On the Necessity of the Ontological Argument
What I propose to do here is look briefly at Leibniz's re-writing of the
Ontological Argument and see what conclusions can be drawn with regard to its
central idea or concept - namely, necessary existence. Leibniz's re-working of
the argument is a response to a perceived weakness in Descartes' articulation of
the argument (which itself is a re-writing of Anselm's argument) so before
examining Leibniz's own account let us briefly recall the form of the argument
in Descartes. The ontological argument is of course an a priori argument for the
existence of God, which is to say that it attempts to prove the existence of God
not on the basis of experience but on the basis of rational deduction alone. In
effect, it tries to show us that God's existence can be proved simply by
unfolding what is contained in the concept of God. The simplest articulation of
Descartes' argument would go something like this:
1. God contains all perfections (e.g. justice, goodness, power etc.).
2. Existence is a form of perfection (i.e. it is better to exist rather than
not exist, and better to exist in a way that is unlimited etc.).
3. Therefore God exists (i.e. it would be a contradiction in the idea of God
for God not to exist).
What the argument wants us to see is that God's existence is necessary, or to
put it another way that existence is contained in the concept of God so that it
would actually be a contradiction to say that God doesn't exist. In other words,
existence belongs to the essence of God in the way that having three sides
belongs to the essence of a triangle. In the Meditations Descartes admits that
it may appear to be a "sophistry" to derive the existence of a thing from its
concept (or essence) but existing (and existing necessarily) is, he argues, the
very attribute that distinguishes God from any finite being. This is why in the
case of God (and God alone) we can know his existence a priori, or from a mere
analysis of the concept of God, whereas with any finite being knowledge of its
existence would have to be based on experience. Despite Descartes' confidence
few philosophers before or since have been prepared to accept that the mind can
derive the existence of a thing from its concept. Aquinas, for example, believed
that existence belongs to God's essence yet never accepted that the mind could
know of the existence of God a priori. Rather one would first have to know God's
existence on experiential grounds in order to properly know that existence
belongs to God's essence. Aquinas thought in fact that knowing about the
existence of anything a priori is just the sort of thing that only God could do.
Similarly, Kant rejected the ontological argument on the grounds that existence
couldn't be treated as a predicate. All genuine predicates or descriptive terms,
Kant argued, add something to our concept of a thing (thus saying that John is
loyal, generous, has a good sense of humour and so on all gives us an extra bit
of information about John). Existence, however, adds nothing to our concept of a
thing, for the concept remains the same regardless of whether a thing exists or
not - e.g. the concept of a hundred pounds remains the same regardless of
whether it exists or not. It should perhaps be pointed out that Kant's idealist
successor Hegel thought that Kant had missed the point with the ontological
argument. After all, it is not entirely clear that one can't treat existence as
a predicate and in the case of God (as Descartes had already argued) necessary
existence is one of the "properties" that distinguishes the concept of God from
the concept of any finite entity. In this sense one could argue that existence
most certainly is a predicate - in fact it tells us something fundamentally
important about God that adds quite a lot to our concept (and as Hegel put it,
one can't compare God to a hundred pounds). Nevertheless, most philosophers
would still baulk at the idea of deriving the existence of a thing from its
concept alone. The ontological argument clearly presupposes that, in some sense,
a contradiction in the idea of God (i.e. the idea of God as not existing) would
also be a contradiction in reality. It is in this connection that I want to
examine Leibniz's re-writing of the ontological argument for it not only
clarifies the role of ideas in relation to reality but seems to have something
important to say about the relation between necessity and possibility.
Fundamentally Leibniz believed that the ontological argument was valid but
"incomplete" in the form in which Descartes presented it. The reason it is
incomplete (and therefore not a proper proof) is because Descartes fails to show
that the idea of God itself is a "real" idea and not a chimera or illusion. Now
according to Leibniz an idea is "real" (or perhaps we could say is "valid") if
it is possible. Thus, a square circle is not a real idea in Leibniz's sense
since it refers to what is intrinsically impossible whereas a red square is
possible (and thus a "real" idea). In Leibniz's account God exists if he is
possible - but how do we know God is even possible? To demonstrate this Leibniz
must do what Descartes failed to do - show that the concept of God is a "real"
concept and not a chimera. Leibniz agrees that the concept of God is the concept
of a being that contains all perfections. But what, properly speaking, is a
perfection? A perfection, Leibniz says, is a simple (i.e. indivisible or
unanalysable) quality that is both intrinsically positive and absolute - i.e.
can be expressed without limit (or infinitely). Thus goodness is a perfection (
a simple quality which cannot be analysed into constituent parts) which is both
positive and can be conceived without limit (likewise, Leibniz would say,
justice and power are also perfections). Not all qualities are perfections
because some can only be conceived with limits (for example any material object
is intrinsically limited by its nature as a material object). The question is
thus whether it is possible to think a being that contains all perfections that is to say, think such a concept without contradiction. Leibniz argues that
the onus of proof here is on the skeptic: to show it is impossible for a being
to possess all perfections one would have to show that there is a necessary
contradiction in the idea of a being containing all perfections, for if there is
no necessary contradiction, then such a being is possible. But in fact, Leibniz
believes, one cannot show that there is a necessary contradiction in the idea of
such a being. If one could one would have to be able to prove it either by
demonstration or by reference to self-evidence (necessary truths must be known
in one way or the other - by proof or by self-evident ideas). Now it is not
self-evident that a being cannot contain all perfections. But neither can it be
proved by reference to the perfections themselves for since the perfections of
goodness and power are (unanalysable) simple qualities one cannot demonstrate
any impossibility in their existing in the same being - and this applies to
anything else one can properly regard as a perfection. In other words, there is
no contradiction in conceiving a being that possesses all perfections. We are
now in a position to begin to understand Leibniz's re-writing of the ontological
argument. The argument goes something like this:
1. It is possible for there to be a being which contains all perfections
(i.e. what we call God). We know that it is possible because it is not
impossible. If the idea of such a being were impossible one would be able to
demonstrate a necessary (a priori) contradiction in the existence of such a
being - but precisely this cannot be done.
2.Now the concept of a possible being that contains all perfections also
includes the perfection of existence (i.e. it not only includes existence as
such but existing "absolutely" or "without limits"). In other words, we cannot
exclude existence from the concept of such a being (nor can we show that it
contradicts any other perfection).
3.But if God is possible, and the idea of God includes all perfections
(including existence), then God must exist (i.e. not existing would be a
contradiction in the idea of God). Now since it would be a contradiction for God
not to exist, God not only exists but exists necessarily. In other words: if
God's existence is possible, then it is necessary. However, Leibniz argues, we
know that God is possible, therefore we can also know his existence is necessary
(we can know it a priori).
How, though, is Leibniz's rewriting of the argument an improvement on
Descartes? To understand this we need to draw out its implications more fully.
Much of Leibniz's reasoning centres around the relation between existence and
possibility and existence and essence. A thing is possible if, by virtue of its
nature or essence, it is not impossible. Thus, anything the essence of which is
not impossible (i.e. contains no contradiction) can, in principle, exist. This
doesn't mean of course that anything that is possible actually exists for, as
Leibniz typically argues, whatever is possible must also have an existential
ground (possibility doesn't exist merely in the abstract). Thus, the world we
live in is a possible world but a (or "the") possible world that God chose to
create. The actual existence of our "possible world" is thus grounded in God who
chose to actualize our world rather than another. All merely possible beings
(i.e. ones that than can exist according to their nature or essence) thus
presuppose a real existential ground - they cannot actually exist merely because
they are possible (in fact if there is not an existential ground that could
actualize them they are not even real possibilities). Thus, any possibility that
is actualized always presupposes a real existential ground which allows it to be
brought about (for example, human beings have the possibility of going to the
moon because they can develop the physical technology to achieve this end). This
seems like a sound principle and yet, as we have seen, Leibniz appears to make
an exception with God. In the case of God alone it appears almost to be the
other way round: with God his mere possibility (or essence) is enough to
"ensure" his existence (although we cannot of course regard his essence as
somehow standing in a causal relation to his existence). Has the great
rationalist not then contradicted himself - reversing a perfectly sound
principle that he himself normally applies to make an exception for God? Leibniz
has two main answers to this. The first is the traditional theological
observation that the concept of God alone refers to a being whose essence
includes existence - indeed, this is the very property that distinguishes God
from a finite being as we have seen. The second point, building on the first, is
that unless there is some being that exists by virtue of its essence we cannot
in fact explain the existence of other beings, and here we perhaps come to the
heart of what is at stake in the ontological argument as far as Leibniz is
concerned. Anything that is merely possible, Leibniz argues, must be grounded in
something actual or existent, for otherwise it could not exist (i.e. could not
come into being or be actualized). But if everything fell into the category of
the merely possible then there is no possible explanation of how anything exists
- thus contradicting the Principle of Sufficient Reason according to which
nothing is without reason (i.e. there is a sufficient reason why everything is
the way it is and not otherwise). The point, however, is not simply that we
couldn't give an account of how anything exists - the point is that without a
being that exists by its nature (or necessarily) then nothing could actually
exist in the first place. In fact, Leibniz goes further than this: if there was
no being that existed according to its essence then it is not merely that
nothing would actually exist, nothing would even be possible. The existence of a
necessary being is thus the ground not merely of the actuality of anything that
exists but the ground of its possibility. In Leibniz's thought this strengthens
the case for God even further, for we not only require a necessary being to
explain the existence of non-necessary (or contingent) beings we require a
necessary being to explain how it is even possible for anything to exist at all.
The upshot is that without a necessary being - or a being that exists according
to its essence - no other being is even possible. The idea of the world just
existing (without any explanation) as a contingent matter of fact - as though it
just happens to exist for no reason but might not have - is thus ruled out by
Leibniz, and for good philosophical reasons. Since the world is actual (i.e.
since it exists) it was clearly possible, but if it was possible it must have an
existential ground and this existential ground cannot itself be merely possible
- it must be necessary. In other words, all merely possible being presupposes
necessary being for it presupposes that which is not merely possible but both
existent and necessary. We can safely assume that Leibniz would not have been
impressed by philosophical doctrines asserting that the existence of the world
is merely a "brute fact" or contingent "absurdity". Perhaps he would have asked
them to "prove" their claim rather than merely assert it - at the very least he
would have accused them of failing to apply the principle of sufficient reason
in any consistent way.
The value - one might say, necessity - of the ontological argument,
particularly in the way that Leibniz develops its implications, lies in the way
that it forces us to contemplate the notion of necessary and eternal existence
as the "ground" of the possible (and indeed forces us to see the necessity in
this idea itself, a necessity which is not merely psychological but
metaphysical). The usual or common criticism that the argument wildly leaps from
concept to reality crudely overlooks the fact that concepts themselves are valid
insofar as they refer to possible, actual or, indeed, necessary being so that if
one can show that possible or actual being presupposes necessary being one is on
strong ground philosophically. To fully understand the reasoning in Leibniz's
account we must understand how the notion of the contingent converges with that
of the possible. A contingent being is one that doesn't necessarily exist therefore prior to its actual existence its being is merely possible. Whatever
exists but was merely possible (and not necessary) therefore requires a
sufficient reason for its existing rather than not existing and this sufficient
reason must be something that exists necessarily (therefore even an infinite
series of contingent beings would still require a necessary being insofar as the
series itself is contingent). However, for all its ingenuity, the argument still
doesn't prove that the personal God of theism (with all perfections etc.)
actually exists and the reason is not hard to determine. While the argument
refers to God as a hypothetical being containing all perfections it will be
noticed that there is only one of these perfections that can effectively "define
God into existence" (as some would put it) and that is the perfection of
existence itself - and therein lies the problem. Even if one accepted the
absolute necessity of a necessary being it is perfectly possible to conceive
necessary existence without identifying this with the personal God of theism
(with all of his particular attributes etc.). In other words, necessary and
eternal existence can be conceived independently of any reference to the
personal God of traditional theism or rational theology. Therefore it is not
really enough to show that whatever is possible presupposes something necessary
for one needs an independent argument to show, in addition, that a necessarily
existing being must be identical with the God of traditional theology (and must
therefore have all the traditional predicates of goodness, justice, power etc.,
conceived as pertaining to a specifically personal and transcendent God). This
is the real reason why the ontological argument fails to show the existence of a
personal God - in every other aspect it appears almost "unassailable".
It is worth noting that most of the traditional theological arguments for the
existence of God rest, in some way or another, upon the assumption that the
existence of the world is itself contingent and thus stands in need of further
explanation, or as Leibniz puts it, stands in need of a "sufficient reason".
Without a necessary being one could never give an account of why the actual
world exists, or why there is something rather than nothing. There are two
closely connected assumptions here both of which can be called into question.
The first is the assumption, almost always taken for granted, that the existence
of the world is a contingent matter of fact (or a collection of contingent
matter of facts) that might have been otherwise (interestingly, the same
assumption underlies the existentialist view that the existence of the world is
merely contingent or even "absurd"). The second, following closely on the first,
is the implicit assumption that the existence of the world needs a special
explanation because somehow it would have been simpler or more "reasonable" for
there to have been nothing at all rather than a world - as though it would
somehow have been a more natural "state of affairs" (if one can put it like
this) if nothing had existed. With regard to the first assumption there is
always a possibility that we are merely assuming the world to be contingent
because we lack proper insight into its necessity. In a way this a natural error
to which the mind is not only prone but seemingly predisposed by its own nature.
But the fact that we might lack insight into the necessity of the world doesn't
by itself entail that existence is merely contingent. There are, of course,
philosophies (e.g. that of Spinoza) and religious traditions (e.g. Buddhism) in
which the world is seen as possessing necessary and eternal existence so that
there is no need to look beyond the world for an external explanation. It is
true that the mind is more naturally inclined to think in terms of finite
beginnings and endings (birth and death etc.) rather than in terms of the
eternal but the fact that the mind has difficulty grasping necessary and eternal
existence (an idea which necessarily exceeds our powers to imagine it) is not
really helped by transferring the properties of necessary and eternal existence
to something allegedly beyond the world. All this achieves is to transfer
necessity and eternity from the actual to the hypothetical - a strategy which
doesn't so much solve a philosophical problem as "double" it, for now we still
have the "difficult to think" properties of necessary and eternal existence but
applied instead to a hypothetical being whose existence is not immediately
evident. No doubt the stronger consideration that impels rational theology
toward the postulation of a transcendent God is the question posed by Leibniz as
to why there is something rather than nothing (i.e. how and why anything can
exist at all). But this question also has its assumptions, not merely the
assumption that the actual world is contingent and must therefore be drawn from
a pre-existent realm of possible worlds, but that somehow it would have been
simpler, easier, or more understandable if nothing at all had existed rather
than something - as though nothing would have been a natural state of affairs
whereas being requires a special explanation as to why it should be the case. As
the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1859-1941) pointed out, there is a certain
confusion that seems to arise here from the fact that the concept of nothing
appears to contain less than the concept of being whereas it actually contains
more, for properly understood the concept of nothing is really the concept of
being itself with a minus sign or logical negation added on. We then effectively
set up the derived (or chimerical) concept of nothing as the opposite of being
as though being and nothing were equal possibilities. Having done this we then
ask why there is being rather than nothing as though nothing could just as
easily (or more reasonably) have been the case (just as if being and nothing
were equal and competing metaphysical possibilities). But in fact there are no
proper grounds for regarding nothing (or non-being) - i.e. the complete absence
of being - as referring to a real metaphysical possibility (quite apart from the
fact that there are no conceivable circumstances in which this alleged
"possibility" could be shown to be the case). As Leibniz himself argued, real
possibility must always be grounded in existence. But since we have no reason to
regard nothing or non-being as even possible we have no reason to regard the
existence of the actual world as anything other than necessary. After all, if
there is no real possibility of nothing or non-being then there is no real
possibility either of the world not existing. Likewise, if the actual world
cannot not exist it is idle to speak of it being drawn from a host of merely
possible worlds for, as Bergson pointed out, the possible in this context is
merely the thought of the actual projected back onto an imaginary state of "preexistence". We should therefore take seriously the notion of necessary existence
but rewrite the ontological argument so that necessary existence is applied to
its proper "object" - the actual world. In this spirit I will therefore conclude
the essay with an alternative atheistic version of the ontological argument which goes something like this:
1.That which exists necessarily cannot not exist.
2.The actual world cannot be coherently conceived as not existing - i.e.
total non-being or non-existence is not a real possibility.
3.Therefore, since its non-existence is not a real possibility, the actual
world exists necessarily - i.e. it cannot not exist.
Finally, it should be noted that the atheistic version of the ontological
argument also has implications for our employment of the idea of God, for the
notion of God only really makes sense on the assumption that the actual world
requires a source of external causality or external necessity as a kind of
ontological or metaphysical supplement to its own lack. In the absence of this
assumption making any sense the concept of a transcendent God becomes a
chimerical or illusory idea based on hypothesizing a being by negating or
overlooking an aspect of the real - i.e. God becomes as nothing. Fundamentally
either the world exists necessarily (contains its reason in itself) or God does
- but it cannot be that both statements are correct. Therefore, if the existence
of the world itself is necessary then it follows that God isn't possible (i.e.
is a chimerical idea). Or perhaps we should say: God isn't necessary, therefore
he isn't possible...