freeze central government
funding to local government for the 2009-2011 period. Also, the Balkenende IV government
carried out a reform programme that should reduce the government workforce by 12.000
jobs. The austerity measures that were announced by the Balkenende IV government
included various measures that affected the public sector directly, such as wage restraint
(600 million €), savings on childcare (310 million €), and efficiency cuts on government (231
million €) (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2011: 15-17).
In September 2010 the Rutte I government took office. This consisted of conservative
liberals (VVD) and christian democrats (CDA), and had a marginal majority because the
populist PVV was willing to support it. This government concluded a Coalition Agreement
that referred to the credit crisis as well as to demographic developments as the reason for
announcing austerity measures: “Because of the ageing population, the credit crisis and the
European debt crisis reconstruction measures of government finances are a sore need”. This
government’s plan listed 105 austerity measures that should save 18.3 billion Euros in 2015.
These measures addressed specific subsectors directly. For instance, central government
was cut back by 1.5 billion €, wages in the collective sector by 870 million €, defence by 500
million €. (Algemene Rekenkamer, 2011: 12-13). Another specific measure was the
reorganization of education for children with special needs (Passend Onderwijs) which
should save 300 million Euros. The government aimed at “a strong, small and serviceoriented government that costs less taxpayers’ money, has less employees, less rules and
less governors.” (Coalition Agreement, 2010: 5). In addition management functions were
centralized such as ICT, procurement, housing, audit and facility services. There is a
difference, however, between the cut back measures of the Balkenende and the Rutte I
governments. Whereas the Balkenende government – and previous governments - specified
the number of government jobs that would have to be reduced – and always failed to
achieve that specific target – the Rutte I government has specified a financial target for each
department and leaves it to the department’s management how this target will be achieved.
In practice, however, cutting jobs is the major way in which departments intend to achieve
their target. A survey of cut back measures of the ministries and the organisations which
come under their authority such as the police, defence and Inland Revenue, showed that at
least 26.000 jobs will be cut, which amounts to almost 10 per cent of total government jobs
(NRC 7 January 2012).
The aim of the austerity measures decided by the Rutte I government was to comply with
the requirements of the European Stability and Growth pact by 2013, more specifically a
national debt of no more than 3 per cent in 2014. However, the impact of the economic
crisis affected government finances more than foreseen and extra austerity measures were
required by the European Commission before 30 April 2012. Because the Rutte I government
had fallen by this time an ad-hoc parliamentary majority agreed upon a package of measures
5
totalling 12 billion Euros, in order to meet with the EU requirements. The new cutback
decisions included a wage freeze for public sector employees for 2 years, which should result
in 1,6 billion € savings in 2012 and 2013. Healthcare employees were excluded from this
measure, because of its difficulty in recruiting sufficient employees currently while extra
employees are needed in the nearby future because of the growth in demand for healthcare
related to the ageing population. Another measure in the parliamentary package included
the withdrawal of the earlier cutback measure on education for children with special needs
(amounting to 300 million €) as a response to protests from unions, schools and parents.
Apart from cutback measures this agreement included other types of measures as well,
notably the decision to raise the pension age to 66 in 2019 and to 67 by 2024 (instead of
respectively 2020 and 2025, which the government had decided only a few months before).
The aim of this measure is that more employees will have to work longer and pay taxes
instead of receiving a pension, which is beneficial for the public budget.
After the September 2012 elections a new coalition cabinet took office in November 2012,
this time consisting of conservative liberals (VVD) and social democrats (PvdA). New
austerity measures were announced, topping earlier measures with an extra 16 billion Euros.
Examples include the following measures:
- central government will be forced to be more efficient and thus cut back about 1
billion Euros,
- legislation concerning dismissal of public sector employees will be harmonized with
regulations for private sector employees and dismissal compensation will be capped,
- again the pension age will be raised more quickly: to the age of 66 in 2018 and to the
age of 67 in 2021.
The brief history of austerity measures shows that the goals of these measures are
quantitative as well as structural. The quantitative goals are evident from measures to
achieve more efficiency, for instance through outsourcing and the creation of shared service
centres, and from measures cutting employment and wages. Structural reforms can be
summarized as ‘service-oriented government’. Previous governments have implemented
their own reform programmes from the 1990s onwards with structural reforms called
‘better government’ or ‘another government’, which should provide better service to
citizens and firms. The present structural reforms involve for instance the decentralization of
public services to municipalities.
While our focus is currently on austerity measures as a consequence of the economic and
fiscal crisis, demographic changes are another important driver of change that should be
taken into account. Demographic trends (ageing, dejuvenation) have been a factor
influencing public sector employment policy for more than a decade, particularly in those
sectors, such as government and education, which have a workforce that is comparatively
old. First, in order to deal with the expected outflow of older employees and the consequent
loss of their knowledge, employers have been encouraged over the past decade to develop
age-related policies to support older workers and retain them. Second, demographic
changes have been a reason for employers and unions to agree on the need for policies to
be an employer of choice attracting young employees. The combined consequence of
demographic changes and the economic and the fiscal crisis is manifested by the decision of
successive governments to raise the retirement age. Every new government is intent on
6
raising the retirement age to 66 and 67 at a shorter notice than the previous government
wanted because in that way more employees are forced to continue working, pay taxes and
social security and pension contributions instead of receiving pension benefits partly paid for
by the government.
This introduction has presented an overview of austerity measures taken by central
government for the public sector in general. The implementation of austerity measures is
left to the respective sectors and organizations. Employer and trade union representatives at
sectoral level add their own agendas to the negotiations over the implementation of
centrally decided measures, which often involve structural reforms. This will become clear
from the next sections on central government, primary education and hospitals.
Central government
Drivers of change
The economic and fiscal crisis is a very important driver of change in central government.
Budgetary constraints are one driver of austerity measures, and so are the political
ideologies of the coalition parties in successive governments which favour a small state. The
trend towards modernisation of employment relations is primarily driven by demographic
developments. Although, according to the employer representative, the ageing of the work
force is slowed down as a result of limited mobility to the private sector, central government
wants to be an attractive employer for younger workers and wants to promote a diverse
work force.
Main proposals and union demands
Since January 2011 there is no collective labour agreement (CLA) for central government. In
the negotiations for a new CLA, unions tabled demands regarding: no forced redundancies, a
wage rise of 2%, and no normalisation of the status of civil servants. By contrast the
employer wanted to make 10,000 civil servants redundant, proposed a 2-year wage freeze,
and a ‘normalisation’ of the status of civil servants.
Outcomes
When the negotiation for a new CLA stranded the unions reacted by sending an ultimatum
to the Minister in which they demanded no forced lay-offs and a ‘respectable’ wage
development. The Minister did not react upon this ultimatum. As a result, the unions
organised a demonstration of 10,000 (national and local) civil servants. Until today, there is
no CLA in central government, resulting in a wage freeze.
Role of social dialogue
In contrast to other sectors in our study, in central government, the government not only
has political authority over policy decisions and decides over the budget, but is also
employer. The Minister of the Interior, who represents the employer, is bound by an
agreement of the political parties that make up the coalition government. In this sector,
central government is in the position to impose the budget cuts that have been decided by
the coalition parties. Union representatives indicate that they understand and respect the
position of the employer (budget cuts, the need to work more efficiently), but do not agree
7
with the proposals made by the employer. Unions try to organise ‘traditional issues’ such as
employment security and wage-development, in non-traditional ways, such as strategic
planning, new ways of working, and external mobility.
Employer representatives have some concerns about the legitimacy of union representation
in the future, as they point out that unions have difficulties relating to the views of younger
workers and are primarily concerned with protecting acquired rights.
Impact on social dialogue
Both employer and union representatives who were interviewed, indicated that the current
situation makes collective bargaining hard. The differences between employer and union
positions are larger than they used to be. However, all interviewees emphasized that this
was a ‘normal’ situation with employer and union representatives meeting each other
informally and negotiating other issues besides the collective labour agreement. There was
no support for the idea that the employer might try to bypass social dialogue and
marginalize worker representatives. The relationship between the four unions also remained
unchanged.
Primary education
Drivers of change
The economic crisis has prompted both the central government and the municipalities to
introduce austerity measures that affect primary education (De Volkskrant, 13-2-12). First,
the financial compensations from central government for personnel costs lag behind the
actual rise in those costs (for example the costs due to the ageing workforce), while other
compensations were abolished completely (for example for teaching-assistants). In total,
central government cut about 900 million euro of the 9,5 billion yearly budget (De
Volkskrant, 13-2-2012). About 300 million of this amount was planned for savings on special
primary education, but this plan was rejected by parliament in April 2012. Second, many
schools are faced with a decrease in subsidies from municipalities, for example for the
maintenance of buildings.
In addition to these changes resulting from the economic crisis, the sector is confronted with
demographic changes leading to a quantitative and qualitative shortage of teachers.
Main proposals and union demands
Since 2010, the Minister of Education, Culture and Science has not allowed a wage increase,
while the unions demanded a wage increase of 2,5% and employment security. As a result,
no new CLA comprising primary labour conditions was signed. This impacted the CLA on
secondary labour conditions, since the negotiation space and possible trade-offs were
limited. In addition, both parties raised demands on which they did not want to
compromise, like the unions’ demand for a guaranteed 12-week vacation and the
employers’ demand to sober the leave for older workers.
Outcomes
The last collective agreements on the primary and secondary labour conditions were
concluded in 2009, effectively leading to a wage freeze. In addition, about 6000, mostly
young, employees were laid-off between 2010 and 2011 (Kerncijfers, 2011). Moreover, the
8
austerity measures cause severe financial problems for schools, resulting in larger classes
and less money for caretakers, cleaners and teacher-assistants.
Role of social dialogue
The Minister of Education, Culture and Science decides over the primary labour conditions –
like wages, working hours and social security. Since 2008, the PO-raad [primary education
council] acts on behalf of the employers with regard to the secondary labour conditions. As a
result of the separate authorities over primary and secondary labour conditions there are
two separate social dialogues. Unions did not have a role in the decision-making on the layoffs and the wage freeze resulting from the cut-backs. With regard to the secondary labour
conditions, there were negotiations, but these were unsuccessful because only issues about
which the PO-raad and the unions did not want to compromise were left.
The PO-raad and the unions cooperated in reacting to some planned policy-changes by
government. This was the case for example in the strike against the planned cuts on special
education that was organised by the unions. Although the PO-raad did not support the
means of a strike, the organisation showed sympathy for the demands of the unions. In
addition, both parties presented a letter to the Minister in which they argued against these
cut-backs.
Impact on social dialogue
The austerity measures taken by the government hampered negotiations. On the other
hand, however, the crisis also strengthened the cooperation between the PO-raad and the
unions on some issues, like the stance towards the cuts on special education. To conclude,
while the crisis has made it even more difficult to come to agreements, this difficulty is also
greatly due to the institutional separation of negotiations over the labour conditions and the
current highly detailed CLA for the secondary labour conditions which makes it difficult to
come to agreements that are acceptable for both parties.
Hospitals
Drivers of change
A main driver of change is related to demographic developments: the ageing of the work
force, as well as the population in general resulting in an increasing demand for healthcare.
Another driver is the tight labour market, the problem of attracting and retaining sufficient
numbers of qualified employees and the ambition to be regarded as employer of choice in
the healthcare sector. The introduction of market-like mechanisms in healthcare, including
the emergence of private equity investors (resulting in work pressure and dissatisfaction) is
another important driver. Although these market-like mechanisms are introduced by
subsequent governments, employer and employee representatives point out that health
insurance companies are the driving force behind these changes. The influence of central
government is weak and employer association and trade unions feel no direct interference
from central government. The drivers of austerity measures are not felt in this sector, apart
from the political ideology among subsequent governments to introduce market-like
mechanisms and the decision to limit the set of insured treatments in the obligatory health
insurance.
9
Main proposals and union demands
Unions have tabled demands regarding: wage rise, training and development, voluntary
night shifts for employees older than 55, and improvements for students and interns.
Employers wanted a CLA for several years and agreements on the local level, including a
system of pay-for-performance. Both parties agreed on the importance of employability, but
differed in their ideas about the specific concretisation.
Outcomes
Two collective agreements have been concluded during the period of our study, one
covering 2009-2010, and one covering 2011-2014. The first agreement included a new agerelated personnel policy. This agreement further offers employees: a structural pay rise of 1
per cent per year plus some other financial benefits, and a new life-stage budget. The
agreement for the 2011-2014 period offers employees: a structural pay rise of 2 per cent per
year plus some other financial benefits, and agreements on schooling. Because both
agreements are generally binding, there is no competition between hospitals regarding
employment conditions.
The life-stage budget is considered an innovative practice by representatives of employers as
well as employees. Instead of offering extra days off to employees aged 55+, both parties
agreed to providing all employees with 35 hours per year extra for leave, which can be used
at the discretion of employees. However, union representatives point to implementation
problems on the local level, since hospital management frequently interferes with
employees’ decisions to take leave. Both parties agree that innovative practices can be
found on the organisational level, for example related to the organisation of work
(‘zorgstraten’).
Role of social dialogue
Social dialogue at the sectoral level consists of consultation and negotiation between
representatives of hospital employers, represented by the Dutch Hospitals Association
(NVZ), and of four trade unions. Collective agreements are negotiated and concluded
through social dialogue. Both employer and employee representatives indicate that they
share the same long-term goals, although the specific ideas about interventions often differ.
In the CLA, unions and hospital employers agreed on a particular amount of money to be
transferred to a labour market fund. This money can be used for several purposes, for
example to conduct research on new ways of working in healthcare. This makes the on-going
dialogue much more relaxed, according to both parties, because this enables a discussion
about content, instead of money. Social dialogue then is mainly about cooperation.
Impact on social dialogue
The economic and financial crisis has had very limited impact on social dialogue in the
hospital sector. Because structural pay rises were agreed upon and because there is hardly
any fear of employees losing their jobs, both parties are quite relaxed. In the negotiations
there is the ‘traditional’ trade-off between employers and unions. Their relationships are
good.. The same goes for the relationship between the four unions.
10
3. a Local government
The sectoral level
Local government in the Netherlands, consists of 418 municipalities, and has responsibilities
for policies in various domains, such as housing, infrastructure, environment, promotion of
the local economy, (primary) education, culture, sports, and social assistance. Apart from
core tasks the range of services that municipalities provide varies. Some municipalities
employ public servants to provide services such as in open space maintenance, musea,
concert halls and swimming pools, while many others have outsourced such activities.
Social dialogue at the sectoral level consists of consultation and negotiation between
representatives of municipal employers, represented by the so-called College van
Arbeidszaken (Body of Labour Affairs) that acts on behalf of the Association of Dutch
Municipalities (VNG) and representatives of a number of trade unions, including Abvakabo
FNV, CNV Publieke Zaak, and CMHF.
Background: the municipal budget
Municipalities are highly dependent on central government for their income. Their largest
source of income are the general payments from central government (gemeentefonds),
which can be spend as local policies wish, and specific payments by central government
departments which are to be used in specified policy areas. Normally, the increase of the
payments from central to local government is coupled to the development of the central
government budget, taking into account budget differences between central and local
government; this is called the ‘normalisation system’. Today a budget cut of 1 billion in
central government, results in a decrease of payments to municipalities of 180.000 (18%). In
addition, municipalities receive designated payments from central government, most
importantly for unemployment related social assistance payments. Budget can be added or
reduced depending on changes in the tasks of municipalities. Next to these incomes from
central government, municipalities can generate incomes with interest and dividends and
exploitation of ground. In general, these sources of income are hard to enlarge and incomes
from ground exploitation decreased due to the economic crisis. If the central government
cuts budgets, municipalities can only try to increase their revenues by increasing taxes (for
example on properties). Other local levies are not substantial or are not allowed to generate
more income than they cost. As a result, municipalities are heavily influenced by budget cuts
of central government.
In 2011, the different sources of income for municipality are shown by the Table below. The
first two sources come from central government, accounting for 67,4% of the total budget.
Table 2: Local government budget in billion Euros (source VNG 2012).
Gemeentefonds (general payments from central
government)
Specific payments from central government
Municipal levies
Other own resources
Total of revenues
17.9
18.2
8.0
9.5
53.6
11
Drivers of change
The economic and fiscal crisis has prompted central government to introduce austerity
measures that affect local government in two ways. First, the general financial contribution
from central government to local government (the gemeentefonds) has been reduced
because of a decrease in the government budget which results – due to the ‘normalisation
system – in a proportional decrease in the budget for municipalities. Furthermore, additional
cuts to the gemeentefonds have been made for example by not compensating for the wageincrease of local municipality employees. In addition, the specific budget for social assistance
payments by municipalities was determined for the period 2007-2011 at a time when the
economic crisis was not anticipated. As a result, in 2010 and 2011, the municipal payments
for social security were substantially higher than the funds municipalities received from
central government, resulting in a deficit of 396 million euro in 2010 and 650 million euro in
2011 (VNG, 2011).
Secondly, central government has decided to decentralize the provision of specific welfare
arrangements (such as providing sheltered workplaces; youth care) to local government but
has simultaneously cut back on the budget for providing these arrangements (between 10 to
20 per cent; NRC 30-11-2011) arguing that local government can provide these more
efficiently. As such the decentralization of specific welfare arrangements is in line with a
general trend of bringing government as close as possible to the citizen (being the local
government level), and is therefore not a direct result of the economic crisis only.
Next to municipalities being impacted by budget cuts from central government, the
economic crisis resulted in the postponement and cancellation of building projects and as a
result, municipalities faced losses of several billion euros on incomes from ground
exploitation.
Because of the reduction of central government’s financial contribution the local
government employers feel the need to restrain budget spending on employment conditions
because what they spend more on one domain (employment conditions) will be at the
expense of another domain (services for citizens). An additional important issue impacting
on local government’s spending decisions is the large uncertainty for municipalities with
regard to the nature and the degree of budget cuts to expect from central government. This
uncertainty about financial prospects beyond the 4 year period of local politicians in office
holds local government back from longer term commitments to employment conditions. On
the other hand, the increasing importance of municipalities as ‘first/nearby government’
stimulates many municipalities to aspire to being an employer of choice. This ambition,
however, must meet with demographic and social changes, and has in recent years resulted
in efforts to modernize the collective labour agreement. This is a process that dates back to
well before the banking crisis set in.
Main proposals and union demands
Two collective agreements have been concluded during the period of our study, one
covering 2009-2011, and one covering 2011-2012 (ending 1 January 2013).
Unions have tabled demands regarding pay and employment security. Union wage claims
are based on the principle that wages should compensate for inflation so that employees’
purchasing power is maintained. For the 2009-2011 period unions demanded 2.75 per cent
over 2 years, whereas the employers initially proposed a wage freeze which was
12
unacceptable for the unions. During the negotiations over the 2011-2012 collective
agreement employers offered 2 per cent for a 31 months’ period but unions rejected this as
too little compensation.
Regarding employment security negotiations between employers and unions have
concentrated on the length of the period in which the employee would have a right to jobto-job support while still on the local government’s pay-list after having been made
redundant. Unions claimed that there should be no limit to the job-to-job period cum paylist safeguard for employees. They argued that it would be irrational for local governments
to make employees redundant while the demographic developments would result in an
outflow of the babyboom generation of employees shortly and local government would then
need all employees they were about to dismiss. Employers, however, argued that local
government was forced to decide on cutbacks and show financial health within the 4-year
term of their election period (2010-2014) and thus could not afford to keep redundant
employees on the pay-list indefinitely.
In addition, employers and trade unions were also engaged in negotiations over the
modernisation of the collective agreement, which would be a response to the growing need
for flexibility by local government and to the growing diversity of employees. There is
consensus on various topics that should be part of the “Collective Agreement of the Future”.
These topics include:
- flexibilisation of working hours so as to improve accessibility of public services for
citizens,
- a personal career budget which will empower employees (career self-management)
and which together with other provisions (e.g. job-to-job support) will gradually
replace traditional lifetime employment security,
- reduction of hiring external staff, investing more in permanent staff,
- reduction of bureaucracy.
Outcomes
After prolonged negotiations an agreement was concluded, offering employees:
2009-2011
- a pay rise of 1.5% in 2010 and 0.5% in 2011 and an 0.5% increase of the-end-of-year
payment in 2010 and 2011
2011-2012
- a pay rise of 2% over a 31 months’ period under the 2011-2013 collective agreement,
- flexibility of opening hours without overtime payment or extra compensation,
- job protection in the form of a 2 year period of job-to-job support on the local
government pay-list for employees declared redundant,
- employability support for all employees in the form of a personal career budget of
€1500 for 3 years,
Many local councils have decided on cutbacks on public services. For instance, 1 in 3 local
councils cut back on cultural and social provisions, 1 in 5 on maintenance of infrastructure
and public space, and 1 in 5 on providing household support for elderly and handicapped
citizens (NRC 30-12-2011). Job losses are no longer an exception. In 2011 almost 60 per cent
of municipalities cut back on employment, amounting to almost 4 per cent of headcount,
13
through selective filling of vacancies and terminating temporary contracts. Another 4 per
cent reduction is expected for 2012. Estimates are that by 2014 13.000 jobs will have gone,
which can presumably not be achieved by natural wastage (Personeelsmonitor Gemeenten,
2011). To give one example, Rotterdam will implement the biggest reduction of 2.450 of a
total of 12.2000 jobs (NRC 06-04-2012).
Role of social dialogue
Union representatives have had a role not so much in the decision-making over the austerity
measures but rather in their implementation and consequences. It is significant that over the
period under study collective agreements were negotiated and concluded through social
dialogue, although this proved much harder than before. In addition, unions have been
involved in negotiations over the design of a new Social Framework and in informal talks
over “The collective agreement of the future”.
Employer representatives hold the view that the modernisation of employment relations
confronts the unions with a strategic tension: on the one hand their membership consists
increasingly of older employees who want to hold on to their acquired rights such as lifetime
employment security, while on the other hand such rights mean less for younger employees
who have other interests, which are difficult for unions to identify with because these are
not favoured by their older members. In the future this might pose a threat to union
representation legitimacy – and ultimately to the legitimacy of the social dialogue - if unions
do not succeed in appealing to young employees.
Impact on social dialogue
The negotiations about the two collective agreements which are analysed, broke down and
the unions initiated industrial action (February – May 2010; September 2011 – April 2012).
In both cases informal talks continued and in the end formal negotiations were resumed
resulting in a collective agreement.
Negotiators on the employers’ side acknowledged disagreement on two major issues,
namely job security and pay rise, but emphasized that there was agreement on the issues to
be covered by the “Collective agreement of the future”. They state that relationships
between the two sides are friendly as usual. They reject the idea that there would be a
politicization of industrial relations in the sense that government employers would be intent
on by-passing trade unions. They are adamant that local government employers would not
accept to be kept on a leash by central government. In fact, early May 2012, just after a
collective agreement had been concluded (20 April 2012), the Minister of the Interior called
upon local government employers not to accept the pay rise and to implement a wage
freeze which had just been accepted by Parliament, but the local government employers
decided not to comply. The employer negotiators point out that trade unions, on the other
hand, seem to be intent on postponing bargaining agreements in various sectors with a view
to organizing workers’ discontent over this government’s austerity measures so that
ultimately the government will fall.
14
3. b Case studies in two municipalities
Selection of case studies
Two Dutch municipalities were chosen based on the following considerations. First, only
medium sized municipalities (about 100.000 inhabitants) that had to cut about the same
amount of their total budget were selected. A study by Nicis (2011) evaluating the municipal
budgets of the 2011-2014 period was used to select the municipalities that were reported to
save the largest and the least amount on their budget for their internal organization and
personnel. Two municipalities were chosen that were roughly comparable as regards the
political party representation in the city council, at least in terms of the share that parties on
the left have, based on the assumption that political orientations will influence the choice of
austerity measures. Leeuwarden was chosen as the municipality with the least cut-backs on
its organization and personnel and Zwolle as the municipality with the most cut-backs. In
addition to Zwolle being the municipality with the largest budget cuts on the organization
and its personnel, this municipality has a strong reputation of being a good employer. This
added another interesting dimension, since the success of Zwolle in this area could also play
a role in how this municipality handled the budget cuts on its organization. During the
interviews, it turned out that Leeuwarden, contrary to our expectations based on Nicisinformation, also cut substantially on their costs for the organization and personnel (about
30%) and that therefore, the cases were not contrasted in the way that had been expected.
The interviews did, however, show differences in interviewees’ evaluation of the process of
the cut-backs and the role of the social dialogue, indicating that other factors than the
amount of money being cut explain differences between municipalities.
Within the selected municipalities, we interviewed members of the works councils and the
head of the HR department. In both municipalities, the work councils had the role of
controlling if the local social plans were adhered to and to monitor the process of
reorganizations. In both Zwolle and Leeuwarden, the city council – based on their political
authority – decided on the amount that had to be cut on the budget for the administrative
organization and civil servants. Once this amount was decided on, the management boards
of the municipal organizations were responsible for the way the savings were implemented.
In both municipalities, this was where the works councils became involved. Next to the role
of the municipality director in this process, it was expected that the head of the HR
department would play an important role.
Findings
In this section we will first report the case studies of the two municipalities of Leeuwarden
en Zwolle separately and then compare their situations. Leeuwarden employs about 1050
employees and has a budget of roughly 370 million euros. Zwolle has about 1200 employees
and a budget of roughly 470 million euros. Both Leeuwarden and Zwolle had a stable
financial policy and as a result austerity measures were introduced quite late and were less
far-reaching than in other municipalities. Differences in the process of the implementation
of measures and the role of the social dialogue were found, however.
15
Leeuwarden
Drivers of change
The main development impacting the Leeuwarden municipal organization is perceived to be
the trend towards a smaller government, leaving more tasks to citizens and the
organizations with fewer civil servants. These developments force the municipality to
change by working more business-like and focused on the demands of the citizens. In this
process, the economic crisis and its effects are mainly seen as adding an additional
budgetary pressure and insecurity concerning the incomes from the central government.
An on-going focus on efficiency resulted in a 5 million budget cut the organisation in the
period 2003-2008. Another cut of 1.3 million was planned for the period 2008-2011. These
cuts could be realized without impacting the personnel situation.
The first signs of austerity measures resulting from the economic crisis can be found in
governing programme of 2010-2014. Due to the crisis – and the resulting losses on ground
exploitation and increase of social security payments - budget cuts of 1.2 million were
expected (but not yet planned) in 2010. In 2011 however, it turned out that savings of 12
million would be needed due to the budget cuts from central government. This resulted in a
budget cut for the organization of 4.3 million (3 million from the new governing programme,
1.3 million from previously planned reductions). In addition, a saving on the organization of
3.5 million was planned for the period 2015-217. These measures were expected to result in
a reduction of about 80 to 100 full-time jobs from the total number of full-time jobs of 1054.
These jobs should be reduced by ‘natural wastage’ mainly, in order to limit the number of
redundancies as much as possible. The total budget cut on the municipal organization should
be reached by saving 5-10 per cent spread evenly throughout the organization.
Main proposals
Both the employer and the works council support the aim for an organization that is more in
line with the demands from society by being less controlling and leaving more professional
room for its employees. In addition, both parties emphasize the need for strategic personnel
planning to be able to be more flexible and react to developments in society. There are
however also differences in the views of the employer and the works council. The employer
aims at creating a more flexible organization, including more flexibly hired employees and
more tailor-made agreements for the employees rather than the same rights for all. The
works council on the other hand wants to decrease the number of externally hired
employees and aims to protect the employees having a fixed contract. They do acknowledge
that a more flexible organization is needed, but emphasize that there is a group of
employees that is unable to cope with these changes – especially the group of older
employees.
With regard to the budget cuts, the employer expected that about 80 to100 fulltime jobs
had to be cut. These jobs would mainly be cut by reorganizing the social security department
and by ceasing some of the services the city used to provide, like a cultural centre. Initially, it
was expected that no forced lay-offs would be needed to reach this planned reduction. The
works council agreed with the importance of reducing the number of employees, expecting
that no forced lay-offs would be needed.
16
Outcomes
The actions that resulted from the budget cuts seem to be ‘classical’: all departments had to
cut about 5 to 10% and some departments have an additional specific target. However, the
planned reduction of about 100 full time jobs was changed to about 300 jobs, and the
employer suddenly assumed that it was not possible anymore to adhere to the workguarantee, which had no end at that time. This resulted in the municipality wanting to layoff dozens of employees in the reorganization of the social security service without adhering
to the work-guarantee that was part of the municipality’s social plan. The works council did
not accept this neglect of the social plan and as a result, the works council and the employer
ended up in court to settle the issue – a highly unusual development in the Dutch public
sector. The judge decided that the municipality was only allowed to reorganize when a new
social agreement was made. In this new social agreement, the former work-guarantee was
limited to a two-year period. The works council agreed with this, since they acknowledged
that an unlimited work-guarantee was no longer tenable.
Role of the social dialogue
The works council in Leeuwarden used to have a role aimed at controlling issues according
to the works councils legislation and protecting employees against the employer, rather than
taking the role of a strategic partner. However, this role of strategic partner has been taken
up lately, and the works council is now more involved in policy-development. For example,
the works council has written a document explaining its vision on developments in society
and on how employees should become able to be more flexible by getting more professional
responsibilities.
The control role adopted by the works council in earlier years may have contributed to the
escalating conflict over the reorganization of the social security department, but so have
changes in the position of both the city manager and the head of the HR department. This
change bringing in new people played an important role in the conflict, since at the moment
of the planned change an ad interim city manager was coming into office, who had no
experience in labour relations and no trusted relationship with the works council based on
earlier contacts.
Impact on social dialogue
Although the social dialogue in Leeuwarden has been problematic, both parties expect that
the climate of the social dialogue will improve in the future. One of the reasons is that both
parties acknowledge that they need each other in this period of budget cuts. In addition, the
works council indicated that in the end, it expects to achieve more with a good social
dialogue and being a strategic partner rather than by using legal rights. This change into
being a strategic partner is expected to be even more important for the works council’s
contribution to flexibility on the local level as an answer to changes in the environment.
Zwolle
Drivers of change
On a more general level, the main driver of change is the perceived need for a more integral
organization in order to be able to provide good services to the citizen. Due to the crisis, this
17
pressure became larger because concrete changes needed to be implemented. As early as
2007, Zwolle decided to cut about 2,5 million on its organisation (to be realised in 2011) by
means of information management, HRM and shared service concepts. This was planned to
result in a reduction of 20 to 30 fulltime-jobs on a total of 1200 employees.
In 2010, the first signs of the economic crisis were noticeable: the incomes of ground
exploitation decreased and the number of people needing social security increased. In
addition, a general sense of uncertainty with regard to cutbacks from central government
was felt. As a result, a plan with savings of 8 million was presented, including a 3 million cut
on the municipal organization. In 2011, these cuts were stepped up to 11 million, including a
5 million cut on the municipal organisation, due to the continuing uncertainty about the
cutbacks from central government. From the 5 million cut on the organisation, 4 million was
planned to result from efficiency gains through less managers, a decrease in costs for
facilities, and collaboration with partners in the city. It is expected that the organisation will
shed 30 full time jobs and if collaboration with partners is successful, another 100 full time
jobs will be reduced.
The central government plans in 2012 involving the decentralisation of several public
services together with large efficiency cuts will presumably result in another round of
savings of 8 million, including a 4 million cut on the organisation. Zwolle aims to reduce 20%
of its policy-employees by abolishing duplicates between departments.
New budget cuts from central government are expected in the nearby future and as a result,
Zwolle will make financial provisions to implement the decentralised tasks.
Main proposals
The works council introduced the principle of ‘appreciative changes’ and thereby focuses on
the process through which the employer wants to implement changes or layoffs. In addition,
the works council focuses on a qualitative strategic personnel policy. To achieve a 4 million
cut decided in 2011, the employer planned to lay-off about 40 to 50 full time jobs, excluding
the outsourcing of tasks, without forced-layoffs and focused on the long-term vision
(Rapport Bezuinigingsoperatie, 2010).
Outcomes
The works council agreed with the need of employment reductions and mainly focused on
the way layoffs were implemented. The works council had a large role in the process and
agreed with almost all of the proposals to cut back costs. Some examples include the lay-off
of 8,5 jobs in the public swimming pool, which was implemented by a social plan and which
included a special settlement for older workers in order to secure the jobs of the young
employees (De Stentor, 4-2-2010). In the case of the abolishment of the city guards, the
parties agreed on a social plan that included work-to-work arrangements for the employees
laid-off (RTV Oost, 22-2-2012). Zwolle’s strong network within the city and with other cities,
contributed to the mobility of the laid-off employees. The network with partners within
Zwolle has for example contributed to outsourcing the public green maintenance
department to a private organization. The employees of this department could be
transferred to this private organization with a good social plan, including a ten-year work
guarantee and the establishment of a shared works council with Zwolle.
18
Once the works council decided to advise negatively on an employer plan, namely
concerning the establishment of a shared service centre with some other municipalities. The
main reason was the process of the planned change.
Role of social dialogue
A good relation based on trust is said to exist between the works council, the HR department
and the board of directors. The works council plays an important role and its position is
valued highly by the organization. This importance is evident from the fact that the
municipal departments have their own employee participation platform which functions as a
sort of subcommittee of the works council, although this causes larger costs for the
municipality to organize the works council. As a result, the works council is part of several
discussions and its input is used by the board of directors and the HR department in the
decision making process. In addition, the works council receives feedback about what has
been done with their input. Both parties indicate that part of this good relation is due to the
work of the city manager, who has been on this position for a large number of years and has
given a priority to HR issues and the relation with the works council. For this situation to
flourish continuity of personal relationships between the main actors – works council, HR
director, municipal board of directors – is considered important.
Impact on social dialogue
According to the works council, the relation with the employer is even more important in a
situation of crisis, since parties need each other even more. In this case, it is important to
know on ‘which side’ the HR department stands because it influences the collaboration
between both parties. Both parties support the development of a sectoral collective
agreement which limits itself to the regulation of basic employment conditions and leaves a
more important role for the works council at the local level. This is in line with the
recognition by the works council that the employee should get more responsibility and that
the works council should mainly monitor the process and act as a critical party towards the
board of directors.
Comparison of the two municipalities
The dominant driver of change is the existing trend towards a smaller and service-oriented
government. This trend gets an extra impulse from austerity measures, being mainly the
decreasing payments received from central government and the municipal losses on ground
exploitation. In both municipalities a process of several rounds of budget cuts goes on due to
the financial crisis and the resulting reaction from central government.
In both municipalities the works councils demand a strategic personnel planning which
would enable the organization to react better to changes. The works council in Leeuwarden
opts for a position of strategic control of municipal personnel policies, based on their own
view on employment relationships which involves more room for professionals, less
externally hired staff and temps, and no forced redundancies, while the works council in
Zwolle focuses on the process of change and participates in seeking alternative employment
opportunities based on their view of the organization’s social responsibility and rejection of
forced redundancies.
19
The outcomes of change differed. In Leeuwarden staff reduction was effectuated without
active support in finding alternative employment whereas in Zwolle the municipal workforce
was reduced with active involvement of the employer in arranging jobs in the private sector
– accompanied by a private-public partnership for 10 years – and in other public
organizations. Because the Leeuwarden municipal employer decided to cut more jobs than
initially agreed on, a conflict between employer and works council arose and the works
council attempted to defend its refusal of forced redundancies by submitting the conflict to
court. The court ruled that the employer should design a new reorganization plan and
consult with the works council on the work-to-work support.
In both cases the role of the social dialogue involves the works council monitoring the
process of change. When the employer does not stick to the rules conflict arises. In addition,
the works council in Zwolle participates more in the process of arranging alternative job
opportunities. The role of the social dialogue is actively supported by the employer which
facilitates social dialogue platforms in all municipal departments which feed management
and the works council with information and ideas. Apparently trust-based long personal
relationships between employer and works council in Zwolle influence the role of the social
dialogue positively.
In Leeuwarden and Zwolle both works council and HR director acknowledge the need to
collaborate in the current situation which requires change towards a more flexible
organization. In Leeuwarden the climate for social dialogue is becoming more positive after
a period of strained relationships, whereas in Zwolle the issue is to maintain the positive
social climate in a new situation in which the HR function develops from being employee
champion towards also being a strategic partner in business.
Table 3: Comparison of the two cases
Drivers of change
Outcomes of
change
Role of social
dialogue
Zwolle
Trend towards smaller and serviceoriented government
Leeuwarden
Trend towards smaller and serviceoriented government
Austerity measures: decrease in payments
from central government and losses on
ground exploitation
Staff reduction with active support in
finding alternative employment (in private
sector)
Dialogue actively supported by employer
Austerity measures: decrease in payments
from central government and losses on
ground exploitation
Staff reduction without active support in
finding alternative employment
Role of dialogue according to legal
regulations
Works council as ‘strategic partner’
Impact on social
dialogue
Need for better collaboration
acknowledged by employer and works
council in order to attain goal of being a
more flexible organisation
Works council controls process of change
Need for better collaboration
acknowledged by employer and works
council in order to attain goal of being a
more flexible organisation
Relation between the sectoral and local level social dialogue institutions
20
In both Zwolle and Leeuwarden a local social plan existed to deal with the consequences of
reorganisations and as a result, both municipalities did not experience a large influence of
the negotiations on the sectoral level. The local social plan however, has to be at least at the
level of agreements made in the sectoral collective agreement. This played a role in
Leeuwarden, where the employer and the employee-representatives had agreed on a workto-work period of 16 months, which had to be adjusted after an agreement at the sectoral
level that this period should be 24 months.
In addition, the employer and the works council in both municipalities indicated that they
experienced the sectoral agreement as hindering on several points, especially with regard to
the training budget and local flexibility. Therefore, they support the idea that the sectoral
collective labour agreement should be more basic and leave more room for the local level to
negotiate tailor-made arrangements. In both municipalities, this development is
complemented by a more important role for the works council on the local level, since the
works council is expected to be better able to respond to municipality-specific situations.
The works councils do note however, that the unions have more power on the sectoral than
the local level.
To conclude, it should be noticed that these developments have been around for a longer
time, with the crisis mainly adding more pressure to the need for local flexibility and the
negotiations on the ‘CLA of the future’.
4. Conclusions
These conclusions deal with the major issues of our study. First, we deal with the drivers of
change in public sector employment relations, namely the influence of central government
and its austerity measures, and demographic changes. Secondly, we assess the
consequences of austerity measures and other changes. Thirdly we evaluate what influence
the social dialogue has had on shaping these consequences, and we reflect on the
institutional characteristics of the Dutch employment relations system with a view to
assessing what is distinctive of this national case.
The drivers of change in public sector employment relations
The economic and fiscal crisis and the influence of central government
The history of central government policies to cut back on the public sector goes back to well
before the current economic and fiscal crisis. Previous public management reform
programmes aimed at creating a smaller government that provides better public services for
citizens. The ideological legitimization of these programmes has been a mix of efficiency and
quality of service, lately picking up on some of the Big Society themes that have been
propagated by the British prime minister Cameron. The economic and fiscal crisis has added
an extra impulse to these reform programmes. This impact manifests itself first in
quantitative measures aimed at cuts in public sector employment and wages, and second in
structural reforms such as the decentralization of public services to local government.
Formally it is sectoral employers associations and unions that negotiate over the sectoral
collective agreement, with no involvement of central government. This is in accordance with
21
the 1993 agreement about the decentralization of collective bargaining. Obviously, central
government’s funding decisions have a major impact on public services and influence
employment relations indirectly in each sector. Cut back decisions constrain the scope which
employers and unions have for collective bargaining at sectoral level. This was evident in the
case of local government. However, both local government and hospitals are in the position
that they have other incomes than government funding only, so that they have relative
autonomy in determining terms and conditions. By contrast, central government decides on
the budget for employment conditions in central government and primary education, and
government ministers act formally as employer in negotiations with trade unions. This
means that when government decided on a wage freeze in central government and primary
education there was no room for unions to negotiate about this. Central government also
influences employment conditions for those public services (sheltered workplaces, youth
care) that have been transferred by central government to local government but with cut
backs of up to 20 per cent.
The impact of demographic changes
The average age of the workforce is higher in some parts of the public sector – public
administration; education – than in other parts, with only small numbers of young
employees joining the sector. Demographic trends (ageing, dejuvenation) have been a factor
influencing employment policy in various ways.
First, in order to deal with the expected outflow of older employees and the consequent loss
of their knowledge, employers have been encouraged over the past decade to develop agerelated policies to support older workers and retain them. Such age-related policies, in
combination with the governmental decision in 2004 to stop fiscal support of early
retirement, have resulted in an increase of labour participation among older workers.
However, on the other hand implementing austerity measures in government organizations
is much easier if older employees leave the public service voluntarily, because their labour
costs are higher than average and because there is less chance of the need for collective
redundancies with the associated need for bureaucratic procedures and risk of conflict with
unions. To date the outflow of (older) employees has been sufficiently large to compensate
for the planned reduction of jobs
Second, demographic changes have been a reason for employers and unions to agree on the
need for policies to be an employer of choice attracting young employees. Several measures
have been the result, such as employability support, life-stage and personal career budgets.
The case of hospitals differs from the other sectors in this study, because the current labour
recruitment problems and the expected increase of the demand for healthcare due to the
ageing population create a situation in which employers and unions are exempt from
austerity measures.
To conclude, the current economic and fiscal crisis has provided an extra impulse to public
sector reforms aimed at creating more efficient and service-oriented public services.
However, these reforms have a longer history going back to the 1990s well before the
current economic crisis emerged and they are also a response to other longstanding trends
such as ongoing demographic changes.
22
The consequences of austerity measures and other changes
The austerity measures have had a significant impact on employment relationships in central
and local government, in primary education but hardly any impact in hospitals. This impact is
manifest in a government decided wage freeze in central government and primary
education, where government ministers act as employer. Local government felt the impact
of austerity measures as well because central government reduced its funding to
municipalities. The association of local government employers made use of its relative
autonomy to conclude a collective labour agreement, which includes a modest wage rise.
The impact of austerity measures is also evident in the decline of public sector employment
in all sectors except hospitals. Job losses in central and local government amount to almost
10 per cent. There are also modest job losses (up to 4 per cent) in primary education, which
are partly due to cut back decisions and partly to the declining number of children.
Hospitals are a special case in this study because of the current labour market situation with
which hospitals are confronted and because of the growing need for hospital care related to
the ageing population. Consequently, employer and trade union representatives were able
to agree on a ‘normal’ wage rise.
The public sector is confronted as well with demographic changes. As a result various forms
of employability measures have been introduced, including work-to-work support and a
personal career budget. Another consequence of demographic changes in combination with
the economic and the fiscal crisis is manifested by the decision of successive governments to
raise the retirement age. Every new government is intent on raising the retirement age to 66
and 67 at a shorter notice than the previous government wanted because in that way more
employees are forced to continue working, pay taxes and social security and pension
contributions instead of receiving pension benefits partly paid for by the government.
Austerity measures and demographic changes have also added an extra impulse to the
modernisation of public sector employment relations. Obviously, the concept of
‘modernisation’ means different things to different actors. Yet, despite these differences the
modernisation process has resulted in changes that are quite significant.
Lifetime job security is formally no longer a characteristic of public sector employment,
which it was until recently in government organisations though not in semi-public and
nonprofit organisations. Employers and unions have agreed on regulations to that effect.
The LIFO-principle (Last in first out), which in practice guaranteed that older public servants
could not lose their job, has been replaced with a set of rules that oblige the employer to
offer support for public servants who have become redundant to find another job, and that
obliges the employee to collaborate with the career support and to accept an appropriate
job offer. In local government unions have accepted that employees who have been made
redundant will get support to find another job and will remain on the municipal paylist for a
maximum of 2 years.
Employability has replaced the notion of job security, which - in the Netherlands – involves
the responsibility of the employer to provide facilities to the employee. Modernisation of
23
employment conditions in this domain is strongly related to the recognition of employers
and unions of the increasing diversity of employees and the need to make collective
agreements less standardized. This was also found in the case studies in Leeuwarden and
Zwolle, where both the employer and the works council argued for a more ‘basic’ collective
agreement at sectoral level in order to allow for flexibility at the local level.
Innovative agreements
Over the past years most collective agreements have come to include measures meant to
support lifetime employability of employees, involving measures such as job guidance and
counselling, training and development for older workers, and mobility support in the form
of temporary placements in other organizations with a right to return to the former job.
Several collective agreements include innovative measures that are meant to empower
employees and support their career self-management. Examples of such innovative
measures are the life-stage budget in hospitals and the personal career budget in local
government.
Examples of innovative mobility programmes at local level were found in Zwolle. First, a
strong network of both public and private partners in the municipality was found. This
network contributed to the municipality of Zwolle being able to provide a well-working
work-to-work program for laid-off employees. This network also contributed to the
outplacement of the public green maintenance department to a private organization.
Second, several networks with other partners outside the city were established, like the
Talentenregio which includes 15 municipalities and the Zwolle-Kampen network, in which
the municipalities Zwolle and Kampen closely collaborate. These networks help to increase
mobility by exchanging employees and creating a larger internal job-market. Although these
networks were developed before the crisis, the crisis added extra pressure to the process by
making collaboration between the involved parties more important.
The influence of the social dialogue on shaping the consequences of change
Assessing the influence of social dialogue is not a straightforward and easy task, because all
actors present their proposals, demands and results from their own strategic perspective.
Having said this, we are fairly confident in concluding that collective bargaining by trade
unions has been fairly ineffective in central government and primary education and was
effective in local government and healthcare.
Unions tabled conventional demands for a wage rise compensating for inflation and for job
security. In central government and primary education no collective agreements were
concluded and industrial conflict organized by unions had no effect. The industrial conflict in
the primary education sector is notable because this involved unions and school employers
jointly lobbying against central government’s decision to cut 300 million on education for
children with special needs; at a later stage this lobby was successful as parliament repealed
the initial government decision. In local government negotiations were more difficult than
before, and when employers and unions continued to disagree unions organized protest
demonstrations and strikes, which eventually resulted in collective agreements which
provided a modest wage rise as well as a measure replacing job security by 2 year work-to24
work support for employees made redundant. In healthcare social dialogue functioned as
usual and collective bargaining resulted in wage rises and other arrangements that can be
considered ‘normal’.
When it comes to job losses unions and works councils take the role of controlling that the
process proceeds according to established rules. On the level of local municipalities, social
dialogue is more actively supported in Zwolle and a long trust-based relationship between
the employer and the works council exists. This seems to go along with a proactive
involvement of the social dialogue in developing policies and supporting the creation of
alternative employment opportunities through public-private partnerships and mobility
networks with public and private in the region.
Assessing the influence of unions on the consequences of austerity measures it should be
noted that central and local government have to act within an institutional framework that
constrains their influence on the austerity measures themselves through the so-called
primacy of politics. It is the prerogative of government and parliament to decide on austerity
measures, and when these explicitly involve decisions such as a wage freeze and cuts on
employment it is impossible for unions to change that.
A specific issue of interest in this project concerns the question whether social dialogue
institutions themselves suffer from the impact of austerity measures. There was no support
among our interviewees for the idea that (central) government employers might make use
of the economic crisis to bypass social dialogue and marginalize worker representatives.
Both employer and union representatives who were interviewed, indicated that the current
situation makes collective bargaining hard – in the case of central government and primary
education leading to a unilaterally decided wage freeze. However, all interviewees
emphasized that this was a ‘normal’ situation and that employer and union representatives
meet each other informally and negotiate other issues besides the collective labour
agreement such as social frameworks. The continuity of ‘normal’ employment relations
appears to be dependent on frequent interaction and trusted personal relationships.
However, there is some concern among employer representatives about the legitimacy of
union representation in the future. From their point of view unions cling to claims, for
instance about job security or about the need for detailed rules which provide rights to
employees, that resonate with their membership which consists predominantly of older
employees, but that do not resonate with young employees. Employer representatives
observe that unions do not relate to the views that young employees hold. They think that
unions’ lack of identification with young employees’ views is a major reason why young
employees do not join unions and that this will ultimately affect union representation
legitimacy. On the other hand, union representatives hold the view that young employees
tend to hold naïve views about employment relations and that they will discover the need
for detailed rules providing rights later on in their career. Therefore, unions defend the need
for rules but they recognize that it is difficult for them to bring this message across and
appeal to young employees.
What comes across in this latter issue is the contested issue of flexibility and its wider
implications. One of the characteristics of HR-practices in public sector organizations has
25
been its standardized employment practices and collectivized industrial relations (Farnham
& Horton 1996; Boyne, Jenkins & Poole 1999). Public sector employers are moving towards
HR-practices that involve more flexibility and more space for the individual employee.
Employee representatives continue to subscribe to the view that standardized rules that
specify employee rights are better.
Reflections on the institutional characteristics of the Dutch case
The social dialogue is a stable institution as such in the Netherlands. The economic crisis
does not impact the central institutions of the collective agreement, the consultation and
negotiation mechanisms at sectoral level, and the works council at organizational level.
Employer as well as employee representatives emphasize that employment relations are
‘normal’ even if in some sectors it is impossible to conclude collective agreements because
the central government employer imposes a wage freeze. Employee representatives observe
no attempt from central government or from employers to bypass them. While it may be
impossible to conclude a collective agreement on wages, consultation on other issues occurs
as usual. It appears that the Dutch culture of cooperation, which is also referred to as
‘poldermodel’, is quite resilient and supports the continued functioning of the social
dialogue.
However, the difficult question to answer is whether the social dialogue delivers results.
First, it appears that the effectiveness of the social dialogue varies by sector, partly reflecting
the differential impact of economic and demographic circumstances. In some sectors
collective bargaining is able to produce moderate or even normal results in terms of
employment conditions. More importantly, trade unions and works councils act as
watchdogs of employers’ policies on employment cuts and their implementation. The case
of the Leeuwarden works council shows that legally institutionalized rights help the works
council to enforce its control role. Second, the social dialogue at sectoral and organizational
level is also able to generate innovative arrangements. While one may question the
‘innovative’ character arguing that this is basically enforced because of reorganizations, the
creation of a work-to-work support scheme is regarded by both employers and unions as a
modernisation of employment relations that is better fitted to today’s permanent change.
They take the view that measures to support employees’ employability reflect employer’s
social responsibility, and feel that the social dialogue has been able to contribute to
developing such arrangements. So it appears that social dialogue institutions in the
Netherlands facilitate producing balanced outcomes that take into account the interests of
various stakeholders.
26
References
Algemene Rekenkamer (2011). Bezuinigingsmonitor 2011. Tweede Kamer der Staten
Generaal, vergaderjaar 2010-2011, 32 758, nr.1. ’s-Gravenhage.
A+O fonds Rijk (2011). Medezeggenschap bij de overheid. The Hague.
Arbeid en Overheid (2012). Kerngegevens arbeid en overheid. Retrieved from
http://www.arbeidenoverheid.nl/tng/default.aspx?guid=0a34bb3c-06de-4190-ab47113a5a89ca35&type=pg on 09-10-2012
Boyne, G., M. Poole & G. Jenkins (1999). Human Resource Management in the public and
private sectors. Public Administration, 77(2): 407-420.
CBS (2012). Kerngegevens zorginstellingen. Retrieved from
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=81732NED&D1=1-207&D2=12,6&D3=2-4&HDR=G2,G1&STB=T&VW=T on 09-10-2012
De Stentor (04-02-2012). Sociaal plan voor zwembadpersoneel. Retrieved from
http://www.destentor.nl/regio/zwolle/6187752/Sociaal-plan-voor-zwembadpersoneel.ece
on 14-08-2012.
De Volkskrant (13-02-2012). Ten eerste: ontslagen in het basisonderwijs.
Farnham, D. & S. Horton (1996). Managing people in the public services. Basingstoke and
London: MacMillan.
Kickert, W. (2012). State responses to the fiscal crisis in Britain, Germany and the
Netherlands. Public Management Review, 14(3): 299-309.
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (2011). Kerncijfers 2007-2011. The Hague.
RTV Oost (22-02-2012). Tevredenheid over social plan stadswachten Zwolle. Retrieved from
http://www.rtvoost.nl/nieuws/default.aspx?nid=139753 on 14-08-2012.
Pollitt, C. & G. Bouckaert (2011). Public Management Reform. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Steijn, B. & P. Leisink (2007). Public management reforms and public sector employment
relations in the Netherlands. International Journal of Public Sector Management, 20(1): 3447.
27
VNG (2011). VNG-reactie gemeentefondsbegroting 2012. Retrieved from
http://www.vng.nl/files/vng/vng/Documenten/actueel/brieven/parlement/2011/20111111
_Parlement_ECGF-U201101838.pdf on 14-10-2012.
VNG (2012). VNG-notitie: De financiele stromen van Rijk naar gemeenten. Retrieved from
http://www.vng.nl/files/vng/vng/Documenten/actueel/beleidsvelden/gemeentefinancien/2
012/20120621_geldstromen_rijk_gemeenten.pdf on 12-10-2012.
Zwolle (2010). Rapport bezuinigingsoperatie 4 + 4. Zwolle.
28
Appendices
Appendix 1: Notes from the social partner workshop
On September 20th 2012, researchers and social partners met for a session on the impact of
the economic situation on labour relations in the Dutch public sector. The meeting was
organised by the CAOP, a knowledge centre on labour affairs in the public domain. Employer
representatives from several ministries, representatives from several trade unions and
several academics and experts from the CAOP participated.
In the workshop, both national and international perspectives on the impact of the
economic crisis were discussed and a comparison between different public domains was
made. At the start of the meeting, the research team presented their preliminary findings
and an employer-representative of central government acted as discussant. These
presentations were followed by a discussion on several key issues. In the following section,
the main points discussed will be presented.
Flexibility versus rules
On the one hand, there is a high degree of detail in the CLA, on the other hand there is a
shift in focus towards more flexibility and more steering capabilities for the individual. As
one union representative explained, there are on-going discussions about the CLA being
aimed at ’standard employees’ – while the demands of many employees are different. Some
of the choices that have been made for the group of employees as a whole are sub-optimal
for all or most employees (for example with regard to travelling expenses). As a result, there
needs to be a focus on the different kinds of work within organizations and sectors and the
tailoring of employment arrangements in the future.
According to the discussant, secondary labour conditions get increasing interest. A trend is
developing from detailed rules towards more freedom for the individual. Especially in the
market sector, employees are interested in exchanging working conditions (for instance
wage and leave). The impression is that this has a moderating influence on the total costs for
public employees.
Social dialogue
Role of politics
In many sectors, the government has several roles in negotiations – financial, regulatory and
policy-formulating – and has a variety of reasons for intervening in collective bargaining
negotiations. The interventions by politicians in the industrial relations are both economic
(for example a wage freeze) and policy-oriented (for example the position of older and
younger employees). In the current economic situation, the government is openly
intervening as a reaction to budgetary developments.
29
The participants observe that unions appear to accept the primacy of politics. The downside
of this is that politicians are not always aware of all the ins and outs of labour conditions. As
a result, more connections between the unions and politicians are needed in order for
politicians to make well-informed decisions about labour conditions.
As a result, a different division of roles is proposed between politics, the employer and the
unions: politics need to define the budgetary framework (budgets) and the negotiations
between the employer and the unions should focus on the agreements within this
framework.
Changes within unions
Within the unions, a declining number of members, a shift towards a conflict-model and
internal conflict add pressure to change. The union representatives presented several
explanations for these changes.
First, the union-density is declining, which results in a low number of employees that are
represented and in a worsening of the financial position of the unions. The need for unions
to manifest themselves could lead to a decreasing influence of the social dialogue.
Second, a general shift towards the conflict-model can be noticed in unions. However, the
important role of personal relations between the negotiators should not be underestimated.
The negotiator of a union has to take both its union board and the other negotiator into
account; as a result, it is difficult for unions to suddenly change direction.
Third, different groups of followers can be distinguished within unions, for example more
and less active members and lower and higher educated members. This results in a greater
tension between these groups – also with regard to which regulations are preferred (for
example the ‘last in first out’ principle versus support in finding another job). This results in
tensions within unions.
A CAOP expert and the discussant argue that these developments pressure unions to
change. However the consultation model is still the most advantageous for both employees
and employer to make efficient labour agreements and therefore these are still legitimate.
Impact of the economic crisis
As the discussant indicated, the economic crisis mainly adds an extra financial pressure to a
system that was already changing due to drivers like demographic trends and liberalisation.
On the long run, the contours of a new system can already be noticed. As a result, it is
difficult to pinpoint the impact of the crisis exactly; in the Netherlands budgets for the public
sector are being cut since the ‘80s. The economic crisis forces the government to introduce
budgetary measures which result in a tension in the negotiations because of the limited
options for trade-offs. The discussion focuses on the price of labour, rather than the number
of public servants; the trend is budgeting. The crisis however also creates room for
discussion and leads to innovative measures, like the replacement of the work-guarantee by
a two year work-to-work period.
As concluded by the several parties participating, the crisis is not seen as an all-decisive
factor influencing the Dutch public-sector labour relations: the change started long before
the economic crisis and will last until long after the crisis.
30
Appendix 2: Information about fieldwork
Two Dutch municipalities were selected as case-studies using the following steps. First, only
medium sized municipalities (about 100.000 inhabitants) that had to cut about the same
amount of their total budget were selected. Within this selection, a report of Nicis (2011)
evaluating the municipal budgets of the 2011-2014 period was used to select the
municipalities that were reported to save the largest and least amount on their budget for
the internal organization and personnel. Of the municipalities that had the most and least
reductions on this budget, two municipalities were chosen that were roughly comparable on
their share of left seats in the city council. Leeuwarden was chosen as the municipality with
the least cut-backs on its organization and personnel and Zwolle as the municipality with the
most cut-backs. In addition to Zwolle being the municipality with the largest budget cuts on
the organization and its personnel, this municipality has a strong reputation of being a good
employer. This added another interesting dimension, since the success of Zwolle in this area
could also play a role in how this municipality handled the budget cuts on its organization.
During the interviews, it turned out that Leeuwarden, contrary to our expectations based on
Nicis-information, also cut substantially on their costs for the organization and personnel
(about 30%) and that therefore, the cases could not be compared on the amount they had
to cut back. The interviews did, however, show differences in interviewees’ evaluation of the
process of the cut-backs and the role of the social dialogue, indicating that other factors
than the amount of money being cut explain differences between municipalities.
Within the selected municipalities, we interviewed members of the works councils and the
head of the HR department. In both municipalities, the work councils mainly had the role of
controlling if the local social plans were adhered to and to guard to process of
reorganizations. In both Zwolle and Leeuwarden, the city council – based on their political
authority – decided on the amount that had to be saved on the budget for the
administrative organization and civil servants. Once this amount was decided on, the boards
of the municipal organizations were responsible for the way the savings were implemented.
In both municipalities, this was where the negotiation room for the works councils could be
found. Next to the role of the municipality director in this process, it was expected that the
head of the HR department would play an important role in this process of savings on
personnel. With regard to the sectors central government, hospitals and local government,
a union-representative and employer-representative were interviewed. Primary education
was an exception, since only an employer-representative was interviewed.
List of interviewees (in chronological order)
Union negotiator central government
Two members of employer delegation of local
government
Union negotiator healthcare
Employer board member primary education
Employer negotiator central government
Head of HR department
Manager quality and labour healthcare
Member of works council
Three members of works council
Head of HR department
Union negotiator local government
Abvakabo FNV
VNG
14/03/2012
16/03/2012
Abvakabo FNV
PO-raad
Central government
Municipality of Zwolle
NVZ
Municipality of Zwolle
Municipality of Leeuwarden
Municipality of Leeuwarden
Abvakabo FNV
21/03/2012
26/03/2012
17/04/2012
19/04/2012
20/04/2012
05/06/2012
19/06/2012
19/06/2012
16/08/2012
31
Appendix 3: Employer and trade union organizations
Overview of employer and trade union organizations for each sector included in this study,
which are involved in negotiations over the collective labour agreement
Central government
employer
Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en
Koninkrijksrelaties
Trade unions
ACOP = Algemene Centrale van Overheidspersoneel
CCOOP = Christelijke Centrale van Overheids- en
Onderwijspersoneel
Ambtenarencentrum
CMHF = Centrale van Middelbare en Hogere
Functionarissen bij Overheid, Onderwijs, bedrijven en
Instellingen
Municipalities
employer
VNG = Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten
Hospitals
employer
NVZ Vereniging van Ziekenhuizen
Primary Education
employer
Minister van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen
PO-Raad (PO=primair onderwijs)
Trade unions
Abvakabo FNV
CNV Publieke Zaak
CMHF
Trade unions
Abvakabo FNV
CNV Publieke Zaak
FBZ= Federatie van Beroepsorganisaties in de zorg en
daaraan gerelateerd onderwijs en onderzoek
NU’91
Trade unions
ACOP (Aob FNV)
CCOOP (CNV Onderwijs)
AC
CMHF
32
Appendix 4: Overview of included sectors
Central government
Central government in the Netherlands consists of various ministries, executive bodies (such
as the tax and customs administration), inspections (such as the health care inspectorate)
and quango’s (such as Statistics Netherlands).
Primary education
Dutch primary education consists of basisonderwijs [primary education] and speciaal
onderwijs [special education] for children that are in need of special care. In 2011, about
1.629.600 children between 4 and 12 years were educated in 7.435 schools (Kerncijfers
Onderwijs, 2011). Schools are financed by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science,
involving a lump sum for material and personnel costs based on the number of students and
on the mean age of the teachers employed. The housing of schools is financed by the
municipalities.
Hospitals
The healthcare sector in the Netherlands (care and cure) consists of three domains: care,
elderly homes and home care; hospitals; and academic medical hospitals. The hospital sector
consists of 137 organisations. Approximately 75 per cent of all hospital staff has a job that is
directly care-related.
Annually, a budget is allocated to hospitals by the Dutch healthcare authority (NZa). This
budget is composed of several components, including the number of hospital beds and the
expected ‘production’. The money from this budget is not automatically transferred, but has
to be ‘earned’ by the hospitals by performing medical procedures, all of which have
standardised rates. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (VWS) makes funds available
for developing working conditions (OVA-ruimte).
Local government
Local government in the Netherlands, consists of 418 municipalities, and has responsibilities
for policies in various domains, such as housing, infrastructure, environment, promotion of
the local economy, (primary) education, culture, sports, and social assistance. Apart from
core tasks the range of services that municipalities provide varies. Some municipalities
employ public servants to provide services such as in open space maintenance, musea,
concert halls and swimming pools, while many others have outsourced such activities.
33