Dawkins, Richard (1976). Chapter 10-12, You Scratch my Back, I’ll Ride on Yours (Pgs.166- 188) and Nice guys finish first (Pgs.202-233). Oxford University Press Summary by Deekshitha Divyendar, Georgia Devito, Maddie Lipkowitz and Alex Xie For Dr.Mills Psyc100 Class, Fall 2014 Chapter 10 : You scratch my back, I’ll ride on yours In the nature, the idea of “you scratch my back, I’ll ride on yours” does not work. If you place a scenario where “A” has a parasite located in an area where “A” cannot reach and “B” comes along and helps “A” get rid of the parasite. Then later in the future “B” has the same problem and goes to “A” in hopes of having the favor returned. However “A” turns and walks away from “B”. “A” is considered a “Cheater”, an individual who accepts other individual’s altruism without repaying it back. Then let’s picture a population where it is comprised of 50% “Suckers”, individuals who groom indiscriminately, and 50% “Cheaters”. The cheats would start to gain benefits without cost as the suckers keep grooming the cheats. As time passes the cheats’ genes would pass on as the suckers die from the parasite. When the population reaches 100% “Cheaters” that species would start to go into extinction as none of the cheats are grooming each other and removing the parasite. However when we add a third type in the equation called “Grudgers”, individuals who first groom and discriminate anyone who does not return the favor, the Grudgers are there to weed out the cheats and returns the favor back to anyone that does. So in a population comprised of 50% “Grudgers” and 50% “Cheaters”, as time passes the Grudgers would make mental notes on who the Cheaters are and would not groom them in the future. This then leads to the death of Cheaters by parasites and then the population would be 100% Grudgers and the species would continue to prosper. The idea that works in nature and life is “you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours”, with the idea of exchanging altruism between each individual you can create a kind of symbiotic relationship. This idea works in many organism lives in nature. One being the zebra and oxpecker (a kind of bird). The Zebra provides food to the oxpecker in the form of ticks and parasites and the oxpecker warns the Zebra of predators in the form of a warning call. Another form of altruism is between social insects, such as bees, ants and termites. These insects have great cooperation with each other and provide numerous altruism to their queen. This is due to the fact that the female version of the insects are sterile which means they are not capable in reproduction. Only the queen is able to reproduce more insects. However the question is why do female worker drones help the queen reproduce? The answer is that since they are not able to reproduce they help their queen or mother to reproduce instead. This allows the female worker drones to pass on some of their genes into the next generation. This is because each baby the queen produces, the female worker drones share around 50% of their genes with the baby. There are plenty forms of altruism, another being between ants and fungi. The ants provide leaves to the fungi to break down which in turn allows the fungi to grow. Then when the ants get hungry they break pieces of the fungi to consume. Another form of altruism is between ants and aphids. The ants protect the aphids from harm, while the aphids provide ants nectar. The ants every go as far as taking the baby aphids into the ants den and raise them until they mature, then they gently carry them to the aphids feeding grounds to produce nectar. A way to look at this is that aphids are the ant’s version of a cow. Where the nectar is their version of milk. Chapter 12, Nice guys finish first CONCEPTUAL OUTLINE A) Game Theory (Prisoner’s Dilemma) Strategies 1. Nice/Good Strategies Strategies that first pick COOPERATE are considered to be nice strategies. a) Tit for Tat Strategy b) Tit for Two Tats Strategy 2. Nasty Strategies A nasty strategy is a strategy that DEFECTS before the other player has defected. a) Naïve Prober b) Remorseful Prober B) Division of Games 1. Zero Sum Games A game where there could be only one winner. (Soccer) 2. Nonzero Sum Game A game such as Prisoner’s Dilemma where both players could be winners. C) Payoffs 1. Mutual Cooperation (CC) 2. Defection while the other cooperates (DC) 3. Cooperation while the other side defects (CD) 4. Mutual Defection (DD) SUMMARY As the worldly saying goes- ‘Nice guys finish last’. And although in evolutionary terms according to Darwinism, a nice guy would be someone who helps other genes replicate over his own by incurring personal costs in the process, in which case, nice guys do indeed finish last, there is also another definition of a nice guy that we need to consider. This other definition of a nice guy is a nice guy in the Game Theory. Game Theory is essentially the best decision an individual could take given the strategies that are at play during the time. It could be easily explained with the help of a Payoff Matrix. Suppose there are 2 players playing a card game and there are four possible outcomes. First (REWARD)- Both players COOPERATE and win $300. Second(PUNISHMENT) Both players DEFECT and pay a fine of $10 to the bank. Third (TEMPTATION/SUCKER’S PAYOFF)- 1st player COOPERATES and 2nd player DEFECTS leading the second player to win $500 and the first player (SUCKER) pays $100 to the bank. Fourth (TEMPTATION/SUCKER’S PAYOFF) - 1st player DEFECTS and 2nd player COOPERATES leading first player to win $500 and second player (SUCKER) pays $100 to the bank. In fact, the popular ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ works in a similar fashion, where you replace money with jail term. Therefore, a nice guy in Game Theory is the one who COOPERATES and the bad guy is the one who DEFECTS. We learn that in the Game Theory, a person who COOPERATES has an upper hand in comparison to the person who DEFECTS. Although this theory is extremely simple, it is so hard to understand to a lot of clever individuals as they think more cunningly whereas they don’t need to. The origins of the nice guy stems from reciprocal altruism. Note that the nice guy doesn’t always win. In simple Prisoner’s Dilemma, the best decision for each individual is to always DEFECT. This is because there is no means of establishing trust between the two individuals. However, there is another version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma – the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma or the ‘Iterated’ Prisoner’s Dilemma. Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is essentially the same thing as simple Prisoner’s Dilemma explained above with the only difference that it is played multiple number of times between the same players. This leads to analyzing your opponent’s patterns and there is a means of establishing trust or mistrust as you can in a way predict your opponent’s move after having played him/her a few number of times. This repeated game is way more complex than the regular simple Prisoner’s Dilemma. When the players trust each other, they can succeed at the expense of the banker rather than at the expense of each other. Robert Axelrod, in order to test the iterated model, asked experts to submit strategies; preprogramed rules for action. Fourteen strategies were come up with and Axelrod added a fifteenth strategy called ‘Random’ which played COOPERATE and DEFECT randomly. All these strategies were fed into a computer and each strategy was paired with every other strategy including itself (15x15=225). After 200 moves, the winnings were totaled up and the winner was declared. Surprisingly, the winning strategy was the most ingenious and simplest of all – Tit for Tat Strategy. It is the strategy where COOPERATE is played first and thereafter, whatever is played by the opponent is repeated. If Tit for Tat is playing against Tit for Tat, both end up cooperating throughout the game. If Tit for Tat plays Naïve Prober, which is similar to Tit for Tat except once in a while it plays defect. After the Naïve Prober defects, Tit for Tat retaliates and imitates defect and Naïve Prober copies Tit for Tat’s move and cooperates. This leads to a situation where: Both Tit for Tat and Naïve Prober do worse in comparison than Tit for Tat playing Tit for Tat. Other strategies Tit for Tat is played against is Remorseful Prober who is similar to Naïve Prober but feels remorse and tries to correct itself back to cooperate, however, Tit for Tat playing Tit for Tat is still at the top of the game. Tit for Tat is considered to be a nice strategy; one that is never first to defect. Tit for Tat is the nice guy. Now translating this game in terms of evolution, money is replaced by offspring. In nature, all living beings engage in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and it is proven that playing nice helps. However, playing too nice doesn’t (Tit for Two Tats). We go back to the Grudger birds, who help each other in an altruistic way but don’t help the birds that have refused to help them before. Grudgers dominated the population by passing more genes to the future generations than Cheats(who took favors and didn’t return them bringing both of them down- bad guys) and Suckers (who helped others indiscriminately , and were exploited – too nice). Prisoner’s Dilemma is not a zero sum game, meaning that both parties can win at the expense of the banker. In evolutionary terms this translates to the fact that both parties can win by surviving better at the expense of the nature if they cooperate with each other and help each other. Therefore, by maintaining the selfish gene at the helm, nice guys can finish first by availing the advantage of reciprocal altruism and the bad guys are generally driven out of the environment and become extinct. However, it is also interesting to note that a strategy works well in a climate dominated by that strategy. For example: Tit for Tat works well in a climate that is dominated by Tit for Tats, as all cooperate. Now, Tit for Tat is a robust strategy, which means that it works well with most of the strategies present in the climate. Therefore, in a climate filled with diverse strategies, Tit for Tat is your best bet. It is important to note that Tit for Tat never wins a game, as it never scores more than it’s opponent. It’s benefit results from a mutually shared high score. This is how living being help each other and mutually benefit each other to share a high score(pass on to the future the most number of genes). This goes back to how the strategy is not a zero sum strategy where only one player needs to win but rather a nonzero sum strategy where both players can enjoy a position of high score without one player having to be higher than the other. The idea even applies to many real life modern world scenarios surrounding humans. Consider a couple getting a divorce. It makes sense for the couple to share the same lawyer instead of find two separate lawyers to represent each of them as it saves on money. Although it is a financially better for the couple to share a lawyer, the lawyers don’t represent couples together and the resulting benefit is enjoyed by the lawyers alone. The hapless couple is sucked into a zero sum game whereas they could have played a nonzero sum game by mutually cooperating with each other to reach a common ground without having to involve lawyers. Another example is that of men involved in a war. Mutual cooperation with the particular enemy soldiers facing you across no man’s land most definitely affects your fate and it is greatly better than mutual defection. This situation is a true Prisoner’s Dilemma. Alternatively, the soldier could choose to mutual defection (DC) if he is patriotic and he could get away with it. This behavior could also be seen in fishes that have no gender and switch as they prefer between the two genders. In a fish couple, if the fish that was supposed to play the female defects, the other fish starts to defect too and this eventually leads them to break up. It can be seen in vampire bats, who display a great deal of altruism or favoritism, sharing blood with those bats from their same cave in comparison to those from outside. Altruism and being nice helps in carrying forward a living being’s selfish gene in the process of helping other living beings carry forward their genes as well. Social behavior Social or solidarity ways of life depends on the costs and benefits to the individual 1. Cost/ benefit: a. Increased competition b. Availability of resources c. Attraction of predators Patch size refers to how food is distributed a. Sociality would be costly for animals with small, scattered patch sizes b. Sociality is good for animals with large, scattered patch sizes Sociality in a species 1. Good for sociality a. Sociality can be used as a defense b. Scattered but rich patches 2. Bad for sociality a. Diseases b. More likely higher predation c. Eaten more animal prey Societies are focused around kinship 1. Kin=highly reliable source of aid a. Biological kinship inhibits lethal violence doesn’t include step siblings or spouses 2. Kinship weighs more in situations where fitness is challenged Reproductive value curve 1. represents age-specific expectation of future off spring a. Peaks at sexual maturity Effects of living with non-kin 1. has measurable physiological and health consequences a. Higher levels of cortisol in kids living with a step parent than a biological b. Higher rates of sickness High reciprocity 1. happens when cost is low and benefit is high a. Inability to reciprocate causes individuals to shy away from asking for help Cheater detection 1. enhances the chances of facial detection a. People are able to recognize cheaters in advance b. allows people to minimize altruistic behavior 2. Altruism spreads when withheld from cheaters How we guard our reputation 1. Non-iterated games results in people being nicer than the game theory would predict 2. People are nicer when they are being watched a. Anonymity reduces niceness In-group bias 1. How we treat people in our group as compared to those we view as part of another group 2. Alliances for mutual gain were important to reproductive success a. Such behavior pays off in the form of reproductive fitness 3. In-group and out-group bias becomes more intense when the distinctions are more obvious 4. We categorized people a. Race is a misread of a coalition alliance Encoding race results from a misfiring of adaptions for detecting alliances Historically most large scale conflicts are based on religion and ethnicity which can be accounted for as our in-group/ out-group perception In the chapter on social behavior the textbook begins with the cost and benefit relationships in regards to living a social lifestyle. Animals take into account the increase or decrease in competition (reproductively), the availability of resources, and whether or not the increased size will be more attractive to predators. Animals will also take into account the environment and distribution of food, which is called the patch size. With a small, scattered patch size sociality would be costly for a species; but when the patch size is large and scattered sociality would help a species. The large, scattered patch size works well with a social population because they can spilt up to find food and once found can signal others in the group. Being social is also good in a sense that it can be used as a weapon of protection. On the other hand diseases, higher predation, and (if needed) an increase in the amount of prey needed to feed the group. Societies in the animal kingdom are built around kinship. Kin are thought of as a highly reliable source of aid. It has been shown that biological kinship inhibits lethal violence, however this inhibition of violence is not shared with spouses or stepsiblings. The true importance of kinship comes when fitness of an animal is tested. The effects of living with non-kin have show high correlation with physiological and health consequences such as high levels of cortisol and high rates of general illness when children live with no relational guardians. In lieu of kinship high reciprocity is shown when the benefit outweighs the cost. Interestingly enough when people fell they are less likely to be able to reciprocate they will not ask for help. Connected to kinship and reciprocity is the idea of altruism. Altruism is shown throughout the animal kingdom and has evolved along side cheater detection. We are programmed to detect certain facial characteristics of cheaters. When detected we are naturally programmed to withhold acts of altruism from such people. As a species our level of niceness to others seems to be influenced by the scenario. When anonymous levels of niceness become reduced and when we are being watched our niceness increases. Being social creatures we unconsciously create in-group and out group categories. We treat those that are not in our certain in-group differently than we do those that are, and the more of a distinction the between the two causes a wider chasm. An example of in-group bias is race; this is a misfiring of our ancestral adaptions that detected alliances. In conclusion we are a social species because the benefits outweigh the costs leading to the occurrence of altruism and reciprocity. Questions: 1. All of the following are costly to being a social species except… a. Increased competition b. Small, scattered patch sizes c. Higher predation d. Large, scattered patch sizes Living with non-kin has no negative effects on a child as compared to one who is living with kin. False Tit for Tat Strategy in game theory is a robust strategy. True Which of the following is not a nasty strategy? a. Tit for Tat b. Naïve Prober c. Remorseful Prober d. Random Strategy Altruism can be seen in zebras, bees, ants, fungi, and aphids. True Which role in a society notes which individuals do not reciprocate and discriminate against them? A. Sucker B. Cheater C. Grudger D. Queen E. Worker