Terror List Negative
Topicality
A. Interpretation - Economic engagement includes economic incentives such as
investment, aid, loans, tech transfer, removal of sanctions, etc.
Haass 2k
(Robert N. Haass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings 2k, Survival, Vol 42, no. 2, Summer, p. 114-115, JD)
Economic engagement might offer tangible
incentives such as export credits, investment insurance or promotion, access to technology, loans or
economic aid. Other equally useful economic incentives involve the removal of penalties such as trade
embargoes, investment bans or high tariffs, which have impeded economic relations between the
United States and the target country. Facilitated entry into the global economic arena and the institutions that govern it rank
Architects of engagement strategies can choose from a wide variety of incentives.
among the most potent incentives in today’s global market. Similarly, political engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition,
access to regional or international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits.
B. Violation – affirmative only removes Cuba from the terror list which is not a form
of economic engagement
C. Topicality is a voting issue for competitive equity and fairness
1. Predictable Limits – research focus is on economic policies towards topic
countries. Including non-economic engagement explodes these limits. Limits
key to neg prep and clash
2. Ground – All DA and K links are based on economic engagement. Non-economic
engagement should be reserved as key neg cp ground. Gound key to in-depth
debates and education
3. Effects T – at best the aff can win that removing Cuba from the terror list might
result in economic engagement, but its not a direct result of the plan. Effects T
is an independent voter because it makes the aff a moving target and explodes
limits
2nc Overview
Ext – More Definitions
Aff is political engagement – plan is diplomatic recognition
Hass 2k
(Richard Hass, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution, Summer 2000, Survival pg 1115)
Similarly, political
engagement can involve the lure of diplomatic recognition, access to regional or
international institutions, the scheduling of summits between leaders – or the termination of these benefits.
Military engagement could involve the extension of international military-educational training in order
both to strengthen respect for civilian authority and human rights among a country’s armed forces and,
more feasibly, to establish relationships between Americans and young foreign military officers
Economic is distinct from political and military
Shafritz 92
(Jay M Shafritz, The Harper Collins Dictionary of American Government and Politics 1992 p 195)
Economic action The planned use of economic measures (as opposed to political or military) designed
to influence the policies or actions of another state in order t(1) to hurt the economy of a real or potential enemy, as with a
trade embargo, or (2) to help the economy f a friendly power, as with loans or favorable terms of trade.
Aff is non-economic engagement – it engages in human rights and democracy
promotion
Rose and Spiegel 8
(Rose is B.T. Rocca Jr. Professor of International Trade and Economic Analysis and Policy in the Haas School of Business at the University of
California, Berkeley, NBER research associate and CEPR research fellow. Spiegel is Vice President, Economic Research, Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco. NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES ; NON-ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE: THE CASE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES Working Paper 13988, National Bureau of Economic Research May 2008
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13988.pdf?new_window=1)
Countries, like people, interact with each other on a number of different dimensions.
Some interactions are strictly economic;
for instance, countries engage in international trade of goods, services, capital, and labor. But many are
not economic, at least not in any narrow sense. For instance, the United States seeks to promote
human rights and democracy, deter nuclear proliferation, stop the spread of narcotics, and so forth.
Accordingly America, like other countries, participates in a number of international institutions to further its foreign policy objectives; it has
joined security alliances like NATO, and international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. In this paper, we
concentrate on the interesting and under-
studied case of international environmental arrangements (IEAs). We ask whether
participation in such non-economic partnerships tends to enhance international economic relations. The answer, in both theory and practice,
is positive.
AT – Removes Sanctions
1. Removing cuba from terror list wont effect santions
Carone 13
(Mauricio Carone, executive director of Cuba Democracy Advocates, The American, April 2 2013, “Cuba Sees an Opening,”
http://www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism, Accessed July 27, 2013, JD)
Kerry supported unilaterally easing sanctions on Cuba during his Senate career, and speculation that the State Department is considering
removing Cuba from the state sponsor list – which also includes Iran, Sudan, and Syria – has been spurred by news reports citing contradictory
remarks from anonymous administration sources. Some high-level diplomats have suggested Cuba be dropped from the list, according to the
Boston Globe. But the State Department's spokesperson Victoria Nuland clarified in late February that it had “no current plans” to change
Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, that has not slowed efforts by those seeking rapprochement with the Castro
regime, as a final decision will not be officially revealed until April 30. Cuba has been on the state sponsors of terrorism list since 1982 due to its
hostile acts and support of armed insurgency groups. While
being on the list of terrorist sponsors imposes sanctions
such as prohibiting the United States from selling arms or providing economic assistance, removing Cuba
from that list would have little effect on these sanctions, as these were separately codified in 1996.
However, it would certainly hand the Castro brothers a major – and unmerited – diplomatic victory. The Castros have long protested and
sought to escape the ostracism associated with the terrorism listing, while refusing to modify the egregious behavior that earned them the
designation. They are also hoping the change could improve their standing among otherwise reluctant members of Congress and lead to an
unconditional lifting of sanctions in the near future.
1. Even if they win that the plan would decrease sanctions – this is an effect of the
plan. This proves our effects T argument
2. And this proves they are extra T – all their definitions say the removal of sanctiosn
is economic engagement – not the terror list. Addition of the terror list into the 1ac
adds something outside of the topic and explodes limits.
Ext – Wont effect sanctions
They don’t solve—even if the FSIA is repealed, Helms-Burton ensures IFI loans to Cuba
Feinberg 11
(Richard E. Feinberg, former senior director for Inter-American Affairs at the NSC, Cuba In Transition, November 2011,
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume22/pdfs/feinberg.pdf, Accessed July 27, 2013, JD)
The U.S. Congress, nevertheless, has passed
legislation that conditions U.S. policies toward Cuban admission to,
and receipt of resources from, the IFIs.¶ These bills include the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (“HelmsBurton”) and¶ legislation concerning international terrorism, expropriation, and trafficking in persons.¶ The most prominent of these legislative
mandates,¶ Helms-Burton,
instructs the U.S. Executive Directors in the IFIs “to oppose the admission of
Cuba as a¶ member of such institution until the President submits a determination that a democratically
elected¶ government in Cuba is in power” (Public Law 104–¶ 114 (1996), Section 104). The bill continues: “If
any¶ international financial institution approves a loan or¶ other assistance to the Cuban government
over the opposition of the United States, then the Secretary of¶ the Treasury shall withhold from
payment to such¶ institution an amount equal to the amount of the¶ loan or other assistance” with respect to either the¶
paid-in or callable portion of the increase in the institution’s capital stock.
AT – Allows IMF Investment
A. Interpretation—Its means belonging to
Oxford English Dictionary 13
(Oxford English Dictionary, Copyright 2013, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/100354?redirectedFrom=its#eid, Accessed July 17, 2013, JD)
its, adj. and pron.
Pronunciation: /ɪts/ A. adj. As genitive of the pronoun, now possessive adjective. Of or belonging to it, or that thing
(Latin ejus); also refl., Of or belonging to itself, its own (Latin suus).The reflexive is often more fully its own, for which in earlier times the own, it
own, were used: see own adj. and pron. B. pron. As possessive pronoun. [Compare his pron.2] The absolute form of prec., used when no n.
follows: Its one, its ones. rare.
B. Violation—plan does not increase engagement belonging to the United States
C. Topicality is a voter for
1. Predictable Limits—aff explodes the topic, removes domestic boundaries on
plans and destroys topic-specific education on USFG engagement
2. Fairness—explosion of topic kills competitive equity, increase in engagement
not belonging to the US destroys ability of neg pre-round prep
3. Still is effects – IMF engagement is only a result of the plan
Rogue States Adv.
1nc
They don’t indict terror list, they indict the accuracy of the terror list
Security threats real – US must hardline Cuba after weapons sales to North Korea
discovered
*also applies as 2nc link to the appeasement DA
Miami Herald 13
(Miami Herald, Editorial, July 21 2013, http://www.miamiherald.com/2013/07/21/3512459/cuba-north-korea-and-the-chong.html, Accessed
July 21, 2013, JD)
The seizure in Panama of the Chong Chon Gang, a
rusty old North Korean ship carrying last century’s Soviet-era
weapons from Cuba hidden under 250,000 sacks of brown sugar, may seem to have the wacky trappings of a Gilligan’s
Island episode with a Cold War flashback that includes a rioting crew and a captain threatening to kill himself when Panamanian soldiers
boarded his ship.¶ But as
the ship’s containers begin to be cleared of the 100-pound bags of sugar and the
weapons systems are exposed and analyzed by experts, no one’s laughing. The case for maintaining a
tough line on North Korea and Cuba has been strengthened.¶ The Obama administration, which has
spent years tossing carrots at both communist countries, keeps finding that neither wants to nibble.
They’re too busy, after all, plotting against the United States and the United Nations.¶ Any talk of removing the communist island from the
State Department’s terror list remains a fool’s errand when faced with more evidence of Cuba’s role as a pass-through for every renegade
nation and terrorist group that seeks harbor there.¶ The Cuban
and North Korean communist dictatorships maintain
Cuba was sending “obsolete defensive weapons” for repairs in North Korea so that Cuba can “protect its
sovereignty.” Among the 240 metric tons of weapons are two anti-aircraft missile systems, nine missiles
“in parts and spares,” two Mig-21 bis jet fighters and 15 engines, the Cubans say.¶ But if the weapons are obsolete why
repair them? In fact, a key radar component of the SA-2 surface-to-air defense system on the ship can still be
used once upgraded to ward off newer Western systems that can disable the old SA-2, surface-to-air
missiles designed for higher elevations like North Korea’s. Were these weapons headed for North Korea to spruce up for
its own use now that neighboring China has toughened its position against Pyongyang?¶ North Korea’s arms deal with Cuba
violates United Nations security resolutions that prohibit the Asian renegade from dealing in arms. The U.N.
Security Council imposed sanctions against North Korea after its first illegal nuclear test in 2006 and again in 2009, sanctions that authorize
inspections of ships at sea. Yet North Korea was removed from the U.S. State Department’s terror list in 2008 after it agreed to international
inspection of its nuclear program. Time has shown that this promise was made to be broken.¶ U.S.
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a
right to call for North Korea to be put back on the
terror list. And those hoping to get Cuba pulled off the terror list should have gotten their wake-up call
about the Castro brothers’ ill will, too.¶ As Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez noted, “Weapons
transfers from one communist regime to another hidden under sacks of sugar are not accidental
occurrences and reinforce the necessity that Cuba remain on the State Department’s list of countries
that sponsor state terrorism. In addition to possible violations of Panamanian law, the shipment almost certainly
violated United Nations Security Council sanctions on shipments of weapons to North Korea and as such,
I call on the Obama administration to submit this case to the U.N. Security Council for review.Ӧ This is no time to be chummy with
rogue regimes. Keep Cuba where it belongs — on the terror list — and add North Korea to the
membership because both countries have demonstrated that they cannot be trusted.
member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and past chair, is
Cuba sponsors ETA and FARC, two foreign terrorist organizations
Claver-Carone 13
(Mauricio Claver-Carone, former US Treasury Department Attorney-advisor, “Cuba Sees an Opening,” The American, April 4 2013,
www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism, Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)
The United States designates ETA and the FARC as foreign terrorist organizations and Cuba continues to
provide support for both groups. The favorite new argument of those seeking Cuba’s removal from the list is to note that peace
negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC are taking place in Havana. But the United States would need to
rescind its designation of ETA and the FARC as foreign terrorist organizations before it could remove
Cuba from the terrorism sponsor list. More importantly, there is no peace agreement or peace in Colombia
and ETA continues to threaten Spain.
Cuba supports Iranian proliferation
CFR 10
(Council on Foreign Relations, “State Sponsors: Cuba, March 23 201, www.cfr.org/cuba/state-sponsorscuba/p9359?breadcrumb=%2Fissue%2F458%2F, Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)
Cuba supports Iran's nuclear ambitions and opposed IAEA rebukes of secret Iranian enrichment sites.
The two countries have banking agreements (Islamic Republic News Agency), economic cooperation and lines of credit
( FNA), and three-way energy-focused treaties with Bolivia (CSMonitor). Cuba and Iran hold regular 'Joint Economic
Commission' meetings; the latest, in November 2009, further expanded bilateral trade and economic ties.
Security is not about mere survival – rather, some degree of relative security is a
prerequisite to human becoming and emancipation.
Booth 5 [Ken, visiting researcher - US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p.
22]
The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by
people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a
life-determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to the extent their life choices and
changes are taken away; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats – whether
these are the lack of food for one’s children, or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The
corollary of the relationship
between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security
might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives. This allows for
individual and collective human becoming – the capacity to have some choice about living differently –
consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be
understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from lifedetermining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is not
synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term
camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal
existence). It is survival-plus , the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming. As an instrumental
value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to
their human being. The achievement of a level of security–and security is always relative –gives to individuals and
groups some time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become, other than merely surviving as human
biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species
can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.
No single cause of violence
Muro-Ruiz 2 [Diego, London School of Economics, “The Logic of Violence”, Politics, 22(2), p. 116]
Violence is, most of the time, a wilful choice, especially if it is made by an organisation. Individuals
present the scholar with a more difficult case to argue for. Scholars of violence have now a wide variety
of perspectives they can use – from sociology and political science, to psychology, psychiatry and even
biology – and should escape easy judgements. However, the fundamental difficulty for all of us is the
absence of a synthetic, general theory able of integrating less complete theories of violent behaviour. In
the absence of such a general theory, researchers should bear in mind that violence is a complex and
multifaceted phenomenon that resists mono-causal explanations . Future research on violence will
have to take in account the variety of approaches, since they each offer some understanding of the logic
of violence.
Stuff to look at
Cuba is a terror threat to the US – fund and harbor hamas, hezbollah, and ETA
Suchlicki 13
(Jaime Suchlicki, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American studies at University of Miami, April 4 2013,
http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue188.htm, accessed 6-25-13, Accessed July 27, 2013, JD)
In addition to its proven technical prowess to interfere and intercept U.S. telecommunications, Cuba has deployed around the world a highly
effective human intelligence network. The type of espionage carried out by Ana
Belén Montes, the senior U.S. defense intelligence
enabled the Castro regime to amass a wealth
of intelligence on U.S. vulnerabilities as well as a keen understanding of the inner-workings of the U.S.
security system. Such information and analysis was provided to Saddam Hussein prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and would undoubtedly
analyst who spied for Cuba during some 16 years until her arrest in 2001, has
be provided to a strategic ally like Iran. While one may argue that factors such as Iran’s limited military capabilities and sheer distance diminish
any conventional concerns, one should expect that Tehran, in case of a U.S.-Iran conflict would launch an asymmetrical offensive against the
U.S. and its European allies through surrogate terrorist states and paramilitary organizations. In such a scenario, Cuban intelligence would be
invaluable to Iran and its proxies and Cuban territory could be used by terrorist groups to launch operations against the U.S. In more specific
terms: Cuba
directly and through Venezuela continues to provide intelligence to Hamas and Hezbollah. Ghazi Nasr al
Din, one of the most important representatives of Hezbollah in Venezuela, has maintained close contact
with Venezuelan government officials and most likely with Cuban officials. Current and former member of Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a Basque terrorist organization continue to reside in Cuba. While some of these
terrorists are on the island as part of an accord between the Cuban and Spanish governments, others are hiding in Cuba, fugitives of Spanish
justice. The
FBI estimates that Cuba has provided safe harbor to dozens of fugitives from U.S. justice who
live on the island under the protection of the Castro regime. Some of these fugitives are charged with or
have been convicted of murder, kidnapping, and hijacking, and they include notorious killers of police
officers in New Jersey and New Mexico. Warranting special mention are the outstanding U.S.
indictments against Cuban Air Force pilots Lorenzo Alberto Pérez-Pérez and General Rubén Martínez
Puente, the head of the Cuban Air Force, who in 1996 ordered these Cuban pilots to shoot down two
unarmed civilian American aircraft over international waters in the Florida Straits. That act of terrorism
killed four men, three of them American citizens. On March 4, 2013, the 44th Anniversary of the founding of the “Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine,” an Iranian supported organization, the Cuban Ambassador to Lebanon, Rene Ceballo Prats, reaffirmed
“Cuba’s firm support for the Palestinian cause.” The previous year, in March 2012, a delegation of the Front headed by Abu Sami Marwan,
visited Cuba at the invitation of Cuba’s Communist Party. Jose R. Balaguer, head of Cuba’s party International Department expressed “the
support and solidarity of Havana with the Palestinian cause.” Another Cuban official emphasized “Cuba’s support for the Palestinian struggle to
establish an independent state with eastern Jerusalem as its capital.” In an attempt to obtain unilateral concession from the U.S., Gen. Raul
Castro’s regime has toned down some of the violent anti-U.S. propaganda of older brother Fidel. Yet the commitments and
interrelationships with anti-American terrorist groups have not disappeared. They have taken a more
sophisticated approach; many times using proxies such as Venezuelan supporters.
There is evidence that Cuba is sponsoring multiple terrorist groups
Hudson 13
(John Hudson, reporter on national security and foreign policy from the Pentagon, Foreign Policy, June 3 2013,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/03/rubio_cuba_belongs_on_the_state_sponsor_of_terror_list, accessed 6-24-13, Accessed
July 27, 2013, JD)
In the face of mounting calls to remove Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FLA)
defended Foggy Bottom's recent decision to keep Cuba on the list, in a statement to The Cable. "The Castro regime sponsors terrorism abroad
and against their own people, and removing
a country from the list of nations that sponsor terrorism requires
evidence of reform," Rubio said. "We have not seen such evidence in Cuba." In its annual Country Reports on Terrorism
released last week, the State Department acknowledged that some conditions on the island were improving, but maintained
three reasons for keeping Cuba on the list: Providing a safe haven for some two dozen members of Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a Spanish rebel group charged with terrorist activity; providing aid to Colombia's rebel
group the FARC "in past years" -- Cuba no longer supports the group today; and providing harbor to "fugitives wanted in
the United States." "It remains clear that Cuba is the same totalitarian state today that it has been for decades," Rubio told The Cable.
"This totalitarian state continues to have close ties to terrorist organizations."
Cuba is sponsoring terrorist groups and Castro brothers are a threat
Ros-Lehtinen 13
(Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee Chairman, May 30 2013, http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/cubaremains-state-sponsor-terrorism-list-ros-lehtinen-concerned-report-underestimates, Accessed July 27, 2013, JD)
“The release of the State Department 2012 Country Reports on Terrorism continues to rightfully designate Cuba on the State Sponsor of
Terrorism (SST) list. The report reaffirms that the Cuban
dictatorship provides safe haven to foreign terrorist
organizations such as the FARC and ETA and harbors fugitives wanted in the United States, one of them being
Joanne Chesimard who is wanted for the murder of a New Jersey State Trooper. “While the report reminds us that the Cuban regime supports
acts of international terrorism, I am disappointed that the report failed to mention the unjustly detainment of U.S. citizen Alan Gross, the fact
that Cuba
collaborates with other SST regimes such as Iran and Syria, and operates an extensive spy
network that poses a significant threat to our national security. The Administration should immediately stop giving
concessions to the regime and deny U.S. visas to their operatives who will never respond to diplomatic niceties. The Castro brothers
will always take any step to undermine U.S. interests, harm U.S. citizens, and support our enemies.”
Cuba government is housing over 70 US fugitives
Claver-Carone 13
(Mauricio Claver-Carone, former US Treasury Department Attorney-advisor, “Cuba Sees an Opening,” The American, April 4 2013,
www.american.com/archive/2013/april/cuba-should-remain-designated-as-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism, Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)
Second, the State Department country report says that “the
Cuban government continued to permit fugitives wanted in
the United States to reside in Cuba and also provided support such as housing, food ration books, and
medical care for these individuals.” That has not changed either. The FBI estimates that Cuba has provided safe
harbor to more than 70 fugitives from U.S. justice who live on the island under the protection of the
Castro regime. Some of these fugitives are charged with or have been convicted of murder, kidnapping,
and hijacking, and they include notorious killers of police officers in New Jersey and New Mexico.
Warranting special mention are the outstanding U.S. indictments against Cuban Air Force pilots Lorenzo
Alberto Pérez-Pérez and Francisco Pérez-Pérez and General Rubén Martínez Puente, the head of the
Cuban Air Force, who in 1996 ordered the pilots to shoot down two civilian American aircraft over
international waters in the Florida Straits. That act of terrorism killed four men, three of them American
citizens.
Ext – Threats Real
Threats real – Cuba recently caught smuggling weapons to North Korea – violating
U.N. arms embargo
Kriel and Adams
(Lomi Kriel and David Adams, July 19 2013, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/20/us-panama-northkoreaidUSBRE96I1A020130720, Accessed July 21, 2013, JD)
(Reuters) - When a
North Korean ship carrying Cuban arms was seized last week in Panama on suspicion of
smuggling drugs, Cuba first said it was loaded with sugar for the people of North Korea, according to a Panamanian official familiar with
the matter.¶ Cuban officials were quick to request the ship be released, pledging there were no drugs on board, and
made no mention of the weapons which two days later were found hidden in the hold under 220,000
sacks of brown sugar, the official told Reuters.¶ "They said it was all a big misunderstanding," the official said, speaking on condition of
anonymity.¶ Cuba declined to comment on the official's account.¶ Questions still surround the cargo of sugar and what
Cuba called "obsolete" Soviet-era weapons which it said it was sending halfway around the world to be
repaired in North Korea.¶ The discovery has put the already isolated Asian nation under increased
diplomatic pressure because the cargo is suspected of being in breach of a U.N. arms embargo against
Pyongyang over its nuclear and ballistic missile program.¶ For Cuba, the benefits of smuggling out-of-date weapons to
North Korea did not seem to make up for the potential pitfalls, experts said.¶ "It's baffling. It's hard to believe Cuba would risk
so much for so little," said Frank Mora, the Pentagon's senior official for Latin America during president Obama's first term.¶
Cuban supplying North Korea with weapons – proves they should remain on terror list
Fontova 13
(Humberto Fontova, Frontpage Mag, July 22 2013, http://frontpagemag.com/2013/humberto-fontova/cuba-north-korea-terrorist-brothers-inarms/, Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)
A North Korean ship trying to sneak missiles through the Panama Canal after leaving Havana was seized
by Panamanian authorities this week. Somebody tipped off the Panamanians that the vessel was carrying illegal drugs.¶ Instead,
while searching under sacks of Cuban sugar the Panamanians found the ship crammed with missilesand
mucho military contraband. (Nuke-rattling North Korea has been under a UN arms embargo since 2006.)¶ Upon getting caught redhanded the ship’s North Korean captain and crew went berserk. The hysterical captain was crippled by a heart-attack then tried committing
suicide by slitting his throat. The crew ran amok sabotaging the ship’s unloading cranes and battled with the Panamanian police. No fatalities
were reported and the crazed North Koreans were eventually subdued, arrested and incarcerated inside an old U.S. naval base.¶ A proud
Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli announced the spectacular bust whereupon Republican Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen issued a pressrelease. “This
incident should serve as a wakeup call to the [Obama] Administration, which over the past
few months has been leading an apparent effort to normalize relations with Cuba, that it cannot
continue to engage the Castro regime,” read the statement by the former Chairwoman of the House Committee on Foreign
Relations. “This revelation confirms once again that Pyongyang must be re-designated on the State Sponsor
of Terrorism list as it continues to cooperate with the Cuban regime, a designated State Sponsor of
Terrorism country, in order to undermine U.S. interests.”
US must hardline cuba in response to North Korea sales – both dems and reps support
hardlining Cuba
*2nc plan unpopular evidence
Johnston 13
(Ian Johnston, Staff Writer, NBC News, July 18 2013, http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/07/18/19537132-senators-call-on-obamato-act-over-cuban-arms-shipment-to-north-korea?lite, Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)
Leading Republican and Democrat senators called on President Barack Obama to act over a Cuban
shipment of weapons and equipment to North Korea, as talks got under way about migration between the U.S. and Cuba.¶
A North Korean ship was stopped by Panama as it headed home with a cargo of rockets, missile parts
and two Cold War-era fighter jets hidden among sacks of brown sugar.¶ United Nations sanctions ban the export of
most military equipment to North Korea, though Havana said it was sending “obsolete” hardware to be repaired and then returned to Cuba.¶
Sen. Robert Menendez, the Democrat who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a statement that the shipment was “a grave
violation of international treaties.”¶ “Weapons transfers
from one communist regime to another hidden under
sacks of sugar are not accidental occurrences, and reinforces the necessity that Cuba remain on the
State Department’s list of countries that sponsor state terrorism,” he said.¶ “In addition to possible
violations of Panamanian law, the shipment almost certainly violated United Nations Security Council
sanctions on shipments of weapons to North Korea and as such, I call on the Obama administration to
submit this case to the U.N. Security Council for review,” he added.¶ Sen. Marco Rubio, who gave the Republican response
to Obama’s State of the Union address this year and is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in a letter to Secretary of
State John Kerry that the
discovery of the shipment should “finally prompt the administration to re-calibrate
its misguided and naïve Cuba policy.”¶ He said the U.S. should “immediately reverse its January 2011
decision easing restrictions on people-to-people travel and remittances sent to Cuba; as well as
immediately halt granting visas to Cuban government officials.”¶ Rubio said Cuba’s actions were a “flagrant
violation” of U.N. sanctions and “the latest reminder of the true nature of the Cuban regime.”¶ “I urge
the Administration to take meaningful action to send a clear message that Cuban collusion with North
Korea to undermine the international nonproliferation system carries heavy consequences,” he said.
Threats aren’t arbitrary – we need to develop strategies for coping with threat
perceptions.
Knudsen 11
(Olav. F., Prof at Södertörn Univ College, Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 360, JD)
In the post-Cold War period, agenda-setting has been much easier to influence than the securitization approach assumes. That change cannot
be credited to the concept; the change in security politics was already taking place in defense ministries and parliaments before the concept
was first launched. Indeed, securitization in my view is more appropriate to the security politics of the Cold War years than to the post-Cold
War period. Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states ‘really’ face dangers from other
states or groups. In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming mainly from the actors’ own fears, or from what happens when the
fears of individuals turn into paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis
on the subjective is a misleading
conception of threat, in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat.
Granted, political life is often marked by misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not occur
simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the time. During the Cold War, threats – in the sense of plausible
possibilities of danger – referred to ‘real’ phenomena, and they refer
to ‘real’ phenomena now. The objects referred to are often not
have to be dealt with both in terms of perceptions and in terms of
the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The point of Wæver’s concept of security is not the potential
the same, but that is a different matter. Threats
existence of danger somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation, he writes, ‘One can view
“security” as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real – it is the
utterance itself that is the act.’ The deliberate disregard of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & Wæver’s joint article of
the same year. As a consequence, the phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic politics. It seems to me that the security
dilemma, as a central notion in security studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Wæver himself has no compunction about referring to
the security dilemma in a recent article.
This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security studies to
insignificant concerns. What has long made ‘threats’ and ‘threat perceptions’ important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication
that urgent action may be required. Urgency, of course, is where Wæver first began his argument in favor of an alternative security conception,
because a convincing sense of urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of ‘security’ and the consequent ‘politics of panic’, as Wæver
aptly calls it. Now, here – in the case of urgency – another baby is thrown out with the Wæverian bathwater. When
real situations of
urgency arise, those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the
problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary democracy. But in Wæver’s
world, threats are merely more or less persuasive, and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of ‘abolishing’
threatening phenomena ‘out there’ by reconceptualizing them, as Wæver does, we should continue paying
attention to them, because situations with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then
we need to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states (such as civil wars, for
instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing with them.
Ext – Security not root cause
The aff’s portrayal of security as monolithic and inherently exclusionary forecloses the
possibility of crafting alternative logics in concrete political contexts.
Browning & McDonald 11 [Christopher S., Associate Professor in International Security in the
Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, & Matt, Senior
Lecturer in International Relations in the School of Political Science and International Studies at the
University of Queensland, Australia, European Journal of International Relations, 19(2), “The future of
critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security,” p. 241-243]
While not without analytical purchase and some degree of normative appeal, however, the Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of the politics of security — of
what security does — is problematic. Put simply, the
suggestion that security has an inherent, universal logic (associated with
urgency and exceptionalism, for example) is a claim that lacks attention to the multiple ways in which security is
understood and practised in world politics. Here, and to reiterate a core claim of this article, greater attention is needed to
the varied social, historical and political contexts in which security is constructed. A range of authors utilizing broadly
constructivist insights, for example, have pointed to the ways in which different discourses of security have radically different
implications in terms of the types and boundaries of communities they serve to construct, the limits of
ethical concern for outsiders, and the types of policies and practices that might flow from them. Nils Bubandt
(2005), for example, suggests that different forms or ‘scales’ of political community — ranging in his analysis from the global to the
national to the local — can be constructed through representations of security, often in competing or
contradictory ways. Maria Julia Trombetta (2008), meanwhile, has argued convincingly that rather than environmental issues being militarized through
being defined as security threats, the logic associated with such issues might encourage alternative logics of security. Roxanne Doty (1998/9) points out that
alternative US government policies towards Haitian refugees in the 1990s should be understood as representative of changing security discourses (from national to
human security). Stefan Elbe (2006) has shown how the securitization of HIV/AIDS has in some contexts resulted in problematic policies that have constituted those
infected with the virus as potential threats to national security to be excluded, while in others it has encouraged states to focus resources on tackling the virus in
ways that would have been unlikely if it remained treated as just another public health issue. And, as Rita Abrahamsen (2002) has noted, the Copenhagen School’s
strong distinction between the realm of ‘security’ on the one hand and ‘politics’ on the other paints a
simplistic image of politics more broadly, limiting the extent to which we can recognize alternative logics
at work (such as that of ‘risk’, for example).¶ Taking this criticism further, it is possible to argue that there is something of a tension here
between the development of a framework that allows us to make sense of the changing content of
security over time and space on the one hand and a commitment to the idea that there is a fixed logic to
security on the other that should encourage us to resist or escape it.3 To a significant degree, the belief in a
negative and exclusionary security logic is a claim that is arguably parasitic upon security being equated
in a timeless and abstract sense with a dominant discourse of security (tied to the nation-state and its preservation).¶ The
above is indeed a criticism advanced stridently by Welsh School theorists, who suggest that security can and should be associated with emancipation rather than
the mechanisms of the state (Bilgin, 2008; Booth, 2005, 2007; Wyn Jones, 2005). For these theorists, the
profound scepticism towards
security characteristic of theorists working in the tradition of post-structuralism or with the Copenhagen School framework is only justified to the
extent that a narrow, exclusionary and statist vision of security is accepted as timeless and inevitable .
And yet in subsequently equating security with the concept of emancipation, Welsh School theorists arguably similarly endorse a set logic of security. Specifically,
they can be accused of ignoring the possibility of negative implications flowing from an association of a particular issue with the language and logic of security (see
Aradau, 2004; CASE Collective, 2006: 456; Neocleous, 2008). And in attempting to use (the power of) security to advance emancipatory ends, little attention is given
to the question of whether a better pragmatic basis for realizing such ends might be through the language of justice, human rights or even economics, for example. ¶
Ultimately, the
tendency to characterize the politics of security as either benign (in the case of the Welsh School) or
pernicious (in the case of the Copenhagen School or post-structuralists) suggests a problematic binary in the critical security studies project.
These positions serve to either deny an association of security with a (sedimented) realist security discourse or a logic of exceptionalism (in the case of the Welsh
School) or perversely require that discourse and logic to remain dominant across time and space for the broader rejection of security to make sense (in the case of
post-structuralism and the Copenhagen School). While this oversimplifies matters somewhat, missing
in such accounts is recognition of
the temporal and spatial specificity of security logics. In short, missing is recognition that security does
different things at different times and in different places (see Ciuta, 2009). While this is a particularly striking omission for
approaches that have precisely set themselves the task of exploring the politics of security and the implications of securitization, it is an omission that questions the
capacity of the critical security studies project as a whole to develop a convincing account of the politics of security. In the final pages, we suggest the need for the
critical security studies project to better recognize these variegated security logics, and to come to terms with the (albeit complex) relation- ship between
sedimented and dominant security discourses on the one hand, and the possibilities for change and difference on the other.
Appeasement DA
Links
Politics
Pol Cap Link
Removing cuba from terror list will drain obama’s political capital
Williams 13
(Carol J. Williams, LA Times, May 3 2013, http://www.latimes.com/news/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-cuba-us-terror-list20130502,0,2494970.story, Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)
Politicians who have pushed for a continued hard line against Cuba cheered their victory in getting the
Obama administration to keep Cuba on the list. U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a South Florida Republican whose
efforts to isolate and punish the Castro regime have been a central plank of her election strategy throughout her 24
years in Congress, hailed the State Department decision as “reaffirming the threat that the Castro regime represents.”¶ Arash Aramesh, a
national security analyst at Stanford Law School, blamed the continued branding of Cuba as a terrorism sponsor on politicians “pandering for a
certain political base.” He also said President Obama and Secretary of State John F. Kerry have failed to make a priority of removing the
impediment to better relations with Cuba.¶ “As much as I’d like to see the Castro regime gone and an open and free Cuba, it takes away from
the State Department’s credibility when they include countries on the list that aren’t even close” to threatening Americans, Aramesh said.¶
Political considerations also factor into excluding countries from the “state sponsor” list, he said, pointing to Pakistan as a prime example.
Although Islamabad “very clearly supports terrorist and insurgent organizations,” he said, the U.S. government has long refused to provoke its
ally in the region with the official censure.¶ The decision to retain Cuba on the list surprised some observers of the long-contentious
relationship between Havana and Washington. Since Fidel Castro retired five years ago and handed the reins of power to his younger brother,
Raul, modest economic reforms have been tackled and the government has revoked the practice of requiring Cubans to get “exit visas” before
they could leave their country for foreign travel.¶ There was talk early in Obama’s first term of easing the 51-year-old embargo, and Kerry,
though still in the Senate then, wrote a commentary for the Tampa Bay Tribune in 2009 in which he deemed the security threat from Cuba “a
faint shadow.” He called then for freer travel between the two countries and an end to the U.S. policy of isolating Cuba “that has manifestly
failed for nearly 50 years.Ӧ The
political clout of the Cuban American community in South Florida and more
recently Havana’s refusal to release Gross have kept any warming between the Cold War adversaries at
bay.¶ It’s a matter of political priorities and trade-offs, Aramesh said. He noted that former Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clinton last year exercised her discretion to get the Iranian opposition group Mujahedeen Khalq, or MEK, removed from the
government’s list of designated terrorist organizations. That move was motivated by the hopes of some in Congress that the group could be
aided and encouraged to eventually challenge the Tehran regime.¶ “It’s
a question of how much political cost you want to
incur or how much political capital you want to spend,” Aramesh said. “President Obama has decided not to
reach out to Cuba, that he has more important foreign policy battles elsewhere.”4 4
Plan kills political capital- angers electorally important Cuban exiles and will be spun
as a victory for Castro. The link only goes one way- keeping them listed costs nothing.
Metzker, reporter @ IPS interpress service, 2013
[Jared Metzker, 6/13/13, “U.S.: CRITICS OF U.S.-CUBA POLICY DISMAYED AT ISLAND'S RE-LISTING AS 'TERROR SPONSOR'”, Interpress Service,
lexis, chip]
Both Muse and Bilbao concluded that Cuba's
continued presence on the State Department's terrorism list arises
less from these shaky legal justifications than from political calculations. Others have arrived at similar
conclusions for years. In 2002, a former advisor to President Bill Clinton suggested that maintaining Cuba on the list
keeps happy a certain part of the voting public in Florida - a politically important state with a large
Cuban exile population - and "it doesn't cost anything". Muse disagreed with the latter part of that statement, however. He
noted that by behaving arbitrarily in what should be a strictly legal matter, the United States was damaging its "credibility on the issue of
international terrorism" and diminishing its "seriousness of purpose" in using the term "terrorism" in a meaningful manner. Proponents of
the status quo argue the opposite, saying that by removing Cuba the United States would damage its credibility
by effectively making a concession. Bilbao explained to IPS that those such views focus on the "spin" of the Cuban
government rather than on the actual consequences of taking Cuba off the list, a move he believes would ultimately benefit the United
States. "I think the priority of the U.S. government should be to determine what's in its best interests," he told IPS. Muse went a step further,
saying the list itself is a problem. He noted that even while the list includes countries that don't deserve to be on it, proven sponsors, such as
Pakistan, of international terrorism - albeit those with friendly relations with the U.S. - are absent from it.
Cuban-American Link
The plan is contentious with Cuban-Americans and will continually be obstructed
Feinberg, former Senior Director for Inter-American Affairs at the National Security
Council, 11
[Richard E., November 2011, “The International Financial Institutions and Cuba: Relations with Non-Member States,” Cuba in Transition,
Volume: 22, p. 44, http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume22/pdfs/feinberg.pdf, date accessed 6/27/13, YGS]
What, then, accounts for the anomaly of the empty¶ Cuban seat at these international organizations? The¶
principal answer is as simple as it is disturbing: a relatively small but well placed and hard-charging community of
Cuban-American exiles. As will be explained toward the end of this section, U.S.¶ legislation mandates the U.S.
Executive Director in¶ the IFIs to oppose the admission of Cuba, and to¶ withhold U.S. payments to the
IFIs should they approve assistance to Cuba over U.S. opposition.¶ Moreover, influential congressional
representatives¶ stand ready to hold legislation or personnel confirmations of interest to the executive
branch hostage to¶ their Cuba-related concerns. To a remarkable degree,¶ the unyielding CubanAmerican lobby has bullied¶ the U.S. executive branch and the IFI leadership into¶ submission, even as
many of their economists and¶ staff understand that excluding Cuba—or any country, for that matter—on political
grounds runs¶ counter to U.S. strategic interests and core IFI¶ norms. In U.S. debates on Cuba policy, there is no¶
equally insistent counter-lobby to balance the hardline pro-sanctions faction.
Plan unpopular-Cuban American legislators
LDN, staff writers, 4/27/13
(Latino Daily News, 4/27/13, “Cuban-American Legislators Want Cuba Kept on “Terror List” While North Korea Off List”,
http://www.hispanicallyspeakingnews.com/latino-daily-news/details/cuban-american-legislators-want-cuba-kept-on-terror-list-while-northkorea-/24133/, accessed 6/24/13, KR)
Numerous Cuban-American
legislators, including Senator Marco Rubio of Florida, want Cuba kept on the U.S.
terror list in spite of the island nation not having sponsored recent acts of terrorism.¶ Beside Rubio, Reps Mario Diaz-Balart (R-FL), Joe
Garcia, Illeana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), and (D-FL) Albio Sires (D-NJ) are drafting a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry to
insist Cuba still meets the critieria to be labeled a sponsor of terrorism. In addition Cuban Senators Ted Cruz
(R-TX) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) have voiced support for keeping Cuba on the list.
Cuban-American lobby has massive clout
Stieglitz, Research fellow at Cornell, 11
(Matthew, 2011, Cornell University, “Constructive Engagement: The Need for a Progressive Cuban Lobby in Obama’s Washington”,
http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Stieglitz-_Final_Paper.pdf, accessed 6/26/13, KR)
Reflecting upon the Castro reign during the 20th century, two themes
emerge: the prominence of the Cuban-American
community, and the actions of US presidents towards Cuba. The clout of the Cuban-American lobby cannot be understated, as the
2000 presidential election showed us. President George W. Bush secured his victory as president in no small part
due to the Cuban-American vote, which he and Al Gore campaign vigorously for. As such, the Gore and Bush campaigns remained
relatively silent on the Elian González case, leaving the matter to the courts so as not to risk any back lash from the Cuban-American
community. After his victory, President Bush tightened restrictions on Cuba much like his Republican predecessors. He further restricted travel
to the island for Cuban- Americans, reduced the amount of remittances that could be sent to the island, placed Cuba on terror-watch lists after
9/11, and maintained that Cuba was a strategic threat to national security (Erlich, 2009). Further, cultural and academic exchanges were
suspended, and many Cuban and American artists found themselves unable to attain visas to travel between Cuba and the United States to
share the rich culture of both nations. By the time President Bush left office, the only Americans legally allowed to enter Cuba were journalists,
family members (who could only go once every three year s), and those visiting the island for religious reasons. While President Bush’s
actions were clearly a reflection of partisanship, they represented a greater component of managing the CubanAmerican electorate, lobby, and agenda. Essentially, Congressional Cuban-American leadership maintains a
stance of isolationism towards Cuba that American presidents have not risked challenging since President
Carter . Every president, regardless of party affiliation, has had to become adept at catering to the CubanAmerican lobby, and this continues to this day. It reached its apex with Jorge Mas Canosa and CANF, but in recent years has waned
slightly. Nevertheless, the power dynamics of the Cuban-American vote have been too risky to challenge,
especially with Florida’s electoral votes hanging in the balance for every presidential election. From a financial perspective,
the campaign contributions of Cuban- Americans highlight how Cuban-American issues will not be ignored, and have
kept them in the limelight despite other, more pressing, foreign policy debates in recent years. Historically, the
Cuba lobby could use Cold War tactics of distaste for communism to drive American inaction towards the island. Recently, this has
shifted towards heavily criticizing Cuba for its deplorable human rights record, which has been a legitimate
complaint since the 1960s. In recent years, Cuba has imprisoned political activists, often without cause, which raised awareness
for Cuba’s government-sponsored infringements upon civil rights in the form of limited or non-existent due process and freedom of speech is
(Erickson, 2009). These
contemporary issues are paramount to any future dialogue with Cuba, and transcend partisan
politics in Washington.
Obama will push and hardline Cuban-American backlash outweighs progressive
influence
Stieglitz, Research fellow at Cornell, 11
(Matthew, 2011, Cornell University, “Constructive Engagement: The Need for a Progressive Cuban Lobby in Obama’s Washington”,
http://www.thepresidency.org/storage/Fellows2011/Stieglitz-_Final_Paper.pdf, accessed 6/26/13, KR)
Normalization of relations with Cuba may come as a result of younger Cuban-Americans, who along with recent
arrivals from Cuba
prefer a policy of engagement with Cuba (Eckstein & Barbería , 2002). This is a stark contrast from the older
generation, which is problematic because the older generation has maintained a well-funded and well-planned
approach to controlling the Cuba debate. This makes President Obama the best candidate for reform
given his predisposition to bipartisan collaboration. Illustrating this are the campaign promises to address Cuba that
President Obama made prior to his election, and some of the issues he has addressed through policy
changes and discourse during his administration. Moving forward, th ere will be opportunities to bring conservative and liberal CubanAmericans in to the discussions regarding the future of US-Cuba relations, the only problem being the way in which this is accomplished. To
date, the Obama Administration has taken some steps to 11 constructively engage Cuba, but there still remains room for the engagement of
progressive Cuban-Americans on the issue.
Rubio Link
Rubio opposed removing cuba from terror list
Hudson 13
(John Hudson, The Cable, June 3 2013,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/03/rubio_cuba_belongs_on_the_state_sponsor_of_terror_list, Accessed July 22, 2013, JD)
In the face of mounting calls to remove Cuba from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism, Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FLA)
defended Foggy Bottom's recent decision to keep Cuba on the list, in a statement to The Cable.¶ "The Castro regime
sponsors terrorism abroad and against their own people, and removing a country from the list of nations
that sponsor terrorism requires evidence of reform," Rubio said. "We have not seen such evidence in Cuba."¶
In its annual Country Reports on Terrorism released last week, the State Department acknowledged that some conditions on the island were
improving, but maintained three reasons for keeping Cuba on the list: Providing a safe haven for some two dozen members of Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a Spanish rebel group charged with terrorist activity; providing aid to Colombia's rebel group the FARC "in past
years" -- Cuba no longer supports the group today; and providing harbor to "fugitives wanted in the United States."¶ "It
remains clear
that Cuba is the same totalitarian state today that it has been for decades," Rubio told The Cable. "This
totalitarian state continues to have close ties to terrorist organizations."¶ Critics allege that State's rationale for
keeping Cuba on the list is increasingly thin and say the island nation shares little in common with the list's other members: Iran, Syria, and
Sudan or those that didn't make the list, and arguably should, such as North Korea and Pakistan. They also latched on to a line in the report that
says: "There was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups."¶ "The report makes
it clear that the State Department doesn't really believe that Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism," said Geoff Thale, program director at the
left-leaning advocacy group Washington Office on Latin America. "Cuba is clearly on the terrorist list for political reasons." ¶ Cuba has been
under a U.S. economic embargo since 1962, which is supported by a small but vocal community of former Cuban citizens in Florida, and a
number of members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, such as Senate Foreign Relations Chairman and Cuban-American Robert Menendez
(D-NJ), who declined to comment to The Cable.¶ Earlier this year, the Boston Globe reported that Secretary of State John Kerry, who has
criticized travel restrictions to Cuba in the past, was considering removing Cuba from the list, but ultimately opted not to change the policy.¶
Rubio made it clear that he supports a hard-line on Cuba, and opposes administration efforts to move
too quickly on the issue.¶ "The Obama administration should abandon considering unilateral concessions
to the Cuban regime," he told The Cable. "An American development worker Alan Gross remains
hostage and only cosmetic reforms have taken place, while nothing has been done to give the Cuban
people greater freedoms."
Gross CP
Counterplan – Gross Condition
CP: The United States federal government should condition the plan on the freedom
of Alan Gross
Conditioning on freedom of Alan Gross key – avoids politics and appeasement
Associated Press 13
Paul Haven, Associated Press, March 23 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/23/cuba-terrorism_n_2939613.html, Accessed July 24,
2013, JD)
HAVANA -- A normally routine bit of Washington bureaucracy could have a big impact on U.S. relations with Cuba, either ushering in a longstalled detente or slamming the door on rapprochement, perhaps until the scheduled end of the Castro era in 2018.¶ U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry
must decide within a few weeks whether to advocate that President Barack Obama should
take Cuba off a list of state sponsors of terrorism, a collection of Washington foes that also includes Iran, Syria and Sudan.¶
Cuban officials have long seen the terror designation as unjustified and told visiting American delegations privately in recent weeks that
they view Kerry's recommendation as a litmus test for improved ties. They also hinted the decision could affect discussions
over the release of jailed U.S. subcontractor Alan Gross, whose detention in 2009 torpedoed hopes of a
diplomatic thaw.¶ Inclusion on the list means a ban not only on arms sales to Cuba but also on items that can have dual uses, including
some hospital equipment. It also requires that the United States oppose any loans to Cuba by the World Bank or other international lending
institutions, among other measures.¶ U.S.
officials agree the recommendation, which Kerry must make before the State
Department's annual terror report is published April 30, has become ensnared in the standoff over Gross. The American was
sentenced to 15 years in prison after he was caught bringing communications equipment onto the island illegally while working for a USAIDfunded democracy-building program.¶ Cuba has been on the terror list since 1982, and is also the target of a 51-year U.S. economic embargo –
the reason why the island of beaches, music and rum is the only country Americans cannot visit as tourists. Removal from the list would not
change that.¶
Critics say Cuba's inclusion on the list has little to do with any real threat posed by the
Communist-run Caribbean island, and they say the list has become so politicized it's useless. North Korea was
removed in 2008 during nuclear negotiations that ultimately failed, and was never put back on. Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden had been
hiding out, is not on the list in large part because of its strategic importance.¶ Longtime Cuba analyst Philip Peters of the Virginia-based think
tank the Lexington Institute said removing Cuba from the list "makes sense ... just because it's been a specious allegation that the United States
has repeated for many years ... It would improve the atmosphere."¶ Others
argue against rewarding Havana unless it
releases Gross.¶ "I have long believed it's in our interest to see an improvement in relations with Cuba,"
said Rep. Chris Van Hollen, a Democrat from Gross's home state of Maryland who traveled with a congressional delegation to Havana last
month. But "the
first step needs to be resolving Alan Gross's situation."¶
Ext - Solvency
Cuba says yes – it’s in their interest
Lopez-Levy 13
(Arturo Lopez-Levy, Lecturer and Doctoral Candidate University of Denver, Huffington Post, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/arturolopez-levy/alan-gross-time-to-negotiate_b_2724758.html, Accessed July 24, 2013, JD)
Any negotiated solution has its costs but it is logical to compare it with the alternatives. In Washington and Miami, the discussion is incomplete
if hardliners do not assume the cost of U.S. government abdicating its moral and legal responsibilities toward someone who worked for the
USAID programs conceived under the Helms-Burton law. The
sectors opposed to a negotiation have prevailed without
even explaining the benefits, costs and uncertainties of the proposed course of action. It is time they
explain to Judy Gross that their proposal amounts to leaving her husband behind bars for four years and
more.
The day there is political will in Washington and Havana to solve the structural problems of the bilateral
relationship between the two countries, they will creatively solve the Gross affair. Hence, the worst case
scenario is the absence of negotiations on topics of mutual interest. Havana must also think twice.
Nothing would be worse than wasting the next four years of Obama's second term without promoting a
less confrontational relationship. It would not be in Cuba's national interest. It would not improve the situation of
Cuba's agents still serving sentences in 2016.
Counterplan is a move away from previous policy of hardlining and toward
negotiation – solves the aff and gets Alan Gross home
Herrero 12
(Ricardo Herrero, Deputy Executive Director of Cuba Study Group, Huffinton Post, December 27 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ricardoherrero/getting-serious-about-ala_b_2370767.html, Accessed July 24, 2013, JD)
Earlier this month, USAID subcontractor Alan Gross began his fourth year in a Cuban prison. Ever since
his incarceration, a debate has raged over whether the United States should halt further efforts to
engage with the Cuban people until the Cuban government releases Gross. Both Alan and his wife Judy
have repeatedly called on the U.S. and Cuba to engage in a dialogue without preconditions. Sadly, like all
things Cuba-related, the debate over Gross' incarceration has since devolved into an ideological threering circus where finding a solution has become a secondary objective behind not appearing to be
making concessions to the enemy.
The Washington Post perfectly captured the tone deafness of the current debate in a recent editorial:
"better relations between Cuba and the United States must be conditioned on real steps toward
democratization by Havana. But until Mr.Gross is released, they ought to get worse." This position
reflects exactly the sort of stale, inside-the-box thinking that has long plagued the discourse over U.S.Cuba policy.
For years we've known that the Cuban government is incredibly adept at manipulating U.S. policy
choices. Time and again, any attempt by the U.S. to increase its engagement with the Cuban people has
been met with confrontation and repression by Cuban officials, which in turn emboldens hardliners in
the U.S. to call for the tightening economic sanctions. This pattern has become all too predictable, and
the Gross case is its latest example: arrested in Havana for bringing communication devices to the island
less than three months after President Obama relaxed family travel and remittance restrictions in 2009
and only two weeks after the U.S. House held hearings on lifting the Cuba travel ban for all Americans. In
response to Gross' arrest, U.S. hardliners blocked any further normalization efforts in Congress, though
they weren't able to stop the Obama Administration from further loosening restrictions on people-topeople travel and remittances in January, 2011. Shortly thereafter, Gross was sentenced to 15 years in
prison.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton once said "It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see
an end to the embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States, because they
would lose all of their excuses for what hasn't happened in Cuba in the last 50 years." If we believe this
to be the case, then why don't we use this insight to steer our efforts in securing the release of Alan
Gross?
The Cubans have often stated that they are willing to swap Gross for five Cuban spies who were arrested
in Florida in 1998 for infiltrating a U.S. Navy base and several anti-Castro groups in Miami. The U.S. has
refused to accept the swap, and the negotiations have remained stalled for almost three years.
So what can be done? There are three opportunities for securing Gross' release that could also help
improve relations between the U.S. and Cuba:
1. Introduce alternative terms to the negotiation. The Cubans have dictated the terms of the negotiation
from day one, and hardliners in the U.S. government have seemingly been too happy to play along.
However, just because the U.S. won't agree to the spy swap doesn't mean negotiations should stop
there. U.S. sanctions on Cuba remain a decades-old morass of congressional actions, presidential
directives and executive orders, resulting in an entrenched and inflexible foreign policy that is as
incoherent as it is ineffective. There are plenty of outdated sanctions on the books that the United
States could repeal or amend in exchange for Gross' release.
2nc – Solves Relations
CP solves relations – greatest obstacle to U.S.-Cuba relations
Associated Press, 2013,
(Paul Haven, "Kerry, Hagel On Cuba: Cabinet Nominees Could Help Ease Relations, Lift Trade Embargo",
Huffington Post, 1-26, PAS) www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/26/kerry-hagel-cuba-us-tradeembargo_n_2559023.html 4-8-13
The atmosphere is changing in Cuba as well.¶ Alzugaray noted that the
island has taken many steps that would normally be
welcomed by Washington such as freeing dozens of political prisoners, opening the economy to limited
capitalism, hosting peace talks for war-torn Colombia and eliminating most restrictions on travel for its own
citizens.¶ "Cuba is changing, and it is changing in the direction that the United States says Cuba must change," Alzugaray
told The Associated Press in an interview in his Havana apartment.¶ The greatest obstacle to better ties is undoubtedly the
continued imprisonment of U.S. contractor Alan Gross, who is serving a 15-year sentence for crimes
against the state after he was caught setting up clandestine Internet networks as part of a U.S. Agency for
International Development democracy-building program.¶ Havana has insisted the 63-year-old Gross will not be
released unless Washington considers freeing five Cuban agents held in the United States. One is out on
supervised release but was ordered to remain in the country, and the other four are still incarcerated.¶ Critics of engagement, including several
prominent Cuban-American legislators, say none of the reforms Cuba has made brings the island closer to being a democratic state after 54
years of rule by brothers Fidel and Raul Castro.
Politics Links
Wall
AT: No Link- Executive Action
Executive action doesn’t shield the link-Still angers the Cuban-American lobby
Thale, Washington Office of Latin America program director, and Anderson, Senior
Associate for Cuba at the Latin America Working Group 5/24/13 (Geoff Thale and Mavis
Anderson, 5/24/13, WOLA, “Cuba, the Terrorism Report, and the Terrorist List,”
http://www.wola.org/commentary/cuba_the_terrorism_report_and_the_terrorist_list, accessed
6/29/13, KR)
Importantly, the State Department will have many opportunities over the course of the year to take the
sensible step of removing Cuba from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. In fact, it is because of this
possibility that opponents of change are working so hard to convince the administration to sit on its
hands. Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart, and Albio Sires recently sent a letter to Secretary of
State John Kerry asking him to keep Cuba on the list.
Rubio
Rubio opposes the plan
Hudson, Foreign Policy Writer, 6/3/13 (John Hudson, June 3, 2013, The Cable, Foreign Policy,
“Rubio: Cuba belongs on the ‘state sponsors of terrorism' list”,
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/06/03/rubio_cuba_belongs_on_the_state_sponsor_of_t
error_list, accessed 6/24/13, KR)
"The Castro regime sponsors terrorism abroad and against their own people, and removing a country
from the list of nations that sponsor terrorism requires evidence of reform," Rubio said. "We have not
seen such evidence in Cuba." ¶ In its annual Country Reports on Terrorism released last week, the State
Department acknowledged that some conditions on the island were improving, but maintained three
reasons for keeping Cuba on the list: Providing a safe haven for some two dozen members of Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), a Spanish rebel group charged with terrorist activity; providing aid to
Colombia's rebel group the FARC "in past years" -- Cuba no longer supports the group today; and
providing harbor to "fugitives wanted in the United States." ¶ "It remains clear that Cuba is the same
totalitarian state today that it has been for decades," Rubio told The Cable. "This totalitarian state
continues to have close ties to terrorist organizations."
Ros-Lehtinen
Ros-Lehtinen hates the plan-she wants a more inclusive list-and there’s bipartisan
opposition
Ros-Lehtinen, Florida Representative, 5/1/13 (Ileana, 5/1/13, Press release, Office of Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen “No Change in Cuba’s Designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism Reaffirms the Threat
Posed by the Castro Regime, Says Ros-Lehtinen”, http://ros-lehtinen.house.gov/press-release/nochange-cuba%E2%80%99s-designation-state-sponsor-terrorism-reaffirms-threat-posed-castro, accessed
6/24/13, KR)
U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, made
the following statement on the State Department’s recommendation to not change Cuba status on the
State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list. Statement by Ros-Lehtinen:¶ “The State Department’s
announcement yesterday that it intends to keep Cuba on the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) list
reaffirms that the Castro regime is, and has always been, a supporter and facilitator of terrorism. The
unlawful actions against our nation include the Castro regime’s order of the Brothers to the Rescue
shootdown in 1996 which caused the deaths of U.S. citizens over international waters.¶ “The Cuban
tyranny continues to undermine our interests at every turn and provides a safe haven for members of
terrorist organizations like the FARC and ETA. The Castro brothers have long been collaborators with
fellow SST members Iran and Syria, and Cuba acts as a sanctuary for fugitives from our country,
including Joanne Chesimard wanted for the murder of a New Jersey State Trooper. Cuba also continues
to operate its vast spy network within the United States, posing a direct threat to our national security. ¶
“While I’m pleased that the State Department isn’t taking Cuba off the SST list, I am disappointed it has
not indicated a willingness to re-designate North Korea as an SST country. Removing North Korea form
the SST list was a poor decision and it has not stopped the Pyongyang regime from undermining U.S.
interests and from continuing its support to other SST members such as Iran and Syria. The illicit actions
by the regimes in Cuba, Iran, Syria, North Korea, and Sudan all warrant their inclusions on the SST list. ¶
Note: This week, a bipartisan group of Congressional Members (Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Mario Diaz-Balart,
and Albio Sires) sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry explaining the reasons why Cuba should
remain on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.
The plan alienates Ros-Lehtinen and other Cuban-Americans
Kasperowicz, The Hill writer, 5/30/13 (Pete Kasperowicz, 5/30/13, “State keeps Cuba on terror
sponsors list”, The Hill, http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/americas/302609-cuba-remains-a-statesponsor-of-terror-despite-some-improvements, accessed 6/24/13, KR)
Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-Fla.) said in reaction to the report that it rightfully keeps Cuba on the list,
and noted Chesimard. "The report reaffirms that the Cuban dictatorship provides safe haven to foreign
terrorist organizations such as the FARC and ETA and harbors fugitives wanted in the United States, one
of them being Joanne Chesimard who is wanted for the murder of a New Jersey State Trooper," she
said.¶ Decisions by the government to remove countries from the list of state sponsors of terrorism can
be made at any time by the president. These decisions are independent of the Country Reports on
Terrorism, which always review actions from the prior year.¶ To remove a country from the list, the
president must give notice to Congress by submitting a report outlining why this change is being made.¶
Cuban-American lawmakers last month had pressed the White House to ensure that Cuba had remained
on the terror-sponsor list.¶ The decision also comes as Cuba continues to hold an American citizen Alan
Gross in prison, the latest hurdle to efforts to improve relations between the two countries.¶ Gross is
serving a 15-year sentence after being convicted on charges of trying to subvert the government. The
White House and lawmakers have called on Cuba to release the 63-year old Maryland man, who is said
to be suffering health problems.¶ Ros-Lehtinen said she is "disappointed" that the report does not
mention Cuba's imprisonment of Gross, Cuba's cooperation with Iran and Syria, or Cuba's spy network in
the United States. She said these omissions amount to concessions.
Cuba Terror List Removal
Postmodernism’s criticism of security uses a Cartesian logic that creates homogeneity
of exclusion, creating the concept of the other
Dornelles 02 Felipe Krause Dornelles (Felipe Krause Dornelles is currently doing a MPhil in
Development Studies at the St. Anthony’s College,¶ University of Oxford. He obtained a BA in Politics
with International Studies from the University of Warwick.) “Postmodernism and IR: From Disparate
Critiques to a¶ Coherent Theory of Global Politics” Global Politics Network¶ 2002
http://www.globalpolitics.net/essays/Krause_Dornelles.pdf
Derrida is especially interested in the notion of inclusion and exclusion within texts,¶ and argues that
what is known to be reality is but a particular configuration of textsiv¶ .¶ What realists have done with
Thucydides and Machiavelli’s texts, conferring prevalence¶ to some aspects of their theories over others,
Derrida has called logocentrismv¶ . The¶ logocentric procedure involves constructing dualities
(inside/outside, realpolitik/virtu)¶ and imposing a hierarchy between the two opposing themes, which
subsequently¶ becomes normalized as the truth. The most notable of postmodernism’s attacks on ¶
logocentric narratives in traditional IR is the anarchy/sovereignty dichotomy. This is¶ one of the central
tenets of realism, since its concepts of security , either on the¶ international structural scene or
between rationally acting statesmen, are based¶ primarily on the notion that outside the sovereign
realm of the state lies a dangerous,¶ anarchical – more in the chaotic and disorderly sense of the word
than simply the¶ absence of government – world in which there is no legitimate rule of law. As Ashley¶
argues, Waltz’s ‘Cartesian spatialization’ involves a doubly logocentric procedure in¶ which the concept
of the state is first given a ‘human’ quality of rational congruity – as¶ opposed to the emotional,
irrational and therefore inferior “man” – and then is placed¶ in opposition to the equally inferior and
unruly outside33. The very existence of state¶ sovereignty, the assumption that states are firmly
established unitary actors, is not¶ justifiable in itself because it suggests that there is an inexorable
consensus within¶ each state, achieved either by democratic or authoritarian rule; this homogeneity, in¶
turn, only acquires significance when placed in opposition to the heterogeneous and¶ irresoluble
disharmony of interests outside. Ashley argues that the sovereignty¶ narrative can only exist when
discordancies within states are overlooked, the effect of¶ this being that a false account of international
politics is given. The implications of¶ Ashley’s deconstruction of the logocentric opposition between
anarchy and sovereignty¶ are that, contrary to Waltz’s theory, the mere condition of anarchy does not
logically¶ provoke states to resort to aggressive power play. Waltz fails to substantiate his link¶ between
power politics and the anarchical world because there is no clear¶ differentiation between the anarchy
of the inside and that of the outside. Thus¶ postmodernism reveals how realist theories of IR cannot
be deduced with Cartesianprecision, that what might at first appear to be logical is indeed a series of
texts¶ blended into narratives which are dependent upon exclusionary practices.
Post-modernism’s Western locus of enunciation continues to instill colonial dichotomies in
favor of its blanket assumptions
Grosfoguel (Associate Professor Ethnic Studies Department, Chicano/Latino Studies) 12
(Ramón, “Decolonizing Western Uni-versalisms: Decolonial Pluri-versalism from Aimé Césaire to the Zapatistas”
2012 http://escholarship.org/uc/item/01w7163v) //DDI13
4. Post-modernity vs. Trans-modernity? Nothing that I have said up to this point has anything to do with the
postmodernist perspective. The transmodern position is not the equivalent of postmodernist critique.
Postmodernism is a Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism, and as a result reproduces all of the problems of
modernity/coloniality. We will take the example of the postmodernism of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,
and contrast this perspective with that of Zapatismo. For Laclau and Mouffe, the processes of the formation of
hegemony are constituted when a particular subject becomes an empty signifier through which all particulars are
identified and stamped with meaning, establishing chains of equivalence between themselves and simultaneously
creating chains of difference against a common enemy. This counter-hegemonic power bloc is always
hegemonized by a particular that becomes the representative of all forms of oppression against a common
enemy, but which does not incorporate each particularity into itself, instead dissolving these into the
abstract universal of the empty signifier which represents the particular subject, articulated into chains of
equivalence among the oppressed . Therefore, the shout of “Viva Perón” is an example of a hegemonic
process (Laclau, La razón). This cry of “Viva Perón,” through which all of the oppressed would identify with one
another, dissolves all particular demands into an abstract universal, in this case privileging the Peronist movement
through its signifier “Perón,” which hegemonizes the popular power bloc against the common enemy. The problem
with the position of Laclau and Mouffe is that they cannot conceive of other forms of universalism beyond the
abstract, Eurocentered universalism in which a particular presents itself as representative of all particularities
without recognizing them in their plenitude, thereby dissolving their particularity and preventing the new universal
from emerging through the negotiation among particulars. Of course, for them there is a limit to the recognition
of difference: epistemological alterity. The epistemic alterity of non-European peoples is not recognized in their
work. They recognize only those differences internal to the horizon of meaning of Western cosmology and
epistemology. For Laclau and Mouffe, there is no outside—not even a relative outside—to Western thought. Let us
contrast this form of universalism to that which is proposed by the Zapatistas and the “Other Campaign.”
It is worth clarifying that here I am not prejudging the failure or success of a political vision, since in political
struggle nothing is guaranteed. It can win or lose, but what I want to emphasize here is an Other
understanding of politics. The Zapatistas, far from coming to the people with a pre-made and canned program as
is the case with most if not all political parties from right to left, set out from the Tojolabal Indigenous notion of
“walking while asking questions.” This “walking while asking questions” proposes an Other way of doing
politics, very different from the “walking while preaching” of the Judeo-Christian, Western cosmology
reproduced in equal measure by Marxists, conservatives, and liberals. “Walking while asking questions” is linked to
the Tojolabal understanding of democracy as “commanding while obeying,” in which “those who command obey,
and those who obey command,” which is very distinct from Western democracy, in which “those who command do
not obey," and “those who obey do not command.” Setting out from this “Other” cosmology, the Zapatistas, with
their “Tojolabal Marxism,” begin an “Other Campaign” from the “rearguardism” that moves forward “asking
questions and listening,” instead of a “vanguardism” which “preaches and convinces.” (see EZLN). The idea or
hope of the “Other Campaign” was that after a long critical transmodern dialogue with all of the Mexican
people, it will be possible to bring together a program for struggle, a universal concrete (in the Césairean
sense) which bears within it the particular demands of all the subjects and epistemes of all oppressed
Mexicans. The Zapatistas do not set out from an abstract universal (socialism, communism, democracy, the
nation, as floating or empty signifiers) in order to then preach to and convince all Mexicans of the correctness of this
view. Rather, they set out from the idea of “walking while asking questions,” in which the program of struggle is a
concrete universal constructed as a result, never as a starting point, of a critical transmodern dialogue which
includes within itself the epistemic diversality and the particular demands of all the oppressed people of
Mexico. Notice that this is an-Other Universal, or as Walter Mignolo (see Local Histories) would say, a pluriversal
very much different from those abstract universals of the “empty signifier” which characterizes the hegemonic
processes of Laclau and Mouffe, Gramsci’s “subaltern,” or Hardt and Negri’s “multitude.” The decolonization
of the Eurocentered, Western understanding of universality is a central task in order to make
possible the Zapatista motto of constructing “a world in which other worlds fit.”
Giving Cuba the ‘gift’ of being off the terror list is an implicit form of authority in itselfinstills sovereignty
Stanford 11 Richard A. Stanford (EDUCATION:¶ Public Schools of Duval County (Jacksonville), Florida;
graduated with¶ honors, June, 1961, Robert E. Lee High School.¶ Furman University, Greenville, South
Carolina, 1961-65; graduated,¶ cum laude, June, 1965, major in Economics, minors in Political¶ Science
and Mathematics.¶ University of Georgia, 1965-1968, doctoral progam in Economics,¶ National Defense
Education Act Fellowship; Ph.D. in Economics¶ conferred August, 1971.¶ EMPLOYMENT HISTORY:
September 1968, Department of Economics and Business Administration, Furman University; tenured
1974; promoted to Associate Professor, 1975; leave of absence from Furman University during 1976-77
academic year to serve as visiting associate professor of management in Troy State University's M.S. in
Management Program in Europe; promoted to Full Professor at Furman University, 1984; appointed the
David C. Garrett, Jr., Professor of Economics, 1993; served as department chair, 1988-1993; retired and
accorded emeritus status, May, 2008.) “Economy and Government in the Postmodern Era.” 2011.
http://www.dickstanford.com/EG/EG6.html
Several Postmodern thinkers have advocated replacing both market capitalism and authoritarian
forms of economic organization with a “gift economy”. The concept of a gift economy has emerged
more at the hands of anthropologists than economists. It seems that there are numerous examples of
what economists might have called a "transfer economy" in the primitive societies usually studied by
anthropologists.¶ Anthropological literature contains accounts of various tribal and feudal societies
within which a wealthy member, often the tribal chief or lord of manor, provided sustenance and other
bequests to members of the local community, and in so doing achieved and maintained elevated status
within the community. Such "gifting" may have served as the basis of allegiance and loyalty. It could
preserve the status of authority and control as long as the benefactor was able to continue the
beneficence. ¶ ¶ Gifts in the Modern Economy¶ Eric Raymond argues that gift cultures are predicated
upon material abundance.[1] In contrast, market-based economies have arisen to deal with allocating
resources and distributing product through trade in an environment of material scarcity.¶ Most
transactions in a modern market economy are of the quid pro quo nature, i.e., a two-way (bilateral)
exchange of values, "this for that." A "transfer" is a one-way (unilateral) flow of value from one party to
another with no counter flow of value, "quid non quo". Such transfers may occur at the individual level
or the international level. Examples of individual-level transfers include birthday and Christmas gifts and
charitable contributions. Contributions to support foreign mission efforts are international transfers.
Foreign aid is a so-called "unilateral transfer" of purchasing power, commodities, weapons and
ordinance, etc., from one government to another.¶ In modern market-based economies, status has
traditionally been ascribed to members of society on the basis of education, earning power, and
inherited or accumulated wealth. Lewis Hyde points out that in a gift economy, status is accorded to
those who give the most to others .[2] In the early twenty-first century, people like Michael Blumberg
and Bill and Melinda Gates have been socially acclaimed not only because of their great accumulations
of wealth, but also for their generosity in giving away substantial portions of their wealth. To the extent
that status ascription by giving becomes more prominent, education, earning power, and inheritance
will recede as bases of social status. This leaves ever less room for those at the lower ends of the
income/ wealth spectrum to achieve social status. For churches and other charitable organizations to
take advantage of status ascription by giving, ways will have to be found to make public both the
identities of the givers and the amounts given. ¶ ¶ True Gifts¶ A "true gift" is a unilateral transfer of value
that does not incur any obligation to reciprocate to the giver. "Gifts" that are predicated upon the
expectation of a return gift or which elicit a return gift are actually quid pro quo transactions, possibly
with a delay built in between the original gift and the reciprocal gift.¶ Within a household, the
sustenance provided by parents to their offspring is usually construed as a true gift, but it may not be a
true gift if there is a hope on the part of the parents that the offspring who mature to adulthood will
reciprocate care and sustenance to the parents in their dotages. Aside from expectation of care during
old age, parental sustenance may be a true gift to offspring even if it creates an obligation on the part of
the children to "pay it forward" to their offspring in subsequent generations.¶ If the motivation to donate
to a charity or contribute to a church is a "feel-good" effect in return, it can be argued that such
donations and contributions are not true gifts, but rather implicit quid pro quo transactions. From the
perspective of the economic theory of consumer behavior, it is rational for a person to incur the cost of
doing something only if he or she can expect the same or greater value in return. People often assist
neighbors during times of need with the expectation that the neighbors would do the same for them in
their times of need. Such neighborly assistance would also be a form of implicit quid pro quo
transactions rather than true gifts. What about the Old Testament dictum of an eye for an eye and a
tooth for a tooth? How do Jesus' teachings bear upon this? Do unto others..., ...turn the other cheek, the
rich young ruler instructed to give away all, the good Samaritan, the widow's mite, etc. ¶ ¶ Micro-Level
Gift Economies¶ There are numerous examples of modern gift economies at the microeconomic level,
e.g., the household, churches, charities, close communities, etc., all of which are nested within
macroeconomies organized around markets with invested capital, i.e., "market capitalism". It is also
possible and likely that micro-level gift economies have existed in authoritarian economies (e.g., fascism
and authoritarian socialism) within households and very close local communities.¶ Micro-level gift
economies seem to be quite workable as long as the number of constituents remains relatively small,
perhaps no more than 150, the so-called Dunbar number first proposed by R. I. M. Dunbar as a
theoretical limit to the number of people with whom one can maintain stable social relationships.[3]
Once the number of members of a micro-level economy increases beyond some such relatively small
number, quid pro quo market transactions enabled by the formal institution of contract law make it
possible for people who do not know each other well to take advantage of specialization and division of
labor and to engage in exchange.
Critical terror studies rely on a view of history that treats Europe as the center of
history – their analysis is one that reinforces Eurocentrism
Barkawi 06, University of Cambridge Center of International Studies senior lecturer, and Laffey,
University of London politics and international relations professor, 6
(Tarak and Mark, 2006, “The postcolonial moment in security studies”, Review of International Studies,
vol. 32, pg. 331-333,
https://umdrive.memphis.edu/rblanton/public/POLS_7508_Fall_2012/barwaki_postcolonial_RIS_2006.
pdf, accessed 7/12/13, JZ)
The rootedness of the current conflict in centuries of often violent interaction between North and South
is difficult to see due to security studies’ reliance on histories and geographies which reproduce
Eurocentric conceptions of world politics. This problem is not peculiar to security studies. According to
Barry Buzan and Richard Little, ‘there is no doubt that I[nternational] R[elations] has been studied from
a very Eurocentric perspective . . .’10 Eurocentrism is a complex idea but at its core is the assumption of
European centrality in the human past and present.11 On this view, Europe is conceived as separate and
distinct from the rest of the world, as self-contained and self-generating. Analysis of the past, present
and future of world politics is carried out in terms – conceptual and empirical, political and normative –
that take for granted this centrality and separation.12 Neither the content – social, political, economic
and cultural – nor the geographical location of ‘Europe’ are fixed. Eurocentrism is about both a real and
an imagined Europe. Over time, as Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen demonstrate, the location of Europe
shifts, expands and contracts, eventually crossing the Atlantic and the Pacific and becoming synonymous
with the ‘West’.13 Today, the ‘West’ is centred on the Anglophone US – a former European settler
colony – and incorporates Western Europe, North America, Japan and the British settler societies of
Oceania. There are few better examples of Eurocentrism than the notion that the end-point of
development and modernisation is defined by the contemporary West.
The Eurocentrism of conventional security studies takes different forms across the theoretic
perspectives that constitute the field. For realists, a ‘general theory of international politics is necessarily
based on the great powers’.14 In modern history those powers are overwhelmingly located in Europe
and the West . Eurocentrism is therefore intrinsic to the way in which realism is constructed in
International Relations (IR). 15 The great antagonists of realism, the liberals, seek to regulate conflict
and alleviate its humanitarian consequences through a turn to domestic and international institutions
and norms. International institutions such as the League of Nations, the United Nations and the nuclear
non-proliferation regime are largely the product of interstate diplomacy dominated by Western great
powers.16 Moreover, liberal democracy and the ethical principles that inform liberal opinion are the
product of purportedly European histories and intellectual trajectories, most prominently those
associated with the Enlightenments.17 Many constructivists share similar commitments as in attempts
to make sense of international order in Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian terms.18 Recent efforts to move
beyond the realist-liberal debate, such as Critical Security Studies, draw their core concept of human
emancipation from these same intellectual traditions .19 Each of these traditions, as postcolonial
thinkers take pains to point out, rest on profoundly Eurocentric and racist assumptions.20 As Immanuel
Kant, a figure dear to both liberal and critical scholars, observed, ‘Humanity achieves its greatest
perfection with the White race’.21
Eurocentrism generates a variety of difficulties for the analysis of security relations, and world politics
more generally.22 Two in particular motivate our argument here. First, as we have noted, questions of
war and peace raised by great power competition are foundational for security thought and practice. As
a result, security studies provides few categories for making sense of the historical experiences of the
weak and the powerless who comprise most of the world’s population. By default, these experiences
are conceived in categories derived from great power politics in the North. Consequently, national
liberation struggles in the post-World War II era were thought of in Cold War terms by many US
policymakers and defence intellectuals.23 Today, this categorical error is repeated in a new form. Armed
resistance to Northern domination of the international system is subsumed largely under the category
of ‘terrorism’. In contemporary usage this term legitimates state power and delegitimates the use of
force by non-state actors.24 It assumes in advance that ‘terrorist’ acts are always illegitimate and
unjustified. Understanding why the weak resist and the forms their resistance takes is not aided by
calling them names.
Second, and related, to the extent it addresses them at all, a Eurocentric security studies regards the
weak and the powerless as marginal or derivative elements of world politics, as at best the site of liberal
good intentions or at worst a potential source of threats.25 Missed are the multiple and integral
relations between the weak and the strong. Across diverse fields of social inquiry, it is taken for granted
that the weak and the strong must be placed in a common analytic frame, as together constitutive of
events, processes and structures.26 In contrast IR, and security studies in particular, mainly proceed by
attending to the powerful only. As Stanley Hoffmann notes, IR takes an ‘Athenian’ perspective on the
world.27 For realism, with its focus on great powers, one-sided analysis of this kind is foundational. For
liberal and some critical approaches to security studies, the weak are of interest but primarily as bearers
of rights and objects of emancipation, that is, for their normative value in Western political theoretic
terms.28 Failing to study the weak and the strong together, as jointly responsible for making history,
hamstrings IR and security studies’ ability to make sense of world politics generally and North-South
relations in particular.
That the weak play an integral role in shaping world politics is harder to deny when a Southern
resistance movement strikes at the heart of Northern power. In the wake of those attacks, a series of
developments transformed international and domestic politics around the world in diverse ways. Wars
are being fought; alliance relations reconfigured; security forces redeployed; borders reworked; civil
liberties curtailed; departments of state created; and identities remade. Understanding security
relations now requires that we discard Eurocentric assumptions about the world and how it works.
The aff operates in a modernist logic of recognition that privileges “respect, freedom,
and equality” and leaves UNTOUCHED the basic structures of oppression—betterment
of peoples lives within the colonial matrix of power is insufficient to solve
Nelson Maldonado-Torres, associate professor of comparative literature at Rutgers, ‘8 [Against War: Views
from the Underside of Modernity, p. 148-50] //DDI13
It is not possible to understand fully the difference between Fanon's and Honneth's critical takes on
Hegel without considering their divergent views on the human subject and on the subjective
motivations behind the struggle for recognition. Honneth correctly argues that when Hegel articulated
the notion of a struggle for recognition he was definitely leaving behind a tradition of social and political
thought that went back to Machiavelli and Hobbes, according to which self-preservation played the
primary motivating role in leading humans to form states, political bodies, and institutions. According to
Hegel, conflicts among humans were not to be traced back to a motive of self-preservation, but, as
Honneth describes them, to moral impulses-that is, to the recognition of one's identity and personality.
What Hegel, however, continues to hold, in line with dominant trends of political theory in his time, and
what Honneth does not examine in his critical reflections on Hegel, is the extent to which the "right of
property" functions as the primary marker of self-identity and personality. As a result, the struggle for
recognition becomes primarily a struggle to be recognized as a proprietor. Hegel inherits this idea from a
liberal tradition that defined human fraternity in terms of the coexistence in a "civil society" of
autonomous individuals with rights of property--Locke's felicitous definition. Consider that for the Hegel
of the Jena writings what initiated the struggle between persons was "theft," which made it clear that a
violation of property was viewed as a violation of the person. Honor could only be regained in a life-anddeath struggle. What changes in the Phenomenology of Spirit is that the life-and-death struggle, now
subsumed in the dialectics of Spirit, gives rise to two modes of consciousness: one is independent and
for-itself, while the other is dependent and takes the form of an object or thing; the former is lord, the
latter is bondsman. Property becomes now a more complex category since even subjects can collapse
into the category of objects, things, and possessions. The slave works on the property of the master and
objectifies himself in it, while the master enjoys the product of the slave's work--from here comes the
Marxist theory of alienation, which Marx later applied to economics and came up with the notion of
surplus value. We have seen all of this already. What I want to add now is that there is a presumption
that the relation between the subject and property is basic. Freedom is the objectification of the
subjectivity of the individual. The end result of this is that the freedom and equality of the subject tend
to collapse frequently into the claim for freedom and equality in the process of coming to possess
something. We are free to possess what we want and equal in our chances to get what we want." This
gives a dangerous self-referential character to the politics of recognition that threatens coalition politics
and that more often than not leads only to minimal structural changes at the political and economic
levels. The problem with the politics of recognition is therefore not so much that it dissolves questions
of redistribution into questions of recognition as some have argued." The problem, in contrast, resides
in self-centered claims for redistribution. In other words, the danger is w hen the struggle for
recognition is reduced to questions about the respect, freedom, and equality of subjects who aim to
overturn the system of lordship and bondage by coming finally to possess something of their own and to
be recognized as proprietors. This conception of the struggle for recognition is fated to leave
untouched the basic structure of the oppressive system that creates pathological modes of
recognition and to hinder the chances for the formation of what has been aptly called "a coalition
politics of receptive generosity.” In contrast to conceptions of the struggle for recognition articulated in
terms of cultural identity or in terms of claims for possession and access to goods, Fanon discovered in
his exploration of the lived experience of the black that one of the main challenges confronted by blacks
in a racial society is not only that they are not recognized as people who can possess things, but that
they are not recognized as people who can give things. Demands to be able to give are, in this respect,
more radical than demands for possession. The master, under pressure, can allow the slave to have
"things," but he will not recognize that he needs what the slave has. For the master, whatever the slave
touches decreases in quality and value. Thus, even ifhe enters into commerce with the slave, the master
will devalue the extent of the slave's contributions. Fanon was well aware of this dimension of the
system of lordship and bondage. It was always the Negro teacher, the Negro doctor; brittle as I was
becoming, I shivered at the slightest pretext. I knew, for instance, that if the physician made a mistake it
would be the end of him and of all those who came after him. What could one expect, after all, from a
Negro physician? As long as everything went well, he was praised to the skies, but look out, no
nonsense, under any conditions! The black physician can never be sure how close he is to disgrace. I tell
you, I was walled in: No exception was made for my refined manners, or my knowledge of literature, or
my understanding of the quantum theory. (BSWM 1l7). Fanon suggests here that while coming to
possess things or gaining abilities may be a necessary condition of the process of achieving liberation, it
is certainly not sufficient and it should not become in itself the telos or goal of the process. The
problem is that the logic of lordship and bondage may very well continue after formal concessions of
rights of property. The master still resists opening himself to the Other and entering into the logic of
ordinary ethical intersubjective contact. But why is it that the master resists accepting the gift or
recognizing the Other as someone who can give? The answer should be clear by now: it makes evident
the incompleteness of the master. Lordship requires impenetrability, while giving necessitates openness
and receptivity. Giving in this sense represents the paradigmatic transgressive act. If giving is so
dangerous it is not so much because it puts the other in debt, but because in the colonial context it
requires an original act of openness that the master fundamentally resists." The master can easily pay
any debt; what he cannot do is to open himself and to be receptive to the gift of the slave. This
transaction violates the very meaning and purpose of the logic of lordship and bondage.
Their proposal is a universalizaing gesture—even well-intentioned inclusion replicates the
exclusion of the other and authorizes violence
Mignolo 2000 [Walter, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies at
Duke University Local Histories/Global Designs, 175-178] //DDI13
In 1971 Dussel, starting and departing from Levinas, conceived totality as composed by "the same" and
"the other." Describing the totality formed by "the same" and "the other," Dussel called it "the Same."
And we'll see soon why. Outside totality was the domain of "the other." The difference in Spanish was
rendered between lo otro, which is the complementary class of ihe same" and el otro relegated to the
domain exterior to the system. I am tempted to translate this view today as a "interior" and "exterior"
subalternilics. Socially and ontologically, the exteriority is the domain of the homeless, unemployed,
illegal aliens cast out from education, from the economy, and the laws that regulate the system.
Metaphysically, "the other" is—from the perspective of the totality and the "same"—the unthinkable
that Dussel urges us to think. "Philosophy in Latin America, and this is a first conclusion, should begin by
making a critique of Totality as totality" (1975, 21). this conception is useful in the sense that the
difference between interior and exterior subalternities is framed in legal and economic terms. Thus, it is
indeed a class difference. However, the difference is not justified in terms of class but in terms of
ethnicity, gender, sexuality, and sometimes ity (i.e., if the nationality in question happens to be
"against" democracy and Western nationalistic ideals). Nobody is cast out because he or she is poor. He
or she becomes poor because he or she has been cast out. On the other hand, this difference allows us
to understand that gender, ethnic and sexual differences could be absorbed by the system and placed in
the sphere of interior subalternity. This is visible today in the United States as far as Afro-Americans,
women, Hispanics, and queers (although with sensible differences between these groups) are becoming
accepted within the system as lo otro, complementary of the totality controlled by "the same." Beyond
the fact lhat Dussel used some questionable metaphors based on the structure of the Christian family to
make his argument, he also untie 1 lined very important historical dimensions: 1. A critique of modern
epistemology or modern thinking (el pensiii moderno); 2. The coloniality of power introduced by
Christianity in the "dis covery" of America and in what Dussel ( 1 9 9 6 ; 1998a) most recent I\ identified
as the modern world system. Dussel placed what is known today as Latin America in the exteriority of
"the other" upon which tin modern world system constituted itself; 3. Claims that looking at Latin
America as "the olher" explain the successive constructions of exteriorities in the colonial histories of
the modern world system and, consequently, the similarity (beyond obvl ous differences in their local
histories) among regions of the "Third World" (e.g., the Arabic world, black Africa, India, Southeast Asia,
and China); 4. Consequently, and beyond the details of the geopolitical relations and the fact that these
observations were made during the crucial year, of the cold war, the geopolitical conclusions were that
Europe, the United States, and the Soviet Union constitute "the geopolitical same" while the rest
constitute "the geopolitical other." At this point the lot .1 tion of Latin America as "the other" is
ambiguous. Dussel's argument tries to show the uniqueness of Latin America as the only geopolitic al
and subaltern unit—with the exception of Cuba—that cannot entertain a dialogue with Europe, the
United States, and the Soviet Union at the same time, while all the other geopolitical units can, but this
line ol argumentation is unconvincing. However, I would like to retain from this issue Dussel's
confrontation with Marxism in the modern world system as well as in Latin America. His
conceptualization of Totality in historical and socioeconomic and legit terms led Dussel, a serious scholar
of Marx (Dussel 1985; 1988; 1990) n I a critic of Marx and of Marxism in Latin America. Marx's
unquestionable contribution to the analysis of the functioning of capitalist economy cannot not be
confused with Marx's sightless when it came to the location ni The other" (el otro) and the exteriority of
the system. That is, Marx, •n • Hiding to Dussel, only thinks in terms of totality ("the same" and "the i a
In i," which is the working class) but is less aware of alterity, the exteriority ni ihe system. Hence, Marx's
thinking on these issues is located within modern epistemology and ontology. In his critical analysis
about modern episteItmlogy (el pensar moderno), that term to which he attributed the conceptual .iiion
of totality I described earlier, Dussel summarizes ideas well known (nilny, although less familiar in 1971.
Modern thought since Descartes, Dus• I argues, presupposed an ontology of totality that, for reasons
that are quite linple, had to include a metaphysic of alterity as negativity. The reason, he Hrues, can be
found in the ontological break of modern thought with its i iieck legacies. The modern concept of being
is secular and is therefore built upon a negation of the other, which is identified with the God of
Christian totality. The same, now, is the ego, an ego without God. Totality, according In Dussel, is no
longer a fysis (in the sense of ancient Greek philosophy) hill ego; there is no longer a physic but an egotic
totality. To this egotic Inundation of totality corresponds the Kantian left denke and Marx's Ich arliflle.
Hegel, for whom Knowledge and Totality are the Absolute, installed lilmsclf, according to Dussel, at the
crux of modern thought. Neither Nietzsche nor Marx could escape from the modern paradigm.
Nietzsche's mystical experience, in the Alps, where he discovered that "All is one," napped him in the
idea of an eternal return to "the Same," a Totality moved li\ "a will to power," to which Dussel opposes
the "dominated will." He • i includes by saying that: A esta modernidad pertenece tanto el capitalismo
liberal, y por lo tanto tambien el dependiente latinoamericano, como tambien el marxismo ortodoxo.
Esto me parece fundamental en este momento presente de America Latina. Puedo decir t|iie no son
radicalmente opuestos siquiera, sino que son ontologicamente "lo Mismo." Esto, evidentemente, no lo
aceptarian con ninguna facilidad muchos marxistas del tipo althuseriano, por ejemplo. (Dussel 1975, 21)
in this modernity belongs both liberal capitalism, and consequently Latin American dependent
capitalism, as well as orthodox Marxism. This premise is basic for me, at this particular junction of Latin
American history. 1 can say that liberal capitalism and Marxism are not radically opposed but that they
are indeed ontologically "the Same." This conclusion may not be easily accepted, I believe, by
Althusserian-Marxists. Dusscl's view of the inadequacy of Marxism for Latin America is grounded in Ins
analysis of modern thought and the place of Marxism in this paradigm— mainly, in the fact that modern
thought was oblivious of colonialiiy. I mil America" in this case could be read as the unthinkable of
modernity, ni , iJ only thinkable within modernity, but not as coloniality. In his own won I El marxismo es
incompatible ontologicamente no solo con la tradicion Lalliin americana sino con la meta-fisica de la
Alteridad. No es puramente una inn i pretacion econoniico socio-politica, es tambien una ontologfa, y,
como tal, n intrinsicamente incompatible con una metafisica de la Alteridad. No es incom patible, en
cambio, lo que podria llamarse socialismo; esto ya es otra cuestion (Dussel 1975, 41) Marxism is
ontologically incompatible not only with the Latin American tradt tion but also with the metaphysic of
alterity. Marxism is not only an economic and sociopolitic interpretation but, as such, is intrinsically
incompatible with the metaphysic of Alterity. It is not incompatible, on the contrary, with something
that could be called socialism. This is a different story. Here, Dussel puts his finger on an issue and a
possible debate within the I. It itself. First of all, Dussel's view of Marxism as ingrained in "modern
thinking" (el pensar moderno) and not alien to it, has been restated by others molt recently (Immanuel
Wallerstein recently did so in his discussions ol tin geoculture of the modern world system [1991a, 8 4 9 7 ] ) . But that is not all and perhaps not the most interesting aspect of Dussel's position. Of more
interest for the argument of this chapter is the fact that il coincides wilh tin positions defended by
Aymara intellectual and activist Fausto Reinaga. What are the grounds from which Dussel is defending
this argument? My sense is that it has to do with his view of the deopolitics of Christianity. Let me
explain.